A Campaign to Remember
By PAUL GLASTRIS
Published: February 20, 2004
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TIMES NEWS TRACKER
WASHINGTON
No one can doubt that something new happened during the 2004 Democratic primaries: a candidate who lost may have as great an impact on the party's political future as whichever candidate wins. That candidate, of course, is Wesley Clark.
It is inarguable that Howard Dean put backbone into his fellow Democrats, tapping a powerful vein of anger at the way President Bush is running the country. And, with the help of Joe Trippi, his campaign manager, Dr. Dean devised a potentially revolutionary new model of campaigning by using the Internet to organize volunteers and raise money. In crucial ways, however, General Clark's candidacy changed not only this election but also elections to come.
General Clark made national security and electability the crux of his campaign. Before he entered the race, Democrats were suffering from a peculiar cognitive dissonance on national security. For any Democrat running for president in 2004, one question would precede all others: can you make voters feel that they will be safer with you as president than with George W. Bush?
Only if a candidate could persuade voters that they would be safer would he be able to interest them in other issues like the economy or health care. But most Democrats were afraid to ask the question. This unwillingness to confront the issue of national security made it possible for Democrats to convince themselves that Howard Dean could beat President Bush.
As soon as General Clark entered the race, however, Democrats could no longer avoid the issue. General Clark leapt to the top of most national polls of likely Democratic voters even though he had no experience in elective office, little name recognition and no staff or money beyond what he was provided by a handful of amateur organizers. And this wasn't just a momentary bump; he stayed near the top of the polls for weeks.
General Clark's early success had a profound effect on Democrats' expectations. As much as voters liked Howard Dean's message, it was now clear they liked the idea of winning back the White House even more — and that a governor who'd gone skiing during Vietnam and had a confrontational, even flippant, antiwar message was not going to make that happen.
In addition to the appeal of his biography, General Clark also brought an informed legitimacy to the Democratic critique of the president's national security policies. Before he entered the race, most of the candidates were talking about the importance of multilateral action — often in platitudes and generalities. General Clark could explain the specifics of how such actions could win wars and secure peace. Soon the other candidates were parroting his answer. The very fact that a four-star general who for most of his adult life voted Republican was saying that the president had failed the troops made those critiques seem less partisan and more credibile.
General Clark had another profound influence on this campaign: with the possible exception of Joseph Lieberman, he was the most willing to talk openly about his religious faith.
This was another area of cognitive dissonance for Democrats. Most voters — including most Democratic voters — take religion seriously, and prefer a candidate who does so as well. But perhaps out of fear of giving offense to secularist voters, most of the Democratic presidential hopefuls had remained largely silent about faith, effectively ceding to the president the language of faith and morality that resonates with so many Americans.
In his speeches and interviews, however, General Clark spoke with evident sincerity and knowledge about faith, especially his own. Other Democratic candidates soon followed, including Howard Dean. Yet Dr. Dean's comments — such as how he left a church in Vermont over a dispute about a bike path — tended to raise as many questions as they answered about his religious convictions. In short, they made him seem less genuine and more like a typical politician.
A final legacy of General Clark's campaign may be the way in which he entered the race: by getting drafted. A dozen years ago, Ross Perot was essentially drafted to run for president, but that movement took A Campaign to Remember
By PAUL GLASTRIS
Published: February 20, 2004
ARTICLE TOOLS
E-Mail This Article
Printer-Friendly Format
Most E-Mailed Articles
ASHINGTON
No one can doubt that something new happened during the 2004 Democratic primaries: a candidate who lost may have as great an impact on the party's political future as whichever candidate wins. That candidate, of course, is Wesley Clark.
It is inarguable that Howard Dean put backbone into his fellow Democrats, tapping a powerful vein of anger at the way President Bush is running the country. And, with the help of Joe Trippi, his campaign manager, Dr. Dean devised a potentially revolutionary new model of campaigning by using the Internet to organize volunteers and raise money. In crucial ways, however, General Clark's candidacy changed not only this election but also elections to come.
General Clark made national security and electability the crux of his campaign. Before he entered the race, Democrats were suffering from a peculiar cognitive dissonance on national security. For any Democrat running for president in 2004, one question would precede all others: can you make voters feel that they will be safer with you as president than with George W. Bush?
Only if a candidate could persuade voters that they would be safer would he be able to interest them in other issues like the economy or health care. But most Democrats were afraid to ask the question. This unwillingness to confront the issue of national security made it possible for Democrats to convince themselves that Howard Dean could beat President Bush.
As soon as General Clark entered the race, however, Democrats could no longer avoid the issue. General Clark leapt to the top of most national polls of likely Democratic voters even though he had no experience in elective office, little name recognition and no staff or money beyond what he was provided by a handful of amateur organizers. And this wasn't just a momentary bump; he stayed near the top of the polls for weeks.
General Clark's early success had a profound effect on Democrats' expectations. As much as voters liked Howard Dean's message, it was now clear they liked the idea of winning back the White House even more — and that a governor who'd gone skiing during Vietnam and had a confrontational, even flippant, antiwar message was not going to make that happen.
In addition to the appeal of his biography, General Clark also brought an informed legitimacy to the Democratic critique of the president's national security policies. Before he entered the race, most of the candidates were talking about the importance of multilateral action — often in platitudes and generalities. General Clark could explain the specifics of how such actions could win wars and secure peace. Soon the other candidates were parroting his answer. The very fact that a four-star general who for most of his adult life voted Republican was saying that the president had failed the troops made those critiques seem less partisan and more credibile.
General Clark had another profound influence on this campaign: with the possible exception of Joseph Lieberman, he was the most willing to talk openly about his religious faith.
This was another area of cognitive dissonance for Democrats. Most voters — including most Democratic voters — take religion seriously, and prefer a candidate who does so as well. But perhaps out of fear of giving offense to secularist voters, most of the Democratic presidential hopefuls had remained largely silent about faith, effectively ceding to the president the language of faith and morality that resonates with so many Americans.
In his speeches and interviews, however, General Clark spoke with evident sincerity and knowledge about faith, especially his own. Other Democratic candidates soon followed, including Howard Dean. Yet Dr. Dean's comments — such as how he left a church in Vermont over a dispute about a bike path — tended to raise as many questions as they answered about his religious convictions. In short, they made him seem less genuine and more like a typical politician.
A final legacy of General Clark's campaign may be the way in which he entered the race: by getting drafted. A dozen years ago, Ross Perot was essentially drafted to run for president, but that movement took place outside the two-party system. Primary voters have usually been forced to choose from among self-nominated candidates fueled by their own ambition. The Clark draft showed the viability of an alternative: Democratic (or Republican) voters acting on their own could choose the candidate most to their liking and lure him into the race with pledges of money and a ready-made volunteer army.
Had General Clark decided to contest Iowa a month ago, he almost certainly would have done well, and he might well be winning the race right now. Instead, John Kerry, the establishment candidate, is the current leader in Democratic presidential campaign. In many ways he owes his position to the revolution that General Clark started.
Paul Glastris is editor in chief of The Washington Monthly.
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/20/opinion/20GLAS.htmlplace outside the two-party system. Primary voters have usually been forced to choose from among self-nominated candidates fueled by their own ambition. The Clark draft showed the viability of an alternative: Democratic (or Republican) voters acting on their own could choose the candidate most to their liking and lure him into the race with pledges of money and a ready-made volunteer army.
Had General Clark decided to contest Iowa a month ago, he almost certainly would have done well, and he might well be winning the race right now. Instead, John Kerry, the establishment candidate, is the current leader in Democratic presidential campaign. In many ways he owes his position to the revolution that General Clark started.
Paul Glastris is editor in chief of The Washington Monthly.
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/20/opinion/20GLAS.html