The American Prospect has a long subtitle to this op-ed by Mark Schmitt: Perhaps we are being too literal in believing that "hope" and bipartisanship are things that Obama naively believes are present and possible, when in fact they are
a tactic, a method of subverting and breaking the unified conservative power structure.
Schmitt recognizes that tactic as one that has evolved in the sphere of non-profits and philanthropies (he first heard of Obama in this context) in relation to what methods, what process, what change theory, most
effectively leads to the desired change. He says this particular primary is not about ideology or electability, but about what is the most productive way of using power to effect change. He does a basic summary of the Edwards change idea of breaking the power structure and Hillary's of working the power structure, which is also worth reading, but the piece is really about Obama.
So how might the Obama theory of change work? I'll give two answers, one entirely mundane and one a little cosmic. The mundane answer is just congressional math. The most important fact about the next administration is nothing about the president's character or policies, but simply how many Democratic Senators there are. To get health care passed in 2009, we'll need 60 votes in the Senate. There won't be 60 Democrats. So a Democratic president will need to, first, get within range by bringing in Democratic senators from Arizona, Colorado, Virginia, and several other red-trending-purple states. And then, subtract the total number of Democrats from 60, and that's the number of Republicans you'll need. If that number is two or three, almost anything is possible. If it's five, it will be much harder. If it's eight, impossible.
This is the math of bipartisanship. It's not a matter of sitting down with thugs like John Boehner and splitting the difference, but winning over just a few Senate Republicans from outside the South. And if the number is small enough, that's entirely possible. This is not 1993, when the Republicans could see that a majority was just around the corner, and the conservative takeover had given it a coherence and enthusiasm. It will be a party in some internal crisis after losing both houses of Congress and the presidency in short order, and the sense of a "party establishment" will be weaker. There will be an effort to hold the party together in united opposition, but the ties holding a Senator Snowe, Voinovich, Grassley, Lugar or Specter to a strict party line -- as they contemplate retirement, legacy, and their own now-Democratic states -- will be much weaker than in either the Clinton or Bush eras.
Obama's approach is better positioned to take advantage of this math. First, I think (though if I tried to prove it, I'd be relying on useless horse-race polls) that Democratic Senate candidates in red/purple states will do better with Obama's national-unity pitch at the top than with Senator Clinton. I worry about the Senate seats in Colorado (where she polls poorly) and Arizona with Clinton at the top of the ticket, and I think the opportunity to take out Mitch McConnell in Kentucky would be lost. And after the inauguration, I think that opposition to Hillary Clinton will remain a galvanizing theme for Republicans, whereas a new face and will make it harder to recreate the familiar unity-in-opposition.
Now for the cosmic explanation: What I find most interesting about Obama's approach to bipartisanship is how seriously he takes conservatism. As Michael Tomasky describes it in his review of The Audacity of Hope, "The chapters boil down to a pattern: here's what the right believes about subject X, and here's what the left believes; and while I basically side with the left, I think the right has a point or two that we should consider, and the left can sometimes get a little carried away." What I find fascinating about his language about unity and cross-partisanship is that it is not premised on finding Republicans who agree with him, but on taking in good faith the language and positions of actual conservatism -- people who don't agree with him. That's very different from the longed-for consensus of the Washington Post editorial page.
This paragraph I found particularly interesting:
The reason the conservative power structure has been so dangerous, and is especially dangerous in opposition, is that it can operate almost entirely on bad faith. It thrives on protest, complaint, fear: higher taxes, you won't be able to choose your doctor, liberals coddle terrorists, etc. One way to deal with that kind of bad-faith opposition is to draw the person in, treat them as if they were operating in good faith, and draw them into a conversation about how they actually would solve the problem. If they have nothing, it shows. And that's not a tactic of bipartisan Washington idealists -- it's a hard-nosed tactic of community organizers, who are acutely aware of power and conflict. It's how you deal with people with intractable demands -- put ‘em on a committee. Then define the committee's mission your way.
Full article:
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the_theory_of_change_primary