If Obama or Edwards or both don't take Hillary down a notch in Iowa and New Hampshire, she's so far ahead in Nevada, South Carolina, and the Huge-Tuesday states that neither Obama nor Edwards will likely be able to catch her.
While all three candidates are bunched, there are ways under the caucus rules to support "second choice candidates" against "main rival candidates." These opportunities are not limited to the non-viable candidates who fail to meet the 15% to 25% precinct level thresholds.
If, for example, candidate X has 50 supporters at the precinct meeting and needs 20 supporters to get one delegate, 40 supporters to get two delegates, and 60 supporters to get three delegates, then the candidates supporters should do everything they can to get another 10 supporters from the non-viable candidates.
But what if the candidates supporters conclude that there is no hope of getting 60 supporters in order to get up to the three delegate level?
In this same precinct meeting, assume that candidate Y is non-viable with only 15 supporters and he's need another 5 supporters and he's the "second choice candidate" of many people who support candidate X as their first choice. Assume that candidate Z is candidate X's "main rival candidate," and candidate Z has 35 supporters (i.e., almost enough for a second delegate).
What often happens in this circumstance is that the supporters of candidate X realize (1) that their main rival candidate Z will likely get the 5 supporters she needs from the supporters of non-viable candidate Y, (2) that they have 10 extra supporters more than they need to get two delegates but they have no chance of getting three delegates, but (3) if 5 of the "extra" supporters of candidate X go caucus with "second choice candidate" Y they will make candidate Y viable and so "main rival candidate" Z wont's get her 5 extra supporters and will therefore get only one delegate.
In short, the supporters of candidate X have the power to cause the precincts delegates to be allocated in either of two scenarios:
scenario 1 - candidate X = 2 delegates, "second choice candidate" Y = 1 delegate, "main rival candidate" Z = 1 delegate
OR
scenario 2 - candidate X = 2 delegates, "second choice candidate" Y = O delegates, "main rival candidate" Z = 2 delegates
In this circumstance, supporters of candidate X have an incentive to boost candidate Y at the expense of their main rival Z but in a way that doesn't hurt candidate X.
Because of Hillary's large advantage in Nevada, South Carolina, and the Huge-Tuesday states, both Obama and Edwards would be well served to help each other at the expense of Hillary.
NOTE: This is an attepmt to clarify this thread:
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=132x3913715