In Iraq, Mixed Feelings About Obama and His Troop Proposal

[babylonsister]

In Iraq, Mixed Feelings About Obama and His Troop Proposal

By SABRINA TAVERNISE and RICHARD A. OPPEL Jr.
Published: July 17, 2008


BAGHDAD — A tough Iraqi general, a former special operations officer with a baritone voice and a barrel chest, melted into smiles when asked about Senator Barack Obama.

“Everyone in Iraq likes him,” said the general, Nassir al-Hiti. “I like him. He’s young. Very active. We would be very happy if he was elected president.”

But mention Mr. Obama’s plan for withdrawing American soldiers, and the general stiffens.

“Very difficult,” he said, shaking his head. “Any army would love to work without any help, but let me be honest: for now, we don’t have that ability.”

Thus in a few brisk sentences, the general summed up the conflicting emotions about Mr. Obama in Iraq, the place outside America with perhaps the most riding on its relationship with him.

There was, as Mr. Obama prepared to visit here, excitement over a man who is the anti-Bush in almost every way: a Democrat who opposed a war that many Iraqis feel devastated their nation. And many in the political elite recognize that Mr. Obama shares their hope for a more rapid withdrawal of American forces from Iraq.

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http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/17/world/middleeast/17voices.html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rss

[grantcart]

1. we don’t have that ability

and they won't have that ability until a time table forces them to get that ability.

Its time to take the crutch away and force people to stand up and defend their country.

[babylonsister]

2. I thought, in general, this was a positive article. The Iraqis

seem to feel that Obama will be much better for their country than what they've had to endure with the rethugs, regardless of the cold realities they might have to face. Now, if we could get Americans to recognize that fact...

[grantcart]

4. I agree

[wmbrew0206]

6. A time table won't give the Iraqis the ability to do their own logistics and fire support

The Iraqi Army is coming along, but they don't have the ability to do all of their own logistics or fire support (ie artillery and air support) that they need to continue to stabilize their country. These are very tough skills that take a long time to develop. They are also the skills the Iraqis need to be able to have and be good at to ensure the Iraqi Army can stay in control of Iraq after we leave.

Giving the Iraqi a date to learn these skills will not help them develop these skills. It would be to use your example "Looking at a man you needs a crutch and taking all crutch making materials away from him and then telling him to go run a race."

[babylonsister]

13. So what's the solution if staying there isn't an option? And we've been

there too long to begin with. Plus, it seems as if the venue is changing...

[wmbrew0206]

14. I agree we have been there too long, but if we pull out too quickly Iraq could destablize again

and then we'd have to go back in and start all over.

I think Obama has left himself enough room to keep enough troops in Iraq to continue to provide the Iraqis with what they need (ie the residual force) and at the same time rotating a majority of our BCTs and RCTs out.

Also, don't get to tied up on the 16 month figure. Susan Powers said, before she left, that 16 months was under the best conditions. Also, some of the military commanders on the ground say 16 month for all the BCT's would be "nearly impossible." Obama based that number on the current rotation schedule, but the current schedule does not allow the BCT's to take their equipment with them. They leave it in place and the BCT that replaces them use it.

[babylonsister]

15. "we'd have to go back in and start all over"

I'm of a different opinion; I don't think we should have gone there to begin with. The sooner Obama can get the US out of there, the better.

I would like to see some aid go to the Iraqis who have suffered so much because of us.

[wmbrew0206]

16. The question is: "What happens if Iraq fails into a civil war after we leave?

This could set off a string of events that could destabilize the entire mid-east.

If a civil war breaks out there is a good chance:

1. The Kurds would withdraw from the government and declare inpendance and the formation of "Kurdistan." That would cause Turkey to invade the Kurdish regions of Iraq.

2. The violence between the Sunnis and the Shias could draw Saudi Arabia into a proxy war with Iran, as both sides funnel money and weapons to their respective sides.

Obama would have to make a very hard decision on whether or not to go back in.

[babylonsister]

19. I don't see us prevailing in

this part of the world that has been conducting their religious wars for so many years. We are not seen as peacekeepers now and never have been. We are resented by so many.
Obama has vowed to extract troops and I imagine he'll keep his word. Who knows what will happen when we leave? There were attitudes of doom and gloom over leaving VN, and look at them now.

[wmbrew0206]

22. As to whether we'll prevail is still up in the air and no one knows.

As far as Obama's position on Iraq, I think it comes down to a personal interuperation of his words. I think he specifically left the definition of the "Residual Force" very vague, to allow himself some wiggle room on the withdraw.

As for Veitnam, while Veitnam is stable today, a lot of bad things happened after we withdrew:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vietnam_War#Effects_on_Southeast_Asia

[The Magistrate]

25. Iraq Is In A Civil War Now, Sir, Which Will Continue When We Leave

Our presence does not prevent, or even contain, civil war there: we are simply one element the contending factions manipulate to the best of their own abilities and to their own best advantage.

[wmbrew0206]

26. If Iraq is not in a civil war right now. It was on the brink in late '06.

Please tell me why you think Iraq is in a civil war right now when violence across the country is down to '04 level.

[The Magistrate]

28. Civil War In Iraq, Sir, Is More Or Less The Natural Condition

So long as it has been a polity in the modern period, the principal business of its central authority has been to contain and suppress the conflict of its disparate constituents. The place is a sort of Middle Eastern Yugoslavia, whether by design of the late Ms. Bell or by her absent-mindnesses coupled with the vagaries of military results versus ibn Saud and English colonial rivalries with France and the expansive phase of the Turkish Nationalists. The English dedicated themselves during their suzerainty to maintaining a central government they themselves created. We, on the other hand, destroyed a central authority without having ready to hand a replacement, and have since been simply a pawn, albeit a rather sizeable one, that the various factions have attempted to play or play off of, for their own purposes, which can be summed fairly as doing down their their traditional foes as thoroughly as possible once we depart.

Thus, the civil war in Iraq essentially commenced with the destruction of Hussein's regime. In the early stages, we constituted the combat arm of the Shia, as direct opposition to the U.S. presence was initially concentrated in Sunni quarters. While the quietists led by Ay. al' Sistani were more than content with this arrangement, 'young Turks' clustered around Mr. al' Sadr would not forgo the mantle of nativist nationalism, and struck an anti-U.S. posture despite the great serviceability of the U.S. to the Shia cause. Awareness of the likely outcome of developments on current lines among Sunni chieftains led to their forming the 'salvationist' front as a means of securing arms and training and protection from the U.S., so that at present we are essentially backing both major Arab elements to some degree, as Iran emerges as a leading patron of the nationalist wing of the Shia. Events of the last couple of years, including the 'surge', have simply clarified the geographic boundaries on which the open campaigns of the civil war will be fought once we have departed. The leading cause of the much vaunted 'reduction of violence' for which the unreflective give credit to the increased presence of U.S. troops is really the compounding of two factors: first, there are few 'mixed' areas remaining, campaigns of terror against local minorities having largely succeeded in driving these out to leave homogenous neighborhoods and countrysides; and second, all factions are looking towards the day of our departure, which they know will be fairly soon, and husbanding their strength for the outbreaks they intend on our departure. The Kurds, having already effectively seceded, play little roll in this analysis, though once the Arab factions have sorted their affairs out, a species of 'reconquista' driving north may be looked for, and the endemic fractionalization of the Kurdish polity, as well as the hostility to them of neighboring nations, will give this some chance of success.

It is a mistake to consider warfare an uninterrupted exercise in violence, and to believe that in the absence of a continuous or increasing level of violence warfare is not going on, or has ceased. Violence in warfare is not engaged in for its own sake but to achieve certain material and political ends, and competent practitioners will not press violence past the gaining of an end, or to a point that will put at hazard future designs.

[wmbrew0206]

29. I guess we disagree.

I think the central Iraqi Government has gotten buy in from all the different ethinic groups because they know what will resualt if the central government fails. See post #16.

I take it, you think that the diffirent ethnic groups are just getting as much training and money from the US as they can so they can fight one another after we pull out. In others words, the Civil War is on hold until we withdraw.

[The Magistrate]

31. Indeed, Sir, We Do Seem To

It does not seem to me that anyone particularly buys into the present central government of Iraq, save to the degree they have hopes of dominating it and thus turning state authority to their own factional ends in the on-going civil conflict. Its halls and chambers are simply one more field of combat, where advantage is wrestled for over the others.

And yes, it seems evident that all factions are in a replenishment and stockpiling period, the lull before the storm often seen in even the most conventional of conflicts as fresh operations are prepared and favorable opportunity awaited.

[grantcart]

18. they in fact have the ability if they are motivated

They may not have the ability to withstand an attack by a foreign power but they have the ability to establish their own police and domestic security operations - if they have the support of the local populace.


This has been clearly shown by the self policing in Sadre City. Al queda has never been able to establish any kind of operation there.

We may not like the way that they do it, and it may no look like us but by using tribal and ethnic and religious groups as a base they could eliminate all internal strife in weeks - if the local population supports it.


Giving them a time table is the 'tough love' necessary to kick the chick out of the nest and make it fly.

[wmbrew0206]

20. They don't have the ability, even if they are motivated

The Iraqi Army is currently almost totally dependant on US logistics and fire support for their operations. Like I said before, logistics and fire support take a long time to learn and longer to be able to execute.

To say that they could learn the skills they need if they were motiviated is almost insulting. It is the same as saying that a star high school senior football player could play in the NFL next year if he was really motivated. He can't, he doesn't know enough about the game and isn't physically developed enough to compete.

[grantcart]

21. No its simply because you think in terms of the NFL

look at Sadre City and the self policing they have implemented.


What Iraq needs is an effective police force not an advance military operation.


The British have withdrawn from the South and there has been no increase in terrorist operations or actions by Al Queda.


You are simply parroting the empty analysis of the Bush administration which even as we speak the JCS has indicated more troops can


be taken out of Iraq.


Of course for issues such as maintaing border security or repelling a foriegn incursion they would need help.


In terms of identifying who are the foreigners living in their area who are not part of the local tribe, mosque or ethnic group they do not need our help they need resolve.


If they simply announced that they were going to institute capital punishment for all of the foreigners now in the country and put a bounty of $ 10,0000 on the head of each one of these interlopers there would be a dramatic movement of the "foreign terrorists" out of the country which is exactly what has been done in Anwar Province - without the involvement of American troops.

[wmbrew0206]

23. OK, couple things

There is no self policing in Sadr City. It is Iraqi Army forces along with Iraqi Police that are in charge of the security of Sadr City. The Iraqi Army in Sadr City has to provide its own food, gas, bullets, vehicle parts, etc. That is the logistical skills that they lack. The Iraqi Army cannot conduct sustained operations if they can't do their own logistics. This is what they are dependant on US for right now.

As far the southern part of Iraq, you are incorrect. First, the south is almost exculsively Shia. The south, being defined as the area south of Karabala, has never had a problem with Al Qaeda attacks. AQI has no base and no resources to carry out attacks. There were MAJOR problems with Shia militia groups fighting in the streets of Basra after the British withdrew and the Iraqi Army had to launch a major operation to stabilize the city. This operation stalled initially because the Iraqi didn't tell the US about it and they couldn't support the operation for more than two days without US logistic and fire support help.

As far as Al Anbar, I've spent 13 months of my life in that province and I can tell you that from late '04 to October of '06, the Sunni Tribes could not have defeated Al Qaeda on their own. They need the US forces and money to help them do it.

As far as my "empty analysis of the Bush administration," go reread my post where I said that Obama will probably pull most of the BCT home and leave a few to handle the logistics and fire support.

[grantcart]

24. The problems that occur after the British departed the south are

typical of the kind of problems that are going to exist after the British leave.


Whether they leave now or 2 years or 3 years there are going to be the same problems.


The fundamental problem is that you think that it is primarily a military problem that if they military has time to develop everything will be fine.



The fundamental problem is political and no additional time is going to change that. Whatever problems exist now are going to exit in 3 years or 5 years.


We are not talking about 06 or 04 but quite frankly with a different strategy those tribes could have prevented Al Qaeda from coming into those areas in 02 had we not alienated them and worked with them or, of course, never invaded the country at all.

[wmbrew0206]

27. There is no such thing as a purely political or purely military solution. It takes both.

I never said that a political progress was not part of the solution. This article was about the pace of troop withdraw, which deals with the military aspect of part of the soultion.

The Iraqis politicians have to reach political agreements and the Iraqi Army has to be strong enough to enforce those decisions. In Iraq, if a leader or a group of leaders don't like a law, they ignore it and then fight any group that tries to stop them from ignoring it. The Iraqi Army has to be able to handle enforcing law and dealing with any group that refuses to abide by it by themselves. (ie. they should have been able to handle the Basra operation on their own and not have had to request US help.)

My point is that the Iraqi Army will continue to need US troops to assist them in their logistics and fire support for more than 16 months. This won't be 15 BCT's, but it will require some. I think this is the "residual force" Obama talks about in his policy.

Please expand on this comment: "The problems that occur after the British departed the south are typical of the kind of problems that are going to exist after the British leave. Whether they leave now or 2 years or 3 years there are going to be the same problems."

If you are saying that violence was envetiable when the British left, I disagree. If the British had moved out of the Barsa Airfield and conducted the clear, hold, rebuild strategy that US forces have been conducting in other parts of Iraq, then I think the hand over to the Iraqi Army after the British withdrew would not have resulted in increased violence and the need for a major Iraqi Army operation.

[Egnever]

11. Well said grant and IMHO

It has been the constant call from the dems for withdrawal as much as the surge that has pushed any gains we have made there thus far. The political "leaders" there are aware of the political situation here and that chances are high they will get a Dem heavy leadership in the us after this election and that when that happens the gig is up. It is that reality I believe that is pushing a lot of the reconciliation on the ground.

[otohara]

3. We Don't Have The Money

sorry Mr. Nassir al-Hiti - the US can't pay billions forever to stay in Iraq.

[blogslut]

5. Interesting article

I've never been a fan of immediate withdrawal and neither has Senator Obama. To me it would be the equivalent of leaving a burning campfire. The country is a mess and we made that mess. I still believe in the plan Kerry spoke about during the 2004 elections: Cut back troop levels, redeploy as a security force and get NATO to help keep the peace until the country is stabilized.

[wmbrew0206]

7. I agree with most of your post, but NATO?

NATO is in charge of Afghanistan right now and they are not doing a great job. I doubt the Pentagon or NATO wants NATO to step into Iraq right now.

[blogslut]

8. Well, perhaps other nations then

Although, from what I read, Afghanistan isn't doing that great.

What I mean is we need to lessen the American presence there. At this point, we're just pissing off the Iraqis. We need other uniforms to help keep the peace while Iraq gets control of itself.

[wmbrew0206]

9. Sorry, that was a typo. It should have "are not doing a great job."

[wmbrew0206]

10. Double post. Having a tough time today for some reason.

[babylonsister]

12. NATO is running into problems in Afghanistan...

they've got too much on their plate to go anywhere else. But that's also the US's problem.

http://news.sky.com/skynews/Home/World-News/Nato-And-US-Withdraw-From-Afghan-Outpost-After-Bloody-Taliban-Battle/Article/200807315039384?lpos=World%2BNews_6&lid=ARTICLE_15039384_Nato%2BAnd%2BUS%2BWithdraw%2BFrom%2BAfghan%2BOutpost%2BAfter%2BBloody%2BTaliban%2BBattle


Bloodied Nato Quits Afghan Camp

9:16pm UK, Wednesday July 16, 2008

Nato has abandoned an Afghan outpost days after it was stormed by militants who killed nine US soldiers and injured 19 coalition troops.

The surprise retreat has resulted in one senior US commander asking for hundreds more mine-resistant armoured vehicles to equip US troops in Afghanistan.

The outpost in Wanat Village was taken over by the Taliban in one of their deadliest offences since the coalition forces attacked in 2001.

"When ISAF withdrew yesterday, we couldn't stand up against the Taliban," said Nuristan Governor Omar Sami Taza.

"We pulled back and the district fell into the Taliban's hand. We will send more troops from the centre to recapture it."

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[Imagevision]

17. Maliki last year said he wanted US. troops out of Iraq by November 2008...

[Disturbed]

30. 2010 is the goal for most of the US Combat troops to be

out of Iraq. The Iraqi Govt. & the majority of Iraqis agree with that goal.