|
The most basic question is "Why not Romney"? It is easy to say that the volatile, only marginally sane McCain can't stand the guy and just couldn't do it.
I don't think that is the right answer. At the end of the day, all politicians are life-long ass-kissers and they all do lots of things that more principled people never would do. If McCain thought Romney would help him get elected, Romney would have been the man. So McCain's calculus says that Romney would not help him enough. Maybe it is a polling thing. Maybe he was afraid of losing the fundie vote. Maybe his polling shows there is a significant shift in the fundie base to Obama, and the Mormon thing would make matters worse. I don't know, but you can bet there were some serious calculations going on.
If McCain determined, and obviously he did, that Romney would not get him over the top, then what thought process led him to Palin?
Clearly this is not a safe choice, so it represents some degree of desperation on McCain's part. If he had a safe route to the White House, he would have taken it.
It seems to me that McCain was ultimately impressed with the Hillbot factor. Now, let me be clear, I don't consider all Hillary supporters to be "Hillbots". Indeed, at another time in other circumstances, I could support her myself. By "Hillbot," I am talking about the subset of Hillary supporters who are mindless in their support -- irrational in their devotion to the cause, even to the destrution of our Party, even after she has asked them to move on. McCain may have correctly figured that this Hillbot faction will support anybody with a vagina, and the rest of the facts don't matter to them.
If we judge from many of the trolls that dominated this site over the past week, I can easily see how he could draw this conclusion. I think that would be an error. While many people support Hillary, I don't think there are so many of these Hillbots in the real world.
I suppose another possibility is a very tactical one -- that he wanted to disarm Biden in teh debate. But I can't see wasting a VP choice for a tactical advantage in one 90-minute encounter.
|