I just read the housing section of Warren Buffet's Letter to Stockholders (
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2008ltr.pdf ) and it is full of sound observations about lending practices, regulation, buyer attitudes, etc., showing how we got into this mess.
But though all that stuff is true it's kind of side-ways to the problem.
Asset bubbles are not the product of wall street criminality, the collapse of the Calvinist work-ethic, going off the gold standard or sun-spot activity.
Bubbles are a natural state of markets following productivity increases or other sources of "free" growth. (Like exploiting the newly discovered Americas or railroads, radio, transistors and the internet) Bubbles are the macro expression of the intersection of free markets, novel economic growth and innate human psychology.
For centuries, for as long as we have had markets in future activity, bubbles arise, follow the same form, collapse in the same way, cause roughly the same havoc. And every time there are commissions and studies and new but backward-looking regulations that would have prevented the last bubble but may or may not prevent the next one.
Regulation can limit natural bubble formation but only at a cost to growth. I believe that bubbles are so damaging that sacrificing a fair amount of growth may be correct (this is hypothetical conceptual thing, no a specific policy proposal) in the very long term but it's obvious why that's a tough sell.
The search for scape-goats and "causes" is, IMO, less useful than it seems. "Unscrupulous" banks stretched sensible lending practices to loan Dutch people money against bubble-priced tulip bulbs. "Greedy" shipping companies drove up the price of shares in the South Sea Bubble. "Wicked" robber barons created the railroad bubbles. And so on... every bubble is the same, and each time people react (quite naturally) to find the witches and well-poisoners responsible. In the span of a life-time bubbles appear to be unique events demanding specific explanation. In the run of history, however, they are a standard, albeit disastrous, feature of a sophisticated economy.
And the one way to guarantee we keep having bubbles is to engage in the sort of ad hoc analysis we are engaging in. If we think that villainy is at the heart of these things then our corrective task is as simple as it is impossible: the moral perfection of humanity. That's not a useful economic program.
Greed and villainy are constants and probably essential features of a robust economy. Market actors are supposed to maximize gains using any legal tools at their disposal. This is why the idea of "responsible" corporations is asinine. A corporation is a mathematical input-output system, not a person. (Our laws notwithstanding.) Our corporate show trials make as much sense as trials for sharks or mud-slides.
It is the job of corporations to find ways around the intention of regulations. Ad hoc regulation will always be like whack-a-mole. Bubbles will find a way much like rain will "find" the hole in your roof.
It is possible that the only way to restrain bubbles is to not pretend to understand or out-think their malignant elements but rather to simply regulate against bubbles themselves.
If bubble happened a couple of times per decade we might be able to learn how to deal with them in narrow ways but they don't. Coincidence? Probably not. Bubbles are spaced out they way they are because we are able to deal with short-term stuff. (It's like why Ebola wasn't a big threat before air-travel. It kills the host too quickly to spread well.)
I believe the right course might be, as crazy as this sounds, targeting growth the way we target inflation. Set generous growth caps and restrain overly-strong growth regardless of whether it looks like good growth because it seems that the marketplace is adept at creating false growth in ways we keep missing, about once per generation. Accept that free lunches are, at very least, exceptionally
rare. If we treat robust productivity driven "good" growth like inflation we will miss some growth but also avoid the bubbles that leveled the US economy many times in the last 100 years. (Adjusted for inflation the bear market of 1965-1982 was as deep as the stock market decline of the great depression.)
Just say: The problem is the bubble itself, not the thousand venal acts that led to it.
What if the capital gains tax on stock profits had been doubled in 1998? Not because someone was being bad, or because a government panel concluded the internet isn't all-that, but simply because such large and rapid increase in asset valuation has a terrible track record. "Warranted? Unwarranted? Who knows? But we do know that 90% of the time this kind of appreciation leads to utter disaster so we are not interested in arguing about the speciffic merits of this latest spasm."
Well, we might have missed some benign activity along the way but our current situation would probably not have arisen. (Tax policy targeting the specific area of "growth" which was stock prices would be more useful and humane than raising interest rates to slow down the entire economy.)
Of course, any society that bubble-proofs itself would have lower growth in many years. 90% of missed growth will be illusory and dangerous, but it will look like real growth at the time. So a nation that allows bubbles will put incredible competitive pressure on its neighbors. The fact that the fast-growing economy will collapse at some point this generation (and that people should not feed capital into that unstable economy without huge interest rates that off-set the true systemic risk) will not be persuasive to people who, quite naturally, wants gains TODAY. So this is probably as impossible as any other approach. But it's still worth talking about.
This chart is tangential to the OP but it's so interesting I wanted to post it somewhere: