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1) You and staff from the Elections’ Division stated on February 26, 2004 to the Senate State and Local Governmental Operations Committee (SLOGO) where Senate Bill 500 was being considered, which would have required voter verified paper records for Georgia’s Diebold Election System, that there was no NASED certified technology that could produce those records. Later, on March 4 and March 11, you admitted to the committee that you DID know of such technology, the TruVote and Avante systems, but that they weren’t certified to 2002 Voting System Standards. You failed to inform the committee that Georgia’s Diebold voting system was also NOT certified to 2002 Voting System Standards at that time. Could you explain why you and your staff made those statements when the information in the first assertion was false and on the second was misleading?
2) On February 27, March 4, and March 11, 2004 at the SLOGO committee public meetings on Senate Bill 500, in your efforts to prevent voter verified paper records from being added to our paperless Diebold Voting System, your office and Elections Division staff and a poll worker they brought to one of the hearings, represented that having voter verified paper records added to Georgia’s Diebold voting stations would disenfranchise disabled voters. You personally distributed copies to the committee members of a letter dated March 3, 2004 from US Congressmen Ney, Hoyer, McConnell and Dodd that said in part, “Most importantly, the proposals requiring a voter-verified paper record would force voters with disabilities to go back to using ballots that provide neither privacy nor independence, thereby subverting a hallmark of the HAVA legislation.” That statement is false. Can you tell Georgia voters why you would knowingly give false information to committee members and the public?
3) Your photograph and testimonial endorsing Georgia’s Diebold Election System has been used in marketing literature distributed by Diebold. Your testimonial is on the front page of the Diebold Election Systems website, where until recently the Georgia State seal was also posted. What is your position on the ethics of elected state officials who help to market a product for a for-profit corporation, particularly in light of the contractual relationship of Diebold with the State of Georgia?
4) California Secretary of State Kevin Shelley banned the use of the Diebold TSX touchscreen system in April 2004, stating, “We will not tolerate the deceitful conduct of Diebold, and we must send a clear message to the rest of the industry: Don’t try to pull a fast one on the voters of California.” He went on to state that he was decertifying the system because of “fraudulent actions by Diebold.” Georgia’s touchscreen system, the TR6, is essentially the same technology as the TSX. Can you tell voters why you did not undertake similar action to protect Georgia’s votes for the 2004 Presidential election? Could you also explain why you effectively killed moves by Georgia voters to get voter verified paper records last spring, particularly in light of the information from former Diebold technician Rob Behler, which was published in Vanity Fair in April 2004, that brought into question whether Diebold technicians had installed uncertified patches, which if true is illegal, to the Georgia system in August 2002?
5) In April 14, 2004, Preston Futrell, of Internet Security Systems, made a presentation at an Information Security Conference at Emory University. Futrell said that he had met the day before with the Georgia Technology Authority as a consultant on securing the Diebold Election System in Georgia. Futrell said that the system could not be secured in time for the 2004 Presidential election in November. Were you aware at that time that the system was not secure and if so, why was the public not informed and a system implemented that would have allowed citizens to vote in a secure manner?
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