NY -- Elections -- Want to Keep Lever Machines?

[Bill Bored]

Those on this forum concerned about electronic voting should call their local board of elections and the media NOW and advise them that under ERMA 2005, NY State's law that implements HAVA, it's perfectly legal to keep lever machines for as long as they want, as long as Accessible machines for the disabled are also provided!

Here is the relevant section of ERMA 2005 aka Chapter 181:

16 § 11. Help America Vote Act voting machine and system implementation.
17 Effective the first federal election in 2006, each polling place shall
18 be equipped with at least one voting machine or voting system which is
19 equipped for individuals with disabilities and provides individuals with
20 disabilities with the same opportunity for access and participation as
21 other voters and which meets the requirements of section 7-202 of the
22 election law and the federal Help America Vote Act.
23 Effective September 1, 2007, all lever machines in New York state
24 shall be replaced by voting machines or voting systems which meet the
25 requirements of section 7-202 of the election law, provided, however,
26 that with respect to any board of elections which determines to retain
27 lever machines on or after the effective date of this act and prior to
28 September 1, 2007, the provisions of this act which impose new standards
29 for voting machines which were not required prior to the effective date
30 of this act, including the amendments to section 7-202 of the election
31 law made by section six of this act, shall not be applicable with
32 respect to such lever machines during any period of time during which
33 such lever machines are lawfully utilized.

Note that even the US Dept. of Justice has agreed with the provisions of this law, at least for now, in their suit against NY, and we will definitely be keeping lever machines in 2006. What is at issue now is 2007 and beyond, and it's clear from reading this law that it's not the intent of the legislature to ban lever machines.

What needs to happen now, is for our Boards of Elections to become informed. I hear reports that most commissioners in the state would prefer to keep the levers, but they just don't know it's legal to do so because of the disinformation being disseminated by e-voting systems vendors and others who are deliberately misreading the law.

Please contact your county or NYC BoE and send them this law to keep the lever option on the table!

Currently there are no e-voting systems certified in NY, but this could change. There are also no auditing requirements beyond the initial 3% required by law, which is not enough to confirm the outcome of close elections.

Let's not put the cart before the horse! First do no harm. Keep the levers until e-voting, which includes optical scan, is ready for prime time!

Use this link to find contact info for your BoE:
<http://www.elections.state.ny.us/portal/page?_pageid=153,42096,153_42424:153_42428&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL>

[Fredda Weinberg]

1. Are you kidding?

Every election cycle, the broken machines are placed in poor and minority neighborhoods, then the parties agree not to count the paper ballots. I, for one, am sick of it.

Please don't lecture me about e-voting vendors ... I've seen the Diebold code for myself and there was nothing nefarious there. DREs are a bad idea, but state law already stipulates we'll have a VVPT. Precinct based optical scanners work just fine - and we could have them now, but this is New York state ... we couldn't even ratify the Declaration of Independence on time.

Lever machines have no paper trail, no accountability and are over forty years old. Don't be a Luddite - get with the program!

[Bill Bored]

2. Do you know how many machines you would have to audit

to confirm the outcome of a close election?

DREs and scanners may fail at a higher rate than lever machines, according to federal voting system standards which allow them to. Don't lecture me on reliability of ANY e-voting system. The process is vendor-controlled from the ground up. Read the GAO report for starters, and read John Gideon's reports on VoteTrustUSA. He has compared it to a Train Wreck and I agree! Hundreds of machines failed in 2 counties in PA alone yesterday! Chicago has had huge problems with both Scanners and DREs.
http://www.votetrustusa.org/

If you want to help minorities, use the HAVA money now being wasted on e-voting to help the Katrina victims!

Here's what Dr. Rebecca Mercuri has to say about this:

Think About It:

Scientists had been warning for years about the devastation that might result from a major hurricane on the Gulf Coast. But the U.S. Congress failed to provide $35M to fully fund previously approved projects to build and improve levees, floodwalls and pumping stations in the Lake Pontchartrain region. The federal government did, though, allocate some $37M to Louisiana under the Help America Vote Act, primarily for the purchase and upgrade of fully electronic voting systems that provide no mechanism for independently auditing ballots and vote totals.

http://www.notablesoftware.com/evote.html

[Fredda Weinberg]

4. Scanners can be rerun ... level machines are black holes

Yeah, I'll lecture you 'cause VerifiedVoting.org endorses precinct based optical scanners and last time I checked her site, so did Mercuri.

[Bill Bored]

6. What will trigger a recount?

What audit, discrepancy or other parameter(s) will trigger a recount or rescan of paper ballots?

What are NY's routine pre- and post- election testing standards for optical scanners?

What are the auditing requirements beyond the initial 3%?

Answers: unknown, undefined and nonexistent, respectively at this time.

If these issues can't be resolved, then op scan can be as bad as DRE.

I have no problem with paper ballots and op scan in principle but it is unlikely that we will have such a system statewide and we do not have the necessary checks and balances in place to run it yet even if we did.

Until the above issues are resolved, we need to keep the lever option on the table as the only solution that does not involve secret vote counting and the only alternative to DREs in counties where the BoE will refuse to go op scan.

[Fredda Weinberg]

9. Nonsense

This is New York state with a long history of delaying decisions until others have worked out the details. As for DREs, we already have a law requiring a voter verified paper trail ... so you may not trust the system, but I see it working properly.

[Fredda Weinberg]

8. When I see unfounded accusations of deliberate fraud, I cringe

Like this article from the site you reference

http://www.votetrustusa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1281&Itemid=51

No, the vulnerability was not deliberately coded - you can boot off a pcmcia device, another feature of any operating system that Diebold didn't consider to guard against, except to specify that physical security is required.

Yeah, there were failures - and as I noted, we have a long history of placing malfunctioning machines where we don't ballots to be counted. If they were optically scanned ballots, preferably precinct based, there'd be the ability to process the originals later, instead of accusing voters later of casting votes twice.

According to MIT, scanners aren't worse than levers - you got a different source?

http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2001/voting2facts.html

Hand-counted and optically scanned paper have had the lowest rates of unmarked, uncounted, and spoiled ballots in presidential, Senate and governor elections over the last 12 years. (Page 21)


Punch cards have the highest rate of unmarked, uncounted, and spoiled ballots over the last four presidential elections. (Page 21)


Lever machines have the highest rate of unmarked, uncounted, and spoiled ballots in Senate and governor elections over the last 12 years. (Page 21)

[Wilms]

11. Nice post. Swipe VoteTrust - Apologize for Diebold.

It isn't clear to me that Diebold didn't act negligently allowing the kind of access to machines outlined recently. And as I understand it, they not only allow that access, they PROVIDE it, as a feature. Hence the title of the article that cringes you, "Diebold's Deliberate Security Vulnerability".

It makes me cringe, too. But, apparently for different reasons.

Levers can be hacked, I understand. One at a time. Unlike DRE and OpScan systems that can be centrally (as well as locally) hacked. Hacking the server makes a hacked lever machine look like a few undervotes.

Concerned about the poor being disenfranchised by levers? You think DRE's or OpScans are inherently less likely to do so? Agreed, with OpScan you can fill out the ballot and leave before it's scanned, but with DRE's - which some NY counties could well wind up using - it could be Ohio-like long lines.

Also, you may be confusing reliability with error rate. I'm sure you know the difference.

Sorry. It's a Vote Trust link.

"...according to the NYC Board of Elections, only 469 lever machines (6.4%) actually failed during the 2004 general election. Thus, the failure rate allowed for DREs by the 21st-century VVSG Reliability spec exceeds the actual failure rate of 40-year-old lever machines by 44%. Furthermore, the residual vote rate for the lever machines was about 0.9% in 20043 -- less than the national average for DREs.4"

http://votetrustusa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1057&Itemid=26

[Fredda Weinberg]

12. DREs are a canard here

State law already mandates a voter verified paper trail, so optical scan is our most practical solution. Insisting on lever machines, which have been strategically used to suppress minority representation for as long as I can remember, is suspect at best.

Diebold didn't make applying updates from a pcmcia a feature - it's something you can do with any bootable device. But to hack the system, you have to have physical access long enough to boot it up and if you're attacking just a voting machine, wait until the end of the voting day until the accumulator is accessed.

But again, you've shifted the argument back to DREs, which are not an issue here.

As for the reliability of the lever machines, well, there are liars, damn liars and statisticians. Looking at the total failure rate fails to take into account our well-known practice of putting malfunctioning machines in poor and minority neighborhoods.

[Wilms]

15. Agreed. "so optical scan is our most practical solution"

So would you please let all the jurisdiction in the US, who bought VVPAT DRE's know that?

Actually, you've shifted the argument. DRE's can be used to disenfranchise voters just as readily as a lever machine. OpScanners are no saint's, either.

[Fredda Weinberg]

18. Sure, that's why I volunteered my services to

VerifiedVoting.org. That's why I personally phoned the League of Women Voters in 2001. That's why I organized dozens of fundraisers for Pacifica stations across the country in 2001-2002.

Have you got a similar record?

[Wilms]

20. Actually, you've shifted the argument.

DRE's can be used to disenfranchise voters just as readily as a lever machine. OpScanners are no saint's, either.

[Fredda Weinberg]

23. I've been consistent

I've already posted a link to the MIT study that refutes your argument - optical scans, particularly precinct based, are a reliable voting method. No one here has argued for DREs - I'm taking issue with those who want to retain mechanical lever machines, despite their history here in NYC.

[Wilms]

25. Your talking error rate and residual votes.

I'm talking the VVSG "Reliability" spec.

Do you understand what I'm indicating?

[Fredda Weinberg]

27. Voluntary Voting System Guidelines ... so what?

Got something that contradicts the MIT study?

[Wilms]

28. We're talking about two different things.

I guess you don't realize.

If you read the VoteTrust link, I'm sure you'll recognize.

[Fredda Weinberg]

33. The link to their home page?

What point are you trying to make and how do you support it?

[Wilms]

34. Bill Bored gave you the homepage link.

I provided this one...

DRE Reliability: Failure by Design?

http://votetrustusa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1057&Itemid=26

[Bill Bored]

29. Ever hear of a hardware password?

WELL WHY DIDN'T DIEBOLD USE A FEW?

The issue is not just "booting off a PCMCIA card"; it's being able to RELOAD a whole new OS and the boot loader itself that way.

Levers have lower residual vote rates than DREs on average. You have to go by the top of the ticket. I agree op scan is the lowest. The problem is how to audit the system to make sure no one's corrupting it.

The NY VVPAT law is inadequate in that so far there's only a 3% random audit and a high standard is required for there to be a recount. In other words, you have to know in advance that the election was stolen to convince a judge to order a recount. That's a Catch 22.

Too much is left up to the BoE. So far they've done a reasonably good job of writing voting system standards, but they aren't finished yet. Meanwhile they're asking the counties to choose from among the uncertified machines. What's the rush?

[Fredda Weinberg]

35. Why did Diebold use the DES algorithm in CBC mode incorrectly?

'cause they're not the brightest bulbs on the block and didn't anticipate everything. Yes, I've seen hardware passwords ... we use 'em where I currently work and nothing stops their clients from going into the BIOS setup and entering one. But you've wandered far from the claim of deliberate fraud.

As for audits, I'm happy with any. Every election result I've seen so far has variances between the registrations and ballots - but there's no way to query the mechanical machines.

What's the rush? How many times do I have to repeat that NYC has a history of depressing minority and underclass representation with the strategic placement of malfunctioning equipment. I want ballots that will be counted - and if VerifiedVoting.org and Roberta Mercuri endorses precinct based optical scanning, I'm satisfied.

[trogdor]

3. And Diebold is better?

See Philadelphia, last night. 100 busted Diebold machines. Money down a hole.

[Fredda Weinberg]

5. Scanned ballots can be recounted - lever machines are an old

party trick. Didn't I specifically mention my objection to DREs?

[Bill Bored]

7. Glad to see you have a problem with DREs. Now see post # 6. nt

[iconoclastNYC]

10. I want paper ballots counted by teams of bi and non-partisan observers

That's the most secure way to run an election and NYS deserves NO LESS.

[Fredda Weinberg]

13. Ain't gonna happen in NYC

Yeah, Canada can count theirs by hand, but we haven't for a century and won't start now.

[iconoclastNYC]

14. Why is that?

Because some asshole contractors wanted to get paid for some overprice machines.

Your negativism is baseless.

If it's going to happen anywhere it's going to happen in liberal NYC and NYS.

We banned smoking in public.

We can get paper ballots.

[Wilms]

16. How can you accuse Fredda of "negativism"?

She seems rather positive about employing Diebold equipment.

:shrug:

[Fredda Weinberg]

19. Just trying to keep you honest, which is an uphill struggle

I've posted multiple times ... DREs are a bad idea, unless they're used as Mercuri suggests: fancy printers that can handle multiple languages and as aids to the disabled.

You've got this obsession with a single manufacturer, when all of 'em fail in the field. You've become part of the problem, not the solution.

[Wilms]

21. "posted multiple times ... DREs are a bad idea"

Did I say you haven't?

But are they outlawed in NY? No. Therefore, it's possible that they'll be employed in NY as they are elsewhere despite your or my assertion of their impracticality.

It is you who have displayed an propensity to show up in defense of Diebold, and it is that to which I refer. Granted, there IS an obsession with Diebold to the detriment of a closer look at other vendors.

See. We agree on something.

[Fredda Weinberg]

24. I'm defending truth, Diebold is sloppy and ignorant, but

no one has proven a charge of malicious intent.

And DREs can't be used in NY without a voter verified paper trail - and the likely solution will be optical scanning, with some DREs for the disabled. That's a perfectly reasonable solution.

[Bill Bored]

30. Nonsense!

First, if there were optical scanners statewide, there would likely be ballot markers for the disabled -- NOT DREs -- unless of course you're talking about a DIEBOLD "solution!"

What is going to happen is, first, Accessible ballot markers or printers for the disabled because, believe it or not, they are actually the priority.

That's because we haven't banned lever machines and we are NOT rushing into any technology that we can't regulate or audit properly for the rest of our voters. Op scans will continue to be used for absentee ballots and disabled voters' ballots which will be scanned centrally after they're Automarked or printed at the polling places.

Then, in 2007, there will be optical scan and DREs according to what each county decides OR continued use of lever machines.

If you can guarantee a statewide op scan system, I'll listen, and we can figure out how to test and audit it. But we are nowhere near that, even on the Democratic side! So the first rule must be DO NO HARM and keep the levers. Perhaps if the Dems take over the state Senate and the Gov, we can do op scan right in 2008 or so. Meanwhile there is NO RUSH.

[Fredda Weinberg]

17. Negative? Precinct based optical scanners are more than

accceptable. They can be printed from DREs in any language, accessible to the disabled and leave a paper trail.

In 2005 we cast 1.3 million votes for mayor - about 1/10th as many as Canada altogether. Are we going to hire 50,000 counters to get it done? I don't think so ... we have enough trouble with our 30,000 poll workers.

[Wilms]

22. And they can be hacked, en masse. eom

[Fredda Weinberg]

26. Hack a paper ballot?

You'd have to infect one workstation by rebooting it on election day, then wait until the totals are accumulated at the end - and not arouse suspicion? As the experts have noted, highly unlikely.

Besides, precinct based scanning would give local totals that could be compared to the central accumulator. No, your scenario is far-fetched, to say the least.

Can it be done in theory? Sure. But if you think about what you're suggesting, you'd realize how impractical it would be.

[Bill Bored]

31. That's not how to do it. You do it on the EMS BEFORE the election!

You throw a corrupt ballot definition file onto every scanner from the EMS server and no one will have a clue. Paper is a placebo unless it's independently audited and actually used to test the scanners. There are no BoE regs to address this yet, for scanners or for DREs, so we're putting the cart before the horse. The lever option needs to be on the table until these issues are resolved -- unless you're going to try to convince us that "optical scanners aren't computers!"

[Fredda Weinberg]

32. So you're assuming a hacker has physical access to the server?

Now you're into tin-foil hat territory. If elections officials are themselves corrupt, no system is safe.

There are routine logic and accuracy tests before every election; why do you presume otherwise?

[Bill Bored]

36. Uh, maybe because the NYS BoE hasn't figured out how to do them yet!

http://www.elections.state.ny.us/hava/voting_systems_standards-4-20.pdf