The Albany Project: Count the Vote - Security for Paper Ballots, Audits for Scanners

[Wilms]

Count the Vote

by: Dan Jacoby
Sun Sep 20, 2009 at 20:46:23 PM EDT

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Security for paper ballots, and audits for scanners, can be handled two ways--

1. perform hand-count audits on election night to confirm the scanner tallies. This way the voted ballots are never out of public view.

2. arrange to keep the voted ballots in public view continuously until the hand-count audits occur.

New York law allows a 15-day period between election day and the audits, during which voted ballots can remain out of public view. This is an invitation to suspicion of tampering, accusations that cannot be proved or disproved, and actual tampering.

Additionally, the audit mandated by state law is a flat 3%, which is insufficient to prove that all winners identified by the scanners are correct.

The state needs "statistically-significant" audits. This means the percentage of machines or EDs to be audited is determined mathematically by using the number of ballots cast in each scanner or ED, the apparent margin of victory, and the number of scanners or EDs where each race was on the ballot. This is the only way to confirm that all winners are indeed the winners.

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Effective audits would require state-level involvement to coordinate multi-county activities. However, the State Board of Elections has not taken a leadership role in ensuring effective audits. For example: "NY Advocates to State Board of Elections: Audits Won't Find Wrong Winners of Elections"

The current situation jeopardizes the vote for everyone. Activists working on the auditing issue are Teresa Hommel of www.WheresThePaper.org and Howard Stanislevic of http://e-voter.blogspot.com

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http://www.thealbanyproject.com/diary/7305/count-the-vote

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=203x514267

[Bill Bored]

1. Better off keeping the lever machines. But we will have to fight like hell to do it. nt