Listen to Elizabeth Walter, Jason Osgood, and Tim White 's interviews on KBCS at One World Report. The interview begins approximately 9 minutes into the show-Thursday October 2, 2008
http://kbcs.fm/site/PageServer?pagename=OneWorldReport Jason Osgood for Secretary of State
The Time for Change Is Now! “Why should we trust the results of elections? It's not good enough that election results be accurate. We have to know they are accurate—and we don't.” –David Dill, prominent computer security expert. The Secretary of State is the state's chief elections officer, chief corporations officer, and supervisor of the State Archives, and is responsible for supervising state and local elections, certifying the results of state primaries and general elections, filing and verifying initiatives and referendums, and the production and distribution of the state voters’ pamphlet and election-notice legal advertising. In that capacity, s/he has final responsibility for deciding what systems can be used.
The current incumbent has shown bad judgment in the matter of evaluating vote counting systems. In 2002 he certified paperless touch screens. In 2004 these machines were used in Snohomish and Yakima counties. Poll voters using touch screens frequently reported that they would select a Democrat and the Republican’s name would light up. Poll workers suggested that the problem might be screen misalignment (e.g. candidate order = Gregoire, Rossi, Bennett), but oddly enough no Republican voters ever complained about the Libertarian’s name lighting up. Republican Dino Rossi won the poll vote in Snohomish County, a result which was dramatically different from the absentee results with recountable ballots that favored Gregoire. During the recount of the gubernatorial race, more than 100,000 votes could not be verified or recounted because there was nothing to verify or recount. Though a 2004 law requires paper trails for touch screen machines, there are still no audit requirements for optically scanned votes. The incumbent flatly opposes further auditing requirements.
In contrast, secretaries of state from California and Ohio have responded to computer scientist and citizen concerns and data showing electronic voting software on touch screens and op-scans are insecure and often full of bugs. California’s Debra Bowen’s conducted a complete top-to-bottom review of all voting machines sued Election Systems & Software, seeking fines and reimbursements of nearly $15 million from the firm for selling nearly 1,000 uncertified machines in the state.
Ohio’s Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner found that the Diebold touch screen voting machines used in half of Ohio's 88 counties don't work properly and sued Diebold for restitution after they admitted that the system may cause dropped votes.
Minnesota successfully implemented a statewide audit system in 2006. "We have a really good system in place in Minnesota. We have a 100 percent paper-ballot system. But even with these devices the only way to be confident in their security and reliability is to check them out," State Representative Bill Hilty stated.
The incumbent has steadfastly ignored computer experts who have shown time and time again that voting systems, regardless of being certified, and in spite of logic and accuracy tests, have significant security issues. The very term “logic and accuracy testing” is an obscurantist replacement for the usual term “function testing,” used by software professionals to define similar testing for just about every other kind of software system. It was invented to obfuscate the fact that these tests do NOT include security testing.
The incumbent supports unique identifiers on ballots that can link voters to their choices, even though it is against state law to put unique identifiers on ballots. (Barcodes that specify only ballot styles for particular precincts are an entirely different matter.) He has said that this is acceptable because encryption would be needed to decipher the identifiers. Candidate Jason Osgood, playing a critical role in a successful campaign to stop the practice in King County, pointed out that King and other counties already have mail ballot tracking without the use of the unique identifying bar code, which would have added nothing of value to voters while taking away voter privacy.
Jason Osgood’s Three Point Plan for Private Voting and Public Counting 1. Undertake a top to bottom review of all voting systems similar to that completed in California
2. Eliminate unique barcode ballot identifiers to preserve privacy
3. Create more transparency in the Secretary of State’s office and promote election oversight with public auditing
ELECT JASON OSGOOD (D) AS SECRETARY OF STATE