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None of what you have posted has refuted the allegation that RAF Bomber Command committed murder against civilians and I have to take issue with several points.
1. You said that area bombing is notoriously inaccurate. You cannot reduce the highly complex issue of Bomber Command's policy changes to a single short sentence. The issue of whether it is inaccurate or not is hardly important. What is relevant is whether it was (a) militarily necessary and (b) a war crime.
The RAF began the war with a so called oil bombing policy. They would mount pinpoint attacks on oil installations and thereby bring the German war machine to a stand still. It failed because the Wellingtons and Hampdens which were supposed to penetrate German airspace in daylight couldn't defend themselves against German fighters. So, they joined the Whitleys in bombing by night, using the time honoured method of the compass and sextant to navigate. This failed because they simply couldn't find the relevant city, let alone the individual refinery or storage tanks.
To give an idea of their lack of accuracy, here is a quote from R.V. Jones, head of British Scientific Intelligence during the Second World War. "I remember paricularly a raid on the Skoda Words at Pilsen, duly announced by the BBC. A friendly Czech indignantly told us that everyone in Pilsen knew that there had been no raid, and that the nearest bomb that had fallen was fifty miles away." <1> This led directly to the Butt report, which showed that when attacking the Ruhr, only 10% of RAF bombers got within five miles of their targets. <2>
It was this sort of inaccuracy that led to Directive 22, and Operation Gommorah. There is a clear and unambiguous difference between air operations by both sides before Directive 22 and after it. "From this moment on the target areas for the pilots lay in residential areas and not, as previously, in shipyards and industrial areas." <3>
As you say, Directive 22 was recinded in January 1943, to be replaced by the Pointblank plan, but this in no way led to a practical modification of British policy. To quote Dr. Jones again: "... and the coordination of the two campaigns (i.e. the US and RAF efforts) went no further than Bomber Command area-bombing by night the towns in which ballbearing or other targets were being bombed by the American by day."<4>
Area bombing may have appeared necessary during 1942, since Bomber Command was the only offensive weapon open to Britain. However, with the introduction of new navigation and blind bombing aids during 1943 (Gee, H2S, and Oboe) it now became possible for the RAF to bomb as accurately by night as the 8th Air Force could by day. Indeed, the Americans even adopted H2S to allow them to bomb through overcast. Given this it would have been (a) possible and (b) much more effective for the RAF to return to its original oil bombing policy. That it didn't can be almost exlusively blamed on one man, Sir Arthur Harris.
Yes, there was nothing more on the scale of Hamburg during 1944, but the RAF continued to bomb German cities night after night, in defiance of military logic and our own sense of moral superiority.
2. You state that Germany had "some of the best air raid protection in the world" as though this makes bombing civilian targets acceptable. Okay, the best compared to what? A poor second best to the British system (compare German losses during the Bädecker Blitz and the Baby Blitz to see how effective Britain's night defences were). Compared to Italy? Non existant. Japan? The US? The German system had severe weaknesses (such as the inability of the Würzburg radar set to track more than one aircraft at once, the notorious inaccuracy of Flak batteries <5>) but their existence is irrelevant. If I break into your house and kill 9 members of your family, is it any less of a crime if you manage to kill me before I escape or not?
3. "The biggest moral failing of area bombing was that the loss of life on both sides did not produce the desired military results." This is not a moral failing, but rather a practical one. The moral failing was that a liberal democracy felt it necessary to bomb civilians.
4. "RAF bomber activities at key stages in the Battle of Britain had a direct impact on German tactics." If you were referring to the barge bombing and not the retaliatory raids on Berlin, then I have to ask, how did this affect the German tactics?
References. 1. Most Secret War, R.V. Jones, Coronet, 1979, page 274 2. Ibid. page 275 3. Göring, Eine Karriere, Guido Knopp, Goldman, 2007, page 165, author's translation from the original German. 4. Jones, page 487 5. see Eagles Of The Third Reich, Samuel Mitcham, Guild Publishing 1989, page 112 for a further exploration of this topic
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