'Armed and dangerous
Arguments about whether ministers should resign are not the main point of the Scott Report, says Paul Foot. The real dynamite is in the connection between government and the arms industry--and the level of deception involved
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Most people who have studied the matter know that the US and British governments 'tilted' to Iraq during the latter stages of the long and murderous Iran/Iraq war of 1980-1988. The Scott Report pushes the tilt back to the very start of the war. As Scott's figures for military and civilian trade decisively prove, Iraq was favourite from the outset. It follows that ministers' insistence on their impartiality in the conflict--the foundation stone of their declared policy on defence sales--was sheer hypocrisy.
The clearest example of that hypocrisy was the approach of the Export Credits Guarantee Department, which guarantees British exports. From 1985, the ECGD guaranteed the sale of defence equipment to Iraq to the tune of at least £25m a year. No such guarantee was available for Iran. In 1988, when the war ended, the guarantee for Iraq was quadrupled--to £100m. The chief secretary to the treasury who approved that huge leap (and denied any similar facility to Iran) was John Major, the man who has consistently pretended that he knew little or nothing of the arms to Iraq scandal while he was chancellor of the exchequer, foreign secretary and prime minister.
In two other sections, the report exposes the central government hypocrisy--that arms to Iraq were carefully restricted throughout the period. First, all sorts of weaponry, often of the most lethal kind, got to Iraq from Britain through 'diversionary routes', chiefly through Jordan. Arms sales from Britain to Jordan were 3,000 percent (about £500 million) higher in the 1980s than in the 1970s. This had nothing to do with the expansion of the Jordanian armed forces, which were actually contracting in the 1980s. Almost all the extra weaponry went on to Iraq, and there were other conduits too: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Portugal, Singapore, Austria.
Secondly, the 'restricted' policy became much less restricted for Iraq after the ceasefire of 1988. The entire British government was tempted by the honeypot which was opened up by Saddam Hussein as he expanded his vast armed forces after the peace treaty with Iran in 1988. The guidelines were changed to liberate a whole new category of defence sales, and no one was told about it.'
http://pubs.socialistreviewindex.org.uk/sr195/foot.htmA quote from Major's testimony to the Scott inquiry;
“One of the charges at the time of course was that in some way I must have known because I had been the chancellor, because I had been the foreign secretary, because I had been the prime minister. And therefore I must have known what was going on, but I didn’t.”
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The Scott Report;
'1996: Arms-to-Iraq report published
The long-awaited report into the sale of arms-to-Iraq in the 1980s has been published and contains strong criticisms of the ministers involved.
Having taken three years to produce, the report outlines mistakes made by ministers but rejects claims MPs were seeking to deprive defendants of a fair trial in the Matrix Churchill case.
Attorney General Sir Nicholas Lyell and Treasury Chief Secretary William Waldergave were singled out for criticism in the report, which was carried out by senior high court judge Sir Richard Scott.
One of the main problems highlighted in the report was the decision of the government not to inform parliament of reforms to arms export laws for fear of public outcry.
The report concluded government policy towards the export of non-lethal military goods was changed following the Iran-Iraq ceasefire in 1988 in a way that should have been reported to the Commons. '
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/february/15/newsid_2544000/2544355.stm