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Assuming the voter was given a regular ballot, rather than a provisional (I don't know how the provisional process worked):
Multiple precincts were housed in the same room - and should have been separated by space and monitored by different poll workers. The booths are not visibly identified by precinct. I also do not recall anything in the booth, or on the template, which identified the specific precinct (which most voters don't remember anyway). In one location, the booths for three precincts were apparently arranged in an unbroken horseshoe.
Each voter signed in at the correct precinct and was given a ballot for the correct precinct, marked for that precinct (Their votes would not be intermingled and tabulated with the rest unless they were on the roster at the precinct at which they signed in - so each was given the correct ballot). I believe the ballot is marked to be read electronically (as well as, one other poster has noted, by sight) so that the tabulator caretaker doesn't accidentally forget to set the machine for the correct precinct.
Based on conversations I have had, what happened next varies tremendously from polling place to polling place. In one polling place, the card was already in the voting template which was handed to the voter. In another voters were held back at the sign-in table until there was an empty booth which contained the template fastened to the booth, and each was directed to a specific booth. In another, voters were directed to line up behind the filled booths for that precinct and to take the next empty booth (with templates for that precinct). In Cuyahoga County, in some polling places, voters were either directed to a single line to wait for the next empty booth out of a clump of mixed precinct booths - or were individually directed to empty booths in a different precinct (with the template specific to the precinct to which the booth, not the voter, was assigned).
To vote you stick your card in the template (unless you were handed the card in the template). The template is like a book, with a list of candidate names at the left, with a central punch template in the "binding" area aligned with the holes in your inserted ballot. You vote by finding your candidate name on the template, and use the central punch template to punch the hole adjacent to your candidate in your card.
So - you were given a card for Precinct K when you signed in (which is programmed for Badnarik at the top of the ballot). You are directed to a voting booth set up for Precinct E - which has Kerry at the top of the race. You find Kerry on the top in your template, punch the hole adjacent Kerry (top punch). When the tabulator identifies your card as Precinct K it records your top of the card punch as a vote for Badnarik.
Unless the precincts had different local issues (liquor issues are the only ones I am aware of that divide on precinct lines), there is no way to determine that the card was voted using the wrong template - other than the statistically odd results.
To my knowledge, the misvoted cards were deposited in the correct ballot boxes. That might be an interesting question for audit purposes (signed in voters not matching number of ballots in the box), but I am relatively certain that the tabulation depends on the machine readable precinct ID on the ballot - not the box into which it was inserted.
There is no excuse for what happened. No pollworker should leave training without knowing that you cannot vote your ballot in a booth assigned to another precinct. Doing so is about as effective as taking your pencil and randomly punching holes in your ballot. Some of these workers, based on published reports, were even told by observers/challengers that they were not allowed to direct workers to other booths but continued to do so until midafternoon. (Which matches my experience on another matter in the precinct I worked - I was threatened with arrest if I did not comply with the precinct judge's incorrect assessment of the law - which went uncorrected until around 4 pm when the Board of Elections arrived.)
But - the reports that have been identified reflect incompetence, not fraud. To be a good means of stealing an election, the templates would need to leave the preferred winner in the same position (so the vote counted no matter which template was used). The templates rotate every candidate - so Bush votes as well as Kerry votes would have been misdirected by this maneuver (assuming #3). It would also require the cooperation of the pollworkers (who misdirected the voters), and knowledge that when challenged the pollworker would continue misdirecting voters, and that the Board of Elections would not appear for hours to correct the problem. It should be fixed - but it is just inexcusable bungling, not fraud.
Unfortunately, I do not believe there is any way to recover the votes for this election, absent revoting those precincts.
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