MUST READ:analysis & comparison Ensign & Dodd bills by verifiedvoting.org

[Amaryllis]

http://www.ballotintegrity.org/WhyVIVA2005.pdf
Analysis of Ensign bill prepared by verifiedvoting.org

http://www.ballotintegrity.org/AnalysisofS17.pdf
Analysis of Dodd bill prepared by verifiedvotin.org

[LeahD]

1. thanks n/t

[Amaryllis]

2. kick

[FogerRox]

3. I think it may be good to post the 1st paragraph or so

common pratice for some folks

[Amaryllis]

5. Couldn't; they are PDF files. I do if it's not PDF.

[FogerRox]

6. Ah yes --U R right Maybe if I had looked--DOH--ANdy is not the only

one around that been looking at VIVA---There is a consensus about--
MAny groups are on this--have been onit.

[johnaries]

4. Looks like Andy was right.

These analyses recommend the Ensign Bill over the Dodd, also.

[Andy_Stephenson]

7. I am glad yall are looking into it

yourselves and not just taking my word for it.

Another thing about conyers bill...It will almost guarantee that we use nothing but DRE's.

[Amaryllis]

11. Why? And can you PLEASE post that on the threads about Conyer's bill? And,

what about supporting them both?? Don't see any contradictions

[NVMojo]

8. ensign bill

Why The Ensign Bill is Critical
By
Robert Kibrick, VerifiedVoting.org
Passing a meaningful federal paper ballot requirement ASAP (e.g., a re-introduced
version of Ensign's S. 2437 from last session) is the most urgent priority, as dozens
of States are poised to spend at least $1 billion in HAVA funds in the next few
months on voting systems upgrades to meet that HAVA requirements that become
effective in 2006. Less than a dozen states have enacted a state-level paper trail
requirement (either by legislation or by executive action of their Secretary of State).
In the absence of a federal paper trail requirement, we may see States purchase and
deploy in the next few months hundreds of thousands of new, paperless DRE voting
machines. Once those machines are deployed, it will be that much harder to get
VVPB printers installed after the fact. In fact, we would rather not see any more DREs
deployed, period. With a paper trail requirement in place, most States that are able to do
the math are likely to follow Ohio's lead and switch to precinct-based optical scan
systems, which are inherently voter-verified.
A number of States, like Connecticut and Louisiana already have RFPs in progress for
new voting systems. In Connecticut, they are only accepting vendor bids for DRE voting
systems and are excluding other options like precinct-based optical scan; the deadline
there for vendors to submit bids is in February. Other States are not far behind
Connecticut, and are poised to fast-track the deployment of DREs once bids are accepted
and contracts are let. VerifiedVoting.org is hard at work with TrueVoteCT to try to put
the brakes on Connecticut's RFP, but whether we succeed in that effort remains to be
seen. We are also pushing for a paper trail bill in Connecticut (SB 55), but its prospects
for passage remain unclear.
Given the urgency of this situation, we should push for a federal bill that can be passed as
rapidly as possible, i.e., one like the Ensign bill:
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c108:S.2437:
The Ensign bill establishes a clearly-defined requirement for VVPBs in Federal elections
and establishes that in cases where the electronic record and the VVPB conflict, the
VVPB wins. That is the extent of what it does, and for that reason, it provides fewer
provisions for Congresspersons to disagree with. Of the various bills that were introduced
in the Senate in the last session, it was the only bill to attract bipartisan support (it had 4
Republican cosponsors and 4 Democratic cosponsors, including Harry Reid (D-NV), who
is now the Democratic minority leader and Dick Durbin (D-IL), who is now the
Democratic minority whip).
My recommendation would be to make rapid passage of the Ensign bill in the Senate the
top priority for federal legislation, and to push to find a Congressperson to introduce a
companion bill in the House. We should try to get this legislation enacted in the new
month or two, while there is still momentum on this issue and before dozens more states
commit themselves irrevocably to the widespread deployment of paperless DREs.
2. Once a federal paper trail requirement is in place, focus on more comprehensive
election reform legislation
While getting a federal paper trail requirement in place is the most urgent priority
(because of the imminent purchasing decisions that are about to be made by many
States), it is only a small part of the problem. Without some provisions to require
mandatory, manual audits of those paper-trails, they won't do anything to provide greater
verifiability of election results.
More comprehensive legislation is clearly needed to make paper trails an effective tool
for auditing elections, and additional voting rights legislation is needed to correct the
problems of voter intimidation and vote suppression that were all too apparent in States
like Ohio.
However, such comprehensive legislation is going to be extremely difficult to get passed
in this Congress, and it will likely take many, many months to get such legislation
hammered out and passed. It is quite possible that such comprehensive legislation might
not get passed until 2006. So if we entangle a basic paper trail requirement with this more
comprehensive legislative effort, that basic requirement will likely be put in place too late
to stop the deployment of thousands more paperless DREs.
Although we would prefer to see more rapid passage of comprehensive legislation, the
key thing is to make sure that this comprehensive legislation is in place no later than late
Spring of 2006, so there is time for States and counties to implement its provisions in
time for the Nov. 2006 elections. So we do have a little more breathing room to get this
comprehensive legislation passed, which means we can spend a bit more time to make
sure that we get the very best legislation possible.

[NVMojo]

9. dodd bill

Analysis of the “Voting Opportunity and Technology Enhancement Rights Act of
2005”
On January 25, 2005, Senator Dodd (D-CT) introduced the “Voting Opportunity and
Technology Enhancement Rights Act of 2005” (S. 17) into the U.S. Senate. It was cosponsored
by Senators Reid (D-NV), Stabenow (D-MI), Rockefeller (D-WV), and
Schumer (D-NY). Bob Kibrick, Legislative Analyst for VerifiedVoting.org, has prepared
the following analysis of this bill.
General Comments
There are a couple of good provisions in this bill (e.g., Sec. 5, Provisional Ballots, and
Sec. 7, Election Day Registration), but most of the rest are extremely problematic.
Specific Comments
1. Section 2. Finding and Purposes
Subsection (a) ("Findings") contains several paragraphs of lofty sounding platitudes
(including words from Lincoln). It asserts that "the right of all eligible citizens to vote
and have their vote counted is the cornerstone of a democratic form of government…”
But it says nothing about a right of citizens to have their vote counted in a manner that is
accurate and verifiable.
Subsection (b) ("Purposes") include paragraph (3), which calls for the
expanding/establishing requirements and standards to provide for the accessibility,
accuracy, verifiability, privacy, and security of all voting systems and technology used in
Federal elections. Unfortunately, the provisions, which follow in Section 4, fall short of
providing either accuracy and verifiability.
2. Section 3. National Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot
This creates a new section (Sec. 321 under HAVA Title III and Sec. 297 under HAVA
Title II) that would establish a Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot. The actual format of
this ballot and the standards under which it would be distributed and processed are not
fully defined in this bill but are left to the EAC to define.
While this section may be well intended (i.e., to provide one more way of ensuring that
voters, especially overseas voters, can be assured of at least casting a vote for Federal
offices), it contains a terrible loophole in the proposed §321(b)(2), found on page 5,
lines 1 through 8 of this draft, which reads:
"(2) DEADLINE.- An otherwise eligible national Federal write-in absentee ballot shall
be counted if postmarked or signed before the close of the polls on election day and
received by the appropriate State election official on or before the date which is 10 days
after the date of the election or the date provided for receipt of absentee ballots under
State law, whichever is later.
I have highlighted the "or" between "postmarked" and "signed". The problem with this
deadline is that it provides no mechanism for confirming that a ballot was indeed signed
before the close of the polls. What if a voter completes such a ballot after the close of the
polls, backdates it, signs it, and pops it in the mail? So long as it arrives within the 10-day
window specified in this paragraph, it is to be counted, even if arrives with no postmark
or a postmark indicating it was mailed after the close of the polls.
When coupled with the provision to make such Federal write-in absentee ballots (as
contained in the proposed §297(b)(1), found on page 7, lines 1 through 3 of this draft),
the deadline loophole creates the potential for widespread casting of such ballots after the
polls have closed.
3. Section 4 Voter Verified Ballots
Despite its title, this section does little to establish any meaningful requirement for voter
verified ballots while at the same time interfering with the rights of States to establish
requirements for voter-verified paper ballots. It leaves the ambiguous language of
HAVA's manual audit capacity requirement (§301(a)(2)) unchanged, and while it calls
upon the EAC to establish uniform and non-discriminatory standards for meeting that
requirement , it sets no deadline by which those
standards must be established.
Instead of correcting the known deficiencies in the existing language of HAVA §301(a),
it tacks on a new paragraph (7) ("Voter Verified Ballots") at the end of that subsection.
There it establishes a requirement, effective 1/1/2009, that voting systems must provide
voters with "an independent means of voter verification...which allows each voter to
verify the ballot before it is cast and counted". It further requires the voting system to
provide voters a choice of 4 different verification options: a paper record, audio record,
pictorial record, or electronic/accessible record.
Unfortunately, this new paragraph (7) is incredibly deficient in establishing any
meaningful requirement for a voter-verified ballot, because:
a) This paragraph does not itself explicitly define what it means for a voter to "verify the
ballot". Unlike other pending VVPB legislation (e.g., Ensign's VIVA bill), it does not
require that the voter be able to verify "the accuracy of their ballot". While the existing
HAVA §301(a)(1)(A)(i) specifies that a voting system must "permit the voter to
verify...the votes selected by the voter on the ballot before the ballot is cast and counted",
that language does not include verification by the voter that the votes selected on the
ballot represent the voter's intent. For example, miscalibrated touch screens sometimes
register "voter selections" other than what the voter intended.
b) It fails to make any explicit provision for the voter to be able correct any error that the
voter discovers on any such a voter verified ballot record. While the existing language of
HAVA §301(a)(ii) makes provision for the voter to "change the ballot or correct any
error before the ballot is cast and counted", that clause makes no reference to the "voter
verified ballot records" that are newly-defined in this paragraph; rather, §301(a)(ii) refers
only to the "ballot", which could be construed as the non-voter-verified electronic record
inside a DRE voting machine. Thus, if the voting system produces a "voter verified ballot
record" (either paper, audio, pictorial, or electronic) that is incorrect, the voter is afforded
the opportunity to verify that it is wrong, but then what? Note that while there is a
conforming amendment (see page 9 lines 18 through 23) which amends §301(a)(i) to
make reference to this newly-added paragraph (7) ("Voter Verified Ballots"), there is no
corresponding conforming amendment for §301(a)(ii).
c) This paragraph makes no specification that the voter verified ballot record needs to be
permanent. For example, it does not require that the audio or pictorial records be
maintained after voters have cast their ballots, nor does it provide any specification of
what those records are or how they would be produced. Is a pictorial record a photo of the
selected candidate? What would be the pictorial record for a ballot measure?
d) Nor does it specify that the voter verified ballot record becomes a permanent record
only after the voter has certified that such a record accurately reflects the voter's intent.
e) It fails to specify that the voter verified ballot record (whatever its format) needs to
preserved in any way.
f) It fails to specify that the voter-verified ballot record is itself an official record of the
voter's vote, rather than merely a vehicle for assuring the voter that any non-voterverified
electronic record (maintained invisibly inside a DRE voting machine) is correct.
g) It fails to establish that in any discrepancy between a non-voter-verified (and invisible)
electronic ballot record and a voter-verified ballot record that the voter-verified ballot
record shall be the true and correct record of the votes cast.
h) It fails to establish that the voter-verified ballot records shall be the official records
used for purposes of any recount or audit.
In addition, by imposing a requirement that any voting system must provide voters a
choice of the 4 different methods of verification, it would effectively prevent after
1/1/2009 any further deployment of currently-designed optically scanned ballot systems
(including precinct-count optical scanners and associated ballot marking devices), since
those systems do not provide these 4 choices. This would further narrow the range of
existing HAVA compliant voting technologies from which States could choose to meet
their voting needs, and, over time, would force States to ultimately move to DRE voting
machines.
Further, requiring each voting system to provide these 4 different methods of verifying a
voter-verified ballot record will add consider expense to any system that meets such a
requirement.
In addition, if the voter-verified ballot records are to be used to conduct any type of
meaningful audit or recount, elections officials will be forced to deal with four different
flavors of such voter-verified ballot records, thereby greatly increasing the cost,
complexity, and likelihood for error in any such recount or audit.
With regard to the 1/1/2009 date specified in this paragraph (7), not only do these vague
and ill-defined requirements not become effective until that date but any voting systems
purchased before that date "in order to meet the requirements of paragraph (3)(B)" are
permanently exempted from meeting the "voter-verified ballot" requirements of this
paragraph (see page 9, lines 14 through 17):
(7)(D) The requirements of this paragraph shall not apply to any voting system
purchased before January 1, 2009, in order to meet the requirements of paragraph (3)(B).
The referenced paragraph (3)(B) of HAVA §301(a) reads:
satisfy the requirement of subparagraph (A) accessible to individuals with disabilities] through the use of at least 1 direct recording
electronic voting system or other voting system equipped for individuals with disabilities
at each polling place.
Note that (3)(B) says jurisdictions must deploy "at least 1" such system to meet its
requirement but does not preclude them from deploying more than one. As a result, a
jurisdiction might argue that all of the new voting systems it deployed were done so as to
comply with HAVA's §301(a)(3)(B) requirement.
Taken together, this essentially means that any voting systems purchased prior to
1/1/2009 will be exempt from the "voter verified ballot" requirements of this paragraph
(7), which means that hardly any machines will be required to comply with this
requirement. Given the significant amount of new HAVA funding ($2 billion) proposed
for FY 2006 in Sec. 16 of this bill (see page 25, line 7), most jurisdictions will have
installed their new voting systems well before 1/1/2009, and will thus be exempt from
even the vague "voter verified ballot" requirements of this section.
In any case, by creating such a late deadline, this paragraph fails to put in place ANY
voter verified ballot requirement in time for the next Presidential election in 2008.
In summary, the "voter-verified ballot" requirements established in Section 4 of this bill
do little to provide any meaningful voter-verified ballot requirement on any useful time
scale. Longer term, they will impose complex, ill-defined, and costly mandates on the
States, potentially interfering with State-level voter verified paper ballot bills that have
already been passed into law by a number of States, and further restricting the range of
HAVA-compliant choices from which States can choose to meet their voting system
needs. Other Federal legislation (pertaining to voter-verified ballots) that is about to be
introduced (e.g., Sen. Ensign's Voting Integrity and Verification Act of 2005 and Rep.
Holt's Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2005) does not suffer from
the numerous deficiencies identified for Sen. Dodd's bill.
Section 5. Requirements for Counting Provisional Ballots
No concerns
Section 6. Minimum Required Voting Systems & Poll Workers in Polling Places
Provisions are well intended but need further refinement. For example, in subsection (b)
of the new Section 299 proposed for addition to the new subtitle E of Title II (see page
13, lines 12 through 15), the language calls for:
"(b) DISTRIBUTION. - The standards described in subsection (a) shall provide for a
uniform and nondiscriminatory geographic distribution of such systems and workers"
"Geographic distribution" seems to be a poor method for specifying this; it could be read
to require a given number of voting systems per square mile, regardless of the population
density.
Section 7. Election Day Registration
No comments
Section 8. Integrity of Voter Registration List
Provisions are well intended but inadequate. Would be more effective if the required
public notice prior to an election for Federal office listed all names of voter removed
from the registration list since the most recent Federal election, regardless of whether
those names had previously appeared on any such lists between that prior election and the
one about to occur.
Section 9. Early Voting
Provisions are well intended, but might not give sufficient flexibility to the States and
local jurisdictions. For example, the requirement for uniform hours of operation for each
day of early voting might not provide for optimal accessibility in certain circumstances
and locations, e.g., in towns where the schedules of residents are dominated by factory
schedules that might vary on different days of the week.
Section 10. Acceleration of Study on Election Day as a Public Holiday
No comments
Section 11. Improvements to Voting Systems
Subsection (a) of this section would amend HAVA §301(a)(1)(B) to remove punch card
voting systems and central count voting systems. The net effect would be to prohibit the
use of such systems for ballots that are cast in a polling place. (Presumably, such systems
could still be used for mail-in absentee ballots and mail-in ballots).
While it is probably a worthwhile goal to phase out the continued use of central count
punch card systems for votes cast in the polling place (because such systems fail to
provide any protections against over-voting or under-voting), the proposed language
would also prohibit the use of precinct-count punch card systems, which might not be
advisable.
Large jurisdictions (e.g., Chicago) have made extremely effective use of precinct-count
punch card systems, providing the same level of protections against over-voting and
under-voting as are provided by precinct-count optical scan systems.
Further analysis is needed as to where precinct-count punch card systems should be
banned, as this proposed language would do.
Section 12. Voter Registration
There are some good provisions in this section, but the proposal for voter registration via
the Internet raises serious concerns. It would create the potential for wide scale,
automated, and anonymous alterations of voter registration lists from any location on the
globe. Given the currently unchecked abuses of Internet spammers, the prevalence of
viruses that silently infect millions of machines and enlist them to engage in malicious
attacks on other systems, and the potential for denial of service attacks on voter
registration systems, and you have the potential for widespread voter registration havoc.
Many of the same concerns that make Internet voting problematic make an Internet-based
voter registration system equally problematic.
Section 13. Voter ID
No comments
Section 14. Impartial Administration
This section mandates that States must allow "uniform and nondiscriminatory access to
any polling place for the purposes of observing a Federal election" to various groups,
including:
(A) Party challengers
(B) voting rights and civil rights organizations
(C) nonpartisan and domestic observers and international observers
This could have unintended consequences and could pose additional burdens on States
and jurisdictions with respect to size requirements of polling places.

[NVMojo]

10. the Ensign bill was drafted by the NV SOS, good buddies with * & Rove

...and he's still lying about how Nevada had paper trailed Sequoias statewide on Nov. 6th, when over 50% of the machines voted on in the Nevada election were old Sequoias without printers. Even Reid spewed this lie on national TV when the Election protest went on ...someone forgot to tell him it was't true.

Now the NV SOS has announced his run for Congress, guess he knows how the machines will turn out in Nevada....

[Amaryllis]

12. So what do you think of the bill? Andy likes it a lot...

[Wilms]

13. Not so sure that "Andy likes it a lot".

Yes. He said he's supporting Ensign.

And, yes. He said he can't support Conyers/Dodd.

<http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=203x314989#316051>

[Amaryllis]

14. I guess "likes it a lot" isn't accurate. He just likes it the best of the

lot, and sees it doing some positive things.

[Al-CIAda]

15. kick