Paper ballots ,hand counted or e-voting paper trail

[kster]

Where do we all stand on this?

[shraby]

1. Paper ballots, pen and hand counted.

Only way to go.

[LibDemAlways]

2. Paper ballots...hand counted at the

precinct level with representatives of all parties present as observers.

[understandinglife]

5. And, tallied at the County and State level, in the presence of observers..

....representative of all parties all of whom should be encouraged to audio/video record everything. All ballots, poll books, and paper tally ledgers securely archived.

Peace.

TBO;24/7

[kath]

14. Yes, like in Canada. Their system works well.

[Carolab]

15. Seconded, with counting at the PRECINCT level. n/t

[understandinglife]

3. "Not one line of sw code between a voter and a valid election" (nt)

BE THE BU$H OPPOSITION; 24/7

[kster]

4. Paper ballots hand counted ....AYE......nt

[papau]

6. BBV paper trail ONLY if Venezuela style w/ receipt copy kept for audit

BBV (e-voting) paper trail ONLY if Venezuela style w/ receipt copy kept for audit


:-)

[BeFree]

7. What? We copy Venezuela?

I don't think so.

Paper ballots, hand counted, is the only position we should be taking. It is clear and concise, and everyone knows what we are talking about.

Can we alter our position later on? Of course. There are many variables that, if engineered to our satisfaction, could become acceptable.

But for now, the only position to hold is that the present day use of e-voting must be trashed, leaving only paper ballots, hand counted.

Any other message at this point is too murky, too disorganized, and too weak, to ever ensure any kind of change for the better.

[papau]

8. Venezuela WORKS WELL-fair and auditable - but clear message is

important -

and if Canada can use paper I do not see why we can not!

[kster]

16. I agree fixing e-voting is

like giving the guy who just shot you, his gun back.But to keep yourself safe,before you give it back you put a trigger lock on it.It won't be very long before you get shot again. Got to take the weapons away from the criminal's. Paper ballots only.

[Wilms]

9. Paper - 100% Post-Consumer Recycled Stock, or Hemp n/t

[NationalEnquirer]

10. Paper ideally, the other, if we must. n/t

[Amaryllis]

11. Ideally, hand counted; however, there is an issue with complexity of

our ballots with 30 0r 40 items and some splits all on one ballot. Andy says counting King County by hand with the splits would be nearly impossible. The group of us working on this in my state are still researching the idea. We have paper ballots but Diebold tabulators.
I don't know how we would sell hand counting; in Canada they have more than one ballot. They also use optical scans for some ballots.

See this thread I started on this topic:
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_mesg&forum=203&topic_id=303880&mesg_id=303880

[kster]

12. How did

they count the ballots before all the technology ? If it takes 6 months to count with 200 people counting, it would take 3 months with 400 people counting, and so on and so on.

[Amaryllis]

18. Good question. Now you have got me curious...I can't remember back that

far but I think the ballots must have been simpler?

[KerryReallyWon]

13. No E Voting!!!!

Period.:argh:

[yourout]

17. Seperate Ballot for all Federal Elections.

The rest can be on a state ballot but all federal elections should have one design.

[americanwoman]

19. E-voting w/ paper trail can work IF ...

It is federally mandated that:

1) Every single precinct procures and publicly posts its tallies before releasing ballots or results to the county (or wherever the next tabulating level is).

2) Every voting district performs a hand count of a randomly selected and mathematically significant subset of paper ballots and posts the results of that subset.**

3) State results are publicly posted, including subtotals for every single precinct.

4) All discrepancies between State's recorded precinct results and the precincts own result are publicly reconciled, explained and approved by the precinct.

** If the paper ballot subset results are outside the margin of error, a full hand count of paper ballots is performed. Where there are discrepancies between hand-counted paper ballot results and electronic or machine results, the hand-counted paper rules.

[Dcitizen]

22. wish it worked but I didnt see

any excellent procedure to avoid gemini ballots or
any interactive quality inspection to ensure the software in the storage, memory of the remote machines are identical with the master software from the vendor all day of election. And so, the machine
and software can fool you with another very good looking trail paper.

If there were too many problems of E voting, error or quality uncontrol, we should better leave voting machines alone.

[Bill Bored]

20. I am not unsympathetic to the paper chase

although I think the e-crap + paper can work with the proper safeguards.

However...the reality is that you have Democratic Senators and Congresspeople proposing not one, but 4 simultaneously available voter-verified ballot formats: Audio, Pictorial (whatever THAT is), Paper and "Electronic or other means!" They let the voter decide how to verify their vote. And God help the auditors if they have to audit four kinds of ballots.

And it will be mandated at the Federal level so if you want to have just VVPBs in your state, even with a touch screen, forget about it! (So much for the great Oregonian experiment!)

If we are going to continue to live the reality-based community, we have to face up to this challenge before we can even think about 100% paper and hand counts. Right now, to some Democrats, this is about as quaint as the Geneva Convention is to Gonzales!

We need to work this out with Conyers in this thread:
<http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=203x314989>
(I don't know who's going to break the news to Senator Dodd though.)

[Wilms]

21. Hang on. I'm pretty sure this affects only machines for the disabled.

On the thread you referreced, I wrote...

The section in question would (and if not, we ought to demand it) only affect machines used by people with disabilities. THEY WOULD CHOOSE one of the four offered methods:

(i) A paper record.

(ii) An audio record.

(iii) A pictorial record.

(iv) An electronic record or other means that provides for voter verification that is accessible for individuals with disabilities, including nonvisual accessibility for the blind and visually impaired, in a manner that provides privacy and independence equal to that provided for other voters.

I'll repeat a part of (iv) here...

"...provides for voter verification that is accessible for individuals with disabilities, including nonvisual accessibility for the blind and visually impaired, in a manner that provides privacy and independence equal to that provided for other voters."

That seems to (or it better) apply to i, ii, & iii, as well as iv. It's argued that this is what (or would satisfy what) the disabled want.

So...

On the "Conyer Letter Thread" I asked Teddy if the machine could provide a Paper Ballot in ADDition to whatever the voter preferred. The voter's choice would still be the primary legal record, as they desire, but a paper record would still be available to help verify/cross-check in cases of doubt. I don't know if that would satisfy all parties. I hope others chip in ideas.

It's one of the big sticking points but it may also be quite fixable.
:shrug:

[Bill Bored]

24. I don't think it actually says that

a paper record would still be available to help verify/cross-check in cases of doubt.

And if all four options are ONLY for the disabled, then there's no mandate for paper for anyone else. This needs clarification. The audio one (ii) should work for the blind, but they aren't mentioned until (iv).

I agree in principle that it should be paper + machine + one of the other formats (if desired). But audits and recounts should only use the paper. This is NOT spelled out in the bill that I can see and technically that would discriminate against the disabled in audits and recounts. It's a can of worms, Wilms!

[Wilms]

32. You are correct.

It IS a can of worms, Bill!

[Dcitizen]

23. biometric, uncounterfeit ballots, hand count, statewide, automatic QI

Maybe least error:

Biometric computer system.
Voters can vote any V offices.
Uncounterfeit paper ballots and hand count.
Automatic QI and audition controlled by a third party or Fed.

[Boxer Rebel]

25. Please read Andy Stephenson's thread.

The man knows from voting systems. In a nutshell, we need pen on paper ballots that can be audited. We also need to stay away from system w/ central tabulators that can be hacked.
There are al lot of people who are trying to hold out for 100% hand counted, and I'm sorry but it's a pipe dream fellas, akin to a vote for Nader, and you are hurting the urgent effort to support crucial legislation now.
I'll try to find the link for the two bills and add it later.

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_mesg&forum=203&topic_id=306505&mesg_id=306505

[BeFree]

27. Andy is wrong

We have twelve months before the midterm votes. The only system capable of being fully instituted in those twelve months is paper, hand counted.

The 2006 elections will not be as complex as the last, and the next presidential is 3 years away, so there is time to work the kinks or find an acceptable OS.

Your very idea that "WE" are hurting the current effort to keep e-voting live, I will take as a complement. I hope we do destroy all the e-voting in the next 12 months, then rebuild on the ashes.

Join us, or you can stay in the boat with delay, et al.

[newyawker99]

30. Hi Boxer Rebel!!

Welcome to DU!! :toast:

[floridadem30]

26. hand counted paper ballots

[Land Shark]

28. Paper, hand counted, randomized and split into groups....

If all the paper ballots are counted at the precinct level (either fully or to the extent time allows), then sent to central counting, shuffled or randomized in one large bunch but just marking each as an absentee, provisional or election day vote for statistical purposes, then the entire randomized group would be homogeneous.

Within the homogeneous group, you then split into various groups for counting, each of which has reps of all parties plus independent observers, and they use the counting method that is most accurate: nobody moves on until we all agree on the count.... this virtually eliminates human error and error generally so long as motivated people at cross purposes are present who are not outright crooks, but the crooks are under intense observation by others.

Separated into separate groups with several to many motivated observers in each, it will be nearly impossible for a group to cheat or make a mistake.

But IF THEY DO, since we've randomized the whole population if there are any statistically significant differences BETWEEN groups, we will know to do a recount right away, or, to be more precise, not to release any initial counting totals until double or triple checked.

The additional advantage of this approach is not just accuracy, but also speed: If the number of ballots are just too high for the number of available human counters, a machine scanner can also be used by humans to speed up PART of the counting, but even the machine scanner is being cross-checked by the groups of human hand counters.

Thus we get initial accuracy, we get all the speed we truly need, and it's done mostly with volunteers (even partisan ones) so it shouldn't be hard to staff. But in the worst case scenario, if we had to hire some of the hand counters to have enough, this is a wonderful jobs program that also teaches people about their democracy and will increase their pride in our societal commitment to accuracy and fairness. That should be a good temporary jobs program, perhaps even high school government classes would get the day after elections off so they can stay up late and know one of the answers to what they can do for the their country....

An additional possible fallback is if there are simply too many races on a ballot every now and then, the elections department releases the full counts on the HOT races (at least those expected to be close before the election) on election night or the morning thereafter, along with the PARTIAL machine scan results where machines are used. Then the hand counts and checking can be finished up later on for all the races, with the cross checks as identified above.

I think this would work, would make sense to the average citizen, and would be something the loser of the election could trust. (the most important standard, since winners always trust the system). It also has the benefit of getting rid of and being more accurate than touch screens.

[Stevepol]

29. I'm for whatever we can get that is fair and possible. The best

would be paper all the way I think, just as in Canada. Barring that, a system of electronic voting REQUIRING a paper ballot to use for audits and recounts, and in case of differences between the paper and the machine, the paper always trumps the machine. The paper gets the final say.

Also, if machines are used, AUDITS MUST BE REQUIRED FOR EVERY ELECTION. Just as ATM machines or any other money-handling machine is cross-checked by paper, so every election has to be cross-checked by paper. If a truly randomized method can be found, then maybe 5% of the votes could be counted and if that result shows something well within the margin of error, then well and good, but if there's a result close to the margin of error (but enough to swing the election) or beyond the margin of error, the audits must be done for the whole, which means HAND COUNTING THE WHOLE ELECTION.

To me that would do it. It would be easy to do and if the machines function as they are supposed to operate, then it will make everything easier. If they don't, and I would bet almost any amount of money on it, then the machine makers or programmers must be subject to prosecution, and there should be severe penalties for changing the results of an election. The state could recoup any money spent on fraudulently programmed machines and the company could be sued for any amount of money deemed appropriate up to and including the value of the company itself.

[bardgal]

31. PAPER ONLY/HAND COUNTED - PAPER TRAILS ARE USELESS!!!!!!!

[kk897]

33. Has anyone ever suggested votewatch duty, similar to jury duty?

I'd like to see a system whereby citizens are called upon at random to oversee the voting process, however the vote is conducted. I don't know how I got this idea, if it' s mine or if I read it here or somewhere else a while ago and I just kind of encoded it without attribution--if it's the later, I apologize to that person who *did* come up with the idea.

Anyway, it would work just like jury duty. People would be paid a small amount for their trouble, could be excused on reasonable grounds, would be randomly (as specifically defined by law, natch) drawn from the pool of registered voters in that county, employers would be required to allow time off for votewatch duty, etc.

You'd have a panel of, well, why not 12? registered voters for each precinct (unless there were fewer than 12 voters in a precinct, which could happen, I suppose, in rural areas). Each person would receive training about election fraud and how it has been done in the past, so that each would know what to look for, whether it's punch card, paper-and-pen, touch-screen, or something we've yet to come up with. They'd also receive training on the laws and what to do if they observe the laws being broken.

They'd be required to watch, as a group, the entire process, from preparing the machines or ballot boxes in the warehouse before election day to the count, tabulation, or report after the polls have closed. They'd observe how the ballots are preserved afterward. Perhaps they'd be required to vote absentee beforehand, so they can observe the entire process, not taking time out on election day at all.

It would be each person's responsibility, and the responsiblity of the group as a whole, to watch for any evidence of election fraud, and nothing more.

People would bellyache about votewatch duty the way they do about jury duty, but it would help assure less tampering, and perhaps make all of us feel more empowered politically.

Like all systems, it can be rigged, I'm sure, but it would be harder, I would think.

[thanatonautos]

34. Paper ballots hand counted for federal elections ... mandatory auditing.

Ballots counted at precinct level.

Separate, human readable, opti-scan mark sense
ballots are acceptable for complex local elections,
but only with a system of mandatory random auditing in
place.