have you seen this proposed voting system - by the Open Voting Consortium?

[garybeck]

With all this legislation, we are being forced to educate ourselves about voting technology. one of the key issues is the paper ballot vs. the paper record. unfortunately all the proposed legislation only calls for a paper record, not a paper ballot.

This web site, a FAQ from the Open Voting Consortium, is very informative on this issue. it offers a full description of their proposed system, a good comparison of paper ballots and paper trails, and more.

have a look if you haven't seen it :)

http://www.openvotingconsortium.org/web/portal/73/modules.php?name=FAQ&myfaq=yes&id_cat=9&categories=The+Ballot

excerpt:

· What, exactly, constitutes "the ballot" in the Open Voting system?
In the Open Voting system, the ballot is a paper document that contains the voter's choices. This paper is generated by a printer attached to an Open Voting ballot marking machine used by the voter to make his/her choices for each of the various contests that have been placed before the voter in the election.

Many of these Open Voting ballot marking machines will use touch screen technology, as is found on Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) and other kinds of voting machines. Some of these Open Voting ballot marking machines will be designed for use by voters with physical impairments. In all cases, each Open Voting ballot marking machine will contain a printer that produces the actual paper ballot that contains the voter's choices.

The voter will take the ballot from the Open Voting ballot marking machine's printer. The voter may visually inspect the ballot and may also carry the ballot to a separate machine that will read-back the bar-code on the ballot. This read-back machine is present both to assist sight impaired voters and also to give voters the assurance that the bar-code on the ballot properly mirrors the human-readable text on the ballot.

The choices printed on this ballot do not constitute countable votes until the ballot is "cast" by placing it into a ballot box.

< Back to Top >


· What's the difference between a voter verified ballot and other voter-verified paper trails?

[AuntiBush]

1. I don't get it...

Why can't we have an ATM or Computer system. Print-outs that we can walk away with as receipt-proof we voted a particular way. Hence, no chance of fraud! I don't get it. ATM'S are all over the place. Why not!?!

I know some "thing" has got to be done, and soon!

[Wilms]

2. You could use the receipt to "sell" your vote.

That's the big drawback with receipts.

[FogerRox]

37. Oh yes, plenty chance for fraud--we saw how the recount in Ohio went,

Any audit or recount can be fudged--what we need is a system with the smallest fudge factor possible. You are right you dont get it. Consider that the paper trail is a band-aid, but you are bleeding from a mortal wound.

The legal veracity of a paper receipt needs to be defined, and it has yet to be. If your paper receipt said you voted for Kerry----is that deemed to be the overiding proof, does that paper carry the full legal representaion of your "Ballot", or is your "Ballot" really stuck in a DRE?

Hence a chance (big) for fraud.


I don't get it..."
Posted by AuntiBush
Why can't we have an ATM or Computer system. Print-outs that we can walk away with as receipt-proof we voted a particular way. Hence, no chance of fraud!

[demobabe]

68. How do you know who you voted for? Even with a "receipt"?

ATMs work for banking because of the accounting system that goes along with them. If your bank did funny stuff with your money, they'd be out of business in a flash. You get a statement from your bank every month so you can check. With electronic voting machines, there is no way to check your "transaction".

Once your vote goes into the ATM machine, how do you know it was actually recorded for your candidate?

You might be able to walk away with a receipt, with a number on it, which you can somehow verify (such as on the internet), but ultimately, you really don't know if what you punched into the machine is what is recorded.

I could write a program that printed up a receipt for you and allocated your votes the way I wanted them to be, and you'd never know.

[sacxtra]

124. Banks and ATM's get CRACKED ALL THE TIME!

Banks and ATM's get cracked all the time.
It's an acceptable loss to banks.

It's acceptable to you to have your vote lost?

Forget all these god damn laws, act's, measures, and legislation.
They're all fucking bullshit. They ALL IGNORE THE PROBLEMS WITH DIGITIZED DATA, AND NETWORKS.

[Wilms]

3. They're throwing a lot of words (and a typo) around.

They've got:

1. voter verified ballot
2. voter-verified paper trails
3. voter-verified paper train

Here's a chunk...

"What's the difference between a voter verified ballot and other voter-verified paper trails?

As long as the law or regulation that establishes the voter-verified paper trail specifies that the voter-verified paper trail is to be used in the case of a manual recount and in mandatory random spot-checks of machine-produced vote tallies, then a voter verified ballot an a voter-verified paper train are basically the same.

The important points of any voter-verified system are:

--The voter has an opportunity to verify a tamper-resistant record of their vote.

--That record is used in the event of a manual recount.

--When machine-produced vote tallies are used, a random sample of machine tallies are compared to a manual count of those records."


Is anyone satisfied with that description?


And we still have the question of Holt's "Record".

[Bill Bored]

13. I'm satisfied.

Is there a lawyer in the house who can find a problem with a "voter verified paper record" to be used as the "official record of the vote", or whatever the actual language in Holt's bill (H.R. 550) is? Isn't this the definition of a voter-verified paper ballot, if you were going to put it in the dictionary?

It would be a shame to get hung up pure semantics if the meaning is legally the same as a voter-verified paper ballot.

Also, the term "ballot" implies to some that the voter is physically marking the paper and it is therefore redundant to say that this is voter-verified. It may not be wrong, but it can be misinterpreted since there are those who for reasons of disability, can not mark the paper, or verify it and a printout of the voter's choices would be acceptable too as long as it were the official record of the vote.

I think while the VVPB is a useful term, it's not necessarily the only way to say what we mean or what we can accept.

If I'm wrong, I'd be happy to listen.

[Wilms]

26. If I understood Gary.

He was saying that a "VVPB" that goes in a box without ever again seeing the light of day (Ensign), is not the first thing that comes to mind when you say "VVPB"

Used for mandatory audits (Holt/Conyers, sort of). Nice, but that's not the full count.

Used for recounts. Nice, but have you done any recounting in, say, NM, lately?

It's tricky to define.

I was hoping GB would comment on your post.

[Bill Bored]

29. Recounts

This is a whole other area of the law. Specifically: Who pays for recounts and when are they even permitted? Much of the objections to recounts from Board of Elections hacks (uh, I mean officials) is that the taxpayers shouldn't have to foot the bill if it's not a close election.

[Wilms]

35. That's why I appreciate the specification of an audit.

Assuming the audit would really work, that might be the key to stopping fraud at the polling station.

I wonder, if we could get them to carry paper from the precinct to the county and toss the tabulator, except to use it for a "preliminary"?

[sacxtra]

125. AUDIT ALERT, AUDIT ALERT, AUDIT ALERT

Audit all the hell you want.

You'll never get VERIFICATION when you AUDIT DIGITAL DATA.

IT FUCKING CAN'T BE DONE!

[LaraOVC]

54. OVC is not satisfied

"The important points of any voter-verified system are:

--The voter has an opportunity to verify a tamper-resistant record of their vote."

Yes!

"--That record is used in the event of a manual recount."

Obviously.

"--When machine-produced vote tallies are used, a random sample of machine tallies are compared to a manual count of those records.""

Not good enough. First of all, random sample of machine tallies are very rarely done. California election code states that the precincts that are recounted have to be random, but they're not and Connie McCormick (County Registrar in LA) will admit to that.

In order to avoid this problem, the paper AND the electronic records need to BOTH be counted. If there is a difference in the numbers, then something went horribly wrong and the whole system needs a thorough investigation. This is the OVC system. It prevents ballot box stuffing (by auditing the paper ballots with the machine tally) and electronic vote changing (by auditing the electronic tallies with the paper tally). Everything is cross-checked.


Lara, OVC



Is anyone satisfied with that description?

[bardgal]

4. Why is this so HARD TO UNDERSTAND?????? BAN E-VOTING!!!!

PERIOD! I'm sorry for screaming, but it's just THAT SIMPLE. E-voting is the easiest way to hijack the vote on a massive scale.

GET RID OF IT ALTOGETHER!

[WeHoldTheseTruths]

5. AMEN! EXACTLY! n/m

[LaraOVC]

55. hand count everything?

So, do you want to hand count ballots where there are 40 different contests?

Do you want to hand count instant run-off voting contests?

-Lara, OVC

[Wilms]

64. Actually, we do.

We're not in a hurry.

In fact, I'm ok with ANY automated totally unsecured devices used for inaccurate tallies announcing a "preliminary results". And I'd wait for the hand-count for the official result.

I'll bet that's the only security these machines would require. If their tallies were not used for official results, you'll see the machines accuracy improve. :)

[sacxtra]

128. BAN ELECTRONIC PRELIMINARY RESULTS TOO

Wilms, you are wrong.


IT'S NOT OKAY TO USE DIGITIZED DATA for PRELIMINARY RESULTS.


WHO PAYS FOR IT?
A: We do. It's WASTING MONEY!


WHO TRADITIONALLY BENEFITS FROM THE DIS-INFORMATION?
A: Evil Election Hackers Who are Above the Law.


Why do you want this expensive electronic equipment in our elections?

You Must own stocks for DieBoLD, ESS, and all the Rest of the EVIL bastard fucking domestic terrorists??

Or you work the Mainstream Media angle, so they can fuck with the results and spew out quality social engineering propaganda?

Why would I want to see on TV?!
(My candidate)Joe, is loosing in the ELECTRONIC DIGITIZED DATA POLLS.

So no need to show up to vote... I'll be a spectator. Have another beer.

Whoops, you've just won the "I BEEN SOCIALLY ENGINEERED by DOMESTIC TERRORISTS" contest.

You didn't even get a T-Shirt.

But I will provide you with a nice photo to make a T-Shirt out of...

[demobabe]

66. Yes, absolutely.

Or at least we want to be able to watch the count and inspect all parts of it. Optical scan isn't such a bad system if you can keep a public eye on the central tabulators.

The OVC, while I think you guys have a great system, it's trading one complicated and disaster-fraught system for another complicated (read: chance for more things to go wrong) system.

The more complex we make voting, the worse it's going to get. Period.

The other problem the OVC faces is that the HAVA allocated funds for states to purchase new voting machinery. You're fighting an uphill battle to sell new machines to places that just bought a bunch of machines and will not be able to cost-justify or politically-justify throwing the old ones away.

Imagine you're in charge of elections in Littletown in Small County, Anywhere, USA. You just spent $8 million to buy electronic voting machines. How are you going to break it to your boss you want to flush $8 million down the drain?

It doesn't work.

Einstein said, "We can't solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them."

The OVC should think about this.

[sacxtra]

129. YOUR CLUELESS! You CANT KEEP AN EYE ON A CENTRAL TABULATOR!

IT'S FUCKING DIGITAL!

God DAMn.

No wonder our country is going to fucking Shit.

[sacxtra]

127. DEATH TO ACT'S, LAWS, LEGISLATION THAT IGNORE DIGITIZED DATA

You don't have to be a rocket scientist to understand the following photo which I threw together.

[marions ghost]

6. so why ?????

do we need to have ballots with bar codes on them?

I'm not sure of the mission of this openvoting consortium.org
They seem to have good info--their main concern seems to be open source code? They also seem to be pushing the Open Voting Ballot Marking Machine, which they say are comparable to touchscreens? So are these DREs by another (more acceptible) name?

How do yu see it, garybeck?

[Wilms]

7. Re: touch screens "So are these DREs by another (more acceptable) name?"

A touch screen is not necessarily a DRE.

[marions ghost]

9. what do you think of

the move to bar-code ballots, as described on the Open Voting Consortium website?

Also, this might be a personal question Wilms, so dont answer if you dont feel like it, but have you ever voted with (direct) paper ballots? Just curious. Sometimes I wonder if people who are OK with the idea of printouts from individual voting machines have ever seen how easy it is just to mark a ballot in the same way you take standardized tests, and feed it into a counter. I freely admit I've never voted on touchscreens, but from what I've seen I wouldn't want to. I use computers everyday and am not anti-technology, but I just don't think individual voting machines are warranted. And some real computer geeks I know agree, so I know I'm not way out in left field. I don't even think I need an "Open Voting Ballot Marking Machine," which is not a DRE. I don't need a machine to help me make a few marks on paper, but somebody else sure thinks I do.:)

[Wilms]

11. What IS the bar code about??

On the OVC site, the link for a picture of it is dead. Why can't the ballot reader just read a mark next to the selected name??

I've used only ink-a-vote, the stylus punch thing.

I'd be happy to mark a ballot by hand, myself.

However...

DRE's DO provide advantages from the point of view of some (not all) BoE's and some but not all people with disabilities.

1. It's much easier to create the "ballot template".

2. It's much easier to administer the election in multiple languages.

3. The disabilities access and privacy issue is easier to deal with.

4. And it's easier to tally (and manipulate) the vote.


A "non-DRE" "Touch Screen Ballot Marker" can satisfy 1-3 above (and , I think, satisfy our security concerns). The Auto-Mark is one of a few examples of a "Touch Screen Ballot Marker". It is also most-but-not-all-disabilities enabled.

And I'm definitely not in favor of technology that is counter-productive (as most probably is).

MG, you wrote:

"I don't even think I need an "Open Voting Ballot Marking Machine," which is not a DRE. I don't need a machine to help me make a few marks on paper, but somebody else sure thinks I do"

But again, this is not about able-bodied voters. The whole issue surrounds the disabled, the non-English literates, illiterates, etc.

Until we realize that, we're gonna have a rough time. The first thing we need to do is understand what it is that we're trying to deal with.

[Carolab]

27. And that's another Repuke hypocrisy...

seeing as how they are actually actively disenfranchising the illiterates and the non-English literates.

Also, think they REALLY care about disabled voters? It's just another excuse to implement automated systems, like Automark.

What happened in the "old days" when we used hand-counted paper ballots and voters were illiterate, non-English and disabled? Did they NEVER vote?

[LaraOVC]

57. disabled voters

Exactly. People who are sight and/or reading impaired need to be able to vote without assistance. The OVC system does that.

-Lara, OVC

[WillYourVoteBCounted]

99. No one votes un-assisted on a computer

There is a fallacy at large that DREs or touchscreens, or voting machines with sip-puff straws, or audio phones allow the disabled to vote un-assisted.

No one votes un-assisted by computer.

You are assisted by someone you don't know,
that you didn't choose,
that may not agree with your politics,
that is in essence casting your vote for you,
that may not even have the right to vote themselves
and
that is all done by the computer's programming.


The disabled might be better off having someone they
know and trust to mark their ballot for them.

Instead, we are all being assisted by these un-known
strangers.

[Wilms]

100. Of course it is a fallacy.

Another fallacy is that we couldn't fashion a system that enabled those with all kinds of diabilities to vote with privacy and security using a purpose built 'paper ballot based' system.


You said...

"The disabled might be better off having someone they know and trust to mark their ballot for them."

Here's what some diabled experience...

"You are assisted by someone you don't know,
that you didn't choose,
that may not agree with your politics,
that is in essence casting your vote for you,
that may not even have the right to vote themselves..."

[WillYourVoteBCounted]

108. paper solutions for disabled

If someone can develop a voting system that is paper ballot based and fully disabled accessible that also provides privacy, security and marks the ballot as the voter intended, then that system should be built.

There are some paper solutions for disabled -
tactile ballots - these can be used by the blind, do not require knowledge of braille.

The tactile ballot does require that you can hear the audio tape that reads out the ballot and instructions to you.

Tactile ballots do not work for some of the blind who have diabetic neuropathy. (The feeling in the fingertips or other extremeties is diminished). Some complications of diabetes are blindness and/or diabetic neuropathy.

Braille ballots do not work for those who can't read braille, or have diabetic neuropathy.

Paper Ballots marked by a ballot marking device. There is a machine called the automark, that reads the ballot for the blind or disabled, and helps them to mark the ballot.

The ballot can be counted by machine or hand.

I don't know of purely paper solutions that work with a sip puff straw, etc.

With the machine, even with the tactile ballot, there is no way for the blind person to "see" that the ballot has not been tampered with.

While there must be another way for the disabled to have their ballots read to them in a way they can understand, and a way for them to mark their ballots with no human assistance or intervention, is there any such way in existence?

Even with the auto mark or the tactile ballot, they have to "blindly" trust that the ballot is being read correctly to them, and that they are getting accurate and honest assistance in marking that ballot.

The Help American out of it's Vote Act (HAVA) requires that states accepting HAVA funding must provide fully disabled accessible voting systems at each precinct.

[sacxtra]

130. DISABLED CAN USE A COMPUTER TO PRINT A PAPER FUCKING BALLOT

THE DISABLED CAN USE A COMPUTER TO *PRINT* A PAPER FUCKING BALLOT.

THIS BALLOT WILL BE EXACTLY THE SAME AS NORMAL PAPER BALLOTS!~
Wow. What a concept.

THEN THE PAPER BALLOT GETS DROPPED IN THE BOX, JUST LIKE EVERY OTHER PAPER BALLOT.

Then they get counted manually.

ALL THE OTHER ELECTRONIC IDEAS ARE SOCIAL ENGENEERING, PROPAGANDA, AND CORUPTION.

IGNORE THIS AT YOUR OWN PERIL

[garybeck]

18. a touchscreen is far from a DRE, but the website makes a CRUCIAL error

a touchscreen is nothing more than a ballot printing machine.

if the printed ballots from the touch screen machine are really the BALLOTS that are counted in the election (not an audit or a recount) then it's a far cry from a DRE. True, optical scanners are proposed in their system, but they believe that with open source code, etc, they can fix the optical scanner problem, especially if there are random audits. I say, well maybe.

But on a looking closer at this web site, it appears they are contributing to the confusion, buy trying to say that a paper record that is used in an audit or recount is a ballot.

I SAY THAT IS CRAP. WE SHOULD NOT ACCEPT THIS. A BALLOT IS ONLY A BALLOT IF IT IS COUNTED.

For this reason i am going to try to contact the people at that website discuss it with them. Maybe others should do the same. Their statement that a paper record and a paper ballot are "essentially the same" is LUDICROUS. It shows me they don't understand the problem. It makes me question this whole organization. Who are the "experts" in this subject anyway?

[Amaryllis]

33. Glad you are taking this on, Gary. I've had the same questions about this.

[KoKo]

51. These machines can malfunction on election day. Adding a printer only

makes the likelyhood greater of a technological breakdown. The more equipment the more likely a "glitch" can occurr. Also training the poll workers to handle these machines costs more and the necessity to "upgrade" the machines after a few years makes them less cost effective.

That would be my problem with using them as a solution. At least the "Opti-scans" have a marked ballot which can be used for recount. Even they can break down on Election Day...but verifiable hand marked paper ballot is the only way to go, imho. That's what we are pushing for here in NC and it's very hard because the influence of the "Touch Screen Makers" is enormous with our State Legislators. And, for some reason the Lobbyists for People with Disabilities seems to be working hand in hand with ESS/Diebold/Unilect and the rest. I fail to see how trying to use a touch screen is easier for someone with Macular Degeneration or other disability. And, these folks never explain why people with disabilities can't have some help either in the polling station or outside by using an "absentee ballot" where they can take the time they need to fill it out, or have someone help them. I think it's a red herring or the Lobbyists are paid off by the machine makers. :shrug:

[BeFree]

52. Good points, KoKo01

Adding a printer to the mix is problematic. But, as you state, it looks like that's all we will be getting this time around. So, we need to make the best of a little better situation.

Don't get me wrong, I am in favor of Paper Ballots, hand counted. But the reality is the BOEs will hang to the very end with their touchscreens. If we can at least get them hooked up to printers, and the next election shows up even more problems with the touchies, everybody will see what a waste it all is, and finally see the wisdom in plain old paper.

A very influential person in my community had little idea of the problems with DREs when we first spoke about them. Now he says he knows what I've been talking about. Just the other day he was describing to me the opti-scan system he saw on TV! He likes it. So, we are geting somewhere; we may not get all we want this time around, but we have scored.

[Amaryllis]

101. In Oregon, many disabled love vote by mail because it solves all the

mobility issues. Still doesn't solve for blindness and certain other disabilities and OR is poised to buy DREs for disabled voters who can't fill out paper ballots. We are working on alternatives; Myth Breakers offers several options.

[msongs]

8. I wrote them..they are very sensitive about criticism...BUT >>>>

they key thing is that any machines create a PAPER BALLOT that is the ballot of record for counting votes and declaring winners. It is the ballot of record for all recounts or contested elections.

the machine is merely a device to create a PAPER ballot of record. The machine can total votes for information purposes but cannot be the count of record.

AND>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>all ballots must be publicly counted at the precinct/voting station and the results publicly posted before any results are forwarded to a central tabulation center. the count of PAPER ballots at the precinct level is the OFFICIAL count, which can then be forwarded to a central tabulating center.

I emailed them about the BAR CODE thing, and said it was no more reliable than a diebold machine count, since most people cannot read a bar code and got a Nasty response telling me I did not know anything and ought not be working on this issue. I was told the bar code merely repeated the text ballot marking by the voter, but if YOU cannot read it YOU cannot be sure what it says, eh?

Msongs
www.msongs.com/political-shirts.htm

[marions ghost]

10. thanks msongs

yeah my antennae are up about the bar code thing also.

The fact that you got a nasty response indicates to me that somebody has a vested interest in this device, and is not entirely confident with explaining the need for bar codes. Hmmm, saves me the trouble--I was going to inquire directly to them on that. Now WHY would they be pushing the use of bar codes? Does anybody have any guesses?

Seems clear to me--if the voter cannot READ the bar code, how can you verify the vote? Once again we are being asked to trust a machine after seeing how they screw up all over the place. I am ALWAYS suspicious when someone says "you don't NEED to know...."

[LaraOVC]

58. Bar Code

The ballots have the names of the people you voted for typed on them too, so they could be hand-counted as well and they are fully auditable. The bar code system is used because it is the easiest way of doing large-scale counting of paper. Kathy Dopp from US Count Votes says bar code systems are really safe and secure. She said the OVC system was "the best she has ever seen!"

Jeez, you guys. I know it's good to be paranoid, but the OVC is a non-profit and is flat broke right now (trust me, I know, I am the Director of Development). We are not in cahootz with any bar code device companies, I promise.

Lara, OVC

[Wilms]

63. Hi Lara

Nice to have spoken with you at the teach-in.

You just remarked...

"The ballots have the names of the people you voted for typed on them too, so they could be hand-counted as well and they are fully auditable."

Are there not question surrounding privacy with such a procedure??

[LaraOVC]

87. privacy

Your vote is private because you carry it over in a folder to the ballot box. The poll worker takes it out of the folder upside down and puts it in the ballot box. If you want to be able to verify your vote, you have to be able to see who you voted for written on the page.

[Wilms]

89. Thanks. That's probably good for most voters.

It won't accommodate all mobility-limited voters, but I'm not aware of a paper producing system that does.

I wish we had one. As best I can tell, that is one of the boulders blocking the road to DRE-less systems.

[LaraOVC]

91. mobility limited voters

Yes, I know if someone doesn't have arms (let's say) someone will have to take the paper from the printer and turn it in for them (which is still not ideal). But at least they can watch them (if they're not also sight-impaired) and make sure they are not peaking at their vote...

If you can think of a way of making this system fully adaptable to ALL people with disabilities, PLEASE let us know! :)

[Wilms]

93. That's not a technical problem. It's a legislative problem.

A machine that takes a marked ballot and shuttles it to a ballot reader, and after voter verification into a lock box, might do the trick. I doubt it would take much for your system to interface with such an arrangement.

It would provide "access and privacy" to the mobility-limited and resolve one of the only remaining arguments for using DRE's.

[LaraOVC]

95. good idea, given a budget

Yes, given enough money for such a device, I think this could work. Maybe you could be on some sort of advisory board for OVC for helping us keep the system accessible to the disabled. Are you part of any organizations? Would you be interested in something like that?

[Wilms]

97. Wouldn't be cheap, no.

I am not with any organization, just a participant here.

I've been focusing on the disabilities issues because it seems to be the main area where reforming the equipment part of the election process is bogged down.

What some security advocates cite would leave many a disbled voter disenfranchised to some degree.

What some disbilities communities advocates cite would leave all voters votes at risk.

And the two sides talk right past one another.

To any degree I might be able to help in the reform process I'm interested.

[Amaryllis]

102. Wilms, have you looked at the options in Myth Breakers yet for disabled?

[Wilms]

105. Yes

Pardon my not digging for the quote, but it acknowledged that their proposal didn't provide "privacy" for some mobility-limited voters.

I think it was you that encouraged me to review that document. And it confirmed, for me, the sticking point of the debate.

[Amaryllis]

106. There were a number of options. Do touch screens provide privacy? Vote

by mail is great for disabled whose primary issue is mobility.

[Wilms]

109. Some mobility-limited voters are left unaccommodated, despite the options

What's "great" about not being able to go to a polling place and vote with complete "Access, Privacy, and Security"?

Voting at home is an excuse...not a solution.

[Amaryllis]

110. Vote by mail has very strong support by the disabled community in OR. What

do you mean, it's an excuse? As I said, some are still left unaccomodated, but we are working on that. We had a fewer problems than any other state in the country. We are working on the tabulator issue and the issue of disabled voters for whom vote by mail does not work. But it has a lot to recommend it.

[Wilms]

113. Fill me in.

1. Please cite "Vote by mail has very strong support by the disabled community in OR."

2. Re: "As I said, some are still left unaccomodated" OK, we are in agreement.

3. Re: "but we are working on that". What are the specific issues that have come up, and what possible solutions have been offered

[sacxtra]

131. VOTING ELECTRONICALLY IS DOMESTIC TERRORISM

[demobabe]

69. Think Silicon Valley startup

msongs said:

"The fact that you got a nasty response indicates to me that somebody has a vested interest in this device, and is not entirely confident with explaining the need for bar codes."

Of course someone has a vested interest in the device. Someone has to make, sell, and support the machines. This stuff isn't free, and election officials aren't going to buy a product that doesn't have some kind of support.

Essentially this is a kinder, gentler Diebold - as much as I hate to call them that.

But as long as you have this kind of system, there has to be some kind of business structure - there's no getting around it. No matter what you do, you're still building yet another voting machine company.

[LaraOVC]

86. OVC = public radio of voting

Think of the Open Voting Consortium as the public radio of voting systems. True- it has to have a business structure. Almost all non-profits (unless their extremely tiny) have business-like structures. Trust me, I've worked enough to know that sometimes non-profits can be even more hierarchical than businesses.
But trust me, the OVC isn't like a corporation. I work with these guys on a day-to-day business. Alan- the president- is a really great guy and is easy to talk to. He's one of the best "bosses" I've ever had. He doesn't even really consider himself my boss, says he's just here to give me guidance, etc. It's a great working relationship. And I know for a fact he's in this for all of the right reasons. We are NOT in this to make a profit. That said, it would be nice if we could pay the rent and eat, etc, so we do have to try to make some money from this.
Just think of the OVC as the public radio of voting. We are owned by people (member supported), accept feedback and comments from people, and have the people's best interest in mind. But even public radio stations make money so they can pay rent....

Lara

[LaraOVC]

56. Bar code

Hi,
I appologize you got such a nasty reply. Who wrote back to you (email me privately and let me know who). These guys are all computer scientists and academics and have no clue how to do any sort of grass-roots outreach.
You can verify the bar code is right by scanning it and listening to it through headphones (this is also how the blind can vote without assistance). All machines use open source software too, so if the machine was programmed to print an incorrect barcode one of the "geeks of America" (as Jim March of Black Box Voting says) would catch it.

Lara, OVC

[BeFree]

12. ballot is "cast" by placing it into a ballot box.

Then how will the ballot be counted? Will a machine count and tabulate the votes with some hidden software?

Most election workers don't want to hand count the ballots. That's why they love DREs - Direct Record Electronic.

We won't be getting rid of DRE type machines any time soon. The best we can do is hook them up to a printer and print - like on a supermarket type of paper tape - the votes as cast.

Ya with me?

Now, on that paper tape, hidden from the voter's view, would have a running total of the votes cast. It adds your vote to the ones before, ya know, 1 + 234 = 235. 1 + 235 = 236, and so on.

Such a tape would be easily audited and be a voter verified, OFFICIAL paper ballot. All the tabulations, additions, and subtractions the DRE perfoms would be printed on the ballot. No secrets, and easily audited.

[marions ghost]

14. can I ask you

if you have ever voted with paper ballot/optiscan? It's a lot easier than using DREs. Election officials would not have to hand count all the ballots. They would use simple opti-scanners, along with trained volunteers who would conduct verification hand counts to make sure the scanners are correct. This system is easier than DREs. I just read something on this which said that actually it is not election officials who want DREs.

[BeFree]

15. Sure. The answer is no

I have voted on 30+ punch card ballots, 2 lever machines and two DREs.
I will never vote on a DRE again, and I told the election office just that.

Optical scan looks pretty good, except that the votes are counted/tabulated by software. I know, there are calls for the software to be open, that's good, but it ain't good enough.

Now, if the opti scan was to have a running total tape attached to it, I like!

Same as with the DRE running total tape, an opti scan machine, printing to paper with each and every vote printed, might stop the machines from miscounting, or at least, the count would be easily audited. AND, the opti scan counter could print on the paper ballot the way the ballot was tabulated. If the two (the voters marks and the machine printed) marks didn't match, you would know the software was in error.

My view on the DREs is that we will not be able to outlaw them. I don't like that idea one bit, but I feel that it will be the reality in the next election. So.... how do we audit the DREs? Make them print each and every vote on a paper ballot. And using the same idea with opti scan would prove to be trustworthy.

Paper Ballots all the way.

[marions ghost]

21. OK thanks

for explanation BeFree. I see we're pretty much on the same page in calling for paper.

Right, make DREs print a paper "something" verifiable --is the least they can do if they're going to stick with them. But I really don't even see the justification for sticking with them at all, except for the disabled. I like you, hope never to be voting with a DRE any time soon. Those of us who DONT want to use them should have the option.

[Wilms]

17. "This system is easier than DREs"

MG,

I replied to you asking me about all this in post 11.

Are you ignoring me, the disabilities community, non-DRE Touchscreens, non-English literates, illiterates, people with cognitive difficulty, or some combination??


Ya got a link for the "I just read something". Maybe it was one I posted on the daily thread. Fact is some BoE's want it, some don't. Some know the difference between a DRE and non-DRE Touch Screen Ballot Marker, some (like many here) don't. Or may not want too (perhaps, like many here).


Short of acknowleging, in full, the issues brought up by the opposition, and facing them one by one, I recommend we do what was suggested in post 15. Tell the BoE's we'll never vote on a DRE again.

Yeah. That'll do it. Should have thought of that before.

[BeFree]

19. Dear Wilms

To be perfectly clear: I told the elections office that I would never vote on a DRE again, AND I told them I was going to see to it that no one else in my county would.

I am working to see that come true in ways you may never be able to grasp. If you were an activist for over twenty years, like me, you might know whereof I speak.

Your comments to MG are well taken... the complete destruction of DREs is a long way off. IMO, all we can do at this point is nip at the heels, making life miserable enough for the owners, so they become more honest by 2006.

[Wilms]

24. BF, I'm guilty of not being clear, too. And of treating you badly.

I apologize for that. It was unfair to blast you for stating what I often see on DU, just because I don't like it.

As to our activism, I'm glad we both would offer a pile war stories over a pitcher. :)

I'm guilty of not being perfectly clear, or, at least, not enough, given the problem we're all having with terminology.

I think I myself may have referred, at times, to Touch Screens as DRE's. And, in some of my comments, I've come off as having a preference for something when I'm merely acknowledging it as an issue I feel must be addressed or we'll have a very difficult time reforming the system.

I'm frustrated, too, that what we advocate in the extreme, would dis-enfranchise millions.

I'm serious about the disabled. I've known too many (who'd run intellectual circles around all of us) who would not be able to vote with privacy, if we were able to implement our choice in the extreme, ie: no electronics.

From what I've read from the 'experts' on both sides of the debate, it's obvious that they are screaming past one another. It's like listening in on an argument knowing full well that each party is not telling the full truth, is shading or ignoring facts, or just to ignorant given the power wielded.

Meanwhile, I believe a non-DRE machine could, ultimately, be devised to serve ALL disabilities. But that would take the parties LISTENING.

And they're not. It's disheartening.

Have a look at this post on a thread Bill Bored put up on the Disabilities Board. It reminds me of when I served on the board of a children's program. At the end of most meetings, I'd raise my hand to remind the group that we'd just spent another three hours without having once discussed...you guessed it, children.

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=250x493#496

Kind of sad. No?

Again, sorry for piling on you.

[BeFree]

28. Thanks, Wilms

It isn't easy keeping things together here with all the different terms and technologies on the table, but at least we are listening.

The disability issue is important. With all the ways of casting ballots I'm sure one or more will suffice for ensuring the disabled will be taken care of.

What concerns me most is that some ballots are backed up only with electrons, electrons controlled by secret software. That is an issue we all agree must end. The current laws being written, I think, will put an end to some of that.

Our holy grail is Paper Ballots. We are almost there, and as long as we keep listening, we will get to having nothing but paper ballots and an open and honest way of counting and tabulating those ballots.

I know we can do this, lets keep it together, keep listening, and never stop until we get what we want.

I've seen a lot of your posts and am confident your desires and mine are congruent. Thanks for listening.

[sacxtra]

132. BANNING DIGITIZED DATA IS NOT EXTREME, IT IS CORRECT

You say "banning electronics is extreme."

Allowing electronics is already a catastrophy.

Digitized data CAN NOT be VERIFIED.

[marions ghost]

23. Not ignoring anybody...

In post #14 I was replying to BeFree. Did you think I was talking to you, wilms?

OK OK--I realize that you have helpfully listed all the "pluses" of touchscreens. I have memorized them awhile back. But I remain unconvinced that touchscreens really are critical re. language issues. Printing biligual Spanish/English ballots would not be difficult. Other non-English speakers could use pre-election voting aids. For ex. I'd like to see a website that would help prepare non-English speakers to vote. They can take notes in with them to the polls also. I don't think it's a big deal.

As I think you are aware, I am in agreement with the availability of disabled access voting machines--most states seem to get that point it seems. Not a problem.
---------------
I can't tell whether you are being sarcastic or what in your last sentence. I'm certainly not under any delusion about how difficult it would be to get any state BOES to give up their DREs if they already have them. I think those poor voters who have them are doomed to more beta-testing, hopefully with paper something or other. That's not really my point.

My point is--defining what really does work, if we can. I'm interested in voter confidence. I'm interested in promoting the best possible system from the voter's perspective. I still believe that optiscan is easy, fast (you can move a lot of voters through) and time-tested. Yes, I maintain it's easier to administer and use than DREs. Definitely much cheaper. Apparently you don't think so? OK, well we can disagree. It may come down to people who refuse to use DREs demanding an alternative, even going to court if necessary. Believe me, I'm NOT delusional about the opposition. This discussion is productive, but I don't think we all have to agree. I know I'm taking a very hard line, but I think that it's necessary. Hope this helps you understand where I'm coming from. So far, there's nothing I've seen that would make me budge from my position. But I'm still interested in other opinions, and do not ignore them.

[Wilms]

25. Post 24 n/t

[Amaryllis]

103. HAve you read Myth Breakers yet and looked at their options for

disabled voters? http://www.votersunite.org/takeaction/mythbreakers.pdf

[marions ghost]

111. I have read Mythbreakers

Is there a problem with what they advocate for disabled voters? I think most states are on board with the need for disabled access, from what I have read from individual states access.

I don't quite understand your question. My position is paper ballots, EXCEPT where electronic "marking devices" or voting machines are appropriate for the disabled (and then a paper ballot must be generated by the machine).

[Wilms]

114. Yes. There is a problem.

And it is cited right in the myth-filled MythBreakers document. What is proposed for the disabled will not accommodate all mobility-limited voters.

Page 54:

"While ballot templates would not provide accessibility to voters with severe manual disabilities or tactile insensitivity, if used with a Braille instruction sheet, they would allow voters who are both blind and deaf to vote unassisted – an advantage neither DREs nor ballot-marking devices have."

(Note: That statement also indicates an ignorance about the blind. Most of them can't read Braille. And it brings up access for the blind even though the subject is mobility-limited voters. Do you see that?? That's not reasonable to me, and it's certainly a red-flag for opponents.)

It is that very issue of "voters with severe manual disabilities" that much of this DRE issue is hanging. We can ignore it, and get nowhere, or address it head-on.

A reason we may be in this jam is that some of the arguments our side puts forth are illogical or disingenuous. That really hurts our position and kind of pisses me off. It's a big enough problem without that.


Re: "I think most states are on board with the need for disabled access, from what I have read from individual states access."

Please, also, define "on board" and provide citation. But if it is not in reference to mobility-limited voters, spare yourself the time. THAT is the issue.

[marions ghost]

115. so your main concern is

mobility limited voters? And so what is the best solution for them, in your opinion?

[Wilms]

116. Yes. Because it's one of our main problems...

And we're real good at overlooking it. You and I reviewed it together last week (among a number of other times). See post 11.

For the mobility-limited, I recommend the consideration of a polling station using a variation of what's been referred to as the "modular system".

Whatever interface they desire is used to print a paper ballot. The ballot is mechanically shuttled to a ballot reader (again, whatever they desire as an interface for this to), once verified, the ballot is mechanically shuttled to a lock-box. Access, Privacy, Security.

As a side benefit, it would be so expensive they'd be deployed only minimally, and leave just enough money to buy magic-markers for the rest of us to use.

[marions ghost]

118. Never "reviewed" in depth.

You're telling me more here than ever before. Leaving the whole question of DREs and their implication in a greatly flawed overall system, you think that the "modular system" is the best way to provide access for the mobility-limited. So this is an example of what would be ideal. OK, thanks. I don't think anyone is overlooking the basic need--quite the contrary--it's covered in the Clinton Bill, the Dodd Bill, the Conyers Bill. Regardless of the details of those bills, it appears that people are trying. Any one of us could be mobility-limited tomorrow, and I have such family members myself. But I think in light of our electoral crisis, that balance is called for at the moment.

[Wilms]

119. Let's take this one at a time, MG.

Post 11 is among places I've tried to raise the mobility-limited issue. The problem.

The "telling (you) more here than ever before", refers to a possible solution. Correct? Well, giving you an "in depth" report on a potential solution doesn't mean we haven't previously reviewed the problem.

You ask if if I "think that the "modular system" is the best way to provide access for the mobility-limited." Wrong question. I referred to a VARIATION. Nor did I refer to it as ideal. I said I wonder if it'll help (if we're interested) get us out of the jam.

That providing access for certain disabilities can legitimately be subjected or restricted in deference to "balance" is different than saying it provided.

Thanks for the clarification.

[sacxtra]

126. AHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1

Come on.

We have something.

A solution for the Disabled. (use a computer to PRINT a ballot)
A solution for Everyone Else. (count paper ballots manually)
A solution for Taxpayers. (LESS MONEY WASTED)
A solution for The Corrupt (You can't fuck with our vote anymore!)

For DISABLED, Print a PAPER BALLOT which is EQUAL to a NORMAL PAPER BALLOT, exactly like EVERY OTHER PAPER BALLOT, and COUNT IT BY DROPPING IT IN THE WOOD/PLASTIC/BOX.

YOU DO NOT COUNT IT BY TYPING IT INTO AN ELECTRONIC BOX! OR FEEDING IT INTO A SCANNER. OTHERWISE you LOST the vote which can NO LONGER BE VERIFIED IN DIGITAL FORMAT.

Eliminate this first. . .

[marions ghost]

117. Have you made your case directly to Voters Unite?

I think it's harsh to call the report "myth-filled." There is much that is relevant in it, though I'm sure it could be better. I think Mythbreakers is excellent in illustrating the problems with DREs. Voters Unite seems concerned with the problems for the blind, citing the CA survey showing only 2 of a group of over 50 voters found the DREs acceptable after voting.

Most states that have recently bought opti-scan machines specify that each precinct must also have a voting machine for the disabled (look up opti-scan voting--check OH,FL,MN,IN). Now maybe the specs for those machines or "ballot markers" aren't good enough (I don't have time to research all the states on this) but at least I see many localities are mandating that they must be made available. To me, that is a good opening to get some real attention to the issues of exactly what works. It may take some time to provide the ideal machines, but it seems to me that several states are aware and trying. Sorry, I don't have a list of all the websites I visited, but I remember thinking there were an impressive number who were definitely on board. I can't imagine that local disability groups would not be advising them. Maybe you have access to some state-by-state comparisons in your research? I think it appears on the surface that disability groups ARE being heard, and that the way will be paved for improvement in future. Correct me if that's wrong. The only place I think I may disagree with you is in the mandating of DREs for all voters, based on disability access. Otherwise I'm all for providing options for people of various disabilities to vote. My main concern however, is that ALL Americans have greater access to fair elections.

[Wilms]

120. There is quite a lot that is relevant and logical in that report.

Makes it all the more a shame that parts of it are not. Which part??? The one that deals with one of the largest problems facing election reformists. Kind of unfortunate.

While not making a "case", I have had queries ignored by the group, for what it's worth. I'm sure they're busy.

I'm glad that some states are using "Ballot Markers" to provide access for SOME of the disabled. I agree it a great opening. But, again, I'm not referring to the blind, only.

The disabilities community and their advocates are not exempt to mythweaving and illogical assertions, either. (It's what makes this so interesting to witness.) The "improvements" some seek, would destroy system transparency. But I don't need to tell you that.

Re: "The only place I think I may disagree with you is in the mandating of DREs for all voters, based on disability access."

I've never done that. I've formerly suggested that a DRE that provided a verifiable paper ballot, and committed to auditing might offer a solution for the disabled (not the abled). But I'm abandoning that in favor consideration of a system I described in that recent post.

[Bill Bored]

16. Bar code

While I'm not convinced of the need for the bar code, it doesn't seem particularly sinister to me in this context. They say the voter can take it to a bar code reader, just as you can check the price of a product at the supermarket before you take it to the cash register. Nothing wrong with that. And this proves the bar code matches the voter's choices. It might provide an added level of assurance that the vote will be counted as cast. It might be more difficult to switch votes around using bar codes than other formats.

True, we don't usually read bar codes ourselves (although there are web sites that show how to do this and it is possible with human eyes), but it is an open standard AFAIK.

Also, there are indeed AUDIO bar code readers that can be used by the blind. I've seen them at some supermarkets and they are GREAT!

The question is why use bar codes instead of SAT-style OpScans? Perhaps there is a good reason. It could be that bar codes have a lower error rate than conventional OpScans. Nearly every retail transaction uses them, and so do inventory control systems.

Remember when Bush 41 didn't know that they could scan groceries using bar codes, because he never had to go to the store to buy anything? That's a plus for bar codes in my book! (Lack of Bush family involvement!) :)

[garybeck]

20. i prefer optiscan over bar codes

because there aren't two different things that could or couldn't match.

an opticscan machine can be made to read the very same information that the voter is looking at. No symbology is required. I see no reason for a barcode. Did you see that video by the fraud expert from American Express where he said the banks already have optical scanners that can read things that are much more complex than a ballot.

it appears this whole thing is going to come down to how people define the word ballot, and whether or not they use the word in the legislation.


g

[BeFree]

22. Ballots

A ballot, as the law reads now, can be paper, paper cards as in punched, and as an electronic screen backed up by nothing more than bytes.

It is the backup by bytes which must be eliminated first.

Second, it is the counting by bytes, that must be eliminated.

A verifiable ballot simply has to be a paper ballot. There is nothing else voter verifiable, that I can think of.

Number one - Taken care of. Laws are being written as we speak. There will be voter verifiable ballots, however four years late.

Number two is gonna be hard. It's fast. It's not accurate, but it's fast, and it's easy. That's what the election office people love - FAST and EASY.

Any system we come up with is gonna have to be fast and easy. I don't like it, but I don't run an election office, either.

[garybeck]

30. welll......

I think optiscan can be done accurately, and if there is open source and mandatory audits, it is possible to deal with.

but I disagree that the backup by bytes is what we need to elminate first. I think if there is paper backup and still DRE voting, we accomplish little.

You have to get into the minds of the people who are stealing the election.

Having a paper backup only increases the risk of getting caught slightly. It all depends on whether or not the audits are mandatory (and Holt's bill is the only one that calls for mandatory audits, but it's only 2%). Even then, with 98% of the votes being cast by invisible ballot, you can't tell me that's a situation that a smart thief couldn't work around. Plus, they could fix the audits and they could find out which precincts were going to be audited.

So, I'm CONVINCED that the only real solution that will mean anything to us is that if the VOTER VERIFIED PAPER is indeed a BALLOT, not a record of their vote. It is only a ballot if it is used to cast their vote in the actual election, not just an audit or recount.

If the paper is only a record of their vote, it would be a very simple computer program to have it print a vote for one candidate and cast a vote for another candidate and no one would ever know unless there was an audit or a recount.

Paper backup is not a solution.

Paper ballot is the only solution.

Optiscan for counting the ballots is not my first choice but I'm willing to concede it for now if there is open source code and the ballots are counted in public view.

[BeFree]

36. Yes, we totally agree

I wrote:A verifiable ballot simply has to be a paper ballot. There is nothing else voter verifiable, that I can think of.

We don't seem to be communicating very well, eh? You seem to think I am saying a paper backup is what I am for. I am not for a paper backup, I am for only a paper ballot.

Again: There is nothing but a paper ballot that is verifiable.

Also: I am against using any computer to count the votes unless the computer tally is printed directly on the paper ballot. IOW, a running total, printed directly on the paper ballot, whether it is a roll of paper, or a sheet of paper, which is the one and only official ballot.

I realize this is a radically new idea so I can accept why some folks don't quite grasp the idea. But they will.

[Wilms]

39. Say more about the running total, etc. n/t

[BeFree]

42. Hi Wilms

Note that this is assuming that DREs will ALL have a Voter Verified Paper Ballot, and that that Paper Ballot is on a roll of paper like we see at supermarket checkouts.

Here is the idea:

If you are using a touchscreen/former DRE attached to the roll of paper printer, as you vote, the printer marks the ballot with your selections.

You look at the printed selections and verify that the printer is correct. If what you see on paper is not correct, you vote again, and again, until the printed record suits you. Misprinted ballots would be so marked.

When you are satisfied that the damn machine has finally got it right, you hit the vote button signaling to the computer that it finally got it right, and the last printed ballot is the one and only correct ballot on that list.

As you hit the vote button, the computer, which has already marked your one and only verified ballot, adds your votes to the previous total votes also correctly cast.

Then the computer prints to your ballot that running total.

Yes, the computer adds up the votes each time a correct vote is cast. But each time it does, it prints that computation to the ballot, unseen by the voter.

Now, we have, on paper, a "Running Total" of all the correct votes cast, and each and every computer addition is marked on the ballot.

What you end up with, when the polls close is the total of all votes cast for each and every candidate on that machine, and you can easily look up every vote cast in order to make sure each and every computation was done correctly.

[Wilms]

46. Interesting as are your's and Gary's comments below.

But would this in any way violate secrecy.

"and you can easily look up every vote cast in order to make sure each and every computation was done correctly."

Not sure about privacy, here.

Anyone?

[BeFree]

47. Secrecy

There would be only one way to match the vote to any person.

It would have the same level of secrecy that any paper ballot would have. The only way any matching could be done is by an election official. We can trust election officials, right?

Did you know early voting and absentee are not really secret? Yep, election officials can trace either of those types of ballots.

[Wilms]

48. We can trust election officials???

Tonight I'll get my first good sleep since 11/2000.

OK on secrecy. Ask around, though. Just in case.

And yes, I figured with absentee, but, no, hadn't realized with early voting.

[BeFree]

49. Trust

Yeah well, it was kinda TIC. But really, if they went around checking up on people they'd get caught eventually.

Hope Gary's and my conversation was understood, we are kinda treading some new ground.

[Wilms]

31. I spoke with OVC today at the "teach-in".

It was a bit rushed, Gary, but I mentioned your point.

Laura, from OVC said that you can run it through a verifier. Also that a summary is printed on that page. Not the actual ballot where you'd have some marked and others not.

So if the voter runs it through a veifier, then we have a problem wondering if it was hacked. Plus, is a bar code any more/less secure than optiscanning??

One plus, that the paper ballot generating part is done on a PC. That means they can accommodate the disabled with any # of "interfaces" (I'm refering to the Mouse/Keyboard replacements fitted for the disabled. I'm loosely aware that there are piles of devices for this purpose. And I'm guessing that they wouldn't be a security risk.

[garybeck]

32. ?

the barcode is a concern to me even if there is a "verifier". It's just an unnecessary step. Optical scan machines are very accurate.

My real problem with their plan is where they say on their website that a ballot and a paper record are the same thing. I have a real problem with that.

Where they say:

"As long as the law or regulation that establishes the voter-verified paper trail specifies that the voter-verified paper trail is to be used in the case of a manual recount and in mandatory random spot-checks of machine-produced vote tallies, then a voter verified ballot an a voter-verified paper train are basically the same."

this is very troublesome to me.

-gary

[Wilms]

34. I share your concern, as mentioned elsewhere. n/t

[FogerRox]

38. I'd like to add a few points

Tabulators don't keep a digital record of individual votes--they keep running tallies--so they are illegal.

Venezuela--Touchscreens, open source code, paper trial.
Italy-----Touchscreens, no soft ware, hard wired chips, paper trial.
USA-------Touchscreens, no open source code, no paper trail.

What amounts to an unverifiable voter record, There can only be one purpose in having an unverifiable voter record.


To make the voter Record unverifiable.

[garybeck]

40. can you clarify

if you know the answer - for italy and venezuela how do they count the votes. are touchscreens used to print paper ballots, and then they are hand counted? Or do they have open source tabulators? how do they do anything besides keep a running tabulation? how could (does) a tabulator keep track of more than the total? would it be a simple listing of each vote in the order it was cast? I agree this might be a good idea to add to the tabulators if this is what you are suggesting.

gary

[FogerRox]

41. Not sure about Italy as I think they backed away from e voting.

*Roj spins around looking for a source*

IIRC In venezuela touchscreens used to print paper ballots, and then they deposited paper in a box--to be held as an a audit tool. My understanding that recently in the Presidential election the exit polling was no more than 1/2% off from the results. I would assume that all the code is open.

Lyn Landes site had something on voting in other countries---couldnt track it down though.

Tabulators_ my comment proly goes back to AAR broadcasts from Last summer about DRe's and recounts.
I may not be too conversant about the DRE's but_

1+23=24, 1+24=25

vs

1b-1k-1b-1k-1k = Kerry wins

If individual votes were represented digitally in DRE's, then recounts would be no prob and a lot of the complaints about DRE's would washed down the drain. Correct me if I'm wrong

[BeFree]

43. Correction

You wrote:
If individual votes were represented digitally in DRE's, then recounts would be no prob and a lot of the complaints about DRE's would washed down the drain. Correct me if I'm wrong

If votes are kept digitally, then every vote can be altered by the software. If they are printed on a piece of paper, its quite difficult to alter very many.

Paper ballots are the only way to have a voter verify his or her vote.

If we are to keep using computers to add up the votes, then each and every addition should also be printed on the ballot, only after voter verifcation.

Allowing any digital storage of the vote is to be avoided. Paper storage is the only real option.

[garybeck]

44. what if

the optiscan ballot counter, in addition to printing a log that displayed each vote it counted,

what if it also marked each ballot with a sequential number as it was counted?

think how easy it would be to do random spot checks. close your eyes, pick a ballot. look at the number marked by the scanner. grab the log, look up the number, make sure the vote matches.

the sad thing is, that we have good ideas on ways to really improve the system, but very little ways to get our ideas condsidered by the powers to be, and somehow in just 6 weeks of the new congress, they've been able to do all the necessary research to fix the problems with their proposed legislation. I don't think so.

[BeFree]

45. That's a good idea

We will have verifiable paper. Whether it be a trail, or the actual ballot, is what's in question.

I want to see the paper be THE ballot, and is one reason I like optiscan. Now, with your idea, the auditability of the optiscan can be made fast and easy.

The feds are one area of possible reform since they have all the money. I think we got through to them on Jan. 6, and they will reform HAVA, but that's about all. I do believe they will make it a requirement that there will be a verifiable paper SOMETHING.

On the state level we can effect not only the verifiable paper reform, but also how the paper is handled. Our task is to come up with ideas, such as yours, which makes whatever paper is produced be easily, and fastly audited.

[FogerRox]

65. Completely off topic my friend

[Mairead]

50. "And this proves the bar code matches the voter's choices"

Actually, it proves only that the reader says it matches. Unless the reader is supplied and controlled by an impartial third-party, it's no better than having another CRT show you your alleged vote.

Using a bar code is convenient for scanning, but convenience is not an important issue compared to readability by the human voter. A human-readable format wouldn't take more than a few milliseconds longer to scan.

[garybeck]

53. yup, we are acting paranoid but we have to or it will be stolen again n/t

[sacxtra]

123. I Prefer To Be a Moron Instead of Fully Informed about Digitized Data!

[LaraOVC]

59. Difference between VVB and VVPT

Hi Gary,
The difference between a voter verified ballot (or a voter verified ballot summary) and a paper trail is that the paper trail is just used to audit the vote or is available for a recount, it does not have to be looked at hardly at all. The voter verified ballot IS the ballot that is counted as the vote. Every single one MUST be counted!

Lara

[LaraOVC]

60. Questions about OVC

If you guys have questions, please email me: [e-mail]

[garybeck]

67. Lara, please explain this

in your post just above this, you say that there is a big difference between a paper ballot and a paper record (paper trail), right?

Please explain why it says this on the OVC website:

As long as the law or regulation that establishes the voter-verified paper trail specifies that the voter-verified paper trail is to be used in the case of a manual recount and in mandatory random spot-checks of machine-produced vote tallies, then a voter verified ballot an a voter-verified paper train are basically the same.

by the way, note, there's a typo on the site, 'train' should be 'trail'.

But I don't get it. How are they the same? Didn't you just explain how they are not the same? Didn't you just say:

the paper trail is just used to audit the vote or is available for a recount, it does not have to be looked at hardly at all

I disagree with what your website says, and I agree with what you say. I'm just confused as to why your website says that.

If you have any insights please explain

thanks
gary

[LaraOVC]

61. People you may know who have seen the OVC system and what they think

Endorsement Statement: "I endorse the Open Voting Consortium. Their open voting system which runs on open source software and provides a voter verifiable paper ballot summary that is counted as the vote is necessary for the transparency and integrity of electronic voting systems."

Signed:

Maxine Waters, Congresswoman, U.S. Congress
Medea Benjamin, Founding Director of Global Exchange and Co-Founder of Code Pink
Bob Fitrakis, PhD/JD, Editor of FreePress.org
Bob Kibrick, PhD, Legislative Analyst, Verified Voting.org
Jim March, Board Member, Black Box Voting.org
Kathy Dopp, President/Founder, US Count Votes
Allyson Washburn, PhD, Statistical Analyst, US Count Votes
John R. Gideon, Co-Founder, Voters Unite!
Blair Bobier, Media Director for David Cobb's 2004 Presidential campaign
Penny Little, Producer/Director, "Electile Dysfunction" movie
Brad Friedman, Co-Founder, Velvet Revolution.Us
Greg Hewlett, Advisory Council Member, Mainstreet Moms Operation Blue
Mandeep Gill, PhD, Citizens Act


What People Are Saying.....

"I refer people to Open Voting Consortium all the time." Bev Harris, Founder, Black Box Voting.org, February 27, Los Angeles Teach-In

"Diebold has proven that the federal oversight process for voting systems failed. We the people have to take over that process and that means open source. Open Voting Consortium is the furthest along with an open source product." Jim March, board member, Black Box Voting.org, February 25, phone conversation

"I looked at your brochure and I think it's a good system." Bob Fitrakis, PhD/JD, Editor of FreePress.org, February 27, Los Angeles Teach-In

"It is the best system I have ever seen! This system has so many safeguards." Kathy Dopp, President/Founder, US Count Votes, January 19, conference call with voting rights activists

"I think it's a good system. I think it's a great! The trick is to get it implemented." Jonathan Simon, JD, co-author of paper “Election: Who Won the Popular Vote? An Examination of the Comparative Validity of Exit Poll and Vote Count Data,” February 26, Oakland Teach-In

"Election integrity, not financial gain, is the foremost interest of these eminent computer experts including Alan Dechert of California, Doug Jones of Iowa, and Kurt Hyde of New Hampshire. The group has perfected the design through open discussions, and the product is ready to be developed. They need funding to allow for the development and testing period and the cost of NASED qualification." Ellen Theisen, Co-Founder, Voters Unite!, February 8, letter to Assembly Members in New York

“It’s the best system out there.” Mandeep Gill, PhD, Citizens Act, February 27 Los Angeles Teach-In

[garybeck]

62. THANK YOU for posting this but I still don't understand

how they can say on their web site that a paper record to be used in recounts is the same thing as a paper ballot to be used in the first count.

ISN'T THERE A BIG DIFFERENCE?

And, I guess the real question is, does their "plan" allow for DREs with paper records? I'm not sure it's clear on the website.

this is issue #1 for me.

[demobabe]

70. Who cares what those people think...

None of them with the possible exception of Maxine Waters is in a position to implement or adopt your technology.

You can have people saying your system is the best thing since sliced bread, but it's like your Simon quote, "I think it's a good system. I think it's a great! The trick is to get it implemented."

Bingo.

Beta was better than VHS, but look what won out...

[garybeck]

71. I care what they think

because I'm trying to formulate my opinion about which bill(s) are best, and which ones to ask my representatives to support.

[demobabe]

72. What I mean by 'who cares what they think'...

What I'm saying is that I believe the OVC solution - even though I appreciate what they're trying to do - is just another complicated technology.

Even if the Diebold or ES&S DREs had a voter verified paper trail and worked as perfectly as they could, there still is the capability for the machines to break down, the central tabulators to be compromised, or votes tossed.

The OVC system in a lot of ways is WORSE, because there are more things that can go wrong with it.

Why do we need a machine to print out a ballot with our choices on it when we could just mark an X on a paper ballot ourselves?

We need a solution that is SIMPLE, we need a transparent system where the public can actually OBSERVE the vote count (it's supposed to be like that now but isn't), and we need for every vote to count. EVERY vote.

The OVC isn't addressing those issues - instead, they're building another gadget. That's why I say I don't care what those people think - it doesn't matter as long as the other problems exist. Additionally, the OVC people are fighting an uphill battle to get government officials to use their product over the other private voting machine companies.

If you want to make a difference, we need to work state by state to require voter verified paper ballots and we need to be sure every one is counted. If we focus on that, then the technologies like what the OVC is proposing will automatically be considered.

But I still think the OVC solution is too complicated. I give them credit for being thorough - they have put a LOT of thought into their machine.

But If we HAVE to use electronic voting, Optical scanners aren't a bad way to go and are much cheaper than the DREs.

[garybeck]

73. good points

with something like 23 proposed bills in the national congress, a whopping ZERO of them call for paper ballots.

WHAT GIVES?

It is not clear to me what OVC is proposing. Maybe I need to look more at their website. I've mainly looked at their FAQ. I got the impression their proposed system was an optiscan system because it said the paper ballot is counted in the election.

But I don't understand why they say on the website that paper trails that are audited (unspecified minimum audit) are the same thing as paper ballots. That is ludicrous and I've been trying to ask that question for days and no one has been able to explain.

If we can have paper ballot legislation on the state level, why in God's name can we not have it on the national level? What is wrong with these people?

[demobabe]

74. They have an online demo

Here:
http://www.openvotingconsortium.org/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=5

It steps you through voting and creates a ballot which you can look at and it also creates a wav or mp3 so you can have your vote selections read to you (for the blind).

It's actually pretty slick - as I said before, they put a lot of thought into it.

Arthur Keller described it to me once, and the paper ballot is actually a redundant system. Votes are recorded from the voting machine (the same one that makes the ballot) onto a CD-R into a randomized order (to preserve the secrecy of the vote). The info from the CDs is what gets counted, and the paper ballots are used to cross check this data.

It is a lovely system, although it's downfall is the number of parts that could potentially fail during election day. And I can't see how this is going to be any more accurate than the Diebold, ES&S, or Sequoia machines. There can still be battery problems, there can still be callibration errors.

Good question about the ballot legislation - but a big problem right now is that the Republicans will never bring any of the currently proposed bills - paper ballot or not - for a vote. We're at their mercy here.

[Wilms]

75. So it's a "DRE with Ballot Printer"

I'm ok with the Ballot Printer part.

I wonder why the DRE portion of it is employed.

[garybeck]

79. that's not my understanding

I don't think the OVC system involves DREs at all.

to clarify, there is a difference between a DRE and a computerized ballot printer.

the OVC system uses a computer to print the ballot, NOT cast the vote. the paper ballot is taken by hand, by the voter, to the place where it is cast. that is the actual ballot that will be counted in the election.

a DRE system involves the computer casting the ballot.

big difference, speaks to the ongoing debate about the difference between paper ballots and paper trails.

maybe Lara can confirm, but from the reading it appears OVC is paper ballot, not DRE/paper trail.

-g

[demobabe]

80. we'll have to ask them

When Arthur Keller explained the system to me, it was a DRE that had a CD burner. The votes were burned onto a CD in a random order, and a ballot was printed. From what I remember (and I could be totally wrong), it was the CDs that were primarily used in the count, and the paper ballots were there for redundancy's sake and cross-checked against the results from the CDs.

It's been a while since I talked to them, so I'm not sure if my mind is making up stuff at this point. I want to know the answer to this, too.

[Wilms]

84. See post 83, below. n/t

[LaraOVC]

76. Paper ballots versus paper trail

Gary and other DUers,
As far as I know, a paper trail is like an umbrella term, it refers to ANY kind of paper that an electronic voting machine spits out. A paper BALLOT is more specific. Actually the OVC system spits out a PAPER BALLOT SUMMARY. This means that you:

1. Vote on the computer
2. PRINT your PAPER BALLOT SUMMARY of who you voted for
3. Check the bar code to make sure it's correct by scanning the bar code and listening on the head phones (if you want to)
4. Put your PAPER BALLOT SUMMARY (that has BOTH the typed out names of the people you voted for AND the bar code with that information) into the ballot box
5. The PAPER BALLOT SUMMARIES are hand counted or counted by scanning the bar codes

It's called a PAPER BALLOT SUMMARY because it does not say ALL of the people you could have voted for (that would be a paper ballot), it just summarizes who you actually voted for.

Get it now?

I don't know why our website says that a paper trail and a paper ballot is the same if the paper is counted for an audit (and sorry about the train-trail typo, I'll see about getting that fixed, our volunteer webmaster is a little over worked right now, but I'll put that on the list of things to do). I think the legislation gets confusing sometimes when it says ballot when really it's only counted 1% or 2% of the time and it doesn't even say all the choices on it.
I'll ask Alan (our president) about this issue tomorrow (he was really busy today).
Please check out the diagram of our system in our brochure:

http://www.openvotingconsortium.org/images/ovc_lit/official_brochure.pdf

I think it helps to have the visual to explain. Our system is NOT optical scan. It is a ballot marking system using a computer to do the marking....

Let me know if you (or other DUers) have questions.

Here's a question for you: What do you know about Sequoia? I'm going to be on a tv show tomorrow and the County Registrar who'll be on there with me LOVES Sequoia. What can I say to convince her they're not as honest and wonderful as she thinks they are. I know I've heard a few bad things (the past CA Sec of State took a job with them for $10,000 a month after he left office), but I don't know much else. Please tell me what you know (with references if you can)...

Thanks!

Lara :)

[Wilms]

77. Lara, put up a new thread with your info request.

You'll get a lot of help.

-on edit-

Your fast!

[garybeck]

78. thank you for clarifying! I'm glad

you agree that a paper trail with an audit is not the same as a paper ballot. that statement on your website was really confusing me!

personally i'm discouraged that NONE of the federal legislation calls for paper ballots.

and I'm surprised that orgs like Verified Voting are giving such strong support for bills that don't require paper ballots and actually allow for extensive use of DRE machines.

welcome to DU

Gary

[LaraOVC]

81. good to be here

Thanks Gary. I like DU. There's some really cool people here (John Gideon, you, Emily, etc). :) I'm excited to post more and see what happens. The info I got from here and Daily Kos helped me tonight on the show. We didn't talk exstensively about Sequoia but I did manage to tell people afterwards about the revolving door of Sequoia, election officials, the election center, etc. Also I did say on air that the Veri-Vote system didn't work during it's demo in Sacramento (the printer printed the wrong candidate!). I think I got that from Myth Breakers.
Anyway, thanks for all of your help. I think I may create a page for county registrars about why optical scan machines need to be updated and what's wrong with private voting companies.

Lara :)

[Wilms]

82. Lara, is there a function of the OVC system that records the votes

I can't find it now, but I thought I saw a referrence to the OVC system recording the vote onto a CD or dropping it onto a USB device.

Is that correct.

[LaraOVC]

83. how OVC records the vote

1. voter votes on a computer

2. vote is recorded electronically onto a CD

3. vote is printed as a paper ballot summary (a 8.5 by 11 piece of paper with the names of who you voted for printed AND a bar code with the information about who you voted for encoded in it).

4. voter can check the bar code by going over to the machine that will be used to count his/her vote and scanning the bar code himself/herself and listening to his/her vote on a pair of headphones.

5. voter turns their paper ballot summary into a secure ballot box.

6. when the polls close, workers take the CDs out of the computers and upload them into the computer that's hooked up to the bar code scanner.

7. ballot summaries are scanned and the electronic record of their vote is found on the computer and matched to it. This process both counts the vote and make sure that there has been no ballot box stuffing or electronic vote tampering (by matching the electronic records to the paper records).

8. If there is a descrepancy and a ballot is found that doesn't have an electronic match or an electronic record is found that doesn't have a paper match then something went horribly wrong with the system and an investigation is done to find out what happened (e.g. the poll worker who made sure each voter only turned in one ballot is questioned, the computer is checked, etc...)


Any questions/comments?

Lara :)

[LaraOVC]

85. clarification

#1- voter MAKES SELECTIONS on a computer (the act of voting is when they turn their summary paper ballot into the ballot box)

#2- the selections the voter made on the computer are called "Electronic Ballot Images" and they are recorded in several places- on the computer hard drive and also on another device (like a USB thumb drive). The electronic ballot images are not written to a CD (or a DVD- they may be cheaper by the time we fully develop our system) until all the votes have been cast that day.

#3- the correct terminology to use for the paper that is printed is SUMMARY PAPER BALLOT. We will eventually have this written into election code to avoid this whole paper trail/paper ballot confusion.

Hope this helps!

Lara :)

[Wilms]

88. Helps me understand the system.

It's a DRE, that produces a paper ballot which could be used for counts, audits and recounts as law (or other authority) allows.

[LaraOVC]

90. OVC system is NOT a DRE. It is a computer ballot marking device...

From Verified Voting.org "DRE stands for "Direct Recording Electronic" voting machine. As the name suggests, the voter directly enters the votes, which are recorded electronically. Almost all touch screen voting machines are DREs, although there are other DREs that have knobs or switches instead of touch screens."

On the OVC system the voter does NOT enter their VOTES on the computer. The voter enters their selections. The votes are the printed summary paper ballots, NOT the electronic ballot images.

It's like the difference between a piece of paper and it's mirror image. The piece of paper IS the piece of paper. It's mirror image is just an image of that. If the two do not match up exactly, then something is horribly wrong...

The OVC system is a computer ballot marking device. This is important because if all DREs were banned, let's say, this should not include the OVC system.

[Wilms]

92. In your post #85, you wrote...

"#2- the selections the voter made on the computer are called "Electronic Ballot Images" and they are recorded in several places- on the computer hard drive and also on another device (like a USB thumb drive). The electronic ballot images are not written to a CD (or a DVD- they may be cheaper by the time we fully develop our system) until all the votes have been cast that day."


That is the part I was referring when I used the term DRE.


I realize that it marks a ballot, too. And if that marked ballot was the only thing to be counted, we could switch off the DRE portion off the system. Same would be for any DRE that also printed a ballot.

So I agree that if DRE's were banned the OVC should not be, we'd just turn off it's recorder.

[LaraOVC]

94. OVC is not a DRE with a printer

It's not really the same thing as a DRE with a printer, though, because there is a specific standard and procedure set for what happens with the printed summary paper ballot (i.e. it is ALWAYS counted as the vote). It needs to be checked against the electronic ballot image to prevent ballot box stuffing (yes, fraud can happen with paper systems too and has for centuries....)

[Wilms]

96. Thank You

I began to realize this after I posted.

So, then, the recording the OVC system makes is more to secure the paper ballot, the paper ballot being what is used for the counts.

Is that more correct?

[marions ghost]

112. the bar codes are scanned on an optical scanner, correct?

So in addition to the individual computers, there are also scanners.
So you have two specialized computing systems involved.

I can't see the benefit of an individual computer for each voter, when paper ballots can be marked and scanned very easily, and much more cheaply. WHAT IS the advantage of this OVC system? The only advantage I can see is that it's not Diebold. Tell me of the ADVANTAGES this system has over paper ballots/opti-scan (PBOS).

[Amaryllis]

104. Amen, brother. I keep wondering the same thing. All this legislation is

about trying to build safeguards into something that is broken from the get-go. Bandaids on a festering wound. Makes no sense...we keep being told, "e-voting is here to stay, learn to live with it!" And no matter how many safeguards you build in, it's not enough because computers should never be used for voting to begin with since there is no way to make them secure. Granted, any system has its flaws, but none as many as computers.

[sacxtra]

133. NOBODY IS THINKING

I thought maybe I finally found a post that someone finally "Get's it."

Whoopsie...

Quote:
But If we HAVE to use electronic voting, Optical scanners aren't a bad way to go and are much cheaper than the DREs.
Unquote

Optical Scanners ARE BAD.
Take up Reel's ARE BAD.
Networks ARE BAD.
Digitized data IS BAD.
ALL THESE ELECTRONICS COST TOO MUCH.
ALL THESE SYSTEMS CAN BE HACKED.

[sacxtra]

122. OVC can go fuck itself.

If it is electronic. It's fucking RIGGED

[WillYourVoteBCounted]

98. Why I think OVC is so important, and some facts about hand counted paper

I too support Open Voting Consortium's project.
The entire point is to create and make available software that is clean of bugs and malfeasance, and make it available to elections officials.

Otherwise, we are boxed in by the proprietary vendors.

To those that insist that elections must be on paper, and hand counted as well - I am all for that if you can get it legislated.

When you are preaching to the choir (DU), you will get alot of agreement with your stance. Many of us activists dream of the day when elections are on paper, counted in view of the public, and votes can only be lost a box at a time, rather than thousands at a time.

However, most legislators (the people who make the decisions) and most citizens (the people that call or email the legislators) do not have that same opinion.

If all that this issue depended upon was having all of the activists join in and agree on this one particular stance, then it would be a done deal.

*Meanwhile, it is absolutely critical to prevent the spread of paperless voting**** (you can keep working to promote hand counted paper ballots, but do you really want more paperless voting machines? No paper, no proof, no truth?)

About hand counted paper ballots -

It would help if the US Elections had less contests in an election, and some of these contests settled another time rather than during the presidential contest.

However, that is not how it is.

There are better types of paper ballots to use then what is used in
the US.

It takes about a day and a half to count the general election results in hand counted paper ballot counties in NC.
(I know, you don't care how long it takes, I don't either, but that is just the fact).

Hand counted paper ballots had the lowest undervote rate for president in the state of North Carolina, although the sampling is small, the 3 counties studied have about 5,000 voters or less.

Hand counted paper ballots had a higher undervote rate for the other contests than did optical scan, punch card, DRE and lever(in some contests; however, lever was worse than paper in most cases).
Optical scan was best overall, then punch card, then DRE, then paper, then lever
(http://www.cs.duke.edu/~justin/voting/totals.html)

[msongs]

107. opti scan are too subject to fraud when they are "machine" counted

we used to have those here, marked them with a little magic marker kinda thing. then they get sent in to a central tabulator and are machine counted. the software for the machine count is easily rigged, just like pure electronic votes. paper ballots counted by hand are more secure.

the problem in California is usually that our ballots are over stuffed with special interest corporate initiatives that add too many items to be hand counted quickly.

today the arnold prostitutes have begunt their initiative drives to get signatures for the upcoming special election.

Msongs
www.msongs.com/liberaltshirts.htm

[sacxtra]

121. difference between v v b and v v p t's are CONFUSION for the stupid

Neither one is good.

Both are EVIL.

Both a voter verified ballot and other voter-verified paper trail
DOES NOT ADDRESS THE INHERENT PROBLEM WITH DIGITIZED DATA.

All these fucking bills, and measures and legislation are shills, scams, and pork and GIGO (Garbage In/ Garbage Out) they are taking your attention away from ONE SIMPLE FUCKING THING.

I can print to a printer, and send WHATEVER I WANT on the electronic line to the central tabulator. Printer prints one result, tabulator gets a different result.

In essence, I could give you a grade "A" for your article, and send a grade "F" to your permanent record.

Get it? Got it?

Now Picture it... ;o)

[FogerRox]

134. Just got back from Camp Wellstone-- this weekend--I'm trying to catch up

DO I have this right--These people went to all this length --web site etc----and Lara has to come here just to give us a definition of a VVPTsuuhueh
or some paper thingy.

Glossaries are a very common item in well researched books.

Do I have this right---the ballot gets counted--right?

Then define the ballot.

then define things that are not ballots.

Make it clear. Obfuscating leads me to think that there is a reason for the obfuscating.

Gotta admire this person sacxtra wont give up.

sacxtra: I hear ya--but I think I have an additional reason that these people got sumit to hide, another reason to say that

I aint buyin it

Sorry this system aint good enuf for me. Its already broke. I dont want it. Wont buy it for my friends--wont let my MOM use it either.

[In Truth We Trust]

135. Paper ballots NOW!!!! Hand counts Now!!!!! n/t

[FogerRox]

136. yeah what he --or she ---said