10% VVPR passes Ct, HOOray True Vote Ct. tuffest law

[FogerRox]

in the country --well except for IIRC Montana & Vermont -- they have banned digital ballots

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=203x374761#374778



http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=203x374534

&




By NOREEN GILLESPIE
& THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
Published on 6/3/2005

Hartford— Electronic voting machines will have to create a paper trail backup of computerized votes under legislation that overwhelmingly passed the state House Thursday.

The bill was crafted in response to fears that the new technology was subject to hacking, freezing or otherwise “eating” votes, leaving no way to verify how votes were cast in elections.

Gov. M. Jodi Rell will sign the bill, spokesman Rich Harris said.


http://www.theday.com/eng/web/news/re.aspx?re=50236324-29D1-4A8E-908B-993240AA2DD4

[HockeyMom]

1. I sure hope they do this in NY too

Why did they have to get rid of those "one armed bandits"?

[dogday]

2. I had read the Connecticutt did this and I applaud them.

now we have to convince all these other states...

[Wilms]

3. Ding Ding Ding! n/t

[FogerRox]

4. I passed on the PDF to this S55 bill to some one who is an LA

for a commitee member in the state house in Trentonm NJ

[Wilms]

8. Say more... n/t

[FogerRox]

21. NJ State Senator Nia GIll sponsor of S29 now has a copy of

S55 the Ct. Bill--- We're pushing for 15% audit rate

[Wilms]

22. You have a link for Gill's S29? n/t

[FogerRox]

29. Wilms---this might not be the newest incarnation but its a start

SENATE COMMITTEE SUBSTITUTE FOR
SENATE, Nos. 29 and 2463

STATE OF NEW JERSEY


Sponsored by Senators GILL, TURNER and BRYANT


AN ACT requiring that all voting machines produce a voter-verified paper record and amending R.S.19:48-1 and P.L.1973, c.82.

BE IT ENACTED by the Senate and General Assembly of the State of New Jersey:

1. R.S.19:48-1 is amended to read as follows:
19:48-1. Any thoroughly tested and reliable voting machines may be adopted, rented, purchased or used, which shall be so constructed as to fulfill the following requirements:
(a) It shall secure to the voter secrecy in the act of voting;
(b) It shall provide facilities for such number of office columns, not less than 40 and not exceeding 60, as the purchasing authorities may specify and of as many political parties or organizations, not exceeding nine, as may make nominations, and for or against as many questions, not exceeding 30, as submitted;
(c) It shall, except at primary elections, permit the voter to vote for all the candidates of one party or in part for the candidates of one party or one or more parties;
(d) It shall permit the voter to vote for as many persons for an office as he is lawfully entitled to vote for, but no more;
(e) It shall prevent the voter from voting for the same person more than once for the same office;
(f) It shall permit the voter to vote for or against any question he may have the right to vote on, but no other;
(g) It shall for use in primary elections be so equipped that the election officials can stop a voter from voting for all candidates except those of the voter's party;
(h) It shall correctly register or record and accurately count all votes cast for any and all persons, and for or against any and all questions;

(i) It shall be provided with a "protective counter" or "protective device" whereby any operation of the machine before or after the election will be detected;
(j) It shall be so equipped with such protective devices as shall prevent the operation of the machine after the polls are closed;
(k) It shall be provided with a counter which shall show at all times during an election how many persons have voted;
(l) It shall be provided with a model, illustrating the manner of voting on the machine, suitable for the instruction of voters;
(m) It must permit a voter to vote for any person for any office, except delegates and alternates to national party conventions, whether or not nominated as a candidate by any party or organization by providing an opportunity to indicate such names or name;
(n) It shall be equipped with a permanently affixed box or container of sufficient strength, size and security to hold all emergency ballots and pre-punched single-hole envelopes and with a clipboard and a table-top privacy screen;
(o) It shall not use mechanical lever machines or punch cards to record votes.
All voting machines used in any election shall be provided with a screen, hood or curtain, which shall be so made and adjusted as to conceal the voter and his action while voting.
It shall also be provided with one device for each party for voting for all the presidential electors of that party by one operation, and a ballot therefor containing only the words "presidential electors for," preceded by the name of that party and followed by the names of the candidates thereof for the offices of President and Vice-President and a registering device therefor which shall register the vote cast for such electors when thus voted collectively.
By January 1, 2008, each voting machine shall produce an individual permanent paper record for each vote cast, which shall be made available for inspection and verification by the voter at the time the vote is cast, and preserved for later use in any manual audit. In the event of a recount of the results of an election, the verified paper record shall be the official tally in that election. A waiver of the provisions of this paragraph shall be granted by the Attorney General if the technology to produce a permanent paper record for each vote cast is not commercially available.
(cf: P.L.2004, c.88, s.14)

2. Section 3 of P.L.1973, c.82 (C.19:53A-3) is amended to read as follows:
3. Every electronic voting system, consisting of a voting device in combination with automatic tabulating equipment, acquired or used in accordance with this act, shall:
a. Provide for voting in secrecy, except in the case of voters who have received assistance as provided by law;
b. Permit each voter to vote at any election for all persons and offices for whom and for which he is lawfully entitled to vote; to vote for or against any question upon which he is entitled to vote; and the automatic tabulating equipment shall reject choices recorded on his ballot if the number of choices exceeds the number which he is entitled to vote for the office or on the measure;
c. Permit each voter, at presidential elections, by one mark to vote for the candidates of that party for president, vice president, and their presidential electors;
d. Permit each voter, at other than primary elections, to vote for the nominees of one or more parties and for independent candidates; and personal choice or write-in candidates;
e. Permit each voter in primary elections to vote for candidates in the party primary in which he is qualified to vote, and the automatic tabulating equipment shall reject any votes cast for candidates of another party;
f. Prevent the voter from voting for the same person more than once for the same office;
g. Be suitably designed for the purpose used, of durable construction, and may be used safely, efficiently, and accurately in the conduct of elections and counting ballots;
h. When properly operated, record correctly and count accurately every vote cast, including all overvotes or undervotes and all affirmative votes or negative votes on all public questions or referenda.
i. By January 1, 2008, each voting machine shall produce an individual permanent paper record for each vote cast, which shall be made available for inspection and verification by the voter at the time the vote is cast, and preserved for later use in any manual audit. In the event of a recount of the results of an election, the verified paper record shall be the official tally in that election. A waiver of the provisions of this paragraph shall be granted by the Attorney General if the technology to produce a permanent paper record for each vote cast is not commercially available.
(cf: P.L.2004, c.88, s.18)

3. This act shall take effect immediately.





Requires that all voting machines produce voter-verified paper record; provides that results of audit become official tally; provides for waiver if paper record not commerically available.

[Wilms]

32. Got the link for that? n/t

[FogerRox]

33. no I dont--but S29 has undergone--a # of ammendments

making it hard to follow

[Wilms]

34. Where did you get that info then?? n/t

[Bill Bored]

5. What's 10%??????

The random audits? You got a link to the bill?

NY will probably be keeping a lot of lever machines for a while.
They are actually legal under HAVA as long as you have a paper trail. We do. The election inspectors write it themselves whenever they read the totals!

HAVA is total BS! That said, we do need to provide accessible voting for those with disabilities by 2007.

[Bill Bored]

6. Doesn't look like 10% to me

OK, what am I missing? As I read it, it says 1 machine per precinct. Woops, what's a voting district? That would be much more than 10%! Someone explain please!!!!

<http://www.cga.ct.gov/2005/tob/s/2005SB-00055-R03-SB.htm>

(4) Not later than five business days after each election in which a direct recording electronic voting machine is used, the registrars of voters or their designees, representing at least two political parties, shall conduct a manual audit of the votes recorded on at least one direct recording electronic voting machine used in each voting district.

[Bill Bored]

7. Another version:

<http://www.cga.ct.gov/2005/amd/s/2005SB-00055-R00SA-AMD.htm>

"(5) Not later than five business days after each election in which a direct recording electronic voting machine is used, the registrars of voters or their designees, representing at least two political parties, shall conduct a manual audit of the votes recorded on at least two direct recording electronic voting machines used in each assembly district."

OK, we need someone from the Nutmeg State to sort this out!

NY was talking 5% of machines last I heard. Maybe we can bump them up to 10%, not to be outdone by the Skull and Bones guys!

[FogerRox]

9. Draft of Letter

Last week the Conneticut legislature passed Senate bill S55 which is their Voter Verified Paper Record (VVPR) bill. The Governor has said she will sign S55. S55 mandates that printers be installed on all touchscreen voting machines. The print out allows each voter to verify their vote, the paper record then drops into a box. After the election 10% of precincts will be randomly choosen to undergo an audit, the paper record and the digital ballot image will be compared. If there are any irregularities the official count will be from the paper record not the digital ballot images. This 10% Audit makes S55 the toughest VVPR law in the land. By contrast New Jerseys VVPR bill S29, which last week made it thru commitee unaminously, only mandates a 2% Audit. Connecticut has set the standard and New Jersey should not be left behind.

Heres a link to the S55 PDF file:
http://truevotect.org/resources/sSB55-LCO_4930.pdf


Our State Legislaters should be supported in their effort to keep New Jerseys elections open and transparent by urging them to support an effort to put a at least a 10% if not a 15% Audit provision in S29. A 15% audit would give S29 some teeth and help set the standard for other states to follow. 19 States now have some form of VVPR law and the current form of S29 makes it amoung the weakest in this group.

Rebeca Mercuri believes that that the audit should be a 15% Audit. Rebeca Mercuri has a Phd in computer science and her doctorial thesis was on computerized voting machines. She also served on the panel that investigated the 2000 election.

New Jersey should not be a follower, Our State Legislaters should lead the way and adopt the gold standard of VVPR law.

[Bill Bored]

10. The bill says 1 machine per voting district.

I don't doubt our good friends, truckin, et al, and I'd wish they'd post something here, but to us outsiders, "1 machine per voting district" does NOT necessarily translate into any particular percentage, does it?

I hope they do have 10%, but that would mean there are only 10 machines per voting district. Since I have no idea what the term "voting district" means in this state, I can't tell from reading any of this what the MMRA percentage is.

If you can get in touch with these guys, it would be helpful to have them explain it to us. Don't you agree?

Otherwise, show me where it says 10%.

[FogerRox]

11. yeah I hear ya--Truckin posted up a while ago about the 10% and his email

to me said the same--i'm going to email him and ask to appear at DU--

[Bill Bored]

12. Cool beans. nt

[truckin]

13. Bill & Roger, SB55 did not ban digital ballots. If DREs are used

ballots will be cast electronically. However, if there are differences in the mandatory audits or recount, the paper trail will become the official ballot. Otherwise, the ballot will be cast electronically.

The 10% mandatory recount number comes from the number of districts in CT and the number of DREs we estimate that CT will need. One of the co-founders of TrueVoteCT, Michael Fischer, did a cost analysis of what it would cost the state if we purchase DREs or OpScan. In this analysis, Mike calculates that the state would need 5,542 DREs to service 769 voting districts if DREs are used exclusively. If you just divide the number of DREs by the number of districts you find that 13.9% of the DREs will be recounted. SB55 does not call for a 10% audit but because the machines will be randomly selected at least 10% of the votes should be manually recounted after each election. A link to Mike's study follows:

http://truevotect.org/resources/Cost-analysis-model.pdf

[garybeck]

14. thank you for saying that

here in VT we actually have "banned" digital ballots. however we don't have any mandatory audits. I'm not sure which is better, DREs with audits or opscan paper ballots with no audits.

could you please provide a link to the law as enacted, I'd like to read the wording on the manual audits.

thanks

[truckin]

15. The law still has to be signed by Governor Rell but I believe that

this is the version that is awaiting her signature:

http://truevotect.org/resources/sSB55-LCO_4930.pdf

[garybeck]

16. thanks, but it doesn't mention mandatory audits, does it?

I don't see where it says anything about mandatory audits.

also, be wary of interpretations of the word "voter verified". the new diebold paper records are not good. roll tapes suck. We need an individual paper record for each ballot cast.

[truckin]

17. From line 423 in the Bill:

"Not later than 5 business days after each election in which a DRE voting machine is used, the registrars of voters or their designees, representing at least two political parties, shall conduct a manual audit of the votes recorded on at least one DRE voting machine used in each voting district."

[garybeck]

18. cool, what is a "district"?

is it the same as a precinct?

other questions - what percentage of your state is DRE? do you have any wording to mandate audits of opscan systems?

GOOD WORK!

[truckin]

19. I believe that a district is the equivalent of a precinct. CT

currently uses lever machines but our SOTS has an RFP out for DREs. TrueVoteCT is trying to persuade her to reissue the RFP to consider OpScan. Here is a letter that I sent her a couple of weeks ago and I will be sending her the recent information from Miami-Dade where their Elections Supervisor has recommended scrapping the $24.5 million of DREs that they purchased 3 years ago.


May 16, 2005

The Honorable Susan Bysiewicz
Secretary of the State
State Capitol, Room 104
Hartford, CT 06106

Dear Secretary Bysiewicz,

I am writing this letter to address the RFP issued for the DRE or touch-screen voting machines. I am a fellow Democrat and I am grateful to you for all of the service that you have performed for the State of Connecticut. However, I disagree with the direction the State is headed with the RFP for the DRE voting machines.

As a taxpayer to the State and the Town of New Milford, where I am an alternate on the Board of Finance, I believe that the purchase of the DREs amounts to an unfunded mandate to the local municipalities. As a member of TrueVoteCT, I also believe that there are alternatives to the DREs that are less expensive and more reliable. In addition, there have been two recent developments that should be considered before the State commits to purchasing the DRE machines.

One of the reasons that the State is focusing on DREs is that they provide access to the disabled, which is a great benefit and something that needs to be done to allow up to 300,000 disabled CT citizens to participate in the election process. I applaud you for your consideration of this minority group and I am proud to be a citizen of a State where these kinds of issues are addressed.

However, a recent development that will allow access to the disabled with another voting system needs to be considered. On May 9, 2005, ES&S issued a press release that stated that the AutoMARK ballot marking machine has successfully completed final testing by the Independent Testing Authority and ES&S expects full certification status in June 2005. The AutoMARK ballot marking technology allows voters with special needs to mark an optical scan ballot privately and independently. This technology would give the State the option of purchasing the less expensive and more reliable Optical Scan voting machines while still enabling the disabled to vote independently. With full federal certification so close for the AutoMARK ballot marker, serious consideration should be given to the purchase of the Optical Scan voting machines. A link to the press release is listed below as well as a link to a video that shows a visually impaired person using the AutoMARK system.

Other states that have chosen Optical Scan machines are Rhode Island, Arizona, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Michigan. In addition, South Dakota has indicated that it will be using the AutoMARK to provide access to voters with disabilities. Another important document about Optical Scan technology was written by Terri Lynn Land, the Secretary of the State from the State of Michigan, and it is called “A Uniform Voting System for Michigan”. A link to this document and an article about the use of the AutoMARK in South Dakota are listed below.

The other recent event referred to in this letter is addressed in an April 12, 2005 article from the Miami Herald that discusses the election process in Miami-Dade County in Florida. This county spent $24.5 million on DRE machines in 2002, and after using them for recent elections, the county is seriously considering scrapping the DRE machines, effectively throwing away the $24.5 million. The reason they are considering this extreme move is because hundreds of votes were not counted in recent elections and the costs to run elections with DREs are more than three times their previous cost. The complete article is attached to this email and I urge you to contact Lester Sola, the Supervisor of Elections of Miami-Dade County before purchasing any DRE machines. I have spoken to other election officials from Miami-Dade County and I think it would benefit the whole State if you talked to Mr. Sola before purchasing a voting system. The State of CT should not jeopardize its future by putting itself in the same position that Miami-Dade County is in now. We can avoid their mistake if we take our time and make the correct decision.

Another supposed advantage of DREs is that, while their initial purchase price is substantially higher than other alternatives like Optical Scan, the ongoing costs to run elections is said to be less with the DRE machines. Miami-Dade County has discovered the hard way that this simply is not true. The thought was that because paper ballots, which cost approximately $.30 each, would not be required with DREs that the cost of the election would be much less. However, the use of DREs still requires election districts to purchase paper ballots for absentee and provisional voting and in Miami-Dade they purchased some back-up ballots in case there were problems with the machines. While DREs use less paper ballots than Optical Scan, the cost per ballot is greater on DREs due to volume discounts and set-up charges. It is also important to note is that the State would need at least 4-5 times as many DREs as Optical Scan machines because of the number of votes processed by each. In addition, the DREs are much larger and have several other storage and programming issues. Page 58 from the VotersUnite Myth Breakers document (see the link below) lists other additional costs that DREs incur:

1) Increased costs for secure and environmentally-controlled storage.
2) Increased energy costs for keeping back-up batteries charged between elections
3) Increased labor costs for security when these machines are stored overnight at polling places before elections
4) Increased costs for hardware maintenance and software upgrades for thousands of these machines
5) Increased costs for expendable parts including back-up batteries and smart cards
6) Increased labor costs for verifying that each machine has the correct version of software and firmware before and after each election
7) Increased labor costs for individually performing logic and accuracy tests on every one of the thousands of machines before and after each election
8) Increased labor costs for hiring additional poll workers (San Diego doubled the number of poll workers when it switched to DREs)
9) Increased costs for poll worker training
10) Massive costs for replacing these machines when they age and the technology they employ is no longer maintainable or supported by the vendor.

This is why I believe that purchasing the DREs is basically an unfunded mandate for the local municipalities and is the wrong choice for CT. Other options, such as Optical Scan machines, are more reliable, much less expensive to purchase and much less expensive to run future elections with. Additionally, these systems will almost certainly be federally certified as being accessible to the disabled. I could cite many, many examples of problems with DREs but that will be saved for another letter. Please start over with a new RFP that considers all available election systems so that CT purchases the system that will provide the most accurate voting at the best price while still providing accessibility to the disabled. The current RFP does not do this and I urge you to consider issuing a new RFP that does. Please respond to this email or call me at 203-775-0011 if you have any questions and thank you for your consideration.

[garybeck]

20. but wait!

if the law is signed by the governor, there would be mandatory audits on DREs but none on opscans, right?

if so, I would think that the DREs with paper trails and audits would be better than opscans without. do you agree?

especially in light of the recent articles about diebold opscans...

essentially, an optical scanner is a DRE. it takes a real vote and converts it into an electronic vote. It can be programmed to do just about anything, just like a DRE. So if there's no manual mandatory audits, they are bad news, don't you think? I like your new law on DRE auditing, I would take that over opscans with no audits. Just my 2 cents.

[truckin]

23. You have a point but I would still prefer that CT purchase OpScan

and then amend SB55 to apply the same recount requirement to OpScan that is required of DREs. Based on what I have experienced with our legislators and their support of SB55, I believe that it would not be a problem to amend the bill in that way.

[riqster]

24. Optical Scan devices are easy to hack

And thus should have the same manual audit requirement as DREs.

[Bill Bored]

26. HAVA does NOT ban LEVER machines!

As long as you create a paper record of the vote totals, lever machines are still allowed under HAVA. You only need to have one Accessible machine per POLLING PLACE which could be a DRE or an Automark.

If you don't know this, it's understandable. I only found out abut it last week! But it's true.

Why not save yourselves some money, keep the lever machines, and just buy one Accessible machine per polling place or precinct.

FYI, voting distracts don't sound like precincts to me. They are much bigger! Precincts are typically one or two machines and can be located 4 to a polling place if necessary. This is why the whole law was so vague to us outsiders.

If you have a strong auditing law, why not limit the number of DREs by using only for Accessibility? In this way, you can audit almost all your DRE votes!

(And please don't tell me about how the gears on the lever machines can be filed down, etc. While this is true, you ain't gonna file down 5,000 of them, are you? With DREs, one click of a mouse is all that's needed to screw up the whole jurisdiction!)

[truckin]

27. We are aware that lever machines would comply with HAVA if

they are retrofitted to provide a paper trail. However, I am not aware of any company that offers this technology and it might be hard to convince legislators to invest money into a technology that is so dated. TrueVoteCT has discussed this option and at this point we do not consider it a viable option but if there is a company that can retrofit the lever machines for a reasonable cost maybe we should reconsider this option.

[FogerRox]

31. Actually I am not sure about this

"if they are retrofitted to provide a paper trail."

There are 2 parts to that clause -- dont have the link right now I was readding up on HAVA and the NJ HAVA plan last night. a Paper trial for Levers is but one option for levers.

ALso:
Title 1 of HAVA provides funds for replacing levers--
Title 3 provides funds for Handicapped voting equipment----

On Edit: ripstr has it right thanks !!

[Bill Bored]

35. nothing to do with "retrofitting"

The paper trail is produced by bi-partisan election inspectors who write down the results when the machines are canvassed.

The paper trail in HAVA is NOT a voter-verified paper trail.
Otherwise we wouldn't have paperless e-voting that only produces summary results reports (poll tapes). Lever machines do exactly the same thing only humans produce the paper.

HAVA says the voting "system" must produce the trail -- not the voting machines.

This is the position being taken by the NYC BOE, or at least one commissioner I know of, and it means the levers can stay as long as you also provide the accessibility solution.

Of course, this a little-known fact and is based on the same loophole in the law that allows paperless DREs, but WTF?

You can refund your HAVA money, which isn't enough to replace all your machines anyway, and just use the portion necessary to provide accessible voting. That's one DRE or Automark per polling place, and at that rate you can hand count all those particular ballots or VVPATs.

It took me a long time to come to this realization, but when a BOE commissioner and lawyer is telling you to your face, it sinks in!

HAVA is a scam and you have to treat it as such. Save the taxpayers' money and just spend it on Accessible Voting. Keep your lever machines. Run it by the powers that be in CT and NJ, and see what they think!

Here's a link to the statute:

http://www.eac.gov/law_ext.asp

Nothing says you can't sue lever machines, as long as the system produces a paper audit trail.

[Bill Bored]

36. see post 35 nt

[Bill Bored]

38. truckin, Fischer's paper assumes a LOT of voters per DRE.

Depending on machine type, they can be much slower than lever machines. If you are considering the multi-page DREs like the Accuvote TS, I doubt you can get so many voters per machine per day. You will need more of these than the lever machines. Good luck.

[riqster]

28. "create a paper record of the vote totals"

Ah, there's a thing that rubs. Such a record can be so minimal as to be useless.

[Bill Bored]

37. It IS useless, but that's what's in the law.

And you can do that with a lever machine by writing down the totals!
This is done all the time with lever machines. The idea was for the DREs to print a poll tape, but this is NOT a voter-verified paper record. This is why we are questioning our election results in the first place.
But the law is the law.

There were in fact some Dems who voted for the thing that didn't realize the paper trail wasn't voter-verified. The Repukes caught them with their pants down. Sorry to say that the Dems didn't see it coming. They didn't read the PATRIOT Act either, so it's no surprise.

But it does mean we can keep our lever machines. Only punch cards are explicitly banned.

[Bill Bored]

25. Thanks! This is the kind of info I was looking for!

Too bad the law doesn't say 10% though.

As I'm sure you know, paging-style DREs, like the Diebold junk, require more machines to do the same job since it takes longer to vote on them. I hope his analysis takes this into account. I'll give it a look when i have more time.

Thanks for clearing this up though. I knew there was more to it meets the eye. I like your random audit language too. Was there some legal reason why it had to be spelled out so specifically? Does the term "random" in and of itself have no legal meaning?

Grateful for your input truckin.

[FogerRox]

30. SOrry if I confused --- Montana and Vermont IIRC banned digital ballots