Quotes taken from different webpages are separated by a dashed line like this:
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"The computer voting system in this country is a veritable can of worms, so open to tampering that if there is no organized election fraud going on, the criminals are falling down on the job. Computer vote fraud is not only feasible but, by its very nature, undetectable. It is hard to conceive of an organized criminal enterprise with such a favorable combination of high profit potential and low risk."
-- Relevance Magazine editor Dr. Phillip M. O Halloran
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"In fact, all the evidence suggests that computer voting will make election fraud possible with an ease and scale heretofore impossible to achieve."
-- Dr. Charles E. Corry, Ph. D.
http://www.ejfi.org/Voting/Voting-3.htm#
"When it comes to computerized elections, there are no safeguards. It's not a door without locks, it's a house without doors."
-- Howard Strauss, Director of Advanced Computer Applications at Princeton University and a nationally renowned expert in the field of computer voting. Source: Relevance Magazine
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"As Mr. Jones points out, nowhere in the system today from the manufacturer to the independent testing authority to the logic and accuracy testing done by the state is security testing part of that procedure."
"We're flying blind in terms of an industry that doesn't have to build to any standards, independent testing authorities, which by the way are paid strictly by the vendors to test and make sure it functions properly, but not to do the security testing."
-- Michael Wertheimer, Director, RABA Innovative Solutions Cell, NPR's Talk Of The Nation Interview, 2-6-04
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"The most stunning thing in our work was that hand-counted paper ballots were better than anything else."
-- Stephen Ansolabeher, project director of The Voting Technology Project, comparing the reliability of voting systems used nationwide from 1988 to 2000
http://americanfreepress.net/08_25_03/Concerns_Over/concerns_over.html---------------------
"We in Information Security have been protesting the use of the poorly designed voting machines from Diebold and others, and as a result of their poor implementation and widespread use, our election remains in question and our country remains bitterly divided. Many people feel that their votes didn’t count, and for good reason. THESE SYSTEMS ARE NOT WORTHY OF OUR TRUST!"
- Chuck Herrin, CISSP, CISA, MCSE, CEH
Professional IT Auditor
http://www.chuckherrin.com/hackthevotedemo.htm--------------
“As the computer scientists at Johns Hopkins recently reported, these new machines are vulnerable to massive fraud,” Rep. Rush Holt (D-N.J.) said. “Unless Congress acts to pass legislation that would make sure that all computer voting machines have a paper record that voters can verify when they cast their ballots, voters and election officials will have no way of knowing whether the computers are counting votes properly.”
Rep. Rush Holt (D-N.J.)
http://americanfreepress.net/08_25_03/Concerns_Over/concerns_over.html------------
“There is a sense that in the past
were part of the black box crowd and conspiracy theorists. No one is saying that now.”
Kay Albowicz
Representative
National Association of Secretaries of State
http://americanfreepress.net/08_25_03/Concerns_Over/concerns_over.html
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"In the absence of any significant audit trails, you have no knowledge whatsoever as to what goes on inside the systems."
Peter Neumann
Stanford Research Institute
"They claim they keep everything secure, but this shows the lax nature of their procedures. This just blatantly flies in the face of good security."
Rebecca Mercuri
Professor of Computer Science
Bryn Mawr College
"Within the first half-hour of analysis, we found some immediate red flags. The more we examined it, the more we concluded this thing should not be used in elections."
Yoshi Kohno
Researcher
Information Security Institute
Johns Hopkins University
"You can't take something that's that broken and turn it into something secure. I am against electronic voting because I think voting is too important and computers are too difficult to secure."
Aviel D. Rubin
Associate Professor of Computer Science
Johns Hopkins University
Technical Director, Information Security Institute
Johns Hopkins University
"I don't think anybody has the capability to develop a whole new system from scratch in a year and I don't think Diebold had any incentive to do so, because none of this news broke until recently."
Aviel D. Rubin
Associate Professor of Computer Science
Johns Hopkins University
Technical Director, Information Security Institute
Johns Hopkins University
"We looked at the software, and it was poorly written.... all machines had the same password hardwired into the code. Computer Security 101 would tell you that's the first thing not to do."
Aviel D. Rubin
Associate Professor of Computer Science
Johns Hopkins University
Technical Director, Information Security Institute
Johns Hopkins University
* * *
Howard A. Denis, a Montgomery County council member, was "so shaken by the Hopkins report that he is considering asking for a waiver to stop using electronic machines," The Washington Post reported. " 'The more I look into this, the more serious I think it is,' " said Denis.
"I don't want to have this thing whitewashed and have a lot of happy talk, and have people trying to mollify us and blow off these charges," Denis told the Post . "The integrity of our democracy is really at stake here.
"The electronic machines were forced down our throats by the state," he said. "We were used as guinea pigs for this, and on top of it we had to pay for it."
* * *
Jones, as an Iowa state elections official, examined the flawed computer code five years earlier and pointed out the security problems to the system's developers and to government officials. "They promised it would be fixed," he said. "The Hopkins group found clear evidence that it wasn't. Yet for five years, I had been under the impression that it was fixed."
Jones said he was shocked to discover the flaws had not been corrected.
"There are more shenanigans. The hole had not been patched," Jones told AFP. "They can use the excuse of incompetence, but there are hints of deliberation . . . The Diebold machine should be decertified. Incompetence alone should be justification for de-certification. They were told and they didn't fix it."
* * *
"Unfortunately, he's wrong. The report is generally valid," said David L. Dill, computer scientist at Stanford University and member of the California Secretary of State's Ad Hoc Touch Screen Task Force. "It's been obvious that can be hacked, and Aviel shows that they can be hacked. They've blown up all the arguments that the present machines are OK.
"If the Virginia State Board of elections were really worried about being burned in effigy, it would have been prudent to seek a broader range of advice," he said.
"If a programmer employed by an election machine manufacturer introduces malicious code into the system that can change votes, even the most competent local election officials will not be able to stop it or detect it," Dill said.
http://wesavedemocracy.org/congress_electronic_voting.html
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"It seems the nation's election officials aren't open to input from anyone but the industries that are wining and dining them to buy their equipment."
Rebecca Mercuri
Professor of Computer Science
Bryn Mawr College
http://wesavedemocracy.org/voting_problems_corry.html
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Excerpts from the Diebold Memos:
"For a demonstration I suggest you fake it. Progam them both so they look the same, and then just do the upload fro the AV. That is what we did in the last AT/AV demo."
http://scdc.sccs.swarthmore.edu/diebold/lists/support.w3archive/199903/msg00098.html
"I need some answers! Our department is being audited by the County. I have been waiting for someone to give me an explanation as to why Precinct 216 gave Al Gore a minus 16022 when it was uploaded. Will someone please explain this so that I have the information to give the auditor instead of standing here 'looking dumb'."
http://scdc.sccs.swarthmore.edu/diebold/lists/support.w3archive/200101/msg00068.html
"Johnson County, KS will be doing Central Count for their mail in ballots. They will also be processing these ballots in advance of the closing of polls on election day. They would like to log into the Audit Log an entry for Previewing any Election Total Reports. They need this, to prove to the media, as well as, any candidates & lawyers, that they did not view or print any Election Results before the Polls closed. However, if there is a way that we can disable the reporting functionality, that would be even better."
http://scdc.sccs.swarthmore.edu/diebold/lists/rcr.w3archive/200202/msg00051.html
"4K Smart cards which had never been previously programmed are being recognized by the Card Manager as manager cards. When a virgin card from CardLogix is inserted into a Spyrus (have tried CM-0-2-9 and CM-1-1-1) the prompt 'Upgrade Mgr Card?' is displayed. Pressing the ENTER key creates a valid manager card. This happens in Admin mode and Election mode."
http://scdc.sccs.swarthmore.edu/diebold/lists/bugtrack.w3archive/200201/msg00025.html