IRV and the spoiler effect

[wli]

My reading of election methods literature indicates that IRV is not free of the spoiler effect (cloning *and* irrelevant alternatives), as I read it), but I've seen claims that IRV is immune to it (on the basis of cloning alone).

Also, why is IRV so popular when it's vulnerable to gerrymandering (the consistency criterion, as I read it)?

Finally, it's not summable, which makes it somewhat more expensive to carry out than it should be.

[dcfirefighter]

1. I prefer condorcet

or 'Ranked-Pairs' voting, which fixes the glitches of condorcet.

IRV is easier to explain, and has a head start.

Any form of proportional representation would likely mean a decrease in power by the existing major parties (R & D) and an increase in populist representatives. So, while it may mean a weakening of the Democratic Party, it would likely mean an advancement of Progressive ideals. Likely it'd also split the Republican Party into two or more factions: the Religious Right, and the Fiscal Conservatives.

[wli]

2. much the same here wrt. preferences

Schulze/CSSD or Ranked Pairs for Presidential elections, and proportional for Congress.

ON EDIT: Some connections should be made between specific voting system evaluation criteria and electoral tactics. When that's done, I think it will be easier to choose more appropriate voting systems. For example, linking the consistency criterion and gerrymandering would give people and understanding of why an election method passing the consistency criterion is needed.