Decertify a DRE -- today-- well its the weekend-- so do it on monday

[FogerRox]

Accupol and Liberty- these are the only 2 DREs with complete 2002 certification, Avante should be certified by sept.

Any other DRE left over-- cannot be used in a Fed election--

Any other DRE is not eligible for HAVA funds--

Federal law Trumps state law--- so get ready to sue--

In NJ we have alraedy threaned our election officials with seeing them in fed court, because of thier violations of title III, section 301 HAVA.

If your state plans to use any other DRE in 2006--

this is the time---- The more DREs we can take off the table-- sort of-- the easier it may be to talk about alternatives--

Something about --- what is it--- ummm ahhh

Paper ---- uhhhh oh yeah paper ballots---- ! ! !

SO --- decertify a DRE today

[autorank]

1. This is amazing. Everyone should know this.

I've got an idea. I'll PM you later tonight.

[Bill Bored]

2. You know I'm interested in this but

I agree that in 2006 all new DREs used in federal elections have to meet 2002 specs. But there is a loophole in Sec 301 near the very end which reads:

c Construction.--

1. In general.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a State or jurisdiction which used a particular type of voting system in the elections for Federal office held in November 2000 from using the same type of system after the effective date of this section, so long as the system meets or is modified to meet the requirements of this section.

In other words, the machines, if used in 2000, can be re-certified. Not sure about the Diebold junk in Georgia that was not used in 2000 but I'm sure there are some folks working on that.

What do you think Roj?

[Melissa G]

3. sounds like a interesting point BB

Who decides whether "the system meets or is modified to meet the requirements of this section and when must they do that by?

[Bill Bored]

4. Probably the "independent" testing labs and the EAC

Each State and jurisdiction shall be required to comply with the requirements of Sec. 301 on and after January 1, 2006.

http://www.eac.gov/law_ext.asp

Roj is really on to something there. I'm just suggesting that there might be ways around it, unfortunately. But time is running out!
I think this needs some more investigation.
I'm still catching up on it myself.

I do know that lever machines and even punch cards can be retained except for use by the disabled. You just can't take the federal money unless you use it to replace levers and cards.

And you need to establish a voter education program for the use of punch cards to explain how to avoid overvotes and that sort of thing.

Also, states must provide access for the disabled by 2007, one machine per polling place (not per precinct).

It's a fallacy that all the old levers and punch cards have to go. -- a BIG fallacy.

That said, a lot of rural polling places only need one machine, unless of course it's a junk DRE that takes several minutes to vote on!

[Melissa G]

5. Sounds like we need to alert some organizations to this

That way they can mobilize their memberships!

Are we clear yet what we want our folks and the organizations to do?

[FogerRox]

8. You can get HAVA money, under title 1 for replacment of levers

& Punch cards--

and you can get money under title III to purchase handicapped accessible voting systems.

[FogerRox]

12. Yes the EAC-- ITA -- Wylie labs

Most of who are on vacation till the end of the month--- HAHAHAHAHA

[FogerRox]

6. I wouldnt say its a loop hole-

If a DRE can't be upgraded--- it can't be used:

"so long as the system meets or is modified to meet the requirements of this section."

[Bill Bored]

17. Agreed, but some of those requirements are not that strict.

The error rate, you have explained in detail.

The other stuff is just alerting the voter about overvotes, permitting the voter to correct the ballot before it's cast, and printing a results report, right? I don't see what's so hard about that.

The accessibility features are another matter, but they don't have to be in place until 2007.

[FogerRox]

21. umm the 2007 deadline comes into play if you use title II funds for title

III rerquirements--- otherwise the handicapped access is mandated by 2006.

I see someone has been reading HAVA-- good eyes there buddy--


Most jurisdictions are using title III funds for title III requirments though. SO most jurisdictions will be under the 2006 deadline.

In general terms section 301 mandates handicapped access by the first federal election in 2006.

But you are right there is a loophole for handicapped access that pushes the deadline back to 2007.

[WillYourVoteBCounted]

7. how did you do it

do you have lawyers?

Our state is likely to certify non-compliant DREs, because they
hope they will fail (with the toilet paper ballot) so they
can replaced paper with "other verification systems".

Has anyone contacted EFF.org?

[FogerRox]

9. My research leads to this conclusion.

I have contacted a Professor @ Rutgers University, who is a member of the Constitutional Litigation Center and another Lawyer-- the Executive Director of NJ Appleseed. They are quite high on the implications-- we have a state problem in NJ--- only having DREs certified for use that have only 1990 certs-- ? WTF !

It is a complex issue--- in NJ it involves HAVA, Title 19- which is NJ election law-- and the NJ HAVA plan-- and a law passed in NJ called S701 or chapter 88. AND the fact that in NJ the Attorney Generals office runs elections, not the SOS. Which is viewed as a conflict of interest.


My group-- The Essex County Task Force on Voting Rights--
HAS some PHDs and a former NJ Deputy Attorney General. One such Phd is DR Janow-- who has written a great letter on section 301 of HAVA.
This letter has been delivered to members of the NJ Division of elections--- AG staffers-- as well as our county level SOE and BOE members--- and they are crapping in their pants--

The Essex County legal council is looking to put in protection for the County into any contract the county signs to buy voting equipment, reqiuring voting equipment to be HAVA compliant---- or the county gets its money back-- HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAAHA

Additionally-- Ellen @ Votersunite, Kathy Dopp, Bev Harris, J30 yahoo group, Kip Humphreys HERH group have Dr Janows letter.

HEre is DR Janows 1st letter--
THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE FEC ERROR RATE STANDARDS ON
HAVA AND FEDERAL ELECTIONS
The HAVA LAW Title III, section 301.a.5. (text below) sets
requirements for voting machines used in elections and specifically
says they must meet the accuracy requirements of section 3.2.1 of
the FECs voting system standards in effect on the date of HAVA
enactment (in 2002). Section 3.2.1 is quoted below. Not everything
in the FEC voting standards is legally enforceable, but the sections
called out by name in actual laws such as HAVA have to be. If 3.2.1
can be ignored, so can the handicapped access sections of the HAVA
LAW section 301, and no one is claiming that. Conclusion:
IF A VOTING MACHINE DOES NOT SATISFY 3.2.1 ACCURACY STANDARDS, IT
CAN NOT LEGALLY BE USED IN A FEDERAL ELECTION AFTER 1/1/2006
Nowhere does any law say that NASED must do the certification, but
to satisfy 3.2.1 there must be some defensible accuracy
certification other than the NJ AGs sayso or oral tradition.
Otherwise anyone can go into a court and demand that a Federal
election using these machines be overturned unless someone shows
proof that section 3.2.1 is satisfied.
When one reads HAVA Title I, section 102.a.2.c and 102.b.1.C and D
(eligibility to receive funds), thel phrase "meets the requirements
of section 301" appears several times as a precondition for getting
funds. Section "D" explicitly says that certification is needed to
show that 301 is satisfied. The error rates must be satisfied but
not all of the FEC VVS "voluntary" provisions. Therefore
HAVA FUNDING CAN BE CHALLENGED, IN COURT IF NOT BY THE FEDS, UNLESS
ELECTION MACHINES BOUGHT SATISFY HAVA 301 / FEC 3.2.1
Error rate certification has to come from a recognized engineering
laboratory. Neither the Attorney General nor any other lawyer or
legislator can make the certification. They must produce a report to
support any claims.
If there is not PROOF that a machine meets the 3.2.1 accuracy
standard, it's purchase or use can result in a broad rescinding of
HAVA reimbursements to states and localities, and also in election-
time spectacles reminiscent of the 2000 Presidential election.
Specifically, the November 2006 Congressional election results could
and probably would be challenged by the losers in each locality. For
new purchases, it is central to ask
WHERE IS THE CERTIFICATION THAT A MACHINE
MEETS THE FEC 3.2.1 ERROR STANDARD?
To see the impact, note for example that New Jersey has about 6200
Sequoia Advantage voting machines, with the possibility that 1000
–
2000 more will be ordered to use up HAVA funding. What if the error
certification is not available from a reputable engineering source?
What if the machine can not meet the standard, since it is a very
old and opbsolete design?

CITATIONS

HERE IS THE TEXT OF 301, WITH IRRELEVENT STUFF DELETED:
TITLE III--UNIFORM AND NONDISCRIMINATORY ELECTION TECHNOLOGY AND
ADMINISTRATION REQUIREMENTS
Subtitle A--Requirements
SEC. 301. <<NOTE: 42 USC 15481.>> VOTING SYSTEMS STANDARDS.
(a) Requirements.--Each voting system used in an election for
Federal office shall meet the following requirements:
(1) ...
(2) Audit capacity.—
( A) In general.--The voting system shall produce a record with an
audit capacity for such system.
(B) Manual audit capacity.--
(i) The voting system shall produce a permanent paper record with a
manual audit capacity for
such system.
(ii) The voting system shall provide the voter with an opportunity
to change the ballot or correct
any error before the permanent paper record is produced.
(iii) The paper record produced under subparagraph (A) shall be
available as an official record for
any recount conducted with respect to any election in which the
system is used.
(3) Accessibility for individuals with disabilities.--The voting
system shall-...
(4) Alternative language accessibility
(5) Error rates.--The error rate of the voting system in counting
ballots (determined by taking into account only those errors which
are attributable to the voting system and not attributable to an act
of the voter) shall comply with the error rate standards established
under section 3.2.1 of the voting systems standards issued by the
Federal Election Commission which are in effect on the date of the
enactment of this Act.

HERE IS THE RELEVENT TEXT OF TITLE I SECTION 102:
SEC. 102. <<NOTE: 42 USC 15302.>> REPLACEMENT OF PUNCH CARD OR LEVER
VOTING MACHINES.
(a) Establishment of Program.--
(1) .....
(2) Use of funds.--A State shall use the funds provided under a
payment under this section (either
directly or as reimbursement, including as reimbursement for costs
incurred on or after January 1,
2001, under multiyear contracts) to replace punch card voting
systems or lever voting systems
(as the case may be) in qualifying precincts within that State with
a voting system (by purchase,
lease, or such other arrangement as may be appropriate) that--
(A) does not use punch cards or levers;
(B) is not inconsistent with the requirements of the laws described
in section 906; and
(C) meets the requirements of section 301....
…….
(b) Eligibility.--
(1) In general.--A State is eligible to receive a payment under the
program under this section if it
submits to the Administrator a notice not later than the date that
is 6 months after the date of the
enactment of this Act (in such form as the Administrator may
require) that contains--
(A) ...
(B) ...
(C) certifications that the replacement voting systems will meet the
requirements of
section 301; and
(D) such other information and certifications as the Administrator
may require which
are necessary for the administration of the program.


ACCURACY SPECIFICATION FROM the FEC VOLUNTARY VOTING SYSTEM
GUIDELINES SECTION 3 (SEE BOLDED PARAGRAPHS)
http://www.epic.org/privacy/voting/eac_foia /

3.2.1 Accuracy Requirements
Voting system accuracy addresses the accuracy of data for each of
the individual ballot positions that could be selected by a voter,
including the positions that are not selected. For a voting system,
accuracy is defined as the ability of the system to capture, record,
store, consolidate and report the specific selections and absence of
selections, made by the voter for each ballot position without
error. Required accuracy is defined in terms of an error rate that
for testing purposes represents the maximum number of errors allowed
while processing a specified volume of data. This rate is set at a
sufficiently stringent level such that the likelihood of voting
system errors affecting the outcome of an election is exceptionally
remote even in the closest of elections.
The error rate is defined using a convention that recognizes
differences in how vote data is processed by different types of
voting systems. Paper-based and DRE systems have different
processing steps. Some differences also exist between precinct count
and central count systems. Therefore, the acceptable error rate
applies separately and distinctly to each of the following functions:
a. For all paper-based systems:
1) Scanning ballot positions on paper ballots to detect selections
for individual candidates and contests;
2) Conversion of selections detected on paper ballots into digital
data;
b. For all DRE systems:
1) Recording the voter selections of candidates and contests into
voting data storage; and
2) Independently from voting data storage, recording voter
selections of candidates and contests into ballot image storage.
c. For precinct-count systems (paper-based and DRE): Consolidation
of vote selection data from multiple precinct-based systems to
generate jurisdiction-wide vote counts, including storage and
reporting of the consolidated vote data; and
d. For central-count systems (paper-based and DRE): Consolidation of
vote selection data from multiple counting devices to generate
jurisdiction-wide vote counts, including storage and reporting of
the consolidated vote data.
For testing purposes, the acceptable error rate is defined using two
parameters: the desired error rate to be achieved, and the maximum
error rate that should be accepted by the test process.
For each processing function indicated above, the system shall
achieve a target error rate of no more than one in 10,000,000 ballot
positions, with a maximum acceptable error rate in the test process
of one in 500,000 ballot positions.
ANOTHER SECTION FROM FEC VVS
3.2.4.3.3 Recording Accuracy
DRE systems shall meet the following requirements for recording
accurately each vote and ballot cast:
a. Detect every selection made by the voter;
b. Correctly add permissible selections to the memory components of
the device;
c. Verify the correctness of the detection of the voter selections
and the addition of the selections to memory;
d. Achieve an error rate not to exceed the requirement indicated in
Section 3.2.1;
e. Preserve the integrity of voting data and ballot images (for DRE
machines) stored in memory for the official vote count and audit
trail purposes against corruption by stray electromagnetic
emissions, and internally generated spurious electrical signals; and
f. Maintain a log of corrected data.

Rich Janow
South Orange, N. J.

[FogerRox]

10. Here is DR Janows Clarification on the difference between

1990 & 2002 error rate standards.

This discussion may help explain the multiplicity of numbers,
admittedly confusing.

The maximum acceptable error rates for 1990 and 2002 were 1
in 100,000
and 1 in 500,000 respectively. These numbers mean that every
time someone records a
single vote, the probability of getting it wrong because of
SW/HW errors (not voter errors)
is no bigger than either 1/100,000 or 1/500,000. This is
similar to saying that every
time you flip a coin the probability of heads is 50%, but
applied to recording a vote.

But the results of recording a vote or flipping a coin are
statistical. Iin the case of
voting, the machine or software can fail to record the choice
or record it incorrectly.
Even if a machine being tested is very, very reliable it could
record a wrong vote early in the
test process (bad luck). If you continue testing, you will
find no more errors for a large
number of tries, and the machine would pass. Alternatively, a
very, very unreliable machine could have
a run of luck and correctly record a long string of votes
without making an error. But that is
unlikely and the longer the test sequence becomes, the lower
the probability that the bad machine passes.

The other numbers you are seeing reflect this statistical
nature of the prescribed test sequences - i.e., how many
tries do you have to make to be 95% sure that the basic error
rates are no higher than
the specifications above (for both 1990 and 2002). If you
want to be 99% sure, you have do
do a much longer and more expensive test sequence. So both
1990 and 2002 specifications pick
the same confidence level: 95% (= 100% - 5%).

First, in order to pass outright, a voting machine has to have
NO errors in the first 297,589 tries (1990) or
1,549,703 tries (for 2002)*. If they get that far with no
errors, you can be 95% certain that on EACH ballot choice
the error rate is no larger than the ones above.

Suppose there is an error early on (before 297,589 or
1,549,703 tries).
Then the test has to continue on. A machine can also pass if
it has
a maximum of ONE error in the first 762,763 tries (for 1990)
or 3,126,404 tries (for 2002)*.

For 2002, if the machine fails very early before 26,997
tries*, game over, go home and don't come back until
you have modified the machine. There is a 95% probability
that the machine's error rate exceeds
the limit. I haven't seen the comparable number for 1990, but
calculate that it should be about 5100
tries.

The 2002 requirements are thus 5 times stronger than the ones
for 1990.

I believe the 1990 testing stopped at either 297589 or 762,763
tries. So even if a machine
can actually pass the 2002 tests, that would not be
demonstrated in the 1990 reports and it
would have to be re-tested to be certified.

I hope this clarifies, rather than obscures, what's going on.

*See the EAC VVS for 2000, Vol. II, Appendix C "National
Certification Criteria", Sec C5, page 7

Rich Janow
South Orange, N. J.

[FogerRox]

11. Some links to prior threads--

Bill Bored---DRE Junk: Human Error Rate vs. System Error Rate.
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_topic&forum=203&topic_id=388080

The Edge is not HAVA compliant-- it fails a good part of section 301.
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_topic&forum=203&topic_id=386824

PICS: Wheelchair access/HAVA/Sequoia Advanatge
This thread is important because it expands "Operation decertify" beyond the error rate issue-- There are many parts of HAVA that can used against our DRE Vendors--- this is one example.

On July 27th the Task Force-- with Superintendent of Elections, Carmine Casciano hosted a demo of voting machines-- we invited 7 vendors-- only 3 showed-- I walked up to the Sequoia Advantage and measured the machine, a Task Force member took some pics-- one of which I used to annotate. The 2 pics in this thread BLOW AWAY the Advantage--- it is clear this DRE is not HAVA wheelchair accessible-- and the Guy in the wheelchair is a lawyer for the ACLU------
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_topic&forum=203&topic_id=386253

I predict no one will ever buy a Sequoia Advantage again. Decertication:
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_topic&forum=203&topic_id=385849

HAVA section 301 Advisory
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_topic&forum=203&topic_id=385691

HAVA advisory-- title III section 301 THIS IS BIG for the DRE junkie
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_topic&forum=203&topic_id=385179

[Melissa G]

14. Fogerox, you and Bill Bored are Utter Treasures!

Thanks for all you guys do and for sharing it with us here!

[FogerRox]

15. Gulp--- thanks-- ! just doing my job-- ya know--

& maybe kickin ass & taking names along the way--

[Bill Bored]

16. We need one more vote to nominate this thread...

Otherwise we're just BURIED TREASURE!

[Melissa G]

18. The first vote came from me and you need 3 more votes now..

Treasured one..you really need to read the DU updates at the top of the page...5 votes are required for Greatest these days...

[FogerRox]

13. I have not contacted EFF ---- U R nominated-- LOL

Which DREs are in play in your area?

Additionally the Task Force has developed relationships with these vendors-
Accupoll
Avante
Populex
Liberty

None of who were interested in the NJ market place until our demo--

NOw Liberty is undergoing certification in NJ and that has the attention of 2 more vendors-- WHO HAVA CHANGED THEIR MIND about NJ. Since we have a new --no more Sequoia environment-- I have contacted ES&S about applying for certification in NJ, re opscans.
Currently npo opscan is certified in NJ for general use-- this would be a first-----------------

Because we have UTTERLY changed the environment in NJ---
Vendors who considered NJ Sequoia Territory have changed their minds--- they are flocking to get certification before Sept.

[FogerRox]

19. here is a link to The Appleseed foundation they have centers in 17 states

What the hell---Please kick & Recommend--

They have some good lawyers that work on election law--

http://www.appleseeds.net/local/centers.cfm
Appleseed Centers

Alabama
Chicago
Connecticut
District of Columbia
Florida
Kansas
Los Angeles
Louisiana
Massachusetts
Mexico
Nebraska
New Jersey
New York City
Oklahoma
South Carolina
Texas
Washington

[Stevepol]

20. 2 more votes still needed to make thisi post a best post. I just

recommended it, making 3, but 5 recommendations are needed now, so we need 2 more.

[Bill Bored]

22. Well, assuming all this is correct, and it seems to be,

it's still possible for some machines to be certified very shortly, drastically changing this picture, isn't it?

We need to work on VVPAT/VVPB laws and the auditing and recount laws to use them. And in states where one official, such as a SOS, runs the elections, that office needs to be "decertified" too! No better place to start than Ohio and they're workin' on it!

This doesn't mean DREs shouldn't be decertified too -- THEY SHOULD BE! But that's just one more nail in the coffin and like zombies, they can still arise from the dead if they're re-certified.

We just have to keep firing on all cylinders.

Great idea for the state to pick some old clunkers that can't be certified though, as long as they don't actually BUY any!

[Melissa G]

23. Kickin for a coupla nominations! Come on ERDers......vote this up!

[FogerRox]

24. thanks--- for the kicks and noms

This is a big enuf issue - one that I feel will grow and maybe explode-- I am preparing version 1.2 of this thread--- te he he

I heard back from Brian Hancock at the EAC-- all his legal folks are on vacation-- he doesnt want to answer our technical questions himself.

Our next episode asks the questions--
Will the NJ Attorney General have the balls to face the crisis in NJ.
Or will the scandel ruin his resume?

Will North Carolina DUers sue state election officials over lack of HAVA compliant voting machines?

Will Cooke County DUers sue election officials?

SO stay tuned for the NEXT DU Installment of


------ Decertify a DRE today !!

[Melissa G]

25. waiting for that next installment with Bated Breath .....Roj! n/t

[FogerRox]

26. one last little kick before episode 2

[emcguffie]

27. best news I've heard/read in 5 years! thanks. nt

[kster]

28. Kick.nt

[tommcintyre]

29. kick nt

[FogerRox]

30. Heres a link to episode two

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_mesg&forum=203&topic_id=391261&mesg_id=391261