Decertify a DRE today. Episode two. - Democratic Underground

FogerRox

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Fri Aug-26-05 08:39 PM
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Decertify a DRE today. Episode two.

Decertify a DRE today.
Episode two.

In Episode one, when we last heard from our Hero...... Joe Democarcy...... he was in a jam. But Joe aint no quitter. Joe looked around for anything to use as a weapon-- federal & state laws anythig to use as a tool, a weapon. And Joe thought if he could get rid of most touchscreen voting machines then public officals would have to at least consider the options--- you know maybe things like..... Paper ballots--- that get scanned by opscans.

So What is this NASED? The National Association of State Election Directors, they have a NASED web site. SO lets go there and look at what Joe found.

All right enuf of the BS---

Here is episode one if you missed it

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=203x390084

In episode 2 we will look at the NASED list of qualifying systems. I am going to deal with just the big 3 at this point, Diebold, ES&S & Sequoia.
Here is the link to the current pdf:
http://www.nased.org/ITA%20Information/NASEDQualifiedVotingSystems12.03to7.05.pdf
Here is the link to an older list:
http://www.nased.org/ITA%20Information/NASEDApprovedSystems1.03.pdf

Lets look at the new NASED list. Starting with the left hand side we see the company name, in the second column we see voting system/system component. On page 3 we find some Diebold entrys starting with GEMS 1-18-18. We know that GEMS is the Diebold tabulation software, and it is entered in the second column which is marked voting system/system component. And GEMS is also entered into the 3rd column marked Software. There are multiple entries which look like repeated attempts to get GEMS certified to the 2002 standards, since the earlier entries are all certified to the 1990 standards. It appears that Diebold tried 10 times to upgrade GEMS. It also appears they failed 10 times from July 8th, 2003 to May 16th, 2005. Though on May 16th, 2005 Diebold received a 2002 certification for Firmware version 4.6.2.

This is the Diebold DRE, apparently an older unit, not a modern touchscreen: http://www.diebold.com/dieboldes/default.htm . This is the newer touchscreen, most likely using galvanic response for selecting ballot positions: http://www.diebold.com/dieboldes/accuvote_tsx.htm . Neither unit has received the coveted 2002 certification.

Now on page 5 we look at the ES&S entries. ES&S has 2 DREs, (Maybe 3, the V-2000 may still be around) the iVotronic: http://www.essvote.com/HTML/products/ivotronic.html , and the LS model, which is a full face iVotronic: http://www.essvote.com/HTML/products/ivotronicLS.html . In the 2nd column, voting system/system component, we see the entry for Unity 2.4.2, which would indicate the testing was done on this Unity 2.4.2, not a DRE. Otherwise the name of the DRE would be stated. Also note that Unity 2.4.2 is certified to the 1990 standards. It appears that from Febuary 19th 2004 to January 9th, 2005, ES&S tried 5 times to get the upgrades certified to 2002 standards, in which they succeeded with Unity version 2.5.

Moving to page 8 we find the Sequoia entries. First is the Advantage DRE certified to the 1990 standards in 1997. This is strange because the Advantage was introduced in 1986, and certified for use in NJ in 1987. Next is the Sequoia WinEDS version 2.6. This is Sequoias tabulation software, which was certified to the 1990 standards in August 2002.
Next we see the EMS/AERO version 3.54 certified to 1990 standards in October of 2002, which I’m guessing is the software for the Optical scan systems, since it is listed only in entries of optical Scan equipment. Continuing, we see what appears to be multiple attempts at upgrades. Some of which were to the 2002 standards. But, the Sequoia Edge & Advantage DREs are not listed as 2002 certified.

I believe what we have seen is repeated attempts to upgrade Software & Firmware to the 2002 standards by the big 3. While vendors such as Accupoll: http://www.accupoll.com/ & Liberty: http://www.libertyelectionsystems.com/LibertyVote.htm, with newer products, seem to breeze thru the 2002 certification process. Apparently these older DREs cannot cut the mustard. And without 2002 certification there is no way these DREs can be considered remotely HAVA Compliant. And thusly none of the Diebold, ES&S or Sequoia DREs can be used in the next federal election in 2006 as per section 301 of HAVA.

And no Jurisdiction can receive HAVA moneys for the purchase of these DREs.

States cant just grandfather these DREs, so they can be used in 2006. That would still leave open the very real possibility of massive court challemges by sore losers and such, all over the country. The potential for a massive crisis is in the making. SInce Federal law put us there, it is the feds -- sort to speak -- that have to fix it.

The Election Assistamce issued its EAC Advisory on Section 301 of HAVA, and then all the experts @ the EAC went on vacation. There are rumbling acroos the country -- after a summer conferences of county and state election officials, we may be able to enterain the very real possibilty of seeing the Jan 2006 DEAD LINE in HAVA, being postponed until 2007.

Mant county election officials have spoken to members of congress about HAVA. When Congress gets back in September --- this will be our chance to pressure them to push HAVA back at least one year. ANd a chance to spend another year trying to dismantle HAVA, piece by peice.

If you dont see your voting machine on this list with 2002 certification

http://www.nased.org/ITA%20Information/NASEDQualifiedVotingSystems12.03to7.05.pdf

Then it cant be used in 2006. Unless we do nothing.