This is a great article. Unintentionally, it provides a theater of the absurd chronology of electronic voting. Don’t get me wrong, I admire and respect the people in this group. If you read the whole article, it shows that they have concluded that a paper ballot, verified as correct by the voter is the only reliable way of ensuring a fair vote. Now, given the realities, that we are IMPELLED to have electronic voting, they have put together an open source voting machine that basically produces paper—voila! The absurdity is that to get back to what we had in many places in the country, paper first, last, always; -- we need a “Rube Goldberg” contraption – an electronic voting machine. It is totally amazing. We should all appreciate what they are doing because their standards drive the lousy machine makers crazy. In addition, they are working on open source software for tabulation. This is advanced stuff, SourceForge, etc., but it’s interesting. This is a MUST READ in the original. The original has live links that are superb. When Computers Vote
http://www.developerpipeline.com/showArticle.jhtml?articleId=170702562By Jack J. Woehr September 12, 2005
The Open Voting Consortium describes itself as "a non-profit organization dedicated to the development, maintenance, and delivery of open voting systems for use in public elections." To this end, the OVC is designing voting stations, ballot counting equipment, and open source software to run fair and auditable elections. They started with the voting machines themselves, with an open source project appearing on SourceForge as the Electronic Voting Machine Project.
Their efforts have garnered some notable attention in California and in the national press. Could this be the answer to the crisis of confidence in electronic voting in the United States? With this question in mind, I spoke by phone with Open Voting's Alan Dechert (President and CEO), Arthur Keller (OVC Co-founder and Secretary), and David Mertz (Vice President and CTO, also author of the IBM Developer Works column "Charming Python").
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So our proposal is that the paper itself be the ballot. If the official thing is the computer memory and the paper is the backup, then you get into all this complexity about putting it under glass so that you have a tamper-free paper trail. But if the paper ballot is the official thing, then there's no reason the voter can't hold onto their ballot, look at it, put it to another device to verify what the ballot says for those who are reading-impaired or visually impaired, and then physically place it in a ballot box to cast it. Going from the official ballot being computer bits to the official ballot being the paper ballot that people know and love…"I'm going to take this paper ballot and put it in the box, and that's casting my ballot." People understand that intuitively. They know that unless and until they place that paper ballot in the ballot box, it is not cast.
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Mertz: There's a joint publication of the EAC and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) that defines terms. "Fundamental representation" means "what counts as the official vote." In VVPAT systems, the fundamental representation is on the electronic media. The audit trail is a secondary verification. If there's a discrepancy, the electrons win.
If a voter is to look at a representation, the voter can't look at electrons, only paper. For true verifiability and transparency of the election process, you need the representation that the voters look at, i.e., the paper, to be the fundamental representation. Where paper is the fundamental representation, that's a ballot printer, and that's what the OVC system is.
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Keller: But even if we don't reach the point of open sourcing the entire chain, we have still improved the process, because the thing you feed into our tabulation system is always a checkable paper ballot. Also, our design is to have the system make an image of the ballot as feed it in at the precinct to be tallied, so you can't have ballot stuffing after leaving the precinct.
Mertz: An advantage of using our EBP over other EBP or simple ballot-marking systems is that we can include a cryptographic hash code.
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