What are the ripple effects of the Husti Hack?

[garybeck]

Doing some research here... help me out if ya can. just trying to get a list of actions that have taken place at least indirectly as a result of the Hursti Hack. I would like to organize it by state, so please put the name of the state in the subject if you reply.

It doesn't matter how big or small the action is. For example, in Vermont I was able to get a cover story article printed in the Burlington newspaper, and I really think the Hack gave my argument enough credibility that they were willing to cover the story.

On the other end of the spectrum... there are big actions like what happened in California...

I don't need a lot of details, just the general idea... (although people are welcome to discuss it more here if they want to).

thanks

[garybeck]

1. California - Diebold temporarily de-certified

Secretary of State McPherson temporarily decertifies Diebold. Orders inependent review of the software code, which confirms the vulnerability and declares the machines are not compliant with 2002 Standards.

[Wilms]

7. CA: I'm still not clear on this.

Both the Berkeley and Ciber reports confirm the vulnerability.

But neither declares the machines are not compliant with 2002 Standards. In fact, they're not mentioned at all.

There are letters between the SoS and Diebold, that do not mention it.

The reports themselves state the objective of the reviews, and neither claims that it is to determine if the system meets the 2002 VVSG.

They all skirted the issue....

Until McPherson mentioned it in his temp/cond cert., and skirted it some more.

It says that the machines have to meet the standard, and that HAVA compliance ($) could be at issue.

But who will go after counties that purchase equipment that don't meet the standard, but have been certified?

So far, I'm aware of a few CA counties that say they'll use the stuff. And I posted an article of a county that was looking for an alternative so as not to get caught holding the bag.

[garybeck]

12. it says right in the Berkeley report

"Interpreted code is contrary to standards: Interpreted code in general is prohibited by the
2002 FEC Voluntary Voting System Standards, and also by the successor standard, the EAC's
Voluntary Voting System Guidelines due to take eect in two years. In order for the Diebold
software architecture to be in compliance, it would appear that either the AccuBasic language
and interpreter have to be removed, or the standard will have to be changed."

I think that's pretty clear?


One thing that I think is confusing about the report is that it says it would only take a "few hours" to fix the problems. However, I think they are specifically referring to the *bugs* they found, which are a separate issue than the interpreted code. That's my take.

You question is good though- supposedly McPherson said that one of the conditions of the certification is that they have to be compliant with the 2002 standards. If that's the case, the would have to remove the interpreted code completely, not just fix the bugs.

[Wilms]

14. Ouch. In what section did you find the referrence to the VVSG?

Of course I can't find the downloaded pdf AND the CA SoS site is down right now.

[garybeck]

16. the PDF is right at the TOP of my website my friend

http://election.solarbus.org

[Wilms]

15. The VSTAAB snip you offered is on pg 3 of that report. There was another.

Page 35

There are also good arguments for eliminating AccuBasic interpreted code entirely from voting system software. The FEC 2002 Voluntary Voting System Standards expressly forbid interpreted code in section 4.2.2. Perhaps the standard writers had in mind forbidding only powerful, interpreted programming languages, such as Visual Basic, and not relatively benign and limited rendering languages such as HTML. AccuBasic falls somewhere in the middle on the more benign side (assuming the interpreter bugs are xed). But the text of the standard is pretty clear, and the same language from the 2002 standards has been preserved in the EAC's new successor standard, the Voluntary Voting Systems Guidelines, as section 5.2.2. To be in compliance it would seem that AccuBasic would have to be eliminated, or the standard would have to be changed.

Thanks, Gary.

It seems the VSTAAB didn't completely ignore it.


But I want to point out this out from the opening summary:

The questions we addressed are these:

 What kinds of damage can a malicious person do to undermine an election if he can arbitrarily modify the contents of a memory card?

 How can the possibility of such attacks be neutralized or ameliorated?

The scope of our investigation was basically limited to the above questions. We did not do a comprehensive code review of the whole codebase, nor look at a very broad range of potential security issues. Instead, we concentrated attention to the AccuBasic scripting language, its compiler, its interpreter, and other code related to potential security vulnerabilities associated with the memory cards.

Similarly, the CIBER report says this on page 4:

OVERVIEW AND APPROACH

The CIBER Huntsville and CIBER Global Security teams were tasked with performing a combination of testing and analysis of the Diebold Election System’s Source Code to identify security and functionality vulnerabilities. The testing was structured to identify and evaluate as much potential vulnerability as possible within a reasonable/controlled level of effort.

[garybeck]

2. Vermont

voting rights activist convinces Burlington newspaper "Seven Days" to write a cover story on electronic election fraud

[garybeck]

3. Florida - two counties ban Diebold

Leon County Director of Elections Ion Sancho bans Diebold.

question - I believe another county also?

[PVK]

6. Looks like Jeb is trying to sack Ion Sancho now!

http://www.bbvforums.org/cgi-bin/forums/board-auth.cgi?file=/1954/19494.html

http://www.bbvforums.org/forums/messages/2197/sanchothreat-19504.pdf

Look here also:

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=102x2146348

[Wilms]

8. FL: Issues security directives cover ALL voting machines.

http://www.bradblog.com/archives/00002497.htm

[eomer]

11. Hey Gary, I think the other Florida county is Volusia.

http://www.bradblog.com/archives/00002169.htm

[garybeck]

4. Pennsylvania - Diebold OpScans are decertified

Diebold OpScans are banned (de-certified)

hursti hack is specifically mentioned in the decertification report

[Amaryllis]

5. Maryland...did the gov's letter have anything to do with the H.H.?

[Wilms]

9. As Cheney would say, "Big Time". n/t

[Wilms]

10. CO: Voting system raises concerns

:evilgrin:

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_mesg&forum=203&topic_id=412324&mesg_id=412345

[Amaryllis]

13. NM ? Is voter action using it in their work there?