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The following is why I think the Holt Bill (HR 550) does much more harm than good. Regardless of whether or not you are a "paper ballot" person, I think my arguments below apply with equal force. I've not heard most of these arguments before, myself, so I hope I'm not wasting anyone's time.
Please Understand: I'm not trying to rain on anybody's lobbying parade: But I would recommend that we lobby for our VALUES not for specific bill language subjected to future word-smithing and changes anyway....
I don't think one can fairly use the terms "floor" or "bulwark" or "first steps" to describe the Holt bill, at least not without any major qualification. My attack (if you will) is on the notion that the bill accomplishes what it sets out to accomplish, and also whether "gold standard" is a fair description. (I agree with the Holt bill's advertised goals, but I don't think the language meets the advertising) The fact that more and more people are getting involved in the movement and asking for most or all of the right things does not at all tell us whether a particular bill actually delivers those things.
Election systems are like systems that act kind of like kaleidoscopes, and amendments turn the kaleidoscope and force patterns to rearrange.
I think the Holt bill has vetted its 2% audit requirement with "computer scientists" which is great, but it also needs to be vetted from statisticians for sure and perhaps consumer fraud attorneys, and I think it fails in that regard. (My co-author Dr. Jeffrey Hoffman concurs as to the 2% opinions below, but isn't involved with the rest).
THE GENERAL PROBLEM SEEMS TO BE THAT ALTHOUGH MOST PEOPLE'S #1 GOAL IN PROTECTING ELECTIONS IS AN ANTI-FRAUD MOTIVATION, HOLT APPROACHES IT AS A QUESTION OF MAKING TECHNOLOGY WORK. This may be because we often don't want to insult the public officials, and it's hard for Congress to sit down and have a serious discussion about "how do we protect the people from the politcians and election crooks". But as Jon Roland said a wise man prepares for the probability of corrupt administration during a time of good administration, if that's what we have now. Plus, to make an analogy, I don't think security experts in banks stand for too much bullshit about "there's no risk of embezzlement from the inside, just bank robbery from the outside". Same with elections.
So please let me give some examples based on co-authoring a paper actually scientifically and statistically auditing an election result (I know others here have done so as well but I don't think everyone has), followed by some legalistic observations. With a little overlap, these are in addition to the 6 or so concerns I posted earlier, most of which I've not heard any response to. The first one below on the 2% audits is somewhat of a repeat and an expansion of the concern:
(1) SECTION 5 of Holt (Mandatory Manual "Audits"): The 2% audits on a precinct or polling location basis means that the samples are clustered, since all the votes in the entire precinct selected are counted. The problem with Holt is not the 2%; it is that it is 2% of precincts. One cannot do, with precinct-wide samples, what one must do with a true audit: establish a firm margin of error and a "tight" confidence level so that if the sample exceeds that, we can sound the alarms. So, it won't be possible or it will be very unlikely that even a cheating margin (in a reasonably close race at least) can come to a statistical conclusion that something was wrong. Press releases will issue, and it will simply be announced, or we will be forced to announce, that the results are 'within the margin of error' because the margin will be quite wide indeed.
Moreover, although the EAC can do more audits if "cause" appears for the same, when something is "within the margin of error" it is probably not "cause' for further investigation as a matter of law, so a court might well shut us down or shut the EAC down with the argument that UNDER ITS OWN STANDARDS AND RESULTS there is no cause to look further. The fact that citizens are invited to bid on the contracts in order to truly waste their time with a futile exercise (with the contract itself being a control mechanism and probably no access at all in any event to trade secret software) is not an improvement.
It gets worse. Section 5(b) requires at least one precinct in each (microscopic) county, which further forces small precincts to be selected, further making the 2% precinct selection problem even worse, though it the purpose of this provision appears to be to help spread the sample throughout the state, we simply have no rational interest in having statistics mimic the distortions of the US Senate, with 2 from each state regardless of size. Legislation simply does not alter the rules of statistics as to proper sampling, and should not attempt to do so.
In a nutshell, though an "official audit" be completed, nothing can be proven from it due to wide margins of errors created by precinct sampling, so that's the empty end result of the huge audit investigation, and anybody who continues to be unsatisfied is a wacko conspiracy theorist and attorneys will raise their prices and encourage you to reconsider your desire to check more. It will give audits a bad name, and the conspiracy theorists will be 100% correct: the audit proves nothing.
(2) Even if the audit could prove something, which it almost assuredly can not, all it proves is that there's a DIFFERENCE between paper and electronic, not where that difference comes from. It will be argued that the problems are with the paper, or in a real pinch even with the DRE printing an incorrect ballot that the voters (according to one claimed result in I believe an MIT study) don't really check any more than they check their paper receipts at the grocery store (a glance perhaps). Because the paper records under Holt are stored "in the same manner" as other paper records in the relevant jurisdiction, there's no improvement as to that (it may be good or bad with chain of custody issues).
In a nutshell, the audit is almost guaranteed to be within margins of error, and discrepancies (if any) can be blamed on the paper (with DREs, primarily). Although "inconsistent' results mean the paper prevails, the results will be very unlikely to be inconsistent, even in cases of actual substantial malfunction or fraud.
(3) Although in Section 5(a)(1) it says audits will be "random, unannounced, hand counts..." two paragraphs later the HOlt bill provides that the EAC shall determine the precincts "and then *announce* the precincts in the State in which it will conduct the audits." Sec. 5(a)(2)(A). This does not seem "unannounced" it seems "announced".
Even if the unlikely audit-proven discrepancy can not be successfully blamed on the paper records, the Holt bill requires the precincts or polling locations to be "announced" "no later than 24 hours" after the state posts final results. Now, presume that the elections officials have engaged in election fraud, since they are the ones with the access and if anyone in the past has been successful at hacking, they or their friends are now the insiders. Given as little as 4 hours I'm sure they can make paper match computers for certain precincts. This game was allegedly played in Ohio just recently. Maybe the officials aren't even guilty, they just are curious to see if they will pass the audit, so they check the ballots themselves, are horrified by getting caught seemingly with their pants down, and so they do the human thing and pull their pants back up, even though someone else caused the problem? Here again, paper matches result though the officials are innocent, at least of the fraud or irregularity, though not of the coverup.
If a crime has taken place, nobody announces in advance what the search warrant will be looking for. Jesus Christ. My Dad was an IRS auditor for 32 years and he'd be laughing his ass off at this procedure in a criminal matter. So, I can only assume that this bill does not consider either insider election fraud or insider CYA maneuvers to be a serious risk. I think that's deeply mistaken. Or perhaps "announce" has a meaning that I'm not getting, in the context.
(4) So we do all these audits, and they discover nothing because they are not designed to be rigorous enough. Now the whole idea of auditing gets a bad name and some people start rallying for the elimination of audits as a taxpayer waste. We are stuck with educating the public about statistics. Who wins? Even if audits aren't thereby eliminated, the elections are looking a lot cleaner than they are, artificially.
(5) Now, let's say that we somehow, against all odds, have the whiff of a smoking electronic gun. The public and the media is DEMANDING a recount! People are up in arms about these electronic machines. We're unlikely to get any electronic information because Holt provides in section (B)(iv) that the paper records "shall be used as the official records for purposes of any recount or audit conducted with respect to any election for Federal office in which the voting system is used." I'd still like to see those electronic ballots, though! While not saying that electronic records can't be accessed, the trade secrecy claims and the largest law firms in the nation will defend that territory if need be.
(6) The part about prohibiting wireless, power-line or concealed communications devices is GREAT. But then the next paragraph takes it away by saying these must be "certified" by the EAC according to EAC "standards". One of the central election fraud concerns is that people get elected President (or whatever) then "pull up the ladder behind them" by changing the election rules or cheating, or that for any other reason holes are left in EAC standards.
Let's say activists are really smart and spot a hole in the EAC standards, just like 30 "certifiers" failed to spot the Hursti hole, so it just might happen again. The EAC "certification" is nevertheless argued to preclude any suit. As they did in my case, they argue all day long that these certifications mean that the technology can't be questioned, except through the Secretary of State or the EAC's minimal and deficient comment process or litigation from there. This argument I would hope would not win, but it is a major barrier they erect. It is not without legal support. The "strength" of this argument specifically in elections cases has been that the government "estops" or prevents citizens from litigating under some circumstances because the issue has already been decided (i.e. by the certification and comment process). If the government is deemed to represent the people's rights, it is just as if the citizen had personally litigated and lost when the government did it, they can not do it again. Perhaps the Holt bill has planned around this legal authority, I don't know.
(7) The Holt bill basically says appearances of conflicts of interest. 247(11)(B)(iv). That's good. But you can make an office nonpartisan or make a manufacturer shut up, but that does not mean that we don't have partisans in nonpartisan office or at the manufacturers. The local auditor I basically sued though not by name, was a Democrat in nonpartisan clothing. REquirements like this are not disqualifications, they just force partisans into disguise.
(8) Holt says no component of any voting DEVICE upon which votes are CAST shall be connected to the internet. 247(c)(12) The headings use the word "system" but headings are usually ignored in statutory construction at least in Washington state. This language appears to mean DREs can't be connected to the internet, but tabulators can be. It might be different if it said "voting system" instead of "voting device".
(9) Holt says that manufacturers must disclose anyone convicted of election fraud. 247(11)(B)(ii) That's good, but what about a criminal background check? You mean a conviction for computer fraud, perjury, computer crimes and bribery need not be disclosed so long as it's not "election fraud"? Public school teachers have background checks, do they check only for "child molestation" and leave it at that?
(10) Providing all election codes to the Election Assistance Commission. 247(11)(B)(iii): the manufacturer must provide all codes to the EAC and not change them until recertified. I don't think anything like this should be centralized, it gives anyone who breaks into or is inside the EAC access to the entire nation's software. Decentralization makes things harder.
(11) Laboratories doing certification are not supposed to have a financial interest in "the manufacture, sale or distribution of voting system hardware and software". 231(b)(A)(i) They can, and do, have a financial interest in approval or disapproval of systems, and could even have a bonus in their contract for doing, let's say, "fast work", and this would not be prohibited.
(12) Section 401 is amended at (b)(1) to allow aggrieved citizens to "file a written, signed, notarized complaint with the Attorney General describing the violation". Let's say that hypothetically Bush cheated to get into office in 2000 or 2004, our remedy is then to file a complaint with John Ashcroft! (or any cheating person of the same party as this or any other AG, it's not a good remedy) And, let's say we have serious evidence of a democracy-stealing election fraud crime, that complaint will be rejected for insufficient notarization if you want to be an anonymous whistleblower. Stand up and be counted like the guy in Tiananmen Square with the tanks. Don't forget the notarization so we can be sure who you are. There's not a single jurisdiction in this country where even a multimillion dollar lawsuit requires notarization. This needlessly deters complaints.
In conclusion, we should lobby for our Values, not for specific bills. I'd say "I'm all for Holt's bill if it has rigorous audits but I have some concerns about whether it is strong enough to be a strong check and balance"
Paul R Lehto
Attorney at Law
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