Congress Seats Two Clear "Losers" - Election Fraud Research & Dis. News 01/15/07

[autorank]

Election Fraud Research & Discussion News 01/15/07
Weekly comment below.
Selected links from DU's News Contributors HERE

Thanks once again to the great people at "Scoop" Independent News and DU's own althecat of "Scoop" for once again going where the domestic press won't go. Todays comment. You will want to share the "Scoop" link with your lists and associates. Cheers!!!

Link to article: http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0701/S00173.htm

Congress Seats Two Clear “Losers”

Wrong Winner Chosen Twice by Same Voting Machine

Examining Florida 13th and North Carolina 8th
Congressional Districts Leaves Little Doubt

Michael Collins
Part 2 of a Series Part 1
Washington, DC.

The Election Contest filed by Democrat Christine Jennings and her attorney Kendall Coffey creates complications that could blow the electronic voting world to pieces. In the simplest terms, the Jennings Florida 13th Congressional district case requires a review of the Kissell loss in North Carolina’s 8th Congressional district. And that spells disaster for e-voting.

Why? Because both the Florida and North Carolina districts used iVotronics touch screen voting machines. These voting machines produced very similar levels of counting errors. The errors cost both Democrats thousands of votes. Ultimately, both Democratic candidates were denied a victory by less than 400 votes.

While Jennings makes a very strong case for a voided election and new vote in Florida, the case becomes virtually unassailable when reviewing results from North Carolina. At the same time, the North Carolina 8th results, reviewed in the context of the election contest analysis of Florida’s 13th, makes it abundantly clear that the loser, Kissell, should have won in almost any scenario other than voting machine malfunction.

In both districts, the iVotronic touch screen voting machines produced undervote rates at or above 15%. What this means is that supposedly one in seven voters cast ballots but left out a choice for the most important election (an unmarked race on an otherwise marked ballot is called an undervote). The only culprit in both the Florida 13th and North Carolina 8th elections is voting machine malfunction. The facts supporting the case for losers winning don’t allow for much debate in these Florida and North Carolina races. They’re simple and a review leads to conclusions that devastate any trust in electronic voting.

The Florida election contest brief filed in Congress looks at data within the 13th Congressional district and data from other Florida districts. Coffey notes that the undervote rate in Sarasota County is six times the undervote rate in surrounding counties in the same district. How did that happen? These are contiguous counties and part of the same congressional district.

Coffey performs a rhetorical slam dunk by looking at undervotes for the two types of early voting in Sarasota County. Early voting by mail required voters to mark their choices on optical scan paper ballots then mail the ballots to the elections board where they were totaled using optical scan readers. Mail in early voting undervotes were at 2.6%. In person early voters came to central locations and voted on iVotronic touch screens like those used in the general election. Undervotes by that method ran 17.6%. There is no reason for a difference of 15 points other than the one provided by Coffey in the Jennings case: voting machine malfunction by the iVotronics. As a result, 14,000 Sarasota County voters lost their constitutional rights. The election should be voided and a new one held.

Mecklenburg County, NC and the End of Electronic Voting

One might argue that this is an exaggerated claim but review the facts and decide yourself.

Any serious evaluation of the Jennings election contest by Congress leads right to North Carolina’s Mecklenburg County. iVotronic touch screens were used in the Jennings race and three Congressional races in Mecklenburg. That county holds the answers to both the Jennings contest and a resolution of another 2006 travesty, the loss of Democrat Larry Kissell in that North Carolina’s 8th Congressional District.

As a result of voting problems in 2004, North Carolina requires a paper trail for touch screen voting machines. Right now there are paper receipts for each vote cast in these three districts. The test is simple. Total the votes for Congress on paper trail receipts in each Congressional district and compare those totals to the vote totals from the iVotronic touch screens. If paper receipts show more votes for Congress than reported by the touch screens, the variance points clearly to an iVotronic machine error. If Jennings could provide such data, this would add a compelling new level of evidence added to her case.

If the paper trail receipts are available and examined, they represent a smoking gun that validates the Florida case. Even without the paper receipts, there is strong support to argue that the same class of touch screens used in Florida, iVotronics, produced exceptional, no unbelievable rates of undervotes in North Carolina not evident in high visibility races.


iVotronic voting machines were used in Mecklenburg County in 2006. The county contains part of three Congressional Districts. The graph on the left shows very high undervotes in the 8th and 12th. In the 8th, Democrat Kissell lost by 329 votes with an undervote rate close to that in the Jennings race.

A preliminary look at 2006 and 2004 undervote rates shows that the 2006 undervote rate in Mecklenburg County, NC indicates that the iVotronic machines throw away votes. Using the county as a whole, in 2006 the average Congressional undervote rate (for all three races) was 11%. In 2006, the Congressional race was the lead or one of the lead races. In 2004, with vote totals for President as the baseline, the undervote rate in Mecklenburg was 2.6%. Thus, undervotes increased by a factor of four from 2004 to 2006.

By investigating Jennings claims through the use of the highly pertinent and available data from North Carolina, it becomes abundantly clear that Democrat Kissell lost that contest due to machine malfunction – by the very same type of machines used in the Jennings race. Since the undervote rates in these distant and disparate counties were almost the same, the data on Kissell supports Jennings claims.

Below you see the electronic nightmare created by analysis of the North Carolina race. The graph on the left shows 3,199 undervotes (16.6%) in Democrat Kissell’s stronghold in Mecklenburg. On the right, the victory margin district wide for Republican Hayes is shown next to the undervotes for just Mecklenburg where Democrat Kissell won by a two to one margin. The North Carolina 9th and 12th races were blow outs. The 8th was not. In the very area where Kissell was strongest, le lost 3,199 voters, many of whom would have voted for him.


The undervotes in the Mecklenburg portion of the 8th were more than nine times the victory margin for the entire district and they occurred in a voting area that went 68% to 32% for the Democratic Party candidate, Larry Kissell.

Let’s assume a typical rate of undevotes at a generous 3%, or 579 votes, and Kissell’s Mecklenburg share of 68% of the votes counted. The math is easy. Kissell wins. Presume that Kissell’s undervote rate of 16.6% is the final proof (with or without recounting the paper trail voting receipts) of voting machine malfunction in Jennings’ Florida district. It’s easy, Jennings wins. These numbers won’t go away.

We now have two members of Congress seated as a result of elections decided by less than 400 votes. A simple analysis of current and historical data for expected undervotes shows that the double digit undervote rates in each candidate’s stronghold resulted in lost votes; votes that would have lead to a victory by either of the now designated losing candidates. The first shall be last, once again.
Stay tuned.

END

Data Sources:

Mecklenburg County Board of Elections 8th District 11/30/06
http://www.meckboe.org/pages/ENR2006/D8.html
Mecklenburg County Board of Elections 9th District 11/30/06
http://www.meckboe.org/pages/ENR2006/D9.html
Mecklenburg County Board of Elections 12th District 11/30/06
http://www.meckboe.org/pages/ENR2006/D12.html
Screen Shots of Districts 8, 9, 12 Mecklenburg

© Copyright. Please feel free to reproduce and distribute this in any fashion you feel suitable with an attribution to the author, Michael Collins, and the publisher, "Scoop" Independent News, plus a link to the article.

[ISUGRADIA]

1. Voting history in NC CD8 looks like it definately needs examining

In 2004 there were both a Senate and Governor race in NC, the highest level offices so to speak so one would expect a higher undervote in 2004 (depending on what kind of Dem challenger there was). In 2006 the CD race was the highest office on the ballot so it is very odd there is such a big undervote.

If a normal percentage undervote can be researched for this county over the last 10 years or so for the CD race and the percentage is consistenly much lower that 16.6% (!) that would be great evidence of machine malfuncioning.

[autorank]

3. The history would have to be way out of wack to support this.

We'll be looking into that, however, this is more than prima facia evidence here from the Mecklenburg County Board of Elections is interesting. 31% turnout is low so you figure those who voted are there because they want to be. And you make a good point, this was the top of the ticket. So why so many non voters. 2005 was much lower. If this district, part of a district actually, had much higher than 3% over the years, that would be surprising.

One thing beyond any doubt is this: this level of undervotes should trigger a quality assurance recount, which is not called for in the state law since the recounting is tied to candidate margins. But how about the system integrity?

Congress should clearly evaluate and count the paper trail entirely. Given the abundance or problems with voting machines, even if the paper trail matched the machine count, there would still be a basis to strongly question this rate of under votes.

Voting is about the only endeavor where computerization creates many more errors than the manual process it replaces. Strange.

[Ellipsis]

5. .

[philb]

18. Are the undervote counts accurate here?? Someone challenged his analysis on another thread?

[BeFree]

2. And they almost got away with the theft

But certain people are on the case and I have a feeling they are gonna break the balls of the electronic voting machine companies.

I breathe a sigh of relief knowing that the dirty bastards have had their final say in our elections. From now on they will known as the vote stealing bastards they are. Ahhhhh.....

[caruso]

16. TIA says it all

Just found this link by TIA: http://www.geocities.com/electionmodel/TruthIsAllFAQResponse.htm

[philb]

4. Another "Congressional Challenge" election with impossible ES&S results

Given the voter history data of who voted in Congressional District 21 Broward/Dade Florida on ES&S touch screens

for the official results to be valid requires that less than 20% of the large Broward Co(very liberal/minority) population vote for the Democratic candidate. But polling/canvass info indicate the majority of this liberal/minority population intended to vote Dem, as their neighbors and the national trend implied. So the officials ES&S results appear to have
been impossible, unless most of them at the last minute decided to vote Repub for some unknown reason.

Two possibilities that could explain the strange results are:
touch screen switching and disappearing votes like was commonly reported in Broward and Dade on ES&S machines in 2004
www.flcv.com/fraudpat.html

or that most of the large number of missing undervotes in Broward and Dade were Gonzalez(Dem) votes as in Sarasota

A Pearson correlation was highly significant, indicating the official results are improbable given the voter party breakout and internal polling/canvass data on voter intent:

30% Repub, 20% NPA, 50% Dem (voters who voted)

Does anyone know of polling data on Broward or Dade voters in 2006???

analysis:
www.flcv.com/bESSanal.html

[kster]

7. kick nt

[Ellipsis]

6. ...some background on PEBs & EQCs and the voting process.

More acronyms. (sigh)


The following is snipped from

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM F. WELSH, II FORMER CHAIRMAN, CURRENT MEMBER OF THE BOARD ELECTION SYSTEMS & SOFTWARE

U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION PUBLIC HEARING ON THE USE, SECURITY, AND RELIABILITY OF ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEMS MAY 5, 2004



The PEB... or rogerfox's laundry card?

The iVotronic is activated by a unique personal electronic ballot (PEB) The PEB is the portable data bank which holds the ballot styles for the election. In most cases, the PEB is inserted by the pollworker, the appropriate ballot for the voter is automatically downloaded into the iVotronic. Both the personal electronic ballot (PEB) and the port are designed by ES&S and incorporate proprietary infrared communication.

Qualification Code: (EQC)

The iVotronic system also employs an election specific election qualification code (EQC) that provides system-wide security. During preventative maintenance, a single supervisor terminal electronically generates an election-specific EQC. This EQC is then transferred via the supervisor terminal to all Election Day and early-voting PEBs. Next, these PEBs download the election-specific EQC into terminal memories when individual voter and supervisor terminals are cleared and tested. Thus, in order to activate for voting, the PEB and terminal must contain the same EQC. This EQC ensures that all equipment used in an election has been through the proper preventative maintenance. Most importantly, this EQC system prevents “pirate” PEBs or terminals from being entered into the system.

The iVotronic system also requires verification for voter-activated PEBs. Before the supervisor terminal loads a ballot into a voter PEB, it checks the voter PEB for the unique ballot identification code from the ballot last loaded into the voter PEB. If no previous ballot identification code exists on the PEB, the supervisor terminal loads the ballot normally. Similarly, if the ballot identification data on the voter PEB matches the ballot identification code that is about to be loaded onto the voter PEB, the supervisor terminal loads the ballot


"Ballot image"?

As an extra precaution, ES&S has incorporated into our iVotronic touchscreen devices a unique internal audit system that provides an extremely reliable verification mechanism. This audit system includes two separate audit trails within our redundant memory functions. One audit trail captures all of the “voting events” – that is, the date and time a vote is cast. The other stores a ballot image of every ballot cast.

What do they mean by ballot image anybody know?



About the platform:

LOVE this ...in his own words snipped from the next two paragraphs.

..."this type of proprietary platform is much MORE tamper-proof ...LESS susceptible to hacking or other security breaches."

and

"Human factors must be taken into consideration, as well. As with automobiles, for example, safety does not rely solely on the way the vehicle is built. Safety also depends on the way the car is driven"

The ES&S iVotronic uses a proprietary operating system that is unique and secure, not one that you can “buy off the shelf.” The advantages of this approach are three-fold: first, this type of proprietary operating system is much more efficient and compact because it is built specifically to operate the iVotronic DRE. Second, this type of proprietary platform is much more tamper-proof because, as independent assessments have shown, it is less susceptible to hacking or other security breaches. And, third, this type of operating system is much more secure because it does not support “plug and play” devices or other peripheral equipment which would be compatible with commercially available systems.

Human factors must be taken into consideration, as well. As with automobiles, for example, safety does not rely solely on the way the vehicle is built. Safety also depends on the way the car is driven, the way other drivers operate their vehicles, and on the laws that govern vehicle design and operation. While the way the car is built is very important, it is not the only factor. So, at ES&S, we work very closely with election administrators to train and educate those who carry-out elections about the voting systems and the processes and procedures we have established to maintain theintegrityy of the voting process. It is the combination of the security features built into our systems and the on-site election support services, training, and documentation that ES&S provides to county and state election administrators that results in a secure, reliable, accurate voting solution.


...More stuff about vote process security and collection


Focused Security: Voter terminals will not allow voting until properly opened by the supervisor PEB, a specified number of which are programmed with ballots. These supervisor PEBs are distributed to precinct officials separately from the voter terminals. This process places election security in the hands of the trained precinct officials, instead of solely on those at the equipment storage facility.

Detect Pre-existing Vote Totals: If a supervisor PEB already contains votes, it cannot open a voter terminal in the normal manner. A supervisor PEB normally stores votes at the end of the election, not when the voter terminals are being opened for voting. Therefore, if a supervisor PEB contains votes, that supervisor PEB already has closed at least one voter terminal and holds a copy of that terminal’s vote totals. If this supervisor PEB continues to be used in the current election, these existing vote totals would be reported on the precinct results. To avoid error, the voter terminal always checks the supervisor PEB for pre-existing vote totals. If a supervisor PEB already contains votes, the voter terminal issues a message on its screen alerting the precinct official. The voter terminal then requires entry of a precinctspecific override password before the terminal will open for voting. This requirement assures that the situation will be called to the precinct official’s attention and would allow a precinct official to not use that PEB, if necessary.

Check the Ballot: Voter terminals check the incoming ballot for the same unique ballot qualification code that was programmed into the supervisor PEB, which opened the terminals for voting. If the ballot is not coded for the specified precinct and election, the terminal will not accept it for voting. Instead, the terminal will issue an audible alarm and display a message explaining that the PEB has not been qualified properly and cannot be used in this election until it has been reprogrammed.

That same supervisor PEB closes all voter terminals and collects all votes. Because the supervisor PEB recorded the serial numbers of all opened voter terminals, it requires that all opened voter terminals also be closed. This feature assists precinct officials in ensuring no terminals were inadvertently missed. If a reason for not closing a terminal develops, the precinct official can enter an override password and proceed normally. However, the precinct report still includes the serial numbers of any unclosed voter terminals and lists them as “not closed.”

Closing Date and Time Recorded: Voter terminals include their closing date and time on the master supervisor PEB when closed. The supervisor PEB then reports the closing date and time for each voter terminal directly beneath its corresponding opening date and time on the precinct report. This inclusion allows election officials to audit when each voter terminal at a precinct was opened and closed on Election Day. This data can also be compared to the zero tape, which was produced during the opening process.

In short ...One complex process

[autorank]

8. What's the hourly fee for a consultant to translate this;) n/t

[kster]

9. This is much cheaper, you get to keep your sanity, all for free

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I'm just saying :shrug:

[autorank]

10. Check! 10/4 Danno...

It's getting deep...

Where do you think Blackwell will end up? Maybe an ambassador? Dept. of Injustice?

[kster]

12. We are currently in condition Ernie. I repeat. We are in condition Ernie.

Maybe He should be in charge of Homland security? :shrug:



Ohio Warren County election officials who instituted a "lockdown" during vote counting (keeping the media away) claimed terrorist threat notification from FBI led to the "lockdown"; FBI and Ohio Public Safety Director said there was no such threat.

Keith Olbermann at Hard Blogger reports:

http://vote2004.eriposte.com/swingstates/ohio.htm#20041111_3

[Ellipsis]

13. Methinks thou doth protest too much.

No offense Kster but I thought you put me on ignore ... according to the rules.

I never tried to be a burr under your saddle but it appears I have been. if so I apologize.

You have a good night now.

[Ellipsis]

11. I believe the correct answer is ...It can be bought for a song

:)


First off I'm generalist... there are some real "brain on a stick" types here (no offense guys) who have a much better innate comprehension of this stuff... SKIDS being one... though he has been rather ethereal as of late.

I think it's a good idea for people to understand the physical aspect of the voting as well as the math here.

For the most part the above text is just dry jargon, the point I was trying to make before is by designing all these fail-safes into the solution they make it more vulnerable .... it's like putting 20 unions and 14 elbows on an eight foot water-pipe.

The PEB really is foger's laundry card, like a credit card, a magnetic stripe on the card allows for the storage of data. (as I understand it)

Infared... is the topology, simply a vehicle that allows for the transfer of the 1's and 0's. Swipe card or insert card and vote.

...in the day lots of laptops had an infrared port (it was a cool feature*)... the red clear plastic port that nobody could use because they never polished the protocol to make the damn thing function.

I have voted with pencil, punch card and op-scan. I am not familiar with the Votronic

I do understand touchscreen technology from day one... but the whole galvanic response stuff I'd leave to foger to articulate. Though I find it hard to believe that in Sarasota, a bottle of windex (dead skin & oil) could have cured 18,000 vote descrepencies.

...but who knows

It appears as though either the voter or the poll worker can control the PEB (the laundry card). After the vote and to how it's collected is unclear and perhaps a poll worker here who is familiar with the system could elaborate. It appears it could be either "stand alone" via PEB or uploaded via a network ... don't know ...I would have to "touch it" or at least talk to a product manager to get specifics.

I only read the material through once...

The EQC I would compare to a "seed key" (guessin) a randomly changing unlock code. Put in card, Part A and Part B chat and hopefully agree. You may then proceed and vote if they do agree.

And finally, it appears like everybody and their brother may have access to pass words. I would not call this a tight system.


* feature - defined in the original Apple manual as a "bug" described by the marketing department.

[caruso]

15. complex fraud

complex indeed. But check out this statistical analysis by TIA: http://www.geocities.com/electionmodel/TruthIsAllFAQResponse.htm

[BeFree]

14. Well

Your missive has caused quite a stir, eh?

You've got them coming out of the woodwork trying to defend ES&S voting machines. They've even gone so far as to declare that there was nothing to see in NC and that that election was all fine and dandy.

Some of them are even saying that the OFFICIAL RESULTS are incorrect!

'Tis a sad state of affairs to see ES&S defended right here on DU.

[caruso]

17. TIA and his statistical analysis

Here's the statistical analysis of fraud by TIA:http://www.geocities.com/electionmodel/TruthIsAllFAQResponse.htm