Dated...
Electronic Voting and Fair Vote Counts (retitled by editor)
Summarized by Rady Ananda
On behalf of J30 Coalition
Columbus, Ohio
January 17, 2007
In response to the numerous failings of electronic voting
systems, as summarized below, the majority of these experts
offer electronic audit solutions, enhanced security protocols,
greater enforcement of existing laws, and proposals for new
law, election procedures, and backup systems, at additional
exorbitant cost to taxpayers.
The well-financed and most visible portion of the election
integrity movement agrees with these solutions.
None of these solutions, however, meet the Fair Vote Count
standard enumerated by international authority (OSCE, below,
to which the US is a signatory. See page 9). Humans cannot
observe the vote count when it is conducted inside a machine,
be it touch screen, optical scan, mechanical lever, or any other
machine tabulator. No amount of audits, security protocols, or
paper trails will change the fact that machines count the vote
secretly.
Key policy makers, on the other hand, see no urgency in
reconsidering electronic voting systems. Warren Stewart of
www.VoteTrustUSA.org recently advised,
“The incoming chair of the Committee on House
Administration (which crafted HAVA), Juanita Millender-
McDonald (D-CA), has let it be known … that it will not mandate
any voting technology changes until 2011.”
This position ignores the science.
As to the most appropriate and best next step, a vocal portion
of non-experts envisions an entirely different solution. We rely
on expert conclusions about what doesn’t work, and expert
descriptions of what constitutes a democratic election: hand-
counted paper ballots, at the precinct, before all who wish to
observe.
Emphasis in the annotations below appeared in the original
document.
http://www.redpeacecross.com/V-machines.html