'Daily Voting News' For March 03, 2009
Yesterday the California Secretary of State released a letter to the Election Assistance Commission and a report of their findings with regards to the problem discovered in early December in Humboldt Co. with Diebold GEMS v. 1.18.19.
The letter actually challenges the EAC to take action in “requiring that, for every voting system certified by the EAC, the voting system vendor report any and all flaws and problems with the system to the EAC and to the elections officials in the states where the system is used when such flaws are discovered”. And Secretary Bowen has taken the action herself by sponsoring legislation in California that will do what she has challenged the EAC to do. The report is an amazing report that tells why our voting systems are failing.
The issues with the GEMS software go much deeper than just the fact that the system may lose votes. The state also found readily apparent violations of the voting system standards. These violations seem to have been ignored by the test labs, by NASED and their consultants who qualified the voting system, and by past CA Secretaries of State and their consultants.
The big question, is will the EAC, staffed by people who were involved in the NASED “rubber-stamp” of GEMS 1.18.19 take any action? Will they post the letter and report in their “clearinghouse”? We certainly hope so. http://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=8333California Secretary of State Debra Bowen’s Report to the Election Assistance Commission Concerning Errors and Deficiencies in Diebold/Premier GEMS Version 1.18.19
March 2, 2009
The miscount of votes caused by this software flaw greatly exceeds the maximum error rate permitted by the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA).
Diebold knew of this serious software error no later than October 2004. The company, however, did not notify the Election Assistance Commission (EAC), the National Association of State Election Directors (NASED) or the California Secretary of State. Instead, the company sent a vague email to elections officials in the 11 California counties using GEMS version 1.18.19 with the Central Count Server at the time. (Six other counties used GEMS version 1.18.19, but did not use it with the Central Count Server.)
The email, reproduced below, advised the county officials to create and immediately delete an empty Deck 0 before scanning any real ballots, but did not explain why this new procedure was necessary.~snip~
The email and attachment did not inform the elections officials that failure to follow these instructions would likely result in deletion of tallied votes by GEMS without any warning or notice to the system operator. The email and attachment also failed to inform counties that it was a programming flaw in the GEMS software that made the special instructions necessary.
~snip~
A second set of serious problems related to electronic audit logs was discovered during the Secretary of State Office’s investigation of the Deck 0 software programming flaw. First, GEMS version 1.18.19 fails to record in any log important system events such as the deletion of decks of optical scan ballots after they have been scanned and entered into the GEMS election results database. Second, it records the wrong entry date and time for certain decks of ballots. Third, it permits deletion of certain audit logs that contain – or should contain – records that would be essential to reconstruct operator actions during the vote tallying process.~snip~
The 1990 VSS, like its 2002 and 2005 successors, requires that the software in a voting system automatically create and permanently retain electronic audit logs of important system events during tallying of the votes cast in an election. As detailed below, GEMS version 1.18.19 fails to meet these requirements.
snip
Full Report:
(.pdf)
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/sos-humboldt-report-to-eac-03-02-09.pdf