So, relative ethics or absolutes? Which do you prefer and why? How do you work out what is moral?

[Random_Australian]

For me, I want to improve the world, so I tend to judge things in those terms; as in, things tend to be more relatively moral rather than put in 'do this, do that' terms.

As for the question of how do I decide what is moral and what is not, I rely on my reason alone; for me it's simply a matter of performing a calculation. Albeit a complex one.

In other words, I tend to think things are moral when the net contribution of the action on the world, society, and the people directly involved is 'positive'.

That's me done, now I want to hear about you - and although I know this is going to get heated, but I want to actually here people before we get locked in a firestorm, so please try to make sure at least the first four replies and counter-replies to any post are civil. :) And no, I've no power to enforce that idea, I'm just asking people too, nicely.

Thanks in advance... this may get interesting.

Edit: Speel checker is a good idea. :)

[shirlden]

1. Hmmmmmm ???

"In other words, I tend to think things are moral when the net contribution of the action on the world, society, and the people directly involved is 'positive'"
I would agree with this with certain reservations. Some things will never be moral even if the net result is positive. For instance, war is never moral, even when the good guys win. Torture is never moral, even though a "confession" may result in a positive. Theft and greed are never moral, even if you are Bill Gates and use the end result for charitable purposes. While not a religious person, I do believe that there are definable "sins", which can never be moral, regardless of outcome.

Good topic..I hope to see more DUers jumping in here.

:popcorn:

[trotsky]

2. "War is never moral, even when the good guys win."

Now that's a comment that deserves some exploration. Let's go back to Europe, 1939. Are you saying that it never would have been moral to go to war with Nazi Germany? How different do you suppose the world would be today if no one had? How many more millions would have died?

I think R_A's comment about the net effect being positive is a good guide. A war is immoral if you end up causing more destruction than you prevented. But what if the U.S. had jumped in with the Allies back in '39 and shut down Hitler before he had a chance to gas millions of Jews, gypsies, homosexuals, atheists, etc.?

[Random_Australian]

8. I've got that covered:

My view is "The lesser of two evils is still an evil"

Still means it's the best course, in this case, the moral action is to declare that it war is still evil, even as you commit it.

:)

This means you don't stand back and let bad things happen, but if you must take a course that ends up with some bad things happening, then it also limits how much nastiness you'll get up to. :)

[trotsky]

3. Even the strictest biblical literalist...

KNOWS that ethics are always relative to culture and situation. They'll defend atrocities in the bible by explaining it was different back then. Well, there you go. Glad we came to an agreement, huh? Well no, they'll just say that their god's standards never changed, humans did - conveniently dodging the question of why these acts were against their god's will but he rewarded followers back then with riches and land anyway.

[Random_Australian]

9. So, how do YOU decide whether an action is moral?

:)

[trotsky]

14. Um, I know it when I see it?

Naw, seriously, it's much like what you said. Sort of a utilitarian approach. Generally, the best action is that which brings the most benefit to the largest number of people while causing harm to the least. But each moral case deserves its own analysis.

[Random_Australian]

16. fairsky enoughsky trotskysky.

:)

[MistressOverdone]

4. Relative for me, because I have good reasons

and literal for everybody else.


Only half kidding. It is easy to be unyielding about an abstract. Like abortion. I hate it. Would I have one? Not sure. But if I did, I'd have a damned good reason, right?

[Random_Australian]

10. Hmmmm, so, say for murder would you take the view that

you, or someone else who had a "damn good reason" ought to be locked up to discourage murder; as in, to keep society functioning well?

Or am I misreading you? :)

[MistressOverdone]

17. I was half kidding

but you have a point. I think there is should be a difference between, for example, the punishment for a man who kills the pedophile who tortured and murdered his child, and that of the pedophile, himself. Both took a life. I think that the court system more or less does that, at least in a de facto sort of way.

[More Than A Feeling]

5. I think there are some absolutes, and the rest is relative.

There are some things that society cannot countenance if it is to avoid returning to the so-called "state of nature" (we haven't actually left nature, but since it's a philosophical term of art, I'll stick with it) or worse. Those things that must be abhorred can be summed up in the phrase "might makes right". The justice of your desires and your worth as a human being do not come from the barrel of a gun, or a page in a holy book, or your genitals, or your skin color, or your bank account , or your nationality, or your sexual desires.

[NMMNG]

20. Agreed. There are some absolutes, but much room for relativity.

:hi:

[kiahzero]

6. Indirect utilitarianism

It sounds quite a bit like your reasoning, in fact.

Perhaps this is a fault of my narrow thinking, but I can't imagine a valid way of establishing heterogeneity of value (morals) without evaluating utility. Sadly, I'm not a philosopher, and attempts to flesh out exactly what I'm talking about are best left to the experts.

As a little bit of clarification, here's an interesting tidbit I just found online instead of paying attention in class:

Well, utilitarianism says that we ought to do whatever would maximize utility. But attempting to reason in a utilitarian fashion tends to have disastrous consequences, and fails miserably to maximize utility. Therefore, we ought not to reason in a utilitarian manner. Instead, we should try to inculcate those dispositions and attitudes, and abide by those principles, that would tend to promote utility. That is, we should be honest, compassionate, loyal, trustworthy, averse to harming others, partial towards loved ones, and so forth. We should, in other words, be virtuous rather than scheming.

J.L. Mackie (p.91) offers six utilitarian reasons for opposing "the direct use of utilitarian calculation as a practical working morality":

1. Shortage of time and energy will in general preclude such calculations.

2. Even if time and energy are available, the relevant information commonly is not.

3. An agent's judgment on particular issues is likely to be distorted by his own interests and special affections.

4. Even if he were intellectually able to determine the right choice, weakness of will would be likely to impair his putting of it into effect.

5. Even decisions that are right in themselves and actions based on them are liable to be misused as precedents, so that they will encourage and seem to legitimate wrong actions that are superficially similar to them.

6. And, human nature being what it is, a practical working morality must not be too demanding: it is worse than useless to set standards so high that there is no real chance that actions will even approximate to them.


All of this is taken on board by R.M. Hare's "two-level" utilitarian theory. The basic idea is that there are two levels of normative ethical thought (plus the meta-ethical level).

The intuitive level is our everyday, practical, working morality. It concerns our moral dispositions, attitudes, emotions, and the general principles we tend to abide by. This is the level of common-sense morality, and it tends to look nothing like naive utilitarianism.

The critical level, by contrast, is when we critically reflect upon our intuitive-level principles. If beset by a 'moral dilemma', in which we have a clash between our principles, we will need to reason about how to resolve it. Or, in moments of cool reflection, we might ask for justifications of our intuitive-level principles. (Why be honest rather than manipulative, or partial rather than coldly impartial in our relations with others?) This is where utilitarianism comes in.

Utilitarianism is a critical-level theory, not an intuitive-level theory. The idea is that utility justifies our intuitive-level principles, if they are justified at all. (They cannot justify themselves, after all - that would be empty and circular.) It's very important to note that utilitarianism is not an intuitive-level theory. The six reasons outlined above show why it would be a poor choice. Now, it's true that our intuitive principles will be imperfect: that is, perfect adherence to them will sometimes thwart utility, and thus be "wrong" in a strict sense. But these are cases of blameless wrongdoing, as it is right for us to inculcate the dispositions that would lead us to perform those actions. For that is what will, on the whole, tend best to promote utility.

[varkam]

7. I tend to think that there are moral absolutes

But I don't pretend to know what they are. Running the risk of sounding ethno-centric, I do not think the practice of honor killing in some Muslim societies is a moral good, for example. Relativists would assert that had I been brought up in that culture and indoctrinated into that religion, then I would believe that such a practice is morally defensible. I may believe that, but I would be wrong.

[Odin2005]

11. I'm a Rule Utillitarian, wich make me, technically, an "Absolutist" in Ethics.

Relativism makes me gag.

[Random_Australian]

12. So, what are some of these absolutes?

:)

I mean this in a non-flamey way. :)

[Odin2005]

37. 1. Society needs to limit suffering as much as is practical.

2. Society should not get in the way of a person's desire for happiness and self-actualization as long as that person's desires do not causing suffering to another person.

3. People should be ultimately ends in themselves, not means to an end.

[toddaa]

13. Neitzschean perspectivist here

I think absolutists and relativists are both nuts. ;)

[Random_Australian]

15. Well then, extrapolate!

Expand! Give examples of things you think are moral and tell us why!

[toddaa]

19. Oh, you want me to be serious

I'm not sure R/T is ready for a discussion of master v. slave morality.

But just to humor you, read this nice summation of his reevaluation of morality. I mostly align with Nietzsche's viewpoint, but I read it through the lens of Daoism, which posits that the will to power cannot be a conscious exertion of the will but an intuitive act of Doing Nothing (which is very different from not doing). Daoism has parallels with Nietzsche's master morality in that it does not believe that good and evil necessarily exist, but only that the consequences of ones actions in relation to nature result in good and bad outcomes. Align with nature or the Dao and the outcome will be good. Struggle against nature and the outcome will be bad.

[struggle4progress]

18. Ethics by pure calculation? No thanks!

I have several mutually inconsistent guidelines I try to balance.

One guideline is: get as much concrete information about the situation as is possible under the circumstances. Once the facts are accurately known, the proper course of action will often be clear.

One guideline is: respect other life. There's some hierarchy here: for example, potentially conscious beings typically get more respect; and I'm more solicitous of most vertebrates than of arthropod vectors.

One guideline is: trust my own feelings. This includes aesthetic reactions. If it's not attractive (say), is there really a reason to do it?

But another guideline is: remember, when listening to others (or to myself), that people lie to others and to themselves.

There are probably a dozen or so guidelines like this ...

[cyborg_jim]

21. Hate to break it to ya - you're calculating

[struggle4progress]

22. Ya mist da pint. Reread the first of my guidelines

[cyborg_jim]

23. Not at all. You just don't understand stand that unless you're Two-Face

and flipping a quarter to make moral decisions then you're calculating. And even then it can be argued that a coin toss is a calculation.

So I don't get your objection to the suggestion of 'pure calculation'.

[struggle4progress]

24. Ethics is not a matter of pure reasoning. It does not involved unadorned reckoning.

The process of making ethical decisions involves first ascertaining the actual facts-on-the-ground. These facts cannot be known by logic alone. Situations in which ethical decisions must be understood in their particularity, and this understanding never arises by mere calculation.

[cyborg_jim]

25. So, in other words you don't understand what calculation is

The process of making ethical decisions involves first ascertaining the actual facts-on-the-ground. These facts cannot be known by logic alone.

Facts cannot be known by logic alone? No shit. I fail to see the relevance of that.

Situations in which ethical decisions must be understood in their particularity, and this understanding never arises by mere calculation.

In what way is it impossible to have a complete facsimile of any possible ethical situation?

(I'll ignore the nonsense of understanding without calculation - how people think that feat is achieved is beyond me.)

[kiahzero]

26. Semantic quibbling for the win! (n/t)

[cyborg_jim]

27. Hardly. The implication is that there is something non-computational here

But that's merely some emotional reaction against the idea because 'pure' calculation is somehow 'cold'.

(As if somehow 'hot' emotional reactions are always better things :eyes: )

[struggle4progress]

28. I will gently hazard the guess that I might know a great deal more about ...

... calculation that you do, since I taught mathematics for a number of years at the college and university level. I despise neither logic nor calculation: I find both indispensable. I also recognize that those useful tools are limited in important ways.

In #18, I said:

... Once the facts are accurately known, the proper course of action will often be clear ...

You objected in #21 that I was calculating. In #22, I encouraged you to reread the above excerpt. In #23, you again argue that I am calculating. In #24, I reiterated my point:

... The process of making ethical decisions involves first ascertaining the actual facts-on-the-ground. These facts cannot be known by logic alone ...

In #25, you say:

... Facts cannot be known by logic alone? No shit. I fail to see the relevance of that ...

I suppose by now that it is indeed clear that you fail to see the relevance of my ideal, to seek the facts as one of the most important steps in ethical decision making. Perhaps I should therefore be suspicious of your ethical analyses, if you do not recognize the importance of the actual facts in deciding what constitutes an ethical response?

[kiahzero]

29. I'm curious if I'm understanding you correctly

This would be in opposition to something more Kantian, with its categorical imperatives?

[struggle4progress]

31. I don't think much about metaphysics anymore: I did when younger and ...

... I've more or less decided it was a waste of time. Since I'm not seeking a systematic philosophical system with logical coherence and consistency, my answer will have to be pragmatic. I'm suspicious of Platonic ontological commitments and sweeping generalizations.

The closest thing to an ethical absolute I'll recognize is somewhat along the lines of respect other life and other consciousness. This one should, I think, be taken pretty seriously. But my adherence to it is somewhat uneven: I'm not a vegetarian, for example, although I was in the past.

[kiahzero]

34. So, yeah...

It seems like the objection to your post is entirely semantic. :shrug:

[cyborg_jim]

35. I fail to see the mutual exclusion

Since I'm not seeking a systematic philosophical system with logical coherence and consistency, my answer will have to be pragmatic.

How does a pragmatic system lack logic?

[cyborg_jim]

30. And I will hazard that knowing what you do does not preclude you from being wrong here

You objected in #21 that I was calculating. In #22, I encouraged you to reread the above excerpt. In #23, you again argue that I am calculating. In #24, I reiterated my point:

I do not get your point. It is clear that you are implying calculation here. It is your implication there is a lack of calculation subsequently that I find puzzling.

I suppose by now that it is indeed clear that you fail to see the relevance of my ideal, to seek the facts as one of the most important steps in ethical decision making.

Yes. Those would be inputs to the calculation would they not? I fail to see how epistemic calculation is not calculation.

Perhaps I should therefore be suspicious of your ethical analyses, if you do not recognize the importance of the actual facts in deciding what constitutes an ethical response?

Hardly - I just fail to see where there's anything inpure going on here.

[struggle4progress]

32. Yawn. I think you have said everything you wanted to say at least twice now.

[cyborg_jim]

33. Can you not just reply to what I said?

[struggle4progress]

39. Very well. Here is my response:

If you wish me to take you seriously, then try to actually say something worthwhile rather than simply playing a game of picking at my words.

The original poster claimed to "rely on ... reason alone" as a basis for ethical decision making (although later in #36 he asserts he obviously did not mean what I understood him to say). I argued with the claim as I understood it, and in fact I will continue to hold for facts first and foremost, rather than the logic (see my #38). This you wish to interpret as my failure to "understand what calculation is" (your #25), as "some emotional reaction against ... calculation" (your #27), possible evidence of my being "Two-faced" (your #23), and so on. You have also, in the most dedicated manner, argued with things I never said. How uninteresting!

Let us suppose your criticisms actually reflect a factually-based view, that some sort of pure calculation deserves a primacy of place when ethical considerations are required. Well, then, show me! Let us see the ethical calculus you prefer. You should exhibit its language symbols and the rules for their proper syntactic combination. You should lay out something like (a) axioms and deduction rules or (b) a grammar for symbol manipulation or (c) a some other mechanistic description of how conclusions are derived in this calculus. It will be easiest to understand, of course, if you use something resembling an existing scheme (Markov algorithm, Turing machine, lambda calculus, &c) but I will not insist on this point. Next, explain how real situations are translated into this ethical calculus and how to interpret the results of the calculation as advice for ethical behavior. Finally, demonstrate the utility of the method, by applying it to some genuine historical example which poses a nontrivial ethical dilemma: application to some phony hypothetical case will not be convincing.

Frankly, I doubt you will find a convenient ethical calculus prefabricated: you will probably have to construct it yourself. I do not know whether you can or not, but it will not be a trivial matter, and the nature of your posts does not suggest to me that you have made much progress on any such project. Many people perform a sort of crude reckoning, of the sort I indicated as my own (see #18), too vague to qualify as a real calculation. There are many reasons for that, as you can easily see by thinking about the matter more.

[cyborg_jim]

40. Haha

possible evidence of my being "Two-faced" (your #23),

No: TWO FACE.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Two-Face

Many people perform a sort of crude reckoning, of the sort I indicated as my own (see #18), too vague to qualify as a real calculation.

No. That is calculation. It is not in any sense 'vauge' - it is inductive reasoning with with scarce knowledge. As such it forms one of the most important classes of algorithms dealing with how to calculate useful things in polynomial time with incomplete and/or large data sets.

[Random_Australian]

36. Ah, you're one level too low on the logic thing.

When I said calculation of morals by logic, one of the things in the calculation is that accuracy is a strictly increasing function of knowledge of the world.

:)

[struggle4progress]

38. Well, you wrote " ... I rely on my reason alone; for me it's simply a matter of performing ...

... a calculation ..."

I disagreed with that philosophy. Perhaps I misunderstood you. But your response "When I said calculation of morals by logic, one of the things in the calculation is that accuracy is a strictly increasing function of knowledge of the world" doesn't really illuminate the matter for me.

Ethics and morality would be irrelevant if there were not other living/conscious beings. Our notions of right and wrong have some association with the fact that some of those other beings can complain to us and that we can complain to them.

I therefore find it useful to ask What do others think about the ethics of such-and-such?, even when I know the answers given will not always be consistent with my views. More precisely, it is worth investigating exactly what other people find persuasive in ethical discussions about actual (rather than hypothetical) cases. In my experience, the actual known facts usually play a major role, for others as well as for myself. When I want to persuade somebody that my views are correct, I often find that simply telling them the facts that led to my own conclusions (without providing much ethical argumentation!) will lead them to the same conclusions: while, of course, I do not always obtain this outcome, I nevertheless regularly obtain this outcome, whether I am discussing public policy or personal behavior.