More trouble for atheism?

[Stunster]

http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/ap/20050...

Now, assume atheistic materialism is true. Then the rape of this girl
and the tsunami are the same kind of thing. They are BOTH natural
events, natural disasters, caused by natural forces.

Of course, the atheist might say, "No, one is a natural disaster, and
the other is due to a misuse of human free will." But in that case,
s/he undercuts the atheistic objection to theism to the effect that a
good God wouldn't have allowed free will.

So the atheist has a dilemma: shouldn't s/he admit the reality of free
will? If s/he does not, then the rape and the tsunami are on a par,
which nearly everyone thinks is not the case. If s/he does admit it,
though, then already we have a hole in the materialist ontology.

So, if an atheist wishes to hold that rapes and tsunamis are really
very different kinds of bad things, then I submit that the atheist
must give up materialism. But now the impetus for being an atheist in
the first place is gone.

Materialism, of course, is not the only worldview compatible with
atheism. But it is by far the most common one these days. And I've
never understood why anyone would hold to idealism or Platonism as a
philosophy, especially one that allows for an irreducible moral
autonomy and free will, but then think that theism is certainly wrong
on the grounds that such autonomy and freedom are bad things.

There is a straightforward Kantian argument, in fact, that shows that
this is incoherent. For to judge that they are bad things implies that
one wills that they don't exist. But to will something implies that
one has a will. So one would be willing that one had a will, and
willing that one didn't have a will. Kant essentially defines
immorality in terms of rationally inconsistent willing---"Act only
upon those maxims which one can at the same time will to be a
universal law".

And let me make the structure of the arguments more explicit.

They would have the following forms:

A.

1. There is free will
2. Theism is not true, because a good God would not have allowed free
will.
3. Therefore materialism is the truth about reality.
4. Therefore there is no free will.
5. But 1 and 4 are contradictory, therefore there's something wrong
with this argument.

B.

1. Ok, given A, materialism is probably not true, and there is free
will (because some form of atheistic idealism or Platonism is true)
2. But free will is a bad thing, and so theism must be false, because
a good God would not have allowed free will.
3. But to say of something that it's bad implies that one wills, or
ought to will, that it doesn't exist.
4. But one cannot consistently will that there be no such thing as
willing. To will anything implies that one wills that one has a will.
5. Inconsistent willing is something one ought not to will.
6. There being facts about what one ought to will presupposes that one
has free will.
7. Therefore one ought to will, inter alia, that there be such a thing
as willing freely.
8. But then it's not wrong God to will that there be such a thing as
willing freely.

And just to counteract one objection. Earlier, I said that
almost everyone thinks that raping and tsunamis are not the same kind
of thing---one is a bad natural event, the other is a bad moral event.
The objection would be: but maybe almost everyone is wrong, and there
really is no such thing as free will.

The answer to the objection would be this:

Almost everyone thinks that there are trees, because almost everyone
has *conscious data* that lead them to posit the existence of trees.
Maybe some Eskimos don't, etc. But in the right circumstances, their
conscious data would make them think there are such things as trees.
At any rate, we take it as a good enough reason for asserting the
existence of trees that almost everyone has some conscious perception
causing them to believe that there are. Well, sensory perception is
only one kind of conscious perception. Nearly everyone has a conscious
perception that they have some measure of free will, and other
perceptions leading them to believe that other people do too. And if
there are a few people who don't have this kind of conscious
perception of free will, a) I've yet to meet them, and b), I feel
confident that they would have such a perception in the right
circumstances. (NB. All the philosophers I've read who deny the
reality of free will concede that they sense that they have it---but
then argue that this must be some kind of illusion).

So near-universal conscious perception is a good enough reason for
holding that something is the case. But this applies to free will
about as much as it does to trees.

[Zenlitened]

1. This doesn't make much of a case for theists as rational thinkers...

... now does it?

:crazy:

[Stunster]

2. Your reply certainly doesn't make one for you

as a rational thinker, since it essentially offers no rational argument.

[Zenlitened]

8. A rational argument in response to this? Where does one even begin...

... to deconstruct such filth and nonsense?

Please. You do yourself a disservice associating with it.

[el_gato]

9. how does belief in free will require a belief in god?

[Stunster]

16. I didn't say it did

But an atheistic argument that has appeared on this board a number of times is to the effect that theism must be false because free will is a bad thing.

But if free will is a problem for materialism (as I and many materialists think it is), this may lead the atheistic believer in free will to abandon materialism in favor of some form of idealism or Platonism (in order to accomodate free will in their ontology). But then the Kantian argument kicks in to show that it can't be morally right to will the non-existence of free will, and hence it can't have been right for God to will the non-existence of free will.

Therefore it's not wrong for God to have allowed free will, contrary to the original atheist objection.

[el_gato]

26. do you always make stuff up?

"But an atheistic argument that has appeared on this board a number of times is to the effect that theism must be false because free will is a bad thing."

Uh, okay, if you say so. :eyes:

[Stunster]

34. Check out

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_mesg&forum=214&topic_id=5176&mesg_id=5176

:eyes:

[Az]

35. Actually what he does is

He finds other peoples strawmen and then beats the tar out of them. He loves to throw pages of quotes that practically start off with the strawman and then proceed to beat it up for a couple of pages.

Then once you call him on his flawed argument he throws more pages of flawed arguments. If you keep pursuing his arguments he turns even more childish and starts calling you names and other nonsense.

There is no real point in debating with him. If you mud wrestle with a pig you find out the pig likes the mud.

[Commie Pinko Dirtbag]

116. Well...

http://members.lycos.nl/diezijngek/magicgallery/[e-mail]

[arwalden]

119. Fascinating.

Thanks for sharing that with us... and allowing others to have a peek into how your brain works.

-- Allen

[papau]

12. I like it - where is the lack of logic - other than straw man?

:-)

[Zenlitened]

14. Honestly, I can't tell if you're kidding or not!

:D

[Stunster]

18. Thank you for sharing

:boring:

[Zenlitened]

22. Um, I wasn't talking to you. Relax...

... there'll be plenty of other opportunities for misguided indignation, I'm sure.

[papau]

:-) - I'm old - but there is a smile on my face!

And I did like it!

I did not grade it for logic

I just "like" it.

:toast:

:-)

[Zenlitened]

23. Yokey-dokey, then.

[NAO]

3. free will, conscious choice, morality do not require a belief in a god

This article is a flim-flam attack on a straw man. They have put together a very simplistic account and drawn a ridiculous conclusion, and then declared the whole atheistic world view invalid based on their shoddy reasoning.

[Stunster]

5. Thankyou for sharing

and, er, thus refuting my post. :boring:

[mcscajun]

6. Thank you.

I was spinning around on this one, watching a non-atheist declare what, how and why an atheist would think what they do, and then use those made-up arguments to decry the view they themselves created.

It would take hours to take this apart rationally, but you cut to the chase quite nicely. :)

[el_gato]

4. talk about spewing bullshit

[Stunster]

7. Thank you for sharing

and, er, thus refuting my post. :boring:

[el_gato]

11. so do you posit that free will necessitates the existence of god?

[papau]

17. only if you posit "natural disaster" vs "free will" vs "evil" vs ?

OK - maybe not that logical -

but I still like it! It makes as much sense as saying "I do not have to prove a negative" in response to someone noting creation and asking for an alternative explanation to my explanation of God.

[Stunster]

19. See my post #16 (n/t)

[papau]

21. good point! God with free will is permitted under the "God" definition

that the athiest says he rejects

and his rejection can not be because there is free will!

:-)

I did not catch the rejection of God because there is free will - a straw man on the otherside.


ST Aqinas as I recall had 40 some logical reasons that proved God, and Plato was into we can not see the truth - just a reflection of a partial truth - so we can not assert exact knowledge of truth.

I am still going with "by faith alone".

:-)

[indigobusiness]

118. That's an important point.

I think Plato was saying we can't rationalize God. Rationale is only using part of the mind. When all of the tools of thinking are employed, including the subconcious mind, the story is more complete.

[Union Thug]

10. Deliberate BS clouding of a simple question.

They treat atheism as a philosphical system. It is not, it is simply the absence of belief in god. Determinism, fate, doom, destiny, free will and all the nonsense mental masturbation that this guy tries to pass off as an attack on atheism is irrelevent.

[Stunster]

20. Thank you for sharing

:boring:

[Union Thug]

24. I'll gladly share when bullshit is being dispensed as logic.

and this really is a steaming pile of bullshit.

[Name removed]

27. Deleted message

Message removed by moderator. Click here to review the message board rules.

[el_gato]

30. how cute

someone calls your bullshit what it is and you get mad because they won't play word games with you. very cute indeed.

[Stunster]

32. Hahaha

Sheesh!

You and all your fellow atheists are the ones going apeshit, not me. What is even cuter is that your apeshit reaction betrayed that you had misunderstood the argument. Sheesh indeed.

[el_gato]

38. if you are looking for some kind of support group

you are in the wrong place

the only shit I see around here is coming out of your mouth.

:evilgrin:

[Stunster]

55. It's a religion and theology forum

for crying out loud!

Is it a rule that no-one can argue for theism and criticize atheism on the DU religion and theology forum? Seems to be, given the way the atheists splutter and foam at the mouth whenever anyone dares to.

[Az]

39. Look at the title of the thread you created

You are the one with issues. You have a major issue with atheism. I would almost go as far as to say you are bigotted. None of your arguments hold anything other than misinformation and hatred. Seriously. You need to look to yourself before you start trying to pull the twigs out of our eyes.

[Stunster]

50. "You are the one with issues"

Hilarious.

You're the atheist who hangs around a forum devoted to "Religion and Theology", and do little more than say 'poo-pooh' every time somebody argues philosophically for theism.

I've never in my life hung around a forum devoted to "Atheism and naturalism".

Talk about projection! :eyes:

[Az]

52. Sorry you feel that way

If I make myself unwelcome in such groups I would more than respect the wishes of the majority. I do not go where I am not wanted. However I have had it expressed to me by individuals posting in this group that they welcome my presense. Perhaps the irritation is uniquely your experience.

[Union Thug]

31. and you've obviously

blinded yourself from an over abundance of self congratulatory ego stroking.

Face it, your argument is a dead horse.

[Stunster]

56. So that's why you're posting

on the Religion and Theology forum, attacking theists when they engage in explaining their worldview? Because atheism is not a philosophical worldview?

Umm, right.

[Union Thug]

96. No, because the title of your post implicitly attacks atheists...

And then very premise of your argument mischaracterizes what atheism is.

You can't cloud this by inserting more wwwwwooooorrrrddddsss into the question.

[Stunster]

98. The title post does not attack atheists

It attacks atheism. You might say that's tantamount to attacking atheists, and in a sense you'd be right.

But wait a minute. Plenty of people have posted on this forum attacking theism. So, in the same sense, you would have to grant that this was tantamount to attacking theists.

But wait a minute. Are we to have a religion and theology forum in which attacks on atheism or on theism are off-limits because such attacks implicitly attack atheists or theists?

[PassingFair]

74. Do you deny his arguments as to the number

of angels dancing on the heads of pins? Fie! You will burn in hell!

[Union Thug]

97. Ha! Well, if there's a hell, I'm on the fast track.... but

um..well, I'm not all that worried. =)

[FM Arouet666]

136. Mental masturbation is the life force of philosophy

[ClintonTyree]

13. Bad link.........

"Document not found".

It doesn't matter anyway, you're putting WAY too much thought into this. It's not that complex. Either god exists, or he doesn't. Make up your mind and go with it.

[GAspnes]

15. the article is gone

But I would have a wonderful time, if I had the time, dissolving this laughable collection of highschool syllogii.

F'rinstance -- who says a good God wouldn't have allowed free will? This is false on the face of it: assume there is a God, that God created Man, and Man has free will. This cannot imply the negative, that if there is no God, there is no free will. Just because I didn't buy a Pearson's candy bar doesn't mean I don't have a candy bar in my hand.

[Stunster]

25. That's not the argument though

You need to read it more carefully.

It's not arguing *for* theism for a start, chum. It's arguing that, it's not a good argument against theism to say that there's free will, and that free will is a bad thing. The argument is against the idea that free will is a bad thing. And it is saying that the alternative, denying free will, is also implausible.

[Az]

40. Its arguing for a flawed description of atheism

Its a strawman. Its wrong from the start. Think of all the poor little electrons you waisted. Oh the humanity.

[GAspnes]

44. since the article is no longer there

and your excerpt did not include that, I worked from what you laid down.

[Stunster]

28. The article was about...

a tsunami survivor, an 18-year-old female, who was saved from drowning by a man who then raped her.

[indigobusiness]

29. If rational thought were enough

we wouldn't require a subconscious mind to sort it out.

There is more to reality than ratios.

[Az]

33. You keep using the same flawed tactic

[Stunster]

36. You keep on failing to be anything but

:boring:

[Az]

37. Yep real mature

I truly feel sorry for you. And that is an honest opinion.

[Union Thug]

42. And Stunster is such an intellectual giant..

Face it, Stunny, Atheists don't fit the mold you've created for them. This kills your 'argument' from the beginning. The rest is just an over-exercised vocabulary-tool with a single purpose; to take focus off the fallacy of your premise.

Get your hands out of your pants long enough to figure this out.

[Stunster]

48. Molds, schmolds

Atheists don't fit the mold you've created for them

If I had a dollar for every time I've had a similar thought regarding the molds atheists create for theists, I'd be immensely wealthy.

The point is, some atheists have argued that theism cannot be true, because of all the moral evil in the world. When theists reply that the moral evil is due to free will, atheists often respond by saying that a good creator wouldn't create free will.

My argument shows some problems for the atheist position:

1) if they deny free will, then this would put the rape of the young woman on a par with any other natural event ontologically. Most people think this can't be right, a) because they perceive there to be free will, and b) because they perceive that there are normative properties attaching to an act of rape, which don't attach to tsunamis. But since tsunamis and rapes are both material events if materialism is true, then the positing of free will, and of additional, normative properties, is prima facie incompatible with materialism. Since materialism is often the worldview motivating atheism, this is a problem for atheists who are also materialists.

2) But even if atheists are not materialists, and admit free will into their ontology, they cannot consistently will that there be free will and hold that a good God would be wrong to create free will. But if they will that there be no free will, that's also inconsistent, for the Kantian reason I gave.

[Az]

49. Thats not the only argument

For crying out loud its not even a primary one. Most atheists are atheists simply because they see no positive evidence of a god. Get over it.

[Union Thug]

69. I don't care what 'some' atheists may have said to set you off..

I don't believe in god. There is no empirical proof that god exists.

Predestination vs. free will is a completely different debate.

[starroute]

41. Am I dumb because I can't make heads or tails of this?

What does rape have to do with free will? And what does either have to do with theism?

Human beings are certainly capable of making moral decisions. We do it all the time. And that's all that really matters.

"Free will" is just one of these complicated philosophical games that some geek a thousand years ago invented to have something to argue about on a slow Saturday.

There's even something rather perverted about the concept, since it implies that essentially good people would be perfectly willing to rape and kill if they made a conscious decision to do so. That suggests to me that there's something very wrong with the entire frame of reference -- that it's just one more sterile parlor game.

So why even go there?

[Az]

43. His premise is

That atheists do not distinguish between the destruction of a tsunami and the destruction of a rapest. He is claiming they are morally the same to us. This is the entire foundation of most of his arguments. Its rather childish in essence.

[Stunster]

45. Not morally the same

Ontologically the same. And that's not my premise in any case. I explicitly cite the possibility of atheism being independent of materialism. But that's got problems too, for the Kantian reasons I gave.

And you have the temerity to lecture me about creating straw men?

Sheesh!

[lazarus]

46. ontologically?

You keep referring to that, but I don't think it means what you think it means.

[opiate69]

68. He has a problem being confined to actual definitions..

Words mean whatever he wants them to mean..

oh, and Stunster.. I dare you to post this crap here:
http://www.atheistnetwork.com/index.php

[Stunster]

72. It's hilarious that you think

you're right about how to define 'omnipotence'. Screamingly so, in fact.

It's even more hilarious that you're 'daring' me to post on an atheist forum.

Not that this is an emotive issue for you or anything....

:eyes:

[Stunster]

73. Fact

Among philosophers, both atheist and theist, omnipotence is generally taken not to include being able to make a square circle, or make it the case that 2+2=5, or anything else that is logically impossible.

If you want to argue about facts, then be my guest. It's very silly. But don't let that stop you.

[muriel_volestrangler]

78. But strangely, I've never before seen an argument

that 'omnipotence' excludes being able to create a thinking being that can survive in both air and water. Which you seemed to think it did.

[Stunster]

79. I don't think so

I never said so either.

I said, one couldn't create a physical being like us that was undrownable, given the nature of DNA, H20, etc. The underlying physics, itself underlain by mathematics, makes it logically impossible. I even offered $250 to anyone who could show that there was an alternative logically possible physics that would show how to make an undrownable human being, without producing greater overall harm for human beings. No takers so far. But perhaps you're about to surprise me.

[muriel_volestrangler]

80. There are plenty of animals that survive both environments

lungfish, salamanders, etc. But you seems to think there's some logical impossibility involved in combining this with intelligence. If I believed in a god that affected evolution, I wouldn't doubt for a moment its ability to solve the problem. I expect human genetic engineers will be able to do it soon, if they want to. You just need dual systems for extracting sufficient oxygen from both air and water.

I think your concept of 'logical' is different from nearly everyone else's, which is leading you to make strange claims in your arguments. It does not mean "there is a current example of this".

[Stunster]

82. Just give me the physics

that would enable human beings to exist, make them incapable of drowning, and not produce greater overall natural harm for them than there is in the actual world.

If there is no logically possible physics---because the mathematics would have to be irrational---that would generate these consequences, then that's just a way of saying that it's not logically possible, given that the beings in question are physical.

[muriel_volestrangler]

83. The existing physics

as I said, I think humans would be able to do it one day.

[Stunster]

85. Do what? (n/t)

[muriel_volestrangler]

86. genetically engineer an intelligent animal capable of surviving in water

and air.

[Stunster]

87. Would it be a rational animal

capable of understanding physics, etc?

[muriel_volestrangler]

89. Why not? Intelligence doesn't disappear in water (n/t)

[Stunster]

91. Ok, let me make sure I'm understanding your claim

You're claiming that human beings are capable of creating undrownable physical beings with the capacity to do physics, and that this process itself would not result in any overall increase in natural harm?

Ok? Here's my question.

On the neo-Darwinian scientific picture, evolution has had much longer to naturally select beings who are capable of doing physics than humans have had time to do genetic engineering. So, if natural selection is what Darwinian theorists say it is, is there any reason why undrownable physical beings capable of doing physics have not yet evolved on planet Earth? Is there some reason, to do with complex brain chemistry, say, which makes it non-adaptive for there to be undrownable physicists, or, maybe they'd be undrownable, but because of various water-borne bugs, or piranha fish and sharks, or something else, they wouldn't survive as a species for an optimal time?

Even if you could do this, does it follow that this is what God should have done, if God exists? Let's say that there are reasons of a moral/spiritual/intellectual growth kind, related to the whole process by which humans evolve to the point where they become capable of doing this genetic engineering, such that a great deal of value would be lost by simply starting humans off as undrownable physicists. Suppose you had a baby---would you necessarily want it to be, straight out of the womb, undrownable, pretty much indestructible, and capable of doing quantum mechanics? I don't know myself, probably because I find that idea so bizarrely removed from reality as to be able even to get started on any normative assessment of its comparative value, relative to what nature has given us to date.

[muriel_volestrangler]

99. I think it likely that humans will be able to engineer a being

that would survive in water and air, if they choose; I would make no claim about 'natural harm'. That argument is not to do with harm, good, or evil: it's about 'omnipotence'.

Yes, there is a reason why undrownable intelligent beings haven't evolved: the reproductive advantage of developing any stage towards it is insignificant. The reproductive advantage for us of the fully developed ability might not be that great - without an ability to swim faster (which might help in catching fish), it would probably just help in avoiding a few accidental deaths. Animals close to us in intelligence, such as dolphins, have not found an advantage in developing the extra intelligence we have (their bodies give them a fairly good ecological niche, and their behaviour gives them a good chance of feeding comfortably - if there were more competition from different species, perhaps they would evolve too. Oceanic species may not evolve as often as land species as well, since there is less population isolation amongst them). Dolphins have also not developed an 'undrownable' capability - though they have developed much better breath-holding capability than us (which does help their day-to-day lives). It's not often that a dolphin is unable to get a breath in a long period.

If you think that a god's purpose for the earth is to produce lots of intelligent life, and then give it a chance to make moral decisions, without suffering from non-human causes, then I'd suggest an ability to avoid drowning would be of some use, but there are other things that might be more useful - resistance to diseases, better ability to survive childbirth, less of a tendency to cancer, and so on. But as I said, this part of this thread has been about definitions, and whether you are using 'omnipotence' in the same sense as anyone else. If the god's purpose is to experiment with us, including random suffering, then who knows what it should have done.

The idea of much more capable, robust babies does appeal to me, actually.

[Zoskie]

104. I think you're going off at a tangent here...

...with the whole air and water thing. I understand Stunster to be saying that it is logically impossible, due to the physics of the universe, for humans and other creatures to exist without some limits, and therefore it is not due to God's non-existence or lack of love that human beings can come to harm, i.e. through drowning. You seem to think that he is saying it is logically impossible for an intelligent creature to live both in water and on land, which I think is not the real issue. Actually, I think you're wrong about genetic engineering being able to create such a person, and that all you need are "dual systems for extracting sufficient oxygen from both air and water." Most of those creatures who are amphibious do also have limits on their environments--one or the other is a better home for them, despite the fact that they can survive in both. Also, there are many more problems in ocean living than just extracting oxygen from water; there are problems of pressure destroying human organs, lack of light causing other problems (vitamin D deficiency anyone?) and so on. Does that mean we couldn't have evolved as ocean dwellers? Probably not. But if we had, we would still have had physical limits--and would not have faired well on dry land. Could there be intelligent, rational, ocean dwelling creatures? Probably. But the fact remains that we are not ocean dwellers, and we have not yet discovered any intelligent, rational ocean dwellers. So it is reasonable to assume that the way humans actually exist is the optimal condition for intelligent, rational, human creatures.

Also, as far as the tsunami goes, people who died did not just drown, so being able to breathe in water wouldn't have saved all of them. People were slammed around and thrown into things, and so to survive again we would have to be made of rubber to endure that without harm. In other words, they would have needed to be, not just able to breathe underwater, but completely impervious to harm.

Thinking theologically for a moment, I am forced to consider what a human who is impervious to harm is like--and I suspect that a human impervious to harm is also impervious to love, since love inherently involves vulnerability and the possibility of being hurt. Also, so often it is recognizing the lack of completeness in ourselves which leads us to seeking another in love. An impervious creature would lack nothing, and need nothing, and so be incapable of love. I think.

I think the real issue here is the omnipotence one. As Stunster has (repeatedly) tried to point out, it does not mean being able to do anything whatsoever. Any engineer will tell you that there are always design constraints; you have to abide by the rules. I believe Stunster's idea that God is reason itself is a confusing one to many people; they are accustomed to anthropomorphizing God to such an extent that they separate God from the universe, and its rules and characteristics. This God is a childish vision of a magician who can do whatever whenever, and, in fact, considering the need some people seem to have for actual physical evidence, it's rather funny--because the physical evidence we have suggests that the universe operates according to rules, and that magic is an illusion. Thus, a God who acts magically is an illusion, and atheists, who caricature theists as believing in that sort of God, are probably correct in denying the existence of that sort of God. But they refuse to move beyond their prejudices to a new concept of God. That, I think, is where they're making their real mistake.

[muriel_volestrangler]

109. A quote from stunster in another thread

"Omnipotence has usually been defined as being able to do whatever it is logically possible to do. Hence, not being able to do something that is logically impossible to do is perfectly compatible with being omnipotent in that definition.

In my original post, I'm suggesting that it is not logically possible to create inherently undrownable human beings."

So you see, that was exactly what he was arguing. And it was he who thought that the tsunami caused problems for an atheistic world view, and started the discussion about it. Your thoughts about the likelihood of a dual environment intelligent creature are not logical objections - they are hypotheses that one might not develop by evolution, or that it might be less practical than our current existence. Perhaps, but there's no logical problem.

You say: "So it is reasonable to assume that the way humans actually exist is the optimal condition for intelligent, rational, human creatures." No. I, for instance, am shortsighted; I do not believe my existence is optimal. But it is survivable. For all of us, resistance to diseases would be closer to optimal; but there are many infections that we don't yet have immunity to.

If God is reason, then are you saying that God did not create the universe? What are your thoughts about the worship of God? I must admit I'd feel a lot more comfortable if George Bush was saying "reason told me to do it", but I would then wonder about his reasoning ability.

[qazplm]

132. nope he didnt say

a human or creature that can do physics and live in the depths of the ocean or on land, he said something that can do physics and breathe both air and underwater (hence undrownable).

I dont see how creating a hybrid capable of breathing both underwater and on land is even close to impossible given the next 100 years of genetic engineering or so, in fact, I would strongly suspect it to be darn near inevitable.

Eventually, we will have the ability to tailor humans to work in several currently inhospitable climates. We might be able to tailor humans that can endure brief episodes of vacuum/space (moreso than the 30 seconds or so we currently can potentially survive)...or we might be be able to tailor them to survive on Mars while it is still being terraformed, or to live much longer than currently thought possible, or to survive freezing.

[Stunster]

134. Think of evolution

as a natural form of genetic 'engineering'.

Evolution has had millions of years to come up with undrownable physicists, but hasn't done so.

Maybe there's a reason for that. Maybe physics-capable brains can't function well in salt-water environments. Or maybe a potential species of undrownable physicists would all be eaten by sharks. Or maybe there's some other reason.

But maybe undrownable humans are possible. However, I didn't claim that undrownable human beings were impossible. I claimed that for all we know, a physics that would generate undrownable human beings without creating less overall natural harms than the actual physics does, might not be possible.

And that's important to the argument I was making, which was not that undrownable physicists are necessarily impossible, but rather that one cannot say that God must not be good and omnipotent (and hence infer that God doesn't exist) because God (on the theistic hypothesis) chose the actual (tsunami-generating) laws of physics, unless one can show that there is a logically possible alternative set of physical laws which would produce significantly less natural harm overall for sentient creatures, while still generating creatures capable of doing physics and grasping morality.

In other words, you'd have to show that there is a better overall alternative that God could have selected (either no world, or a better overall world) if you're inclined to use actual world natural disasters as evidence of God's non-existence.

The argument structure goes like this:

OBJECTION
1. Ethical monotheism asserts that God exists and that God is perfectly good and can do anything that is logically possible to do (aka 'omnipotent' as that term has standardly been used by theistic philosophers such as Augustine, Aquinas, Leibniz, Kant, etc).
2. If a perfectly good omnipotent being existed, it would prevent natural disasters like the tsunami one.
3. But tsunami and other natural disasters have happened.
4. Therefore there is no good omnipotent being, and hence ethical monotheism must be false.

REPLY
1. A physical world with rational moral creatures is better than no world at all (the evidence for this claim being that most people are glad on the whole they exist in this world, despite its toils and troubles).
2. A perfectly good omnipotent would therefore create this world rather than no world.
3. A perfectly good omnipotent being would select the optimal physics relative to the goal of creating such creatures while minimizing potential natural harms to those creatures.
4. One cannot show that the actual physics is not the optimal physics relative to those goals unless one can show that there is an alternative logically possible physics which would achieve that goal but result in significantly less natural harm.
5. No-one has ever shown that any physics other than the actual physics is genuinely possible (some physicists believe that the actual physics may well be the only logically possible physics consistent with creatures like us); nor has anyone computed the total amount of natural harm that would result from a fully specified alternative physics and compared it to the total amount of natural harm that results from the actual physics.
6. Therefore, for all we know, the actual physics may be the optimal physics.
7. Hence, we don't have grounds for denying the existence of a perfectly good and omnipotent being just because of the occurrence of natural harms and disasters. For all we know, the total amount of natural harms and disasters flowing from the actual physics may be the minimum amount logically consistent with the physical conditions of life for creatures endowed with mathematical and moral rationality.

[Stunster]

107. I emailed you a response to this

which should show up in your inbox. It's my friend's take on the debate that I would draw your attention to in particular.

[qazplm]

131. well golly thats easy

considering we spend our first nine months in fluid.

or that if you watch the movie The Abyss, that the fluid they use to breathe really DOES exist and can by breathed by humans.

So if you can create a fluid that humans can breathe, then that means that all you would need to do to create an "undrownable human" would be to sufficiently alter our genes to allow us to extract oxygen from water efficiently enough to "breathe", while retaining the ability to draw oxygen from air. Thus you would have an "undrownable human" provided you are talking drowning in the conventional H2O sense.

Nothing really physically impossible about that.

[Stunster]

84. "Logically possible" v "imaginable"

I think you are maybe confusing imaginable and logically possible.

I suppose one could imagine a 'man' who was 5 light-years tall, and needed no air to breathe, and could fly at the speed of light in intergalactic space, a la Superman.

Is it logically possible that a human being could be like this? Well, only if there is a logically possible physics that would allow for such a human being. As far as we know, there isn't, and I'd suggest we'd be right to think that there is no such logically possible physics.

[opiate69]

115. Again with the "logically possible" fallacy.

1000 years ago, the average human would have found it "logically impossible" for giant, gaseous nuclear reactors to be hurtling through space, around objects so dense that not even light could escape their gravitational pull. Once again you're assuming that the Laws of Physics can only exist as we humans curently define them. "With God, all things are possible". Heretic.

[Stunster]

81. "There's no evidence for God"

Atheists often say such things.

What do they mean? Do they mean, they personally don't have evidence for God? Or do they mean, nobody, anywhere, at any time ever has evidence for God?

If it's the latter, then this, it seems to me, is simply false. The two most powerful, memorable, transformative experiences I've ever had have been experiences of God. I have met and known a number of other people who would say the same thing.

I reckon Saint Paul, Saint Teresa of Avila, Saint Ignatius of Loyola, Saint Augustine et al might have said the same thing if they'd been asked. Certainly they all wrote about them. And there'd be many non-Catholic theists who would say similar things, and have written similar things.

Now, I'm not suggesting that this 'proves' that theism is true. But I'm trying to get a handle on what it would mean to say that I, and all other theists who have had extraordinary experiences of God, don't have any evidence for the existence of God. And if we do have such evidence, doesn't that mean that it is simply false to say, as atheists are wont to say, that there is no evidence for God?

I mean, suppose there was a rare species of polar bear, which only a few Inuit had ever encountered. Would it be true that there is no evidence that such a species existed? Seems to me there would be evidence, even though it was not directly available to everyone.

Now, the objection might be that there is no scientific evidence for God, but there could be scientific evidence for the rare polar bear species. But theism says that God is not a physical entity, so it would not be surprising in the least that there is no scientific evidence for God (if that's the case, which I'm only conceding here for the sake of the argument).

If there is a God, then God is not a physical object. So insisting on God being subject to the kinds of evidence that we have for physical things would be to miss the point, and to beg the question. The question at issue is whether there are realities other than physical ones, and kinds of evidence for the existence of such realities other than physically experimental evidence. So insisting systematically on providing scientific evidence for God would be a clear case of the logical fallacy of begging the question. But the absence of physical experimental evidence for God is consistent with there being tremendously good evidence for God.

Let's imagine, for a moment, that Saint Paul had a profound encounter with the Risen Christ on the road to Damascus, such that nothing else would be as convincing to him as that experience. Then, St Paul would have a way of knowing, or reasonably believing, that materialism (if he knew what that was) was false and that Christianity was true. But no scientific procedure would be able to establish this. Yet someone (St Paul) would know it. He would have great evidence, from his perspective, of the truth of Christianity. But that would entail that "there's no evidence for God" is a false proposition.

"Ah, but we must use the term 'evidence' in such a way that it is independent of anyone's perspective".

Well, there seems to me to be two problems with this. It seems to me that an attempt is being made yet again to insist that the concept of evidence be restrictively defined to mean evidence yielded by natural scientific method---in other words, to beg the question again. But let's just ignore that for a moment and ask instead, is St Paul's evidence (or mine) purely perspectival? It seems to me that if you placed anyone in St Paul's shoes (or mine), and if anyone had the experiences that St Paul (and me) had, then that would count as evidence for them too---just as much as it would count as evidence for St Paul, me, and anyone else that there is a rare species of polar bear if you placed us in the shoes of the Inuit who had experienced that species. Just because St Paul, me, and most other people would not, ex hypothesi, have actually been in the shoes of those Inuit, surely doesn't entail that there is no evidence for the existence of that rare species of polar bear.

In other words, two points: 1) the concept of evidence is a logically broader category than the concept of evidence deriving from natural scientific method; 2) the concept of evidence is a function of experience. Given the right sorts of experience, then anyone will have the right sorts of evidence.

Have there ever been experiences that count as the 'right sort' to qualify as evidence for the existence of God? Sure there have! I've had a couple, and it seems I'm not alone. Nobody would have heard of St Paul if he hadn't had the right sorts of experiences. It doesn't prove theism to everyone's satisfaction. But an 18th century Inuit couldn't have proved the existence of that rare species to everyone's satisfaction. He'd still have damn good evidence, though, that there was such a polar bear species. And maybe St Paul and I have had damn good evidence that theism is true. And I think this means that the proposition, "There's no evidence for God" is straightforwardly false, unless one insists on committing the logical fallacy of begging the question in favor of scientific naturalism's definition of evidence. Which is a logical fallacy and an error of reasoning...

The difficulty I'm having with an a priori commitment to a universal reliance on naturalistic scientific method is that we have no really solid a priori or experimentally verified reason for thinking that, as science progresses, it will be able, in principle, to uncover the truth about these matters---the truth or otherwise of theism, or Christianity specifically---as long as the above-described scenario regarding Saint Paul seems logically possible (which it strikes me we have every reason to suppose it will always appear to us to be). But what if, it won't be able, even in principle to uncover the truth about these matters by means of using the natural scientific method, and yet St Paul is right, and as justified as he could possibly be (given the nature of his experiences) in thinking that he had met the Risen Christ and that materialism is false and Christian theism is true. Wouldn't that mean that there is evidence that God exists, even though, as in the case with the rare species of polar bear, not everybody had the evidence, or was in a position to experience that specie of bear. (Let's assume that the Inuit and bear species in question all died out 150 years ago).

It seems to me, in other words, that the rational thing to do is to be open to the possibility that science might not be the only way of knowing things, or even the best way, and that science itself may well be systematically incapable of discovering this, and that there may be other ways of discovering it, which a rational person may have access to, or even have had access to in the past. In fact, not only do I think that one should, rationally, be merely open to this possibility. I think it's actually rather plausible that it is the case.

Some will say that we can't even count religious experiences as evidence for theism, because lots of people have strange experiences which are later shown to be associated with certain kinds of cognitively non-veridical brain states. But how does this show that all religious experiences are merely the products of cognitively non-veridical brain states? Isn't that another blindingly obvious logical fallacy? "Some things of type A are the products of F. Therefore all things of type A are products of F." Yup, a fallacy alright.

'Ah, but it's more reasonable to think they are products of F, because being a product of F is more conformable to the worldview of scientific naturalism." Yet again, the objection is logically invalid, because it begs the question at issue---the question being, whether theism, as against scientific materialism, is the correct worldview.

And please name ANY human experience that does not involve some brain event/process or other. There are none? Fine!

Would you then infer that that every human experience was therefore illusory, or non-veridical?

Many years ago, hominid brains evolved in such a way as to enable humans to experience watching a bird fly in the sky, the taste of ice cream, the sound of music, the sound of words, the emotion of fear in the face of wild animals seeking to eat us, etc. That fact says PRECISELY NOTHING about the veridicality of those experiences. Why should a qualitatively similar fact concerning brain processes say any more than PRECISELY NOTHING about the veridicality of religious experiences?

Hence this type of argument---all religious experiences are caused by brain-states, therefore all religious experiences must be non-veridical---is, not to put too fine a point on it, utterly IDIOTIC.

It also has a name. It is called the Genetic Fallacy. See, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genetic_fallacy

[qazplm]

133. That's a whole lot of typing

but it seems to me all of that typing is predicated on you thinking that evidence means personal experience.

Evidence almost never means personal experience, the only time it does is when that personal experience can be repeated.

How do I know you are not mentally ill? Hallucinating? Lying? Delusional? You state you had two incidents that occured, perhaps you heard a voice, perhaps you saw an Angel, perhaps you saw your car move in a way you think impossible to save you from an accident.

But in order for me to take that evidence, you would need to either reproduce it, or provide more evidence than simply "take my word on this" to show that it happened.

Now I, being an agnostic, apply that same standard to atheists and they equally well seem to fail it in my opinion, you cant prove a negative, so the default position should be something akin to agnosticism on any claim...i.e. could be, but not going to believe it til you prove it to me.

Well, atheists havent proven to me that God doesnt exist, and your "experiences" certainly arent going to prove to me that God does exist.

[Az]

47. It might be interesting having a conversation with you

As you obviously are concerned about this subject. But you are simply far too hostile. I do not believe you are capable of a rational discussion. Your arguments are presumptive and demonstrate your clear hatred of atheism. I really see nothing to gain from talking to you. And I am certainly not here to entertain you or keep you from being bored.

So as I have said before. If you would really like to talk then fine, we can talk. But frankly I don't have time to deal with haters such as yourself. There are many more interesting people I would rather discuss real ideas with.

[Name removed]

51. Deleted message

Message removed by moderator. Click here to review the message board rules.

[Az]

53. We are done

[lazarus]

58. you can suggest

that there are rational criticisms of atheism available. You can even suggest that there are rational defences of theism available.

Until you actually provide these rationsl criticisms and defences, however, and stop just attacking people, no progress is possible.

[Stunster]

59. I'm attacking people...

....?

Sweet Jesus, read the fucking threads!

[lazarus]

60. As Az so eloquently put it

We are done. You are either clueless or intentionally obtuse. I don't have time for either.

[Stunster]

62. "clueless or intentionally obtuse"

That describes my interlocutors rather well.

Thanks. Oh, and thanks for not being like me, and attacking people and stuff.

Hilarious.

[Stunster]

64. You're just asserting I haven't

You haven't shown that I haven't.

Any fool can say what you're saying.

Indeed, some fools do.

"Oh, that's horseshit"

"Prove it"

"What a load of rubbish"

etc.

If you've got nothing better to say, say nothing. If you think it's not worth the bother, and you should just ignore it, just ignore it.

But being a member of a chorus reading a script just makes you look fearful or stupid.

[progressoid]

54. Back in the day we used to call this 'mental diarrhea'

You're probably going to need therapy soon - start saving up.

[GOPFighter]

57. In my opinion, it is up to theists...

...to prove there is a God. They need to explain why "god" allows so many hideous things to be done in his name and not a damn peep out of him/her/it. Year after year we see religious fanatics kill and maim. We know of the Holocaust, the American slave trade, N. Ireland, the hatred in the Middle East. Don't try to tell me, an atheist, that I'VE got a problem. You've got the problem.

[progressoid]

61. Proof of god? I got one...

Wait a second...I had it....shoot, now it's gone.

It'll come back to me if I hit my head with this ball peen hammer a few more times.

:silly:

[Stunster]

63. Prove that you have a conscious mind, endowed with free will and reason

I know that's what you think.

But prove it to someone else. You could be a zombie, devoid of consciousness. Yeah, we could cut open your head and see a brain lying in your skull. But how would you prove that that brain is conscious?

Yeah, you could say something to that effect. But that's just sound waves moving through the air from your throat. Still doesn't show that there's anything conscious going on in your mind, or that you even have a mind....

"Daddy, have you ever been to New York?"

---"Yes, once, when I was about your age."

"Prove it!"

"Judge, you can't hold me responsible. I have no free will. I couldn't have done otherwise."

----"Yes you do, and I am going to hold you responsible..."

"Prove it!"

How about reasonable belief. Ever had a reasonable belief that you couldn't prove?

"Oh, theism is not a reasonable belief"

----"I see, so every believer in God (most people in the world, as it happens) are guilty of holding an unreasonable belief by being theists?"

"Yup"

----"Prove it!"

[progressoid]

65. "I know that's what you think."...

really? Clairvoyant or are you god hisself?

[Stunster]

66. What, you mean you

are a zombie???

Come to think of it....

[GAspnes]

67. Ah, solipsism.

Favorite of high schoolers everywhere.

First, define your terms. What do you mean by "conscious", "mind", "free", "will" and "reason". Then we'll talk.

[Stunster]

70. You're missing the point

like a junior high schooler.

The point is not to argue for solipsism. The point is to show that the demand for proof for everything is stupid, and that what is much more rationally acceptable, not to say sane, is to require that beliefs be reasonable. One standard way of showing that a belief is reasonable is by showing that it is arrived at through a reasonable abductive inference (or 'inference to the best explanation'). One appeals to things like simplicity, economy, coherence, scope, etc in choosing between competing hypotheses.

Elsewhere I've suggested that theism accounts for the phenomena associated with reason and value (consciousness; rational thought; the reliability of sense-perception; meaning; free will; morality; the 'unreasonable' efficacy of mathematics; aesthetics; profundity and centrality of emotions like love, pleasure, joy, etc; the fine-tuning of the physics governing the universe, rendering it suitable for life; the general orderedness of the universe; and religious experience) all in one fell swoop, more naturally than materialism or Platonism. I don't claim that this is 'proof', but only that it is a reasonable abductive hypothesis, accounting for a bunch of diverse data, (and hence it's not surprising that loads of people have essentially made the same inference).

So the original objector is a) making a mistake to demand 'proof' in any strict sense for theism---he can't provide it even for the existence of his own conscious mind; and b) ignoring that theism is a reasonable abductive hypothesis, which is all a belief needs to be to be reasonable.

[GAspnes]

71. that second paragraph is a monster

I'm sure it makes sense to you, but I can't determing which definitions you're associating with 'reason' and which with 'value'. Help me out here.

Secondly, are you arguing that there's no way to prove theism? I'd agree with that.

[Bolo Boffin]

75. I don't want to

Is that proof enough?

[Stunster]

76. I don't want to prove theism

either in that case. Proof enough?

[indigobusiness]

112. Proof of God

is only necessary for those who have no use for it.

[muriel_volestrangler]

77. I don't think anyone has understood your argument yet

so maybe you better rephrase it.

"A.

1. There is free will OK, this is a premise
2. Theism is not true, because a good God would not have allowed free
will. The first part is more or less a definition of atheism, so for this number you could just stop there; the second is about the 'goodness' of gods, not their existence
3. Therefore materialism is the truth about reality. Yes, many atheists believe this
4. Therefore there is no free will. Huh? How on earth are you saying that?
5. But 1 and 4 are contradictory, therefore there's something wrong
with this argument."

No-one, and I suspect that goes for the theists too, can understand where number 4 has come from. This is why we all think you are creating a straw man.

And your 'B' argument seems to depend on "free will is a bad thing". Some atheists may argue that, if there were a god, free will could be a bad thing (because it's necessary for sin); but without a god, there's no reason to say "free will is a bad thing". And I don't think anyone here (or any sensible atheist at all? Give us a link if you think someone does say this) does say it. So again, this looks like a straw man.

Finally, your use of the news story seems completely irrelevant to the your argument. Anyway, the rapist's actions are completely explainable in materialist terms - he is a selfish man, who (a) saves a female life (b) forces her to have sex, thus increasing his chances of procreation. It's very anti-social, but it is a workable strategy for survival of his genes. Did you bring it up because it's actually troubling your ideas of moral normative principles?

[Stunster]

88. A4 comes from A3

Loads of materialists deny the reality of free will because they are materialists.

The issue is whether the rapist could have done something else at that moment other than rape the girl, in virtue of autonomous rational choosing on his part.

[muriel_volestrangler]

100. Then they don't start off by assuming there is free will

Taking one part of one argument, and shunting it together with a part of someone else's, is stupid. Don't be stupid.

[Stunster]

101. It's not stupid in general

It's actually standard practice in reductio ad absurdum argument to assume something, and see what follows from it.

If you simply want to deny the reality of free will, fine. That means that most people, who see an important difference between the rape and tsunami, are mistaken. I'm just showing what the consequence is of denying free will. I.e. that it's radically counter-intuitive. That's right there in the original argument if you care to read it.

[muriel_volestrangler]

103. It's your method of argument that's stupid

not anyone else's. You've proved no-one else wrong. No-one argues what you claimed. That's why it's a straw man.

I'm not denying free will.

[Stunster]

105. You haven't shown what's stupid about it

You haven't even shown that you understand the argument, let alone have refuted it.

There is free will? Ok.

What's wrong with the Kantian argument I gave to show that it would be incoherent to claim that it would be a bad thing for God, if God existed, to create free will?

[muriel_volestrangler]

110. Your stupid method of argument is not understandable

by anyone, it seems. Shouldn't that be another clue that it's stupid? You've been repeatedly told that you are setting up a nonsensical position that no-one takes, and then gleefully saying it's nonsensical. You prove, or even suggest, nothing by this.

If one thought that God gave humans free will, and one then used that free will to wish it didn't exist, that wouldn't necessarily be incoherent - it would be a wish to cease to be. But it's your problem anyway - because as an atheist, I don't think God existed, so he couldn't have given me a free will. Without a god around, atheists don't have to worry about original sin. We just don't think this is a perfect world.

[Stunster]

90. Una vez mas

An atheistic argument that has appeared on this forum
a number of times is to the effect that theism must be
false because free will is a bad thing, or inevitably leads
to bad things, and hence a good God (theism defines God as good)
would not create free will, if such a God existed.

But if free will is a problem for materialism (as I and
even many materialists think it is), this may lead an
atheistic believer in free will to abandon materialism
in favor of some form of idealism or Platonism (in order
to accomodate free will in their ontology). But then the
Kantian argument kicks in to show that it can't be
morally right to will the non-existence of free will,
and hence it can't have been right for God to will
the non-existence of free will.

Therefore it's not wrong for God to have allowed free
will, contrary to the original atheist objection.

The point is, some atheists have argued that theism
cannot be true, because of all the moral evil in the
world. When theists reply that the moral evil is due
to free will, atheists often respond by saying that a
good creator wouldn't create free will.

My argument shows some problems for the atheist position:

1) if they deny free will, then this would put the rape of the young
woman on a par with any other natural event ontologically. Most people
think this can't be right, a) because they perceive there to be free
will, and b) because they perceive that there are normative properties
attaching to an act of rape, which don't attach to tsunamis. But since
tsunamis and rapes are both material events if materialism is true,
then the positing of free will, and of additional, normative
properties, is prima facie incompatible with materialism. Since
materialism is often the worldview motivating atheism, this is a
problem for atheists who are also materialists.

2) But even if atheists are not materialists, and admit free will into
their ontology, they cannot consistently will that there be free will
and hold that a good God would be wrong to create free will. But if
they will that there be no free will, that's also inconsistent, for
the Kantian reason I gave.

[muriel_volestrangler]

108. More straw men

Some atheists may argue that, if there were gods, free will would be a bad thing, because that would then allow suffering that the gods could other wise prevent. But this argument says nothing about free will if there is no god. So it has no effect on an atheist's concept of what reality is.

Free will is not a problem for materialism. Materialism can recognise the existence of minds, that are the result of brains (or, perhaps, other systems) of sufficient complexity.

If an atheist would rather there were no free will, this similarly says nothing about the situation if there were a god. So whether it is morally right or not for an atheist to will the non-existence of free will when there is no god, that doesn't affect an argument when there is one. The morals of one being in an atheistic universe don't have to be the same as those of a god in a theistic one.

[Stunster]

114. You're just confused

I'll leave it at that.

[Stunster]

92. Huh?

Finally, your use of the news story seems completely irrelevant to the your argument. Anyway, the rapist's actions are completely explainable in materialist terms - he is a selfish man, who (a) saves a female life (b) forces her to have sex, thus increasing his chances of procreation. It's very anti-social, but it is a workable strategy for survival of his genes. Did you bring it up because it's actually troubling your ideas of moral normative principles?

Am I the only one who would find it morally troubling? I don't think so. I don't think most people on the planet would find it anything other than highly offensive to the moral, normative principles which they regard as applicable to the assessment of this situation. I actually find it bizarre that even someone who was a materialist anti-realist about morality (someone who claimed, in other words, that there was no objective non-physically derivable moral order which applied to and normatively bound human conduct) would think that it was anything other than counter-intuitive to say that the rape and the tsunami were events of the same ontological kind---natural, material events, with no objective normative differences (only subjective ones, which differences are themselves to be naturalistically explained). That is, I think even a materialist anti-realist about morality (or objective normativity in general) would probably admit that it seems to be the case that there are moral properties attaching to the rape event of a very different kind from all the properties science would ascribe to the tsunami event.

Moral anti-realists know full well that their views would strike most people as counter-intuitive. Which is why I am frankly amazed that you should have written what you did in the passage I quote above.

[muriel_volestrangler]

102. I said it was anti-social

so, yes, the vast majority of people, including me, find the act morally troubling. I'm not excusing rape, nor saying that it would be a good strategy for gene survival for everyone to behave that way. Many things (genes, individuals, or groups) take advantage of the usual behaviour of larger groups by doing something that benefits them at the greater expense of something else. If too many do, then this can threaten the survival of of a species.

You seem to be obsessed with categorising the two events (rape and tsunami) as either completely the same or totally different. They have some similarities (both are things that most of us would rather not happen), and they have some differences (one happened to a lot of people, one only to one; one happened as a result of one mind's decision, one as a result of the planet's movements). This is not a problem to atheism. Why do you think it is?

Morals are the expression of our cooperation with one another. Since the two events do involve a difference in human cooperation, there is a moral difference. Who told you there wasn't?

[Stunster]

106. Does one involve free will, and the other not?

If so, I suggest that is a problem for materialism.

If not, then what you're saying is extremely counter-intuitive.

If there is free will, (and let's suppose materialism is false for that reason), then it can't have been a bad thing for God to create it free will, for the Kantian reasons I gave.

An atheist might get out of this by saying, there is no such thing as free will, so it's not a problem to say whether it's a good thing or a bad thing.

But, the rape/tsunami comparison shows just how highly counter-intuitive that claim is.

[Jim__]

93. Well, I guess the earth is flat after all!

Or, at the very least, there used to be a good enough reason for holding that is the case. I mean, based on your final argument:

So near-universal conscious perception is a good enough reason for
holding that something is the case. But this applies to free will
about as much as it does to trees.

But, then, it would appear that near-universal conscious perception ... that something is the case has absolutely nothing to do with whether or not something is actually the case. Or, to put it another way, whether or not there is near-universal conscious perception that there is free will, has nothing to do with whether there is actually free will.

I think science has a superior approach for determining what is the case. If you believe something to be the case, come up with a test to see if your belief withstands testing.

[Stunster]

94. Your argument fails

because there was no conscious perception that the whole Earth was flat. The relevant perception is a function of what is being claimed to be perceived. Whole trees? Yup, there have been conscious perceptions of whole trees. A whole free will. Yup, there have been conscious perceptions of that. A whole earth being flat? No, no such conscious perceptions.

[Stunster]

95. Beliefs and experiences

Nobody experienced that the Earth was flat. People do experience that they have free will. Think of experience or 'conscious perception' as an instance of 'it consciously seeming to be the case that F'. Now I want to distinguish this from belief. One can believe all sorts of things---such as that the Earth is flat---without one ever having an instance of it consciously seeming to be the case that F. Nobody ever experienced the flatness of the Earth, because the Earth is not flat. If one had a vision of being in outer space, and looking at the earth, and saw that it was a big pancake type of thing, that would be an instance of it seeming to be the case that the Earth is flat. But let's suppose people held the belief that the Earth is flat but never on the basis of such a visionary experience.

You will object that people believe in free will, but that this belief is just like the flat-Earth belief without the experience of seeming to see the pancake thing floating in space. But I don't think that's right. People don't just have a belief in the freedom of their will. They have an inner sense---one might even call it an inner sensation---of being able to choose between two courses of action. I can lift my arm right now, or I can not lift it, and it's up to me to choose. I think most people think of this type of thing as something not just that they believe to be the case, but that they are occurrently experiencing to be the case. They have a powerful experiential sense of their own rational and moral autonomy, at least in some circumstances. One piece of evidence for this claim is that materialist philosophers who deny the existence of free will usually don't deny that there is this felt sense---they merely try to argue for its illusory nature. But that's the key. If you say that something is illusory, you're not denying that there's an experience that is going on. You're just saying that the experience is non-veridical---it fails to relate accurately to reality. One can have a hallucination. It fails to relate accurately to reality. But it is a real experience, ex hypothesi. It's not merely a belief about the world, it's a perception of how the world is. A false one, to be sure, but a perception or experience nonetheless.

Now I mention all this not to say that this proves there is free will, but only to say that the experiential basis of the belief that there is free will is not analogous to the experiential basis of the belief that the Earth is flat.

As a matter of historical fact, it's too simplistic to say that everyone bar Columbus thought that the earth was flat in some strong cosmological sense. That was one theory, but by no means a universal theory, even before there were any circumnavigations of the planet.

But in any case, nobody claimed that they had a conscious perception of the flatness of the whole earth as the basis of their belief that the earth was flat. But people routinely, as even most materialist deniers of free will readily admit, claim to experience their own moral and rational autonomy. Many materialists themselves admit that they have such experiences. But then go on to argue that they are illusory. But if they just have the experiences, and even if they are illusory, then the situation vis-a-vis free will is not akin to the situation of the thinking the Earth is flat.

There are other reasons for rejecting determinism anyway. Many have argued that if a belief is held simply because its occurrence is determined, then it is not justified, since rational justification has to mean more than merely being caused. But if all beliefs are like this, then the belief in determinism is not justified. But that's another whole topic, as is the impact of quantum mechanical processes on the determinism v free will debate.

[Jim__]

117. A conscious perception of a "whole" free will?

A whole free will. Yup, there have been conscious perceptions of that.

Let's keep it simple and just deal with that statement. Your claim that someone has experienced a whole free will is pure conjecture. Unless you can tell us precisely what a free will is and what the limits of free will are, how it engages in every possible situation, whether or not there are autonomous reactions that by-pass free will; indeed, unless you've had a vision of being let's say, out of body and looking at the will, and saw that it was a big pancake type of thing or some such; you have no more conscious perception of a whole free will than a peasant living in the Middle Ages had of the whole earth.

[supernova]

111. I don't have the patience to wade through

this crap. Stunster it would be more productive for you to figure out what YOU believe, rather than posting long diatribes.

[Darranar]

113. Materialism and free will are perfectly consistent. n/t

[Imperialism Inc.]

120. I don't see the problem here.

And you are using a straw man.
It seems that you are assuming that materialists have some view of perfection in the material world. Specifically that humans are perfect in some way. This is of course not the case at all. There are many diseases of the mind and body. The example of rape doesn't require some theistic notion of free will only a diseased mind.
The rest of your argument becomes irrelevant at this point.

As far as materialism being generally incompatible with free will ,well maybe it is. From a strictly materialist point of view I can easily see that the mind is a complex organ. It has specifically evolved to be a (using metaphor here to simplify discussion) blank slate of wiring that can be and is programmed by individual experience. Is there more to it than that? Well scientifically we can not say at this point. But even if there isn't anything more than that, the complexity is so great that the myriad of choices that the brain can produce in a given situation is such that it is, at this point at least, indistinguishable from a concept of free will.

[Stunster]

121. Here's the problem

Let's suppose there is no such thing as free will and that materialism is true. Then the tsunami and the rape are no different in kind: they are both simply natural disasters, caused by natural processes. But almost nobody in the world thinks that way---they see that there are major differences of a metaphysical kind between the two. Specifically they think of the tsunami as a natural disaster, but they think of the rape as having objective normative properties. They think the rapist had an objective moral obligation not to commit the rape, that what he did was morally wrong, that it was a wicked thing to do, that he had a choice and chose badly, etc. Nobody in their right mind thinks that the Earth had a moral obligation not to cause the tsunami, nor that what the Earth did in causing the tsunami was morally wrong, nor that the Earth had a choice and chose badly, nor that the Earth is morally wicked for causing it, etc. Hence, the idea that tsunamis and rapes are morally and ontologically events of the same kind---which is implied by the materialistic denial of free will and moral autonomy--flies in the face of our strong intuitions.

Let's suppose the materialist sees this, and tries to accomodate moral autonomy, free will, and objective normative and moral properties in his/her ontology (in order to account for the aforementioned intuitions), then one objection against theism is undercut: atheists typically say that theism cannot be true because there is a lot of moral evil in the world. But if moral autonomy and free will are admitted into one's ontology, then human evildoers are truly responsible for that moral evil. This is the well-known "Free Will Defence".

The atheistic materialist then reformulates the objection as follows: theism cannot be true, because if there were a good God (as theists hold), then God wouldn't have allowed free will (because it can and is misused, and leads to bad things like rape). But this means that free will is a bad thing, and to say of something that it is bad implies that one wills that it shouldn't exist. But there is a Kantian argument to show that this is an incoherent objection. Kant essentially defines immorality in terms of rationally inconsistent willing---"Act only upon those maxims which one can at the same time will to be a universal law". The Kantian argument goes like this:

1) To judge that some things are bad things implies that
one wills that they don't exist.

2) But to will anything at all implies that one has a will and wants to use it.

3) But if the will itself is judged a bad thing, one would be willing that one had a will, and willing that one didn't have a will.

4) Hence, one cannot consistently will that there be no such thing as
willing.

5) Inconsistent willing is something one ought not to will.

6). There being facts about what one ought to will (such as saving someone from drowning in a tsunami) and facts about what one ought not to will (such as rape) presupposes that one has free will. ('Ought implies can')

7) Therefore, if one wills anything at all freely, one ought to will, inter alia, that there be such a thing as willing freely.

8) But then it's not wrong for God to will that there be such a thing as willing freely.

9) Therefore, the reformulated atheistic objection---that God (morally) should not have permitted free will, and hence if God is good, God does not exist---rests on an incoherence.

One could try to escape the conclusion of the Kantian argument by reverting to a denial of moral autonomy and free will, and rest content with straightforward materialism in which such things are at best illusions. But this entails the tremendously counter-intuitive consequence that rapes and tsunamis are both simply species of natural disaster, and that there are no such things as objective normative properties attaching to rape any more than there are objective normative properties attaching to tsunamis.

Notice that the belief in free will, etc, is based on our everyday experience that in many circumstances we have a free choice as to how to behave, and we attribute the possibility of such free choice to the rapist, which is why we hold him morally responsible and morally blameworthy, but we don't hold the tsunami morally responsible or morally blameworthy. Since nearly everybody thinks that these moral properties attach to rape, but not to tsunamis, I'm suggesting that this incident highlights a problem with accepting materialism. But if free will is admitted, one can't consistently hold that it's a bad thing for God to have created it.

[Imperialism Inc.]

122. I actually understand your argument.

I have also heard atheists (I am one myself) make that comment before. That it wouldn't make sense for God to grant free will because bad things happen. I myself am not sure if there is such a thing or not, which is what I meant by not seeing the problem. It really isn't a problem for me personally.
Now there are of course potential problems with your argument. What if one doesn't accept Kant's definition of immorality as one example?
Finally, lets say we accept your argument completely. Then all you have really done is give theism one less problem. It isn't really a problem for an atheistic world view.

[Stunster]

124. The atheistic worldview

Okay dokey, here's why I think it's a problem for atheism.

The vast majority of people have very strong intuitions about the differences between rapes and tsunamis, which tend to make materialism a problematic worldview for them. To the extent that one goes with these intuitions, materialism becomes less credible or attractive. And if, on the basis of these considerations, one concludes that materialism is false, then one of the major reasons proposed by many atheists for rejecting theism---that God cannot be accomodated in a materialist ontology---loses its force. One could then opt for atheistic Platonism to account for non-physical objective normative properties, but either way, there are considerable problems. This would be part of an abductive argument for theism. Elsewhere I've suggested that theism accounts well for the phenomena associated with reason and value:

-- consciousness;
-- rational thought;
-- the reliability of sense-perception;
-- meaning;
-- free will;
-- morality;
-- the 'unreasonable' efficacy of mathematics;
-- aesthetics;
-- profundity and centrality of emotions like love,
pleasure, joy, etc;
-- the fine-tuning of the physics governing the
universe, rendering it suitable for life;
-- the general orderedness of the universe;
-- religious experience)

all in one fell swoop, and more naturally or intuitively than
materialism or Platonism. I don't claim that this is 'proof', but only
that it is an eminently reasonable abductive hypothesis, accounting
for a bunch of diverse data economically, elegantly. Hence it's not surprising that loads of people have essentially made the same inference).

That's why even non-materialist forms of atheistic naturalism don't appeal to me. They are too, well, clumsy as models of reality compared to the theistic model. Admittedly, religious experience plays a key role in suggesting the theistic abduction. If it weren't for that, then I might just go along with a non-materialist naturalism---Platonism being the most famous instance thereof. But I guess, when I read theistic mystical and spiritual literature---the Autobiographies of Augustine, Ignatius of Loyola, St Teresa of Avila, Thomas Merton, John Main, etc---it's just obvious to me that they're honestly sharing as best they can what they've found to be real. And this has been confirmed in my own experience.

Here are extracts from email material I've written before outlining some of the problems.


PROBLEMS WITH ATHEISTIC PLATONISM
Now, the only examples of anything real which are (arguably) *not*
completely reducible to the physical, are persons, or minds and their contents. We encounter physical things all the time, and we encounter minds or persons all the time (at least our own). We simply *don't* encounter *freestanding* abstract entities. When we encounter abstract
entities, they are always encountered as the contents of minds.

Moral obligation, for example, isn't something we bump into *independently* of personhood. Mathematical or logical relations, for example, are never found 'out there'. They're only ever found 'in here', meaning, as part of our mental contents. The physical things which obey those relations *are* 'out there'. But the relations themselves, like all abstract entities, however, *don't* occupy spacetime. They only occupy minds. We don't find physical things
or mental contents as weird as non-physical things which aren't mental contents either. In fact, we never ever encounter such things.

So if that's what moral properties are--non-physical things which don't occupy spacetime OR minds, they would be very weird indeed.

> Is it any more weird than the idea that some rational
> intelligent 'creator' created all this for the sake of some
> apocalyptic sleepover.

We are familiar with personhood. It is wonderful and amazing, but not *weird* precisely because we're intimately familiar with it. Mind and its characteristic content are 'givens' of human existence--utterly basic, fundamental, and logically prior to our knowledge of anything else in existence. Hence, if we postulate that the creator is a mind, this would strike us as less weird than there just being abstract entities eternally existing but not essentially occupying any mind. We are familiar with physical things, and with minds and their (abstract) contents.

Relative to those things, a non-physical thing which is not a mind and not essentially the content of any mind, is weird.

There is another reason why the theistic inference seems more reasonable than an inference to the non-physical existence of abstract moral properties, and that is that it *coheres much better* with the personal, spiritually and morally transformative experiences which many people have had. A very common element of these experiences is that they bear a strong analogy to *interpersonal, mutual knowledge and love*. They *don't* commonly have the content of being an encounter with an abstract, causally inert, impersonal abstract Platonic entity. I would consider it likely that, as a matter of causal genesis of ideas, it is these experiences which initially suggest and give rise to the concept of theism, and thus make it
make it mentally and socially--socially, because the experiences are communicated to others--available for the relevant abductive inference.

PROBLEMS WITH HARD-HEADED MATERIALISM
Some philosophically sophisticated materialists adopt moral anti-realism. They bite the bullet, and hold that our different perceptions towards rapists compared with tsunamis don't involve any objective normative properties, since there are no such properties. They readily admit that if materialism is true, then our deepest moral convictions are not true, but are (roughly) adaptive illusions.
Here's some comments I've posted before on this forum about this option:

Many naturalistic thinkers will answer the last question by saying
that *all there is* to moral obligation and value is the functioning
of rational instincts and desires. The first problem with this reply
is that instincts, dispositions, and desires vary tremendously among
humans--some are instinctively aggressive, others instinctively
deferential and compliant, some are extremely egoistic and cruel,
others loving and altruistic. They vary from ethnic cleansing to
caring for lepers. The second problem is that if reason (the
'rational' part of 'rational instincts') is only instrumental---that
is, if reason only enters the picture as the process by which agents
deliberate about and choose between various possible *means* to their
various ends, then the naturalist is left having to face the fact that
some people's ends are truly horrifying from a moral point of view.
But in that case, one can't reduce morality to the ends people are
disposed to pursue. If, on the other hand, reason enters into the
picture by actually adjudicating which *ends* ought to be pursued and
which ought not to be, then one is back in a vicious circle. One has
smuggled moral reason and moral judgement in to sort out the varying
ends between which the naturalist, contemplating a factual description
of the great variety of people's dispositions and desires, must choose
in order to give any remotely plausible account of the content of
morality.

The biological perspective is simply that people have different urges
to do different things. But biology provides no criteria for deciding
why one set of urges should be labelled more `moral' than another.
We would be left describing the atrocities of the Pol Pot regime as
yet another `interesting' manifestation of humankind's factual
dispositions.

Similarly, the attempt to derive morality from evolution is logically
flawed. Evolution is simply a descriptive theory. Morality is a
*prescriptive* theory---it prescribes certain kinds of conduct for
humans, and PROscribes others. But if evolutionary biology is to
explain morality, it must show the link between morality and adaptive
behavior. The trouble with this is that a very large range of human
behavior is agreed to be immoral, while evolution has to hold that
nearly *all* behavior derives from the adaptive features of our
genetic makeup. From this it would follow that much, perhaps even
all, immoral behavior is adaptive. But then adaptiveness cannot be
that in terms of which moral behavior is defined, or that from which
specifically moral (as against immoral) behavior springs.

Some naturalists are prepared to bite the bullet about this. That is,
they are ready to say that there is no such thing as morality in any
robust sense. There are just human wants and human inclinations to
talk a certain way about them. Morality, if the term is to be
retained at all, simply refers to whatever happens to be the majority
of, or most commonly possessed, sets of dispositions and ways of
speaking with regard to inter-human conduct.

The problem with this view is that it falls foul of naturalism's most
basic starting point---human experience. Naturalism privileges
science as a form of knowledge because it relies on the most immediate
data yielded by our consciousness of the world. Among these data are
most certainly the deliverances of our sensory and perceptual
abilities. We experience a patch of green and call it grass. We
hear a sound and interpret it as indicating a wave is moving at a
certain speed through a large body of air molecules. We look at a
dial and determine by its measurement the mass of a subatomic particle.

But these are not the only kind of data of consciousness. There is
also the utter conviction that shooting defenceless innocent children
as they attempt to escape is something we are morally bound to
condemn---that it is *prohibited* to act thus, whether anyone wants to
or not. There is the absolute certainty we find our conscious mind
giving us that leaving a man to die of thirst in the desert while
driving off in a full water-tanker is an abhorrent act of callousness
that violates an ineluctable moral obligation (unless one is racing to
save the lives of others who would die if you stopped to help---in
that case one's obligation is different--saving the others--but it's
still an obligation).

In other words, naturalism rests its case on the sheer force and
given-ness of sensory experience. But that force and given-ness is
at least, if not *more*, present in the case of people's consciousness
with respect to major moral duties and moral values. One is *more*
ready to attribute an experience of green to optical illusion or
bodily malfunction (such as color-blindness) than to give up as
illusory the idea that one must not kill kids or leave dying men in
the desert. One is *more* ready, in a laboratory, to attribute the
position of the dial to a random electrical disturbance rather than
the properties of the object being studied, than one is to attribute
the notion that we should not rape our grandmothers to a mere lack of
desire to do so.

Naturalism, in order to dismiss morality as a projection or illusion
with no real objective claim upon us, ends up having to deny the
validity of the only thing that would even render itself
(naturalism)plausible in the first place---the deliverances and
character of the subjective conscious experiences of human beings.

[Imperialism Inc.]

125. Not buying it.

But biology provides no criteria for deciding
why one set of urges should be labeled more `moral' than another.

It most certainly does. Some behaviors are more adaptive than others. Animals other than man exhibit complex behaviors that have arisen due to natural selection. Why should man be any different?

One should note that evolution does not create "perfect" beings , only well adapted and best adapted. Otherwise we would not have so many physical imperfection in the "design" of our bodies. An optic nerve that creates a blind spot because it grows through the retina (though there are creatures that don't exhibit this flaw so we know a more perfect eyes can certainly be created). So it should not be of any surprise to us that some behaviors would be preferred over others and that some harmful behaviors would persist.

At the purely theoretical level one can look at the work of John Nash and others in the game theory field of study to know that purely competitive or "everyone for themselves" behaviors are not always the optimal solution to a problem. It should not surprise us that these more cooperative behaviors and a predilection for them would arise through the evolutionary process. In addition, there has been some experimental work in this area recently that seems to confirm the mathematics.

I don't consider this "smuggling it in". It is approaching human behavior the way I approach everything else(or try to for the most part anyway). Observation and data. As far as your discussion of calling grass green and all the rest... You will of course note that in the 2nd and 3rd cases (the "wave of sound" and the "measurement of sub atomic particles") we are making an indirect measurement. Since our minds are so complex how can we expect to understand them "intuitively"? We certainly didn;t think of sounds as waves in the air before such matters were studied intensely. We just heard noises. Why should how our thoughts and behaviors work be any different?

Thanks for an interesting topic. Bye for now.

[Az]

126. Not even best adapted

Suitably adapted would be a better way to phrase it. Evolution and nature have no mold or contruct they are building towards. What survives is simply what was able to survive. It doesn't create perfection. It only supports functional.

[Imperialism Inc.]

128. True.

Better adapted than any peers would have been a better way to say it.

[Imperialism Inc.]

127. Actually I'll give a concrete example before I go.

And I really do want to thank you for your views. I have read most of them on these topics in the other threads that I came to late to. I don't agree with a lot of what you say but I do like that you have at least thought things out.

Not to long back there was an article here on a finding that genetic make-up may determine likelihood to be unfaithful to one's spouse. Some didn't like that idea. "blaming everything on the genes," they said.

I pointed out that "cheating" occurs all the time in the wild. The example I gave was of a particular species of bird where the female of the species will sneak out to mate with a more dominant male than the one she has. If found out she is usually killed by her male. This brings up interesting questions. Is the male acting out based on some moral ideal or is he simply "programmed" that way by his genes? If the latter then why would it be so unlikely that preference for some behaviors over others would be present in humans for naturalistic reasons?

[Selwynn]

123. I really hate these kinds of debates.

I know, I know... don't read it. :)

[spryker]

129. atheism or not

I am impressed by the energy of Stunster in this forum. He is a
strong believer and feels a need to convince others, like so many
missionaries. There is much that is good in Christianity, and I actually support it, in its liberal, non-fundamentalist version, because of a respect for its tradition and moral values. It is to be preferred over islam, which to me is a step into the past.
However, I do not believe in any god, and am not obliged to believe what somebody else, past or present prophet, says or writes that he saw, heard or experienced, unless I personally experience the same thing.
Vide Thomas Paine.

[Name removed]

137. Deleted message

Message removed by moderator. Click here to review the message board rules.

[Name removed]

139. Deleted message

Message removed by moderator. Click here to review the message board rules.

[enki23]

130. to quote billy madison...

"here's a nice piece of shit..."

[FM Arouet666]

135. So called "intelligent design" veiled in philosophy

...in so far as each individual substance has an existence which is independent of other substances, no reciprocal connection occurs between them; and since it certainly does not fall to finite beings to be the cause of other substances, and since, nonetheless, all the things in the universe are found to be reciprocally connected with one another, since all this is the case, it has to be admitted that this relation depends on a communality of cause, namely on God, the universal principle of beings. (1:413) Kant

Kant's philosophy was motivated by a need to confront the implications of modern science. The works of scientists, such as Newton, suggested a materialistic world, devoid of a divine influence, thus leading to atheism. Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason' and 'Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science' seek to bridge the conflict between religion and science using philosophical arguments. The conclusion distilled from these works is that there must be a causal agent at work, namely a god.

Kant's conclusions are as flawed as those of modern day intelligent design advocates. Science does not provide answers to many aspects of the natural world, and deals with matters outside the natural world not at all. Failure to scientifically explain a phenomenon is not a weakness which requires raising the specter of a deity. The weakness is in the need for philosophy and religion to postulate an existence outside of the natural world as a means to explain things currently not explained by rational, empirical processes.

Your augment is flawed because your reasoning is based on a flawed and outdated methodology. Seeking to interpret the world based on the works of Kant is no better than seeking enlightenment through the works of jesus. Yes, I am a scientist and atheist, and have never found the mental masturbation provided in philosophy to be of much use in explaining the physical world.

No trouble here. Atheism alive and well in the material world. :evilgrin:

[BurtWorm]

138. No.

Despite your argument with yourself.

[CrownPrinceBandar]

140. Locking.

Despite some productive discourse, this thread has been predominantly combative.