Does quantum entanglement imply free will?

[Jim__]

Excerpt

Today, Jonathan Barrett from the University of Bristol and Nicolas Gisin from the University of Geneva provide us with an interesting new take on this problem. They assume that entanglement does occur as quantum mechanics proscribes and then ask how much free will an experimenter must have to rule out the possibility of hidden interference.

The answer is curious. Barret and Gisin prove that if there is any information shared by the experimenters and the particles they are to measure, then entanglement can be explained by some kind of hidden process that is deterministic.

In practical terms, this means that there can be no shared information between the random number generators that determine the parameters of the experiments to be made, and the particles to be measured.

But the same also holds true for the experimenters themselves. It means there can be no information shared between them and the particles to be measured either. In other words, they must have completely free will.

The original paper is linked to at the end of the article.

[beam me up scottie]

1. Define "free will". n/t

Bonus points to the authors for using a religious weasel word, opportunist religionists are going to pee all over themselves. :eyes:

[bananas]

4. RTFP

[Jim__]

5. Define n/t.

:eyes:

BTW, if you bother to read the paper, they tell you exactly what they mean.

[bananas]

2. Local deterministic model of singlet state correlations allowing 86% free will

I cheated and skipped to the end of the paper.
In the second to last paragraph it says:

Let us emphasize the change in paradigm since the old
EPR paper <4>. If, contrary to EPR, one accepts non-
locality as a fact, then not only can one develop pow-
erful applications in quantum information science, like
device-independent quantum key distribution <12> and
random number generators <21>, but moreover one can
upper bound the lack of free will of the players !

Then, in the acknowledgements, it says:

After completion of this work M.J.W. Hall posted a related
interesting paper: arXiv:1007.5518.

That paper:

http://arxiv.org/abs/1007.5518

Local deterministic model of singlet state correlations allowing 86% free will
Authors: Michael J.W. Hall
(Submitted on 30 Jul 2010)

Abstract: The derivation of Bell inequalities requires assumptions equivalent to no-signalling, determinism, and measurement independence, where the latter is directly related to the amount of free will experimenters have in choosing measurement settings. Violation of these inequalities by quantum correlations, as has been experimentally observed, requires that one or more of these assumptions must be relaxed. Here it is shown that all spin correlations of a singlet state can be modeled via a relatively mild relaxation of measurement independence, corresponding to giving up only 14% of experimental free will. The underlying model maintains determinism and no-signalling. It may thus be favourably compared with other underlying models of the singlet state, which require maximum indeterminism or maximum signalling. A local deterministic model is also given which achieves the maximum possible violation of the well known Bell-CHSH inequality, at a cost of only 1/3 of experimental free will.

[bananas]

3. Wow - this had two recs, now it's down to zero.

The anti-science woo-woos are busy today.

[Jim__]

6. That's a bit surprising to me.

I've seen a number of people on DU state that we can't have free will - based on our current understanding of the brain. That makes a certain sense; but our own awareness tells us that we are free. I think the question is fascinating.

[bananas]

7. Yes, there's been some interesting results in physics and biology

Along the lines of the OP is John Conway's Free Will Theorem, videos of his lecture series are here: http://www.math.princeton.edu/facultypapers/Conway/

There have been some interesting experiments on fruit flies done by one of Martin Heisenberg's students (Martin is the son of Werner Heisenberg):
http://bjoern.brembs.net/
http://www.brembs.net/spontaneous/

edit to add:
Here's an article by Martin Heisenberg: http://network.nature.com/groups/naturenewsandopinion/forum/topics/4760

[Jim__]

8. Thanks for the links. It will take me a while to work my way through them. - n/t

[bananas]

28. "determinism, like solipsism, is logically possible"

The original Free Will Theorem is here: http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0604079
They did a follow-up called the Strong Free Will Theorem which addressed some objections.

A couple of snippets from the end of the original paper:

11. Philosophical Remarks related to the Free Will theorem

<snip>

It follows that we cannot prove our Free Will assumption – determinism,
like solipsism, is logically possible. Both the non-existence of free agents in
determism and the external world in solipsism are rightly conjured up by
philosophers as consistent if unbelievable universes to show the limits of what
is possible, but we discard them as serious views of our universe.

<snip>

Free versus Random? Although we find ourselves unable to give an
operational definition of either “free” or “random,” we have managed to distinguish
between them in our context, because free behavior can be twinned,
while random behavior cannot (a remark that might also interest some philosphers
of free will).

<snip>

The world it presents us with is a fascinating one, in which fundamental
particles are continually making their own decisions.

<snip>

[ZombieHorde]

53. +1, we have the sensation of free will, but logic seems to state otherwise. nt

[Jim__]

55. How does logic state otherwise? - n/t

[ZombieHorde]

56. Causation. As far as we know, every event, such as making a choice, is the direct and/or indirect

result of previous events. Those previous events are also the direct and/or indirect result of previous events. Cause and effect contradict free will.

[Jim__]

57. Is there any conscious human who does not have direct evidence that she is free to decide?

Why would logic dictate that we ignore our experience? And, if we make a decision, it is usually based on previous experience. Why doesn't that count as a cause? Does cause and effect dictate that my typing this sentence, now, was determined at the instance of the Big Bang?

Does the same logic imply that there cannot have been a first event in the universe?

[ZombieHorde]

58. I think we may misunderstand the experience. I think the sensation of free will is the failure to

understand all of the variables affecting our thoughts.

And, if we make a decision, it is usually based on previous experience. Why doesn't that count as a cause?

Previous experience does count as a cause.

Does cause and effect dictate that my typing this sentence, now, was determined at the instance of the Big Bang?

Possibly. I don't know any of this for certain, I just think about it a lot.

Does the same logic imply that there cannot have been a first event in the universe?

Possibly. I was thinking about this question when I woke up today, but I don't have an answer.

I don't know for certain if people have free will or not, and I don't know for certain if everything has a cause or not.

[Jim__]

59. Can't we test it?

Can't someone tell me to write down a time tomorrow when I will perform some task, I write it down and then perform that task at that time? Does this indicate I have freely chosen to do this at this time? I have freely chosen twice, once when I wrote it down and then when I did it? Or, were both my written sentence on the previous day and my actions at the given time this morning both determined at the time of the Big Bang?

I can't imagine why we doubt our most intimate experience of the world and yet accept other, less reliable experiences as essentially unquestionable. If you tell me to do something, I am free to either do what you say, or not to do it; even in the face of the most dire consequences for my actions.

I agree that we don't understand everything that goes into the decision making process. I think we can learn more about this process. I just can't reject my own direct experience of life, and then selectively accept other, less direct experience, as absolutely reliable. I can't understand the reasoning of anyone who finds that an acceptable approach to life.

[ZombieHorde]

60. "Or, were both my written sentence on the previous day and my actions..."

Causation dictates both actions would be caused by previous events/situations. If the Big Bang is true, then the Big Bang is obviously at least one source of all perceived causes.

I can't imagine why we doubt our most intimate experience of the world and yet accept other, less reliable experiences as essentially unquestionable.

We have two seemingly contradictory experiences. 1) The sensation of free will. 2) The observation of cause and effect.

In my mind, both of these are direct experiences. I feel like I have free will when I go to a restaurant and look at the menu, and I feel the universe is ruled by cause and effect when I burn my hand or use my keyboard. I can prove cause and effect is real, but I can not prove free will is real.

Can you think of something, other than free will, which has no cause? I can't. Everything seems to be caused by something else.

If you tell me to do something, I am free to either do what you say, or not to do it; even in the face of the most dire consequences for my actions.

Let's pretend I tell you to try a new brand of apple juice. If you try the juice, you try it for a reason. Perhaps you are unhappy with your old brand of apple juice, perhaps the new brand is on sale, perhaps I have some and you are thirsty, perhaps you are just polite and want to make me happy.

Why are you unhappy with your old brand? Why is the new brand on sale? Why are you thirsty? Why are you polite? These reasons will have reasons, perhaps all the back to the Big Bang.

If you don't try the new brand of apple juice, you don't try it for a reason. You don't like apple juice. You think I have poor taste. You can not find any apple juice of this brand.

Why don't you like apple juice? Why do you think I have poor taste? Why can't you find any apple juice of this brand?

I agree that we don't understand everything that goes into the decision making process. I think we can learn more about this process. I just can't reject my own direct experience of life, and then selectively accept other, less direct experience, as absolutely reliable. I can't understand the reasoning of anyone who finds that an acceptable approach to life.

As I stated above, I believe both the sensation free will and causation are direct experiences, but they contradict each other. Either our will is free from causation, or our will is directed by causation.

I hope I am making sense.

[Jim__]

61. Just a few thoughts ...

We have two seemingly contradictory experiences. 1) The sensation of free will. 2) The observation of cause and effect. ...

What is the experience of cause and effect? Isn't it just repeated observations that leads to the conclusion that one event caused another? If you are holding a ball 3 feet above the ground and you release it, you expect it to fall to the ground. Why? Why don't we expect it to rise up in the air? Isn't it because we've always observed that unsupported, heavy objects fall to the ground?

What is different in our experience of free will? If you ask your wife if she wants to, say, go to the movies, doesn't she pause and think about it? Is she making a decision, or, has the decision already been made and she is just looking thoughtful because that is what we always do when we are asked to decide? We go through motions that fool both us and other observers that indicate that we are making a decision, but in reality, there is really no decision to be made.

Can you think of something, other than free will, which has no cause? I can't. Everything seems to be caused by something else.

I don't think we're saying that free willl has no cause. We have brain structures that are apparently able to view different actions and come to a choice of which action to take.

Those brain structures, the brain cycles that we use in deciding, have a cost. Why would evolution favor an expensive system that only serves to delude us? If the decision is made outside of the purview of our consciousness, then we are wasting energy when we consciously expend cycles on reaching that decision. Are we just wasting energy when we try to consciously reach a decision? What advantage could this illusion give us that justifies the energy spent?

I don't see the advantage in having an illusory decision making process. I don't understand why such a system should evolve.

[ZombieHorde]

62. "Isn't it just repeated observations that leads to the conclusion that one event caused another?"

Yes.

If you ask your wife if she wants to, say, go to the movies, doesn't she pause and think about it? Is she making a decision, or, has the decision already been made and she is just looking thoughtful because that is what we always do when we are asked to decide?

If my view of cause and effect is correct (I am not certain), then my beautiful wife would not be making a decision, she would be coming to a conclusion. Only one answer would be possible, even if she changes her mind latter that evening.

We go through motions that fool both us and other observers that indicate that we are making a decision, but in reality, there is really no decision to be made.

and...

I don't see the advantage in having an illusory decision making process.

The thoughts in our heads would be one of the events which happened before the conclusion was reached. Thinking and considering are both important, but what we think and what we consider is predetermined by previous events. The process is still very important.

[Jim__]

63. What do you mean by predetermined?

For instance, in the way you used "predetermined" here:

The thoughts in our heads would be one of the events which happened before the conclusion was reached. Thinking and considering are both important, but what we think and what we consider is predetermined by previous events. The process is still very important.

Do you mean that the decision is predetermined? Or, just that the factors that go into the decision are predetermined?

If the decision is predetermined, then I don't see the value of the conscious decision making process, although I do believe that it has a significant cost associated with it. I think there must be an advantage to our consciously and freely making decisions. If not, I don't see why we would delude ourselves that we made decisions consciously and freely; and pay a high price for that delusion.

I realize we don't understand the process. But, my assumption at the beginning of any investigation would be that the conscious process is similar to the way we experience it.

[ZombieHorde]

64. I will give an example as to what I mean by "predetermined."

I foolishly fall off of a roof. While I am falling, we can easily conclude I am going to hit the ground. Hitting the ground is the natural result of being in the air without support on planet Earth. Simple cause and effect. Falling off a roof causes one to be in the air without support. Being on a roof with an untied shoelace can cause one to trip and fall. Me hitting the ground was predetermined by previous events.

If the decision is predetermined, then I don't see the value of the conscious decision making process, although I do believe that it has a significant cost associated with it.

A waiter asks me if I want soup or salad. I love both soup and salad, so I have to think about my answer, but because of cause and effect, only one answer is possible.

I think to myself, "The French Onion soup is awesome here, but I have been putting on weight since I have had kids, maybe I should just have the salad with a low-cal dressing instead of the blue cheese dressing I usually get, but then again, that soup is so good and I will only live once..."

My answer is predetermined by cause and effect, but consideration is one of the cause and effect dominoes. I can not hit the ground until I have fallen off of my roof.

[qazplm]

65. it was not "predetermined"

that being on the roof with an untied shoelace equals falling off.

By that logic, that same guy being born on a Tuesday means that his eventual death was predetermined.

That takes the meaning of the term and stretches it beyond all meaning.

It doesn't mean "can cause one to trip and fall" it has to mean "must cause one to trip and fall off the building." But we know that isn't true. There were all sorts of opportunities, chance, luck, better balance, change in wind that could have affected his falling. The only part that was predetermined is when he actually fell, he was going to hit the ground, hard.

I don't think cause and effect have anything to do with deciding to have soup or salad. The decision to have soup or salad might "cause" one to have soup or salad, but it's the decision we are focusing on, not the actual receipt of soup versus salad. You could choose soup, and the wait staff lose the order, get it wrong, and receive salad.

Does that mean that somehow that decision, since it didn't cause or effect anything, wasn't predetermined?

I'm simply not understanding where you are coming from with this argument train. If you were saying we are all slaves to our experiences and thus cannot ever think outside our own box so in reality are robotically tied to respond predictably every single time given enough information about our past, I'd disagree still, but at least I'd understand the argument.

[ZombieHorde]

67. I did not mean to suggest being on a roof with an untied shoelace

automatically means you will fall.

If all of the conditions for an event are in place, then the event will happen. If an event does not happen, then one or more conditions were missing.

Does that mean that somehow that decision, since it didn't cause or effect anything, wasn't predetermined?

If you order soup and receive salad then the event 'ordering soup and receiving salad' was caused by previous conditions.

One thing leads to another. One thought leads to another. One thing is caused by another. One thought is caused by another.

[qazplm]

68. which says nothing about free will

Free will does not require that your choice is made un-dependent upon any other past actions/thoughts/decisions.

So the fact that something might have "led" to or better stated had an influence on a decision you make does not negate free will.

It simply suggests that free will is not a simple concept.

[ZombieHorde]

69. I would like to believe that, but I have a hard time with something being free from direct causation

What do you think free will is?

[FiveGoodMen]

70. Put it this way: If there's no free will, why are you trying to persuade anyone here of anything?

Just can't help yourself?

[ZombieHorde]

72. I just can't help myself. ;) nt

[qazplm]

71. the fact that my asking a girl out

is directly caused by her attractiveness level is no less free will then my not asking that same girl out is directly caused by my dating someone else.

Free will is the choice, the final decision, not every possible thing that factored into that decision.

[ZombieHorde]

73. If you do ask a girl out, could you have not asked her out.

In order to ask a girl out, all of the proper conditions must be met, the will, the courage, an available method for communicate with her, etc. If one of the conditions needed to ask her out is missing, you will not be able to ask her out, if none of the conditions needed to ask her out are missing, you must ask her out.

Another interesting thing to consider is the reason why you consider her attractive, because you chose to find her attractive, or because of a robotic response to stimuli? Is following robotic responses to stimuli a free act? I don't really know.

[qazplm]

74. again

the mere fact that something precedes does not mean that the decision is not free will, you can have determinism AND free will, they are not mutually exclusive.

I think you keep making arguments that suggest the fact that some initial conditions exist before the decision means that free will doesn't exist.

To me that's a fundamental misunderstanding of what free will is and what it requires.

I find all sorts of women attractive, but I don't ask every attractive woman I see out, so no it is not a robotic response to stimuli, that's what we call instinct.

Ive dated all sorts of women and find many types attractive so that isn't robotic either. Might I find some types more attractive than others? Yes, and might some of that be genetics or something psychological based on my past or even pheromones? Sure, but I still made a choice to ask that person out. So even if my attraction wasn't based on free will, my decision to ask her out was.

I also can't believe you just the word will as a condition to having free will, you aren't keeping your terms straight. Some of the other stuff is a little out there, yes if I have zero ability to communicate then no I won't be able to ask her out, that doesn't mean I don't have free will, it means my free will is frustrated in certain areas by my complete inability to communicate (one assumes in this hypo I am blind and mute, and quite possibly deaf).

[ZombieHorde]

75. "you can have determinism AND free will, they are not mutually exclusive"

I would like to read more about how determinism and free will can both be real.

I find all sorts of women attractive, but I don't ask every attractive woman I see out, so no it is not a robotic response to stimuli, that's what we call instinct.

I hope you are right, but I obviously lean the other way. Seems to me the reason you don't ask every attractive woman you meet because the proper conditions are not present. Like I wrote in an earlier post, I am not 100% sure about any of this.

I also can't believe you just the word will as a condition to having free will, you aren't keeping your terms straight.

You are right, I should have used the word "desire."

yes if I have zero ability to communicate then no I won't be able to ask her out, that doesn't mean I don't have free will,

I was listing some of the conditions necessary for the event to occur.

[qazplm]

76. it's called "Compatibilism"

Guys like Thomas Hobbes believed in it, so it isn't something crazy I thought up. ;)

There is also this:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Two-stage_model_of_free_will

[ZombieHorde]

77. This is going to take some time to read and then consider,

Thank you for the links and argument.

[Jim__]

66. OK. I think the question becomes what is the role of cosnciousness in making decsions.

I think consciousness is an effective way of bringing together all the components that go into making a decision. For now, I accept that we are actually coming to a conscious decision, and can at any time before the decision is carried out arbitrarily decide to change that decision. I realize that's just my opinion. I expect that we may learn more about the nature of consciousness in the near future and that will teach us something about the decision making process.

[jgraz]

9. If you're not familiar with Bell's Theorem, you owe it to yourself to read up on it.

It's been called "the greatest discovery in the history of science". I'm not sure that's true, but it certainly does redefine our concept of reality in some very freaky ways.

[laconicsax]

10. No.

"Free will" is illusory. Your brain makes decisions as much as 10 seconds before you become consciously aware of them.

http://www.nature.com/neuro/journal/v11/n5/abs/nn.2112.html">source

[unblock]

12. i remember that article from a while back. but that doesn't mean free will doesn't exist.

delayed awareness of decision-making processes isn't proof that free will doesn't exist, it only means that the real decisions are made on a different level than we currently conceive.

on the other hand, i agree that a delayed awareness would be consistent with free will being a mere epiphenomenom of our instincts, programming, and accumulated memories and so on, much as a hollywood clone or robot might be convinced he is alive and human and real.

personally, i think free will probably doesn't exist, that it's merely our way of putting our actions into context. certainly if you look on a big enough scale, humans are manipulable and predictable just as bees and ants and amoebas are. somehow we are convinced that lesser animals lack something we have, even though there's remarkably little difference we can point to that would explain such conceit.

[laconicsax]

14. The implication is that it doesn't exist.

It doesn't mean "that the real decisions are made on a different level than we currently conceive." That's a possibility, but far from certain. It's also difficult to reconcile the idea of free decisions being made consciously with the fact that the brain activity associated with those decisions starts well before the awareness of having 'made' a decision.

The study in question had researchers accurately predicting the "free decisions" of the subjects. There's the possibility that we have "free won't" in the form of last minute veto power over these ready-made decisions, but that's a far cry from conscious decision making.

I'm inclined to agree with your last paragraph.

[qazplm]

16. I dont think that's the proper implication

I think the implication is that our "conscious" mind may have only partial free will (although I'd argue that having veto power is decision making and it isn't a far cry from conscious decision-making) but we barely understand what consciousness and sub-consciousness are so it's hard for me to say the idea that maybe our subconscious is where our decisions are made means we are just robots who have no free will.

Perhaps the subconscious is where our true will lies and our consciousness is less important then we think. Or perhaps we are truly a communal organism that tricks itself into believing it's a singular entity. I don't know, but I think free will is a concept that folks will be debating 1000 years from now.

[laconicsax]

25. You can't have unconscious free will.

It's a contradiction in terms--unconscious will is essentially instinct. If the whole idea of free will is that it can operate independently of instinct, you can't label subconscious/instinctive decisions as "free will."

[qazplm]

32. I dont think

we know nearly enough about subconsciousness to say that and I'd say that there is quite possibly a real difference between what we term "unconscious" and what "subconscious" is.

I mean there's a reason we use two different words there. I also don't think it clear that subconscious = instinct.

[laconicsax]

39. It's definitional.

Subconscious brain activity is activity our conscious mind is not aware of.

If the exercise of will is made outside of your awareness, it can't be free will anymore than a spider instinctively making a web is an example of free will.

[qazplm]

42. From wiki

"The term subconscious is used in many different contexts and has no single or precise definition. This greatly limits its significance as a definition-bearing concept, and in consequence the word tends to be avoided in academic and scientific settings."

You are attempting to assert that it has a precise definition, it doesn't.

You are furthermore attempting to say the definition means what you want it to mean, when our understanding of consciousness and subconsciousness and to a certain extent even unconsciousness is hazy at best.

Freud gives an example of this problem although I don't agree with his final thought of there only being consciousness and unconsciousness:
"If someone talks of subconsciousness, I cannot tell whether he means the term topographically – to indicate something lying in the mind beneath consciousness – or qualitatively – to indicate another consciousness, a subterranean one, as it were. He is probably not clear about any of it. The only trustworthy antithesis is between conscious and unconscious."

Again from wiki:

"Neuroscience supports the proposition of the unconscious mind.<18> For example, researchers at Columbia University Medical Center have found that fleeting images of fearful faces—images that appear and disappear so quickly that they escape conscious awareness—produce unconscious anxiety that can be detected in the brain with the latest neuroimaging machines.<19> The conscious mind is hundreds of milliseconds behind the unconscious processes.

To understand this type of research, a distinction has to be made between unconscious processes and the unconscious mind: they are not the same. Neuroscience is more likely to examine the former than the latter. The unconscious mind and its expected psychoanalytic contents<20><21><22><23><24><25> are also different from unconsciousness, coma and a minimally conscious state. The differences in the uses of the term can be explained, to a degree, by different narratives about what we know. One such narrative is psychoanalytic theory."

So no, it isn't definitional.

[laconicsax]

47. Do you even know what the matter at hand is?

I don't think you do.

(Hint: It's not about what subconscious is, it's about what free will isn't. Try again.)

[qazplm]

51. you are one of those guys

who enjoys being an ass, and thinks he has all of the answers, so tell you what, I'll leave you with your certainty that you've determined what folks have spent all of recorded history trying to figure out. Kudos.

[qazplm]

15. on a large level humans are predictable

but on an individual level, not as much.

[qazplm]

17. certainly the answer could very well be

partial free will, because we are a collection of our experiences and biology, but I don't think that means no free will, it just means it isn't absolute or complete but is limited by a certain range-fan.

[Jim__]

18. There is only a brief abstract of your source available without a login.

The abstract does not support your claim that "free will" is illusory.

[laconicsax]

24. The paper certainly does.

Here's a summary of the paper: http://www.mpg.de/english/illustrationsDocumentation/documentation/pressReleases/2008/pressRelease20080414/index.html

Here's the paper itself in PDF: http://www.socialbehavior.uzh.ch/teaching/semsocialneurosciencespring09/Haynes_NatNeurosci_2008_ext.pdf

Basically subjects were asked to push a button with either hand at a time of their choosing. Brain scans revealed predictive brain activity up to 7-10 seconds before subjects consciously chose which button to press. It's pretty tough to have "free will" if your free decisions can be accurately predicted well before you consciously make the decision.

This doesn't mean things are purely deterministic, but it does strongly imply that free will is illusory.

[Jim__]

27. Thanks for the links - an interesting paper.

But, for openers, the summary contradicts your claim: "Free will" is illusory.

This unprecedented prediction of a free decision was made possible by sophisticated computer programs that were trained to recognize typical brain activity patterns preceding each of the two choices. Micropatterns of activity in the frontopolar cortex were predictive of the choices even before participants knew which option they were going to choose. The decision could not be predicted perfectly, but prediction was clearly above chance. This suggests that the decision is unconsciously prepared ahead of time but the final decision might still be reversible.

...

In contrast, Haynes and colleagues now show that brain activity predicts even up to 7 seconds ahead of time how a person is going to decide. But they also warn that the study does not finally rule out free will: "Our study shows that decisions are unconsciously prepared much longer ahead than previously thought. But we do not know yet where the final decision is made. We need to investigate whether a decision prepared by these brain areas can still be reversed."

This test did not determine that free will is illusory.

Then, for the details of the study. Let's just look at one paragraph:

Here we directly investigated which regions of the brain predetermine
conscious intentions and the time at which they start shaping a
motor decision. Subjects who gave informed written consent carried
out a freely paced motor-decision task while their brain activity was
measured using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI; see
Fig. 1 and Supplementary Methods online). The subjects were asked
to relax while fixating on the center of the screen where a stream of
letters was presented. At some point, when they felt the urge to do so,
they were to freely decide between one of two buttons, operated by the
left and right index fingers, and press it immediately. In parallel, they
should remember the letter presented when their motor decision was
consciously made. After subjects pressed their freely chosen response
button, a ‘response mapping’ screen with four choices appeared. The
subjects indicated when they had made their motor decision by
selecting the corresponding letter with a second button press. After a
delay, the letter stream started again and a new trial began. The freely
paced button presses occurred, on average, 21.6 s after trial onset, thus
leaving sufficient time to estimate any potential buildup of a ‘cortical
decision’ without contamination by previous trials. Both the left and
right response buttons were pressed equally often and most
of the intentions (88.6%) were reported to be consciously formed in 1,000ms
before the movement (Supplementary Methods and Supplementary
Figs. 1–3 online).

They're talking specifically about motor decisions. So, we're not talking about free will in general, we're talking about free will with respect to motor decisions. We're also talking about a very specific type of motor decision, namely a decision involving a repeated motion of either the right or left index finger based on nothing but an self-generated "urge," an urge that is self-generated based on the test they are undergoing (they're not just deciding to move their finger, they are in a test where they are to repeatedly move their finger). Suppose we have free will. What would such a movement decision be based on? Might it be based on feedback from the fingers? In other words, might some of the activity that they are seeing in the brain be the input of the only basis the brain has for making this decision?

Then, left and right response buttons were pressed equally often. Really? I'm left handed. Left to my own freely made decisions about pressing a button, all else being equal, I would tend heavily toward pressing with my left finger. I find it surprising that participants didn't favor a dominant hand. Does the fact that using the fingers equally show some predisposition that was a built-in part of the test?

And finally: most of the intentions (88.6%) were reported to be consciously formed in 1,000ms
before the movement. 1 full second from the conscious decision to the movement. In that 1 second, could the participants have changed their mind? Could they fool the test? Could they wait until the last half-second then switch the finger they pressed with? What would the previous preparations show? Could they deliberately befuddle the brain prep? 1 full second between the conscious decision and the actual motion is a lot of time.

I think the test is interesting. For me, it raises more questions than answers - for me, always a sign of a good test. But, establishing that "Free will" is illusory? Hardly.

When I set my alarm clock tonight, what time will I set it for? Should I go to the bank tomorrow morning and move some money from checking to savings? What will I have for dinner tonight? Am I free to make these decisions? I believe I am. Nothing in this test makes me doubt that at all.

[laconicsax]

30. I think you need to define what you mean by "free will."

Your line at the end implies that you believe in some kind of all-or-nothing dichotomy between free will and determinism.

Free will doesn't include subconscious decision making any more than it includes instinct. If it did, you could say that any animal acting on instinct is exercising free will. Similarly, determinism doesn't necessarily mean that your entire life is scripted.

This study clearly shows that decisions are made subconsciously a long time (relatively) before the conscious mind becomes aware of it. When you set your alarm clock, your subconscious will have already decided what time you'll be waking up. When you decide on going to the bank, your subconscious likely knew the answer before your conscious mind did. When you eat dinner, your subconscious probably decided when it was time to eat and what the meal would be before you "made" that decision.

The process of your conscious mind becoming aware of these choices and decisions creates the illusion that you have free will. How many times have you ever done something or made a choice and immediately remarked, "I didn't want to do that" aloud or to yourself? Have you ever felt that you acted without thinking? This study explains a likely mechanism behind that. The quote from about 20 or so years ago when this phenomenon was first discovered is that we don't have free will, we have free won't.

The extent of free will is likely little more than our conscious mind overriding our subconscious literally in the last second. The fact that most of our behavior isn't carefully deliberated before we take an action would also seem to indicate that we don't exercise this veto terribly often.

Also, in those 88.6% of cases having 1000ms between conscious decision and action are immaterial to a discussion of what happened before the conscious decision. If the question is whether decisions are unconsciously made before a conscious decision, what happens after the conscious decision isn't going to be part of the answer any more than "I burnt the roast" answers the question "what makes the oven heat up?"

[qazplm]

34. you are effectively arguing

that setting your alarm clock is instinctual, because you are repeatedly arguing that subconscious = instinctual.

That's a pretty unlikely argument IMO. There is nothing instinctual about changing when you wake up based on an appointment you have the next day. There is nothing instinctual about deciding to DVR a television program. To declare that to be so is IMO to impart a whole new definition of instinctual from what we currently have.

I think the fundamental flaw in your argument is the assignment of any occurrences that happen subconsciously as instinctual. Very few times have I said "I didn't want to do that" and a few more times I have said I didn't mean to do that and a few more times than that I said I did that without thinking, but almost all of those things involved things you do so much, so often that it became muscle memory, or at times when my consciousness was deep in thought or focused on something else.

That suggests to me that you do have free will and you do have a consciousness, but you can also abdicate that free will to the extent that you occasionally go on autopilot.

Long story short, I think there is a range of mental states from instinct to subconscious to conscious that have fuzzy lines between them but each exists and nothing there says free will is an illusion, at best it says, free will is complicated.

[laconicsax]

36. That's not at all what I'm saying.

Subconscious behavior is equivalent to instinctive behavior as far as free will goes. This doesn't mean they are identical--only that neither is an example of free will. Falling off a cliff is also equivalent to subconscious and instinctive behavior as far as free will goes. Does this mean that falling off a cliff is instinctive behavior? No. Of course not. It means that falling off a cliff is just another example of something that is not free will.

(Remember: falling=/=jumping)

[qazplm]

43. that's a pretty bad example

you generally don't fall off a cliff because of your subconscious or instinct, but because of an outside force or loss of balance.

You were pretty quick to tie instinct to subconscious but now you assert they are something different. OK, that's a change but let's deal with that.

If it isn't instinctual, and it isn't consciousness, then it is something between the two, and that absolutely does not provide proof that free will is illusory.
You are looking at this as if the brain is binary, why couldn't it be tertiary or more?

One answer might be consciousness, subconsciousness, instinct...you might even insert muscle memory or habit in between the last two.
I don't know, but again, the fact that there is a start to the process (making a decision), some time passes, and then the process ends (with conscious awareness and action) does not mean there is no free will (which is another word that is fuzzy).

[laconicsax]

48. Ok, you're clearly trying to miss the point.

Either that or you're unwilling to see past your prejudices. If there's a third possibility for why each of your responses is based on me having argued something I never said.

I see no reason to continue this discussion. Good evening.

[Jim__]

41. You need to go back and re-read your links.

From your first link, the people who conducted the survey warn:the study does not finally rule out free will:

In contrast, Haynes and colleagues now show that brain activity predicts even up to 7 seconds ahead of time how a person is going to decide. But they also warn that the study does not finally rule out free will: "Our study shows that decisions are unconsciously prepared much longer ahead than previously thought. But we do not know yet where the final decision is made. We need to investigate whether a decision prepared by these brain areas can still be reversed."

This study clearly shows that decisions are made subconsciously a long time (relatively) before the conscious mind becomes aware of it. When you set your alarm clock, your subconscious will have already decided what time you'll be waking up.

How does the study show that? The study is based on people feeling an "urge" to push a button. But, participating in the experiment means that the people will generate such an "urge". What does this urge entail? Does it entail which finger is to push the button? What part of the experiment, which measurement, tells us about the urge itself? What insures that what they are measuring when they are predicting which finger will be chosen, that this measurement is not based on the "urge" rather than the subsequent decision process?

And, what relates this decision, this decision that is based solely on an "urge", and urge that the participants are obligated to feel, to a decision that deals with the particulars of life? The decision based on the urge is being made without any purpose and the decision itself has no consequences for the participant. What relates that to my decision about what time to get up in the morning? To proclaim that measuring the components of one decision tells us precisely how totally different types of decisions are made is to make a completely unjustified leap.




The process of your conscious mind becoming aware of these choices and decisions creates the illusion that you have free will.

Please cite the part of the paper that justifies that statement.


Also, in those 88.6% of cases having 1000ms between conscious decision and action are immaterial to a discussion of what happened before the conscious decision

The 1000ms are not immaterial to the discussion of how the ultimate decision is made. The 1000 ms precede the carrying out of the decision. Please cite the part of the paper that justiifes claiming that these 1000ms have no part in the decision making process.

[qazplm]

33. Here's my problem with this

stuff has to start somewhere, there is always going to be a delay between a decision being made and making a decision, nothing in the universe happens instantaneously, so I guess I'm less troubled by the concept that if you can be fast enough you can intercept the process as the decision is getting made being an indictment against free will.

[laconicsax]

37. Would you like to reword that so that it makes more sense?

What's supposedly happening instantaneously or without an actual starting point?

Quantum entanglement does seem to cause instantaneous action, but that's more the realm of the OP, not my comment that you're responding to.

[qazplm]

46. Well how about it I re-word it so you can understand it

Your argument is that "It's pretty tough to have "free will" if your free decisions can be accurately predicted well before you consciously make the decision."

All that happens in the experiment truly is that they can read your decision before your consciousness does, they can intercept the process and read it quicker than it can get to your consciousness.
One would assume that if the process were faster and fast enough, they couldn't (which would I assume mean what, a determination that we do have free will?).

So your argument boils down to we don't have free will because the decision-making process takes some period of time before it reaches the conscious level, and my response is that there is always going to be some period of time between the beginning of a process and the end of one. As well as my response that just because something happens below the level of conscious thought, it likewise does not automatically bar free will or imply that it's somehow instinct or random or "not us."

I also find the idea that we have veto power indicative of free will, at the end of the day, "we" still make the decision, even if the other minions of our mind do the work, "we" the boss make the final call. That's free will.

[laconicsax]

49. Close.

We don't likely have free will because the decision is made before it reaches our conscious mind. We're not making decisions--they're made for us and the most we can hope to do is change course at the last second if we're paying attention.

I'm impressed--this is the first time you've actually addressed what I said and not what you wanted me to have said.

[qazplm]

52. I'm pretty sure

that's asinine garbage, but what I'm even more sure of is that you are the poster child for someone who uses jackassery as a substitute for actual discussion because they really need folks to see how smart they are.

[unblock]

11. i think there's a fallacy of aggregation at play here.

things that work one way on a quantum scale don't necessarily play out that way at all on a larger scale, at least not in any practical sense.

the classic example is the one particle can barrier tunnel and appear on the other side of a barrier. but an entire cat cannot. well, strictly speaking, it can, but the probability of every single particle in that cat tunneling across that barrier and emerging on the other side in exactly the same arrangement as before is so incredibly miniscule as to be ignored in any reasonable sense.

the same sort of phenomenon may be at work here. the odds of all your brain atoms behaving the way they would need to to make the "other" decision may be so infinitessimally small as to be ignored. your conclusion might as well be pre-ordained. in practice, there's no difference.


that's not to say free will doesn't exist, i'm just saying that i find it hard to believe that anything about quantum mechanics can PROVE that it exists. at best it can provide a mechanism for it to exist in the sense that it's rather difficult to reconcile free will with a completely deterministic universe.

[Jim__]

19. Can you be specific about where you see the fallacy?

The test is to relax the constraint that the classical variables involved have to be uncorrelated and see what level of correlation is possible and still have the experiment infer non-locality. The variables are more fully described in the paper, but a brief description is:

What assumptions are necessary to derive a Bell in-
equality, and to conclude that violation is indicative of
nonlocality? Apart from the central assumption of Bell
locality, they are remarkably few. Essentially they are
that
1. The inputs x; y and outcomes a; b are classical vari-
ables, meaning that Alice and Bob can copy, store,
memorize and broadcast them as they could with
any other classical variables.
2. The inputs x; y are freely, independently and ran-
domly chosen by Alice and Bob.

I'm not seeing any aggregation of quantum effects. This is stating that the result of the test is that the classical variables, x and y (the inputs chosen), cannot be correlated at all.

[dimbear]

13. This must comfort Einstein's ghost

"They assume that entanglement does occur as quantum mechanics proscribes"

I guess quantum mechanics is out, then, what with its proscriptions being ignored.

[Silent3]

20. Is making random decisions, taking random action, "free will"?

I see nothing in the concept of "free will", as described by this article, that would be distinguishable from an experimenter's mind having its own random number generator as part of the process that guides the experimenter's actions and decision making.

Does having a part of your brain that essential throws dice to guide your actions strike you as "free will"?

[Jim__]

21. Are decisions made through a random process "determined"?

"free will" in this experiment is essentially defined as:

We prove that if an experimenter Alice misses one single
bit of free will - that is if the mutual information be-
tween her choice and the local variables is one bit - then
correlations between two qubits in a singlet state can be
reproduced by local variables, and no demonstration of
nonlocality is possible.

So, yes, if Alice's decisions are internally completely random, and not at all correlated with any local variable, then her decisions are "free" according to this paper.

However, given that Alice is a person and that her decision making processes have been selected via evolution, is it reasonable to assume that these decision-making processes are completely random?

[Silent3]

22. The reason "free will" is such a nebulous concept...

...is that most people wouldn't consider utterly random action the same thing as free will. Randomness may be "free", as in "uncorrelated", but it isn't "will". If "will" and "willful" mean anything, it seems to me that for a decision or action to be willful, it has be based on something one might call "personal character", "values", or "innate nature". Dig deeper into those concepts, however, and I think you end up with complete determinism (Where would an "innate nature" come from, and if it is "innate", doesn't that preclude free choice?), determinism with random variation, or circular definitions of "free will" that are hard to pin down. These are concepts of free will groping toward something which is neither deterministic nor random, which is also not merely a mix of determinism and randomness -- a form of causality arising from a kind of personal willfulness which is something else.

The laws of physics as known, no matter what philosophical dance one tries to perform, can't address that nebulous something else. Any attempt to use the physics of quantum entanglement to try to prove "free will" necessitates a more mundane definition of free will. I'd think for those who want to believe in free will, especially if they wish to attach any spiritual or religious significance to it, a physics-compatible definition will be an unsatisfactory definition.

However, given that Alice is a person and that her decision making processes have been selected via evolution, is it reasonable to assume that these decision-making processes are completely random?

Who said anything about actual final human decisions and actions being completely random? All I brought up -- without taking a pro or con position -- is the notion of random elements in decision making processes. That much would seem to be enough to satisfy the concept of "free will" invoked in the OP.

Imagine you're interviewing people for a job. Candidates must have certain qualifications, therefore the first cut at sifting through résumés will be deterministic -- people either do or do not have the qualifications. Let's suppose after that first cut the remaining job candidates are given a test, and their scores determine who gets the job. Two people come out with exactly the same high score. You flip a coin to settle that impasse.

Would you consider the ultimate hiring choice in such a situation an act of "free will" merely because the result was not entirely deterministic?

[Jim__]

23. "Random elements" in the decision process are not sufficient for the process to infer non-locality.

If the decisions in these tests are not completely random, then your previous post doesn't raise any issues that are significant. Remember the statement from the paper: ...if an experimenter Alice misses one single bit of free will - that is if the mutual information between her choice and the local variables is one bit - then correlations between two qubits in a singlet state can be reproduced by local variables.

So, if the entire decision process is not random, we still have to account that the non-random parts of the decision process are not correlated with any local variables.

Who said anything about actual final human decisions and actions being completely random? All I brought up -- without taking a pro or con position -- is the notion of random elements in decision making processes.

We're talking about Alice's decision process in choosing x. Talking about some elements being random doesn't buy us anything.

The laws of physics as known, no matter what philosophical dance one tries to perform, can't address that nebulous something else.

Neither you nor anyone else knows that. How the laws of physics relate to consciousness, specifically phenomenol experience, is unknown. UNKNOWN. It's nice that you assume everything actually works the way you believe it does; but that belief is baseless.

Any attempt to use the physics of quantum entanglement to try to prove "free will" necessitates a more mundane definition of free will. I'd think for those who want to believe in free will, especially if they wish to attach any spiritual or religious significance to it, a physics-compatible definition will be an unsatisfactory definition.

The charitable thing to do is assume that you haven't actually read the paper. The paper does not say that quantum entanglement proves free will. The paper states that (i)f nonlocality is to be inferred from a violation of Bell's inequality, an important assumption is that the measurement settings are freely chosen by the observers, or alternatively, that they are random and uncorrelated with the hypothetical local variables. The assumption of "free will" is embedded along with these assumptions, and, to the best of my knowledge, these experiments have been widely accepted as inferring nonlocality. What this paper does is state that the requirement of free will cannot be relaxed if the inference is to be held.

The rest of your answer is beside the point.

[Silent3]

26. Let me re-emphasize two words...

The laws of physics AS KNOWN, no matter what philosophical dance one tries to perform, can't address that nebulous something else.

Neither you nor anyone else knows that. How the laws of physics relate to consciousness, specifically phenomenol experience, is unknown. UNKNOWN. It's nice that you assume everything actually works the way you believe it does; but that belief is baseless.

Maybe potentially the actual laws of physics, as opposed to the current understanding of them, can be expressed in terms related to consciousness or free will. As our knowledge stands now, however, no such connections are definitively known. The vaguely defined concepts of "consciousness" and "free will" are not written into our current equations.

You can't build a convincing QM argument on top of what you hope as-yet unknown details of the laws of physics will reveal.

The charitable thing to do is assume that you haven't actually read the paper. The paper does not say that quantum entanglement proves free will.

Actually, I'd only read the first lead-in article and the abstract. I didn't realize the full article was available without paying for it.

Having now read it (or at least skimmed through it -- I have to admit to not totally understanding the math) it still comes across to me that the concept of "free will" used in the article, especially when it talks about "single bits" of free will, is nothing more than mathematical independence of the value of one variable upon the value of another, a lack of any deterministic connecting influence between Alice and Bob or between each of them and their respective measured particles.

If I'm reading this right, if Alice and Bob each consulted random number generators or threw dice to determine which measurements they made, they'd get results that satisfied Bell's inequality, showing no hidden variables. I'd guess that if you ran this experiment for real, because humans aren't really all that good at generating truly random numbers, you'd get experimental result that did reveal hidden variables -- but that those hidden variables wouldn't be mysterious, they'd likely be behavioral and cultural similarities shared by Alice and Bob.

[qazplm]

35. doesnt the poor aptitude at generating random numbers

which is absolutely true, also say something?

I mean if we don't have free will and if all of our actions are ultimately based on random quantum effects then shouldn't we be great at generating random numbers?

[Silent3]

38. That doesn't follow at all

First of all, talking about our actions being "ultimately based on random quantum effects" ignores that, regardless of the quantum nature of reality, much of our nature is still well described by classical physics. (Of course, even a purely classical world can be chaotic, putting calculational limits on prediction, making determinism more theoretical than practical, and producing results that might as well be called "random" too -- but that's another matter.)

Secondly, why would we be great at generating purely random numbers if generating purely random numbers doesn't convey any particular survival advantage? Regardless of how much quantum effects, or classical random thermal noise for that matter, contribute to our mental activity, unless our neurons are wired up to tap into any such randomness in ways that override other mental processes that are contingent upon memories, affinity to patterns, influence from current sensory input, etc., then there's no clear way for good random number generation to arise.

[qazplm]

44. I think you misunderstand me

I am agreeing with you and pointing out that if the other poster were correct, and our thoughts were based not on free will but simply on random effects (whether quantum or not), then you'd think that we'd do well in generating random numbers because after all the basis for the genesis of our thoughts isn't free will. In short, I was being facetious.

My point was that we aren't random nor are we simply based on instinct, but a complex combination of free will combined with instinct, combined with conditioning.

[Silent3]

50. Sorry I didn't catch your meaning there. n/t

[ZombieHorde]

54. I don't think humans are capable of making random decisions or taking random actions.

As far as I can tell, every decision and action has one or more direct and/or indirect causes.

[txlibdem]

29. I don't believe in Schroedinger

I find it difficult to believe that a human's intent or belief could affect the successful outcome of an entanglement experiment. That gives humans a mystical power to govern the laws of the universe. Not buying it. Our understanding of the true laws and rules that govern things at a quantum level can be flawed but there is nothing mystical or magical about the act of a human measuring this or that or the other thing, in my view.

[caraher]

31. Schroedinger doesn't say that

nor does any serious interpretation of quantum mechanics.

And even if consciousness does somehow play a role in the outcomes of experiments (I'm skeptical), that doesn't imply any ability to "govern the laws of the universe" (though plenty of people have this misapprehension, like the nutjob in awful film "What the Bleep..." who claims he shapes his quantum wavefunction every morning). I *may* get to decide what to measure in, say, a "delayed choice" experiment, but the outcome is random according to quantum theory. I can't really control what happens "instantly" halfway across the universe even if my outcome of a measurement I make determines what the outcome of a measurement there would be.

In short - I think I agree with you, but wouldn't express it as not believing in Schroedinger. What you don't believe isn't quantum mechanics, or any of the physicists who develop it, but a whole array of off-base interpretations seized upon by those who want to say physics supports various forms of magical thinking.

[txlibdem]

40. Pretty much

That's about as good as I could explain my opinion. It is our flawed understanding of the actual workings of the universe (or the multi-verse for that matter) that cause all of the "unexplained" phenomenon in quantum mechanics. Once we have a full(er) understanding of the laws I believe that magic will give way to science.

[caraher]

45. OK, I think there's a point where we may differ

I would be happy if we found a theory to supplant quantum mechanics as presently understood. But we have pretty solid experimental evidence for most of the things that are "strange." Our understanding is certainly incomplete, but I sense that you are looking for something like a "hidden variables" explanation, which I personally wouldn't bet on.

My take is more that there's a world of difference between our intuitions failing and magic, than that someday we'll figure out we've been barking up the wrong tree.

Either way, I'm sure we do agree that science does nothing to back the views of some woman claiming to be channeling a cro-magnon warrior called "Ramtha" :)