If you disagree with that section, can you be specific as to what you disagree with, or how this differs from the normal concept of free will?
Section 11 of the paper:
11. WHY STILL USE THE TERM FREE WILL TODAY?
By providing empirical data from invertebrate model systems
supporting a materialistic model of free will, I hope
to at least start a thought process that abandoning the
metaphysical concept of free will does not automatically
entail that we are slaves of our genes and our environment,
forced to always choose the same option when
faced with the same situation. In fact, I am confident I
have argued successfully that we would not exist if our
brains were not able to make a different choice even in
the face of identical circumstances and history. In this
article, I suggest re-defining the familiar free will in scientific
terms rather than giving it up, only because of the
historical baggage all its connotations carry with them.
One may argue that ‘volition’ would be a more suitable
term, less fraught with baggage. However, the current
connotations of volition as ‘willpower’ or the forceful,
conscious decision to behave against certain motivations
render it less useful and less general a term than free
will. Finally, there may be a societal value in retaining
free will as a valid concept, since encouraging a belief in
determinism increases cheating <103>. I agree with the
criticism that retention of the term may not be ideal,
but in the absence of more suitable terms, free will;
remains the best option.
I no longer agree that ‘ ‘‘free will’’ is (like ‘‘life’’ and
‘‘love’’) one of those culturally useful notions that
become meaningless when we try to make them ‘‘scientific’’
’ <96>. The scientific understanding of common
concepts enrich our lives, they do not impoverish them,
as some have argued <100>. This is why scientists have
and will continue to try and understand these concepts
scientifically or at least see where and how far such
attempts will lead them. It is not uncommon in science
to use common terms and later realize that the familiar,
intuitive understanding of these terms may not be all
that accurate. Initially, we thought atoms were indivisible.
Today we do not know how far we can divide matter.
Initially, we thought species were groups of organisms
that could be distinguished from each other by anatomical
traits. Today, biologists use a wide variety of species definitions.
Initially, we thought free will was a metaphysical
entity. Today, I am joining a growing list of colleagues
who are suggesting it is a quantitative, biological trait, a
natural product of physical laws and biological evolution,
a function of brains, maybe their most important one.