OpEd: Operationalizing Tactical Successes in Iraq

[unhappycamper]

Operationalizing Tactical Successes in Iraq
William Lind | December 14, 2007

(Note: This On War column is a product of the Fourth Generation War seminar, whose earlier products include the FMFM 1-A, Fourth Generation War. The seminar, which I lead, is currently composed of U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Army officers, mostly captains. W.S. Lind)

Recent tactical successes in Iraq, especially the reduction in violence in Anbar province and in Baghdad, have led some people to assume that we are now "winning the war." However, for any tactical successes to add up to a win, they must be operationalized. That is, through operational art, they must be positively related to strategic success. While reducing the level of violence is no doubt necessary for strategic success in Iraq, it does not automatically lead to that goal.

If our enemies in Iraq (and elsewhere) are non-state, Fourth Generation forces, then strategic success is best defined as their opposite, i.e., seeing the re-emergence of a state in Iraq. While Iraq currently has a government, it remains largely stateless. Restoring a real state in Iraq requires not just a government but a government that is generally accepted as legitimate. No government created or installed by a foreign, occupying power is likely to achieve legitimacy.

This poses a serious operational obstacle for U.S. forces in Iraq, one that is common in Fourth Generation conflicts. While we can only win if a real state re-emerges, we cannot create such a state, nor be seen as doing so. When it comes to legitimacy, we have a "reverse Midas touch." The operational question, therefore, is: how do we indirectly encourage and facilitate the re-emergence of a state in Iraq?

The basic answer, in the view of the seminar, is to facilitate a bottom-up re-creation of an Iraqi state by building connectivity among local areas that have achieved a reasonable level of security. There is no guarantee expanding connectivity will eventually lead to a state, but it seems to offer the best chance of attaining that decisive strategic goal.


Rest of article at: http://www.military.com/opinion/0,15202,158253,00.html?wh=news



uhc comment: 'When it comes to legitimacy, we have a "reverse Midas touch."' Indeed.