GD post: Vote-stealing demonstration... "erases all evidence"

[blm]

Posted by helderheld in GD

Princeton Research Group Demonstrates Vote-Stealing and Virus Attacks on DESI's AccuVote-TS


Ari Feldman, Alex Halderman and Ed Felten of Princeton's Center for IT Policy have released a paper and video that demonstrates a series of serious attacks against the DESI AccuVote-TS (used statewide in Maryland and Georgia). They were able to, with one-minute of physical access to this machine, inject "vote stealing" code that would completely erase all evidence of its presence after an election. They were also able to "infect" memory cards such that the malicious program could be distributed to a wide population of machines (given enough time).


Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/voting /
Executive Summary:

The Diebold AccuVote-TS and its newer relative the AccuVote-TSx are together the most widely deployed electronic voting platform in the United States <8>. In the November 2006 general election,
The Diebold AccuVote-TS voting machine in our lab these machines are scheduled to be used
in 357 counties representing nearly 10%
of registered voters.

This paper reports on our study of an AccuVote-TS, which we obtained from a private party. We analyzed the machine's hardware and software, performed experiments on it, and considered whether real election practices would leave it suitably secure. We found that the machine is vulnerable to a number of extremely serious attacks that undermine the accuracy and credibility of the vote counts it produces.

Computer scientists have generally been skeptical of voting systems of this type, Direct Recording Electronic (DRE), which are essentially general-purpose computers running specialized election software. Experience with computer systems of all kinds shows that it is exceedingly difficult to ensure the reliability and security of complex software or to detect and diagnose problems when they do occur. Yet DREs rely fundamentally on the correct and secure operation of complex software programs. Simply put, many computer scientists doubt that paperless DREs can be made reliable and secure, and they expect that any failures of such systems would likely go undetected.

Previous security studies of DREs affirm this skepticism, but to our knowledge ours is the first public study encompassing the hardware and software of a widely used DRE. The famous paper by Kohno, Stubblefield, Rubin, and Wallach studied a leaked version of the source code for parts of the Diebold AccuVote-TS software and found many design errors and vulnerabilities, which are generally confirmed by our study. Our study extends theirs by including the machine's hardware and operational details, by finding and describing several new and serious vulnerabilities, and by building working demonstrations of several security attacks.

Main Findings The main findings of our study are:

1. Malicious software running on a single voting machine can steal votes with little if any risk of detection. The malicious software can modify all of the records, audit logs, and counters kept by the voting machine, so that even careful forensic examination of these records will find nothing amiss. We have constructed demonstration software that carries out this vote-stealing attack.

2. Anyone who has physical access to a voting machine, or to a memory card that will later be inserted into a machine, can install said malicious software using a simple method that takes as little as one minute. In practice, poll workers and others often have unsupervised access to the machines.

3. AccuVote-TS machines are susceptible to voting-machine viruses — computer viruses that can spread malicious software automatically and invisibly from machine to machine during normal pre- and post-election activity. We have constructed a demonstration virus that spreads in this way, installing our demonstration vote-stealing program on every machine it infects.

4. While some of these problems can be eliminated by improving Diebold's software, others cannot be remedied without replacing the machines' hardware. Changes to election procedures would also be required to ensure security.


The details of our analysis appear in the full version of this paper .

http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/voting/ts-paper.pdf
Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/voting/

[TayTay]

1. Gotcha red-handed

This is exactly the kind of stuff we need. It can be visually demonstrated and can show voters and elected officials how the system can be defrauded.

I would forward this to everyone. This is exactly what we need.

[blm]

2. This is the press conference I want to see Kerry leading. It's a matter of

securing the NEXT ELECTIONS. All he has to do is order the demonstration for the SENATE and force them to pay attention by holding a big stinking press conference FIRST so the public can get involved and apply the pressure.

[TayTay]

3. Here is part of your 'smoking gun'

De-geek it a bit, tighten it up and you got something to present to the voters and to Congress.

Watch me now: http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/voting/videos.html

This is what we need.

[blm]

4. Thankyou and Hallelujah.

This is what I have had in my head all these months - Kerry and Jonathan Winer leading a press conference with these guys presenting the demonstration.

[TayTay]

5. No, Kerry and Dodd and other Dem members of Rules Comm

doing this. We have to have a solution, not just a problem. There are bills in Congress that stress a voter-verifiable ballot as part of the solution. We need more than just John Kerry at any press conference. We need the Democratic Party standing up for the right of Americans to vote and have that vote count.

Kerry is on your side already. We need to get the ones who aren't. This video and the supporting documentation needs to make the rounds of Capital Hill. It needs to have people in the offices saying, "OMG, did you see this? Is this true? Can they really hack the election this easily?" That is powerful, that is a force that hits people where they live.

John Kerry alone, as much as I like him, can't change this. We have to net-bomb all the Dems with this. It has to be a Democratic position or nothing will happen.

[blm]

6. I know, but he needs to be seen leading on it - LOOK Tay - it's HITTING

MSNBC
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14825465 /

Princeton prof hacks e-vote machine
Students uploaded viruses able to spread to other machines

Updated: 18 minutes ago

TRENTON, N.J. - A Princeton University computer science professor added new fuel Wednesday to claims that electronic voting machines used across much of the country are vulnerable to hacking that could alter vote totals or disable machines.

In a paper posted on the university's Web site, Edward Felten and two graduate students described how they had tested a Diebold AccuVote-TS machine they obtained, found ways to quickly upload malicious programs and even developed a computer virus able to spread such programs between machines.

<<snip>>

"I'm concerned by the fact we weren't contacted to educate these people on where our current technology stands," Mark Radke said.

Radke also question why Felten hadn't submitted his paper for peer review, as is commonly done before publishing scientific research.

Felten said he and his colleagues felt it necessary to publish the paper as quickly as possible because of the possible implications for the November midterm elections.

[TayTay]

7. Because it's a tangible argument.

People don't get the abstract statistical stuff. But this is a clear demonstation of how it can be done. It's not rocket science here... LOL - sort of.

We need to make sure every aide on CapHill sees this. Then maybe they can make sure their bosses see this. It is very powerful stuff.