|
Edited on Wed Sep-20-06 05:23 PM by ProSense
Six Questions for Dr. Emile A. Nakhleh on the CIA and the Iraq WarRecently retired head of key CIA unit calls for Iraq “exit strategy”; says there was “no evidence” of Saddam–bin Laden linksPosted on Wednesday, September 20, 2006. Dr. Emile A. Nakhleh served in the CIA for 15 years and retired on June 30, 2006, as the Director of the Political Islam Strategic Analysis Program, the intelligence community's premier group dedicated to the issue of political Islam. His research has focused on political Islam, political and educational reform, regime stability, and governance in the greater Middle East. Nakhleh was awarded several senior intelligence commendation medals, including the Director's Medal and the Distinguished Career Intelligence Medal. He is also a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. While at the CIA, Nakhleh briefed the “highest policymakers”—he is not allowed to identify them by name—on issues related to the war on terrorism. In 2002, he traveled to the Guantanamo Bay prison and interviewed numerous detainees over the course of an 11-day stay. Before joining the CIA he worked as a university professor for a quarter-century, and in that capacity traveled widely in the Arab world, including Iraq. I recently interviewed Nakhleh and asked him about Iraq and the Bush Administration's “war on terrorism.” This is the first interview he has granted since leaving the CIA. By Ken Silverstein.1. In the run-up to the invasion of Iraq, administration officials claimed that Saddam Hussein's regime had links to terrorist organizations including Al Qaeda. What was your view on that question?We had no evidence that there was a Saddam–bin Laden axis. Saddam was a butcher, but he was a secular butcher, and we knew that. Saddam only started employing religion when he felt defeated. He decided it would be useful to develop an Islamic cause after he was evicted from Kuwait in 1991. He even started going to the mosque to pray. Everyone in the Middle East knew it was a joke; he had no religious credentials. Iraq was a secular state; women had more rights than in most places in the region, and Shiites were the backbone of the Baathist and even the Communist Party. It was almost a year after the 2003 invasion before Al Qaeda decided to make Iraq a jihadist cause because they viewed Iraq as a secular state. People at the CIA didn't believe there were links between Iraq and Al Qaeda. The source for much of the information of that sort was Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress, and their positions jibed with the positions of those in the administration who wanted to wage war in Iraq—Wolfowitz, Feith, people in the vice president's office. So they relied heavily on that reporting, but there was never any evidence to support that link.
2. What accounts for the failure of American policy in Iraq?
...Those people did not understand that just because the Iraqis hated Saddam, that didn't mean they would like our occupation.
Iraq was more complex than just Saddam. We should have learned from the experience of the British in the 1920s, when modern Iraq was created—namely, that bringing in outside leaders would not work. People expressed views about the need to plan for a post-Saddam Iraq, about the potential for sectarian violence and the rise of militias, about the fact that the Shiites would want to rise politically. These were not minority views in the intelligence community, but the administration ended up listening to other voices. The focus was on invading Iraq and getting rid of Saddam, and after that everything would be fine and dandy.
3. You traveled to Guantanamo in 2002. Were you surprised by what you saw there?
..Even the command down there knew that probably one-third of the prisoners were neither terrorists nor jihadists, and wouldn't have been there if we weren't paying a bounty to Pakistani security forces for every Middle Eastern-looking person they handed over to us. Almost every detainee I spoke to claimed that we paid $5,000 per person...
4. What should the United States do in Iraq now?
I have come to believe that our presence is part of the problem and that we should begin to seriously devise an exit strategy. There's a civil war in Iraq and our presence is contributing to the violence. We've become a lightning rod—we're not restricting the violence, we're contributing to it. Iraq has galvanized jihadists; our presence is what is attracting them. We need to get out of there...
5. What is the likely political fallout from the Iraqi debacle and from the failures of the “war on terrorism”?
We've lost a generation of goodwill in the Muslim world. The President's democratization and reform program for the Middle East has all but disappeared, except for official rhetoric...
6. Is there an inherent threat to Western democracies from the Islamic world?
No, there's only a threat from those who use Islam for ideological reasons and who are willing to employ violence. There are 1.4 billion people in the Islamic world and only a tiny minority, maybe 2 or 3 percent, are politically active. Just like Jews and Christians, most have kids to raise and bills to pay. Most view Islam as a personal and societal force, not a political one, and only a tiny minority becomes terrorists. There are hundreds of political parties in the Muslim world, in Indonesia, Malaysia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Morocco, Yemen, Pakistan, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Those parties and their supporters have participated in many elections, and some times they have won and some times they have lost, but they have largely recognized the results. Not all are necessarily interested in creating Sharia societies. Even Hamas highlighted its opposition to Israel and service to society, not religious issues. Political Islam is not a threat—the threat is if people become disenchanted with the political process and democracy, and opt for violence. There is a real danger from a few terrorists and we should go after them, but the longer-term threat is that people opt out of the system. We need to not only speak out in favor of democracy and political reform, but also act on that as well.
7. And an extra question—Iran is another major conundrum for policymakers. How should the United States proceed in formulating an Iran policy?
The conflict in post-Saddam Iraq, the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah war, and the Shiite empowerment and revival across the region have clearly demonstrated Iran's standing as a regional power with influence beyond its borders. Whether we like it or not, we would do well to begin to explore creative ways to engage Iran and bring Iran and Shiite politics to the forefront of our policy in the region. For decades, the US has based its policy and interests in the greater Middle region on close relations with Sunni Arab, authoritarian regimes in the name of fighting Communism during the cold war and terrorism since 9/11. We coddled many of those regimes for the sake of regional stability and catered to their “fears” about the Shiites. Iran is a large country with a vibrant civil society, rich history and culture, and well-established political traditions. I think it would be detrimental to our long-term interests to ignore the Iranian reality and let ourselves be blinded by our dislike for the current president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Shiite revival is evident across the region, from Azerbaijan to Pakistan. We should go beyond the Sunni concerns about the “arc of Shiite revival” and devise ways to engage Shiite political, religious, and social leaders, including state and non-state actors. The growing influence of Hezbollah, and its leader Hasan Nasrallah, across the region and within the Sunni street, and the growing regional influence and reach of Iran, are two new realities that we should recognize and engage. Iran's nuclear issue is as much a failure of the nonproliferation approach as it is one of belligerence. Here too, I think, creative policies of engagement are called for and are possible.
http://www.harpers.org/sb-six-questions-emile-nakhleh-1158706094.htmlHere is an analyst and scholar of the region saying what Kerry has been saying all along. Kerry also brings expertise to his position on the mid east—his knowledge of the region, his foreign relations experience, his understanding of America's reliance on oil and need for energy independence, his experience in Vietnam, his prosecution of the BCCI case and his respect for people and cultures. Tweety just believes no one is paying attention!
|
Printer-friendly format
Email this thread to a friend
Bookmark this thread
(1000+ posts)
Send PM |
Profile |
Ignore
