John McCain, Oct 14, 1993 103rd Congress.
On his Amendment to withdraw toops from Somalia.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona is recognized for 10 minutes.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, this amendment authorizes no further funds for United States operations in Somalia , except those funds needed to support a prompt and orderly withdrawal of our forces from that country in a manner most consistent with the safety of United States personnel. Let us make it perfectly clear: `In a manner most consistent with the safety of U.S. personnel.'
Their withdrawal may take a month to accomplish, maybe 2. But it certainly will not take 6 months. There is no date certain in our amendment, but our amendment will not permit United States forces to do anything else in Somalia other than organize their withdrawal . This means no warlord hunting, no nation building, no law and order establishing, no other missions whatsoever that have not been authorized by Congress.
Mr. President, our mission in Somalia is over. It is time to come home. Our mission in Somalia was to feed a million starving Somali who needed to be fed. It was not an open-ended commitment. It was not a commission of nation building, not warlord hunting, or any of the other extraneous activities which we seem to have been engaged in.
I do not lightly impose on the foreign policy prerogatives of the President of the United States, but in this case I feel that Congress must. Is there a Member of this body who can tell me with any degree of confidence that the situation which ensues following the withdrawal of U.S. forces 6 months from now will be any less chaotic than the situation which may ensue following our withdrawal 1 or 2 or 3 months from now?
Will waiting until March 31 constitute anything more than 6 months of U.S. troops hunkering down in enclaves? Will Aideed or somebody else either lay low until we leave or start bringing Americans under mortar fire?
Mr. President, can anyone seriously argue that another 6 months of United States forces in harm's way means the difference between peace and prosperity in Somalia and war and starvation there? Is that very dim prospect worth one more American life? No, it is not.
If the President of the United States cannot say, `Here is what we are fighting for in Somalia , that more Americans may perish in service to the goals, and here is why it is worth that price,' then, Mr. President, we have no right--no right--to ask Americans to risk their lives in any further misadventures in Somalia .
The loss of American lives in combat is always a tragedy no matter how worthy or necessary the cause, but when those lives are lost to a mission which does not serve the national security interest of the United States, which has no firm or clearly
defined purpose, which has not been well planned or well explained to the American people, then the loss of those American lives is not only tragic, it is needless.
Sadly, these are the circumstances in which the United States finds itself today as it flounders about in Somalia in search of a reason to justify our presence there.
Mr. President, there will be people who take the floor tonight who will say that we did not utter a peep in the previous times, in the time of the tragedy that took place with the helicopter shot down and the tragic loss of American lives. I point out, Mr. President, that on August 2 I gave a speech to this body where I said:
Mr. President, I am calling today for President Clinton to come to the Congress and the American people and explain what our goals and strategy in Bosnia and Somalia are.
I went on to say:
I want to emphasize that Americans are not ready to watch people get massacred if they can prevent it. An open-ended military commission in the region, such as in Somalia , is something that the American people will not support.
I went on to say again, on August 7, basically the same thing. Mr. President, again, in September, on September 9.
There are some of us who saw this coming, Mr. President. It is very, very disheartening to note that we were right.
Mr. President, I want to talk about another circumstance, because there is a lot of talk about another Vietnam and another debacle in which the United States may find itself. I was a new Member of the other body in September of 1983 when a resolution was before the House of Representatives concerning approval of the United States' involvement in Lebanon. That resolution supporting the United States' sending of combat troops to Lebanon was overwhelmingly voted favorably by both Houses of Congress. At that time, I gave a very brief speech and I will quote from it again:
I have listened carefully to the explanations offered for our involvement in Lebanon. I do not find them convincing. The fundamental question is: What is the United States' interest in Lebanon? It is said we are there to keep the peace. I ask, what peace? It is said we are there to aid the government. I ask, what government? It is said we are there to stabilize the region. I ask, how can U.S. presence stabilize the region?
I went on to say:
What can we expect if we withdraw from Lebanon? The same as will happen if we stay. I acknowledge that the level of fighting will increase if we leave. I regretfully acknowledge that many innocent civilians will be hurt. But I firmly believe this will happen in any event. What about our allies and our worldwide prestige? We should consult with our allies and withdraw with them in concert, if possible--unilaterally, if necessary.
I also recognize that our prestige may suffer in the short term, but I am more concerned with our long-term national interests. I believe the circumstances of our original involvement have changed, and I know of four American families who share this view. I am not calling for an immediate withdrawal of our forces. What I desire is as rapid a withdrawal as possible. I believe the longer we stay, the more difficult it will be to leave. I am prepared to accept the consequences of our withdrawal .
I am prepared to accept the consequences of our withdrawal from Somalia , Mr. President. I think it might be well for us to recognize in this body the kind of danger that our American fighting men and women are in. They are in enclaves in Mogadishu. They do not control the roads and highways around them. We are at the whim of the now general leader Aideed--who we used to call fugitive outlaw Aideed a short time ago, when we had $25,000 bounty on his head. Now we are negotiating with him; we are at his whim.
If they choose to launch mortar rounds in the enclaves that our troops are in in Mogadishu tonight they can do so. I do not like to place the lives of young American men and women in that kind of a situation.
Military people tell me that they can be out in 1 or 2 months, that the orderly, safe withdrawal can be carried out in 1 or 2 months. Let us say for argument's sake that it would be the beginning of December or even the end of December.
Mr. President, I think Senators should ask themselves the following question when they vote on this amendment and the Byrd amendment: If the worst case scenario ensues, that sometime between the time we could have withdrawn and the March 31 date young Americans are wounded or killed, whose responsibility is it? Whose responsibility?
In conclusion, I would like to remind our President of the criteria for U.S. participation in U.N. missions which he outlined at the United Nations. He said the criteria for U.S. participation in U.N. missions was: Is there a real threat to international peace? Does the mission have a clear objective? Can an end point be had? And how much does the mission cost?
The President identified the end point. He, however, is unable to answer the questions which seemed so important just weeks ago. The President should match political rhetoric with action. By his own criteria, it is time for our troops to come home from Somali; not 6 months from now, but now.
We need not withdraw our forces so hastily that the withdrawal compromises the security of our troops. We may need to deploy additional forces in the period preceding withdrawal to protect the present force. We do not need to keep Americans in harm's way for 6 additional months in service to a mission which no one can rationalize as important to our security, or even explain in terms that can be understood by the American people.
Our mission in Somalia is completed. We fed the starving there. We undertook a humanitarian mission in Somalia . We achieved an honorable success.
Originally we did not have a national security interest involved in our Somalia policy. However, due to the poorly conceived, poorly explained and poorly implemented U.N.-U.S. policy of recent months, we eventually acquired one. His name was WO Michael Durant. Thankfully, Warrant Officer Durant is again a free man. With his freedom and the last compelling purpose to remain in Somalia resolved, let us now commence an orderly withdrawal from Somalia before we acquire any new national interests during our further misadventures there.