http://blogs.ft.com/economistsforum/2009/03/treasury-rewards-waiting/Judging from preliminary details, the US Treasury’s plan to rescue the financial system is a lot savvier about the relationship between financial markets and the macroeconomy than are the usual-suspects: critics from both left and right who are already pouncing on the Geithner plan.
Unlike the critics, the Treasury has absorbed the main lesson from the past 30 years of academic finance research: asset price movements mainly reflect changes in investors’ collective attitude toward risk.
Warning: this is a fairly technical discussion of risk, fear vs. greed, and how the market behaves.
Which brings us back to the Treasury’s plan. The details flow from an overarching view that the markets for the “toxic assets” that are corroding banks’ balance sheets have shut down in part because in those markets the degree of risk aversion has become not just problematic but pathological. The different parts of the plan reflect different approaches to trying to coax private investors back into the market by reducing their perceived degree of risk to levels that even a skittish risk-shy hedge fund manager might find tempting.
The government and the private investor would be partners in a Buffett-like arrangement in which the assets would be held long enough that the investors can expect to receive payments that have justified the waiting.
This motivation sounds suspiciously like some of the arguments for the ill-fated Paulson TARP plan from last autumn; but the problem with the Paulson plan was never fundamentally with the idea that there were
problems in the market for toxic assets, but with the idea that the right way to fix that problem (and everything else wrong with the economy!) was simply to have the government drastically overpay to buy up the toxic assets from whoever was foolish enough to have ended up holding them. (Maybe this is not really what Secretary Paulson had in mind, but it seems the most sensible interpretation). Instead, the new plan from the Treasury gives private investors (who know more than Treasury about the likely payoffs of these securities) the pivotal role in competing to set the prices of the securities, via a competitive auction process.
The private investors currently on the sidelines are not fools and have no incentive to lose money on the deal. In addition, there is no pretense now (as there was last autumn) that the resolution of the toxic assets problem is the sole remedy for our economic woes; it is part of a carefully conceived plan including the stimulus bill, the housing foreclosure mitigation plan, the TALF plan for reviving the market for securitised assets, the bank “stress tests” designed to triage the good banks, the salvageable banks, and the zombie banks; and a host of other measures designed to address other aspects of the crisis.
It ends:
When fuller details emerge, it would be useful if the economics profession and the financial community could have a mature conversation about whether the plan could be improved before it goes into operation. For example, it may be necessary to make any bank that participates agree to the sale of all their toxic assets, to prevent the kind of cherry picking that has contributed to the shutdown of these markets so far. And there is good reason to be very careful to minimize the possibility of “heads-I-win, tails-the-government-loses” kinds of bets.
But broad-brush denunciations are unhelpful, whether they derive from preconceived prejudices of the left (which needs to recognise the important distinction between the greedy people who got us here and the wise captains of finance who can help us get out), or the right (which espouses a destructive ideology according to which all government action of any kind is a mistake).
I feel like there are two arguments going on in this discussion threader:
1. Whether the plan will work
2. Whether there should be a plan
For me, it is inconceivable not to go forward with Bailout Hell. We do not have a choice. What is now a recession will turn into a depression if all of these financial institutions are allowed to fail. And I just feel like Krugman and friends are ideologically opposed to the plan, therefore being biased as to whether it will work or not. I like the above author's views, which is that academics and the finance people need to have a more mature conversation.
Krugman vs. Anti-Krugman is kind of interesting (Mass brought it up as a bizarre phenomenon that emerged on Sunday). I actually think it is not really about Krugman, the man, but more the ideologues vs. the pragmatists. I am on the pragmatist side. And seriously, it would be political suicide for Obama to drop health care reform. I have no doubt there are mealy mouthed Democratic Establishment types telling him he can't do it; but Obama is a pretty politically savvy guy. He will tell them where to go in a charming manner, I am sure.