Former Secretary McNamara dies at a ripe old age of 93

[TayTay]

and I agree with what http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/07/opinion/07herbert.html?_r=1&ref=opinion">Bob Herbert wrote in the New York Times today. These are harsh, but true words and I think they sum up my feelings on the death of this failed and deeply flawed man:

The hardest lesson for people in power to accept is that wars are unrelentingly hideous enterprises, that they butcher people without mercy and therefore should be undertaken only when absolutely necessary.

Kids who are sent off to war are forced to grow up too fast. They soon learn what real toughness is, and it has nothing to do with lousy bureaucrats and armchair warriors sacrificing the lives of the young for political considerations and hollow, flag-waving, risk-free expressions of patriotic fervor.

McNamara, it turns out, had realized early on that Vietnam was a lost cause, but he kept that crucial information close to his chest, like a gambler trying to bluff his way through a bad hand, as America continued to send tens of thousands to their doom. How in God’s name did he ever look at himself in a mirror?

Lessons learned from Vietnam? None.

These are still the things we have to think about in Iraq and Afghanistan. These are still the "fissures" that divide American thinking on foreign policy. I still wonder if we understand that we go to war not because we want to but because we have zero other choice.

I thought of Sen. Kerry's speech from April 2006 yesterday when I heard that Mr. McNamara had died. I thought once again of all those names on that Wall in DC. I wonder if the lessons can be learned. (Sorry, I could not help but think of the recent remarks of some in the US who wanted some sort of blustery and stupid response to the recent election in Iran. More idiotic and brainless gestures from those who should know that we can't go to war at will.)

I believed then, just as I believe now, that it is profoundly wrong to think that fighting for your country overseas and fighting for your country’s ideals at home are contradictory or even separate duties. They are, in fact, two sides of the very same patriotic coin. And that’s certainly what I felt when I came home from Vietnam convinced that our political leaders were waging war simply to avoid responsibility for the mistakes that doomed our mission in the first place. Indeed, one of the architects of the war, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, confessed in a recent book that he knew victory was no longer a possibility far earlier than 1971.

By then, it was clear to me that hundreds of thousands of soldiers, sailors, Marines and airmen—disproportionately poor and minority Americans—were being sent into the valley of the shadow of death for an illusion privately abandoned by the very men in Washington who kept sending them there. All the horrors of a jungle war against an invisible enemy indistinguishable from the people we were supposed to be protecting—all the questions associated with quietly sanctioned violence against entire villages and regions—all the confusion and frustration that came from defending a corrupt regime in Saigon that depended on Americans to do too much of the fighting—all that cried out for dissent, demanded truth, and could not be denied by easy slogans like “peace with honor”—or by the politics of fear and smear. It was time for the truth, and time for it all to end, and my only regret in joining the anti-war movement was that it took so long to succeed—for the truth to prevail, and for America to regain confidence in our own deepest values.

Rest in Peace Mr. McNamara. IF those 58,000 + names let you, that is.

[YvonneCa]

1. I love that speech. It framed, for me, what was wrong...

...about Iraq by looking at the unlearned lessons of the Viet Nam era. I've always been just incredulous that we (the country) didn't learn those lessons. Until Iraq, I really thought we had.

My feelings about the passing of McNamara are similar to yours. The only redeeming thing is he finally admitted his wrong.

[BlueIris]

2. Thanks for your thoughts about McNamara.

"Failed" and "deeply flawed" pretty much sum him up for me.

[beachmom]

3. Well said. I was wondering what JK must be thinking with the

passing of McNamara. He thought war was just another car company to manage. If anyone has missed it, check out the film "Fog of War" for more insights on him.

[TayTay]

4. I wonder as well

"The Best and the Brightest," were the ones who urged on the War in Vietnam. They also were the ones who simply could not admit that the War was lost and that all those people who died after a certain point died for a cause that had no true believers left.

I think about this all the time. The lessons of Vietnam were lessons we should have learned before we went into Iraq. I wonder about what we are doing in Iraq and Afghanistan. I still believe that the US can't win a war for the Afghanis or the Iraqis. That is one enduring lesson from that prior tragic conflict.

I also wonder if the new President stone-cold knows this. I wonder if he also has to confront his own "bean counters" or if he is truly listening to those who are telling him that he can do nothing more than set a few things in motion and then leave rest is to natives. I think the biggest lesson to be learned in the Presidency and all it's vast powers is one of humility and what you can't do and I wonder how soon this dawned on our new President. (Who I think is a good man, btw, and a just one.)

[wisteria]

5. I find it difficult to condemn a man who in later years regretted some of the decisions he had made

and apparently, had tried to force some changes while in office when he saw the devastation and death taking place in Vietnam.
I never felt he made the decisions he made in an uncaring and unfeeling way. He was appointed by JFK to the cabinet position of Secretary of Defense,a position that he had no background or direct qualifications to oversee and perhaps it was unfortunately the time spend learning while in office-at least in the beginning-that lead to some of the wrong decisions he made.

This is just my opinion and I don't want anyone to think I agree with some of his defense policies and his ideas on nuclear weapons. It is just there are two sides to every coin,and McNamara may not have been the villain he was made out to be.

"Although he loyally supported administration policy, McNamara gradually became skeptical about whether the war could be won by deploying more troops to South Vietnam and intensifying the bombing of North Vietnam. He traveled to Vietnam many times to study the situation firsthand. He became increasingly reluctant to approve the large force increments requested by the military commanders. The Tet offensive of early 1968, although a military defeat for the enemy, clearly indicated that the road ahead for both the United States and the South Vietnamese government was still long and hard. By this time McNamara had already submitted his resignation, chiefly because of his disillusionment with the war."


"His book, In Retrospect, published in 1995, presented an account and analysis of the Vietnam War that dwelt heavily on the mistakes to which he was a prime party and conveyed his strong sense of guilt and regret."




http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories/bios/mcnamara.htm

[MBS]

8. I'm with you

I always had the sense that people in power in that era -- McNamara, Johnson, etc-- realized pretty early on that we and they were screwed. .but for a whole raft of reasons, not all necessarily their fault, they felt unable to extricate us from the mess. (If you can remember how intense the opposition was to JK on this issue, not just at the time of his 1971 testimony, but also in 2004 and even beyond, just imagine what it would have been like in the 60's. They truly were getting hounded from all sides). I was strongly opposed to the Vietnam War, but I felt sorry for our leaders then, .. unlike Iraq, we were sucked into the war gradually-- kind of like a ratchet-- with each step, we got more and more stuck.. . so each administration inherited the mistakes of the last.

[karynnj]

9. Exactly

But, in a way, JK provided MacNamara with a chance to speak the truth. He could have backed Kerry's assertions - including the comment that was directed at him. "Where are the leaders?". It would have required a huge amount of courage to do so. It is good that he lived long enough to finally tell the truth.

[MBS]

10. oh, yes, McNamara did miss a chance there.

Not a Profile in Courage, for sure.(though, as I said, I could so clearly see the fix they were in. .) And, yes, good that he could finally speak and write the truth.

[wisteria]

11. He certainly did miss an opportunity. I wonder though if he might have thought to speak out would

have put the administration is a difficult and threatening position. People like Senator Kerry were need at that time, because they could speak sensibility and truth and put it all into perspective, saying what needed to be said and drawing attention to the horrors.

[TayTay]

12. We differ on this

Deaths in Vietnam by year

U.S. MILITARY CASUALTIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA -
- DEATHS BY CALENDAR YEAR -
1956-1964 --- 401
1965 --- 1,863
1966 --- 6,143
1967 --- 11,153
1968 --- 16,592
1969 --- 11,616
1970 --- 6,081
1971 --- 2,357
1972 --- 641
1973 --- 168
1974-1998 --- 1178

Secretary McNamara admitted in the film The Fog of War that the Gulf of Tonkin incident probably didn't happen. Here is a link to the clip from the film on that point: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HODxnUrFX6k">The Fog of War. The Gulf of Tonkin incident resulted in the Congress ceding it's power to declare war to President Johnson, unilaterally.

This is an entry from the http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_McNamara#Vietnam_War">wikipedia entry on McNamara:

In 1965, in response to stepped up military activity by the nationalist Viet Cong in South Vietnam and their North Vietnamese allies, the United States began bombing North Vietnam, deployed large military forces, and entered into combat in South Vietnam. McNamara's plan, supported by requests from top U.S. military commanders in Vietnam, led to the commitment of 485,000 troops by the end of 1967 and almost 535,000 by June 30, 1968. The casualty lists mounted as the number of troops and the intensity of fighting escalated. McNamara put in place a statistical strategy for victory in Vietnam. He concluded that there were a limited number of Viet Cong fighters in Vietnam and that a war of attrition would destroy them. He applied metrics (body counts) to determine how close to success his plan was.

Although he was a prime architect of the Vietnam War and repeatedly overruled the JCS on strategic matters, McNamara gradually became skeptical about whether the war could be won by deploying more troops to South Vietnam and intensifying the bombing of North Vietnam, a claim he would publish in a book years later. He also stated later that his support of the Vietnam war was given out of loyalty to administration policy. He traveled to Vietnam many times to study the situation firsthand and became increasingly reluctant to approve the large force increments requested by the military commanders.

From the Atlanta Journal Constitution article on McNamara's death:

“In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam” appeared in 1995. McNamara disclosed that by 1967 he had deep misgivings about Vietnam —- by then he had lost faith in America’s capacity to prevail over guerrillas who had driven the French from the same jungle countryside.

Despite those doubts, he had continued to express public confidence that the application of enough American firepower would cause the Communists to make peace. In that period, the number of U.S. casualties —- dead, missing and wounded —- went from 7,466 to over 100,000."

He had doubts in 1967. Go back and see the list of deaths in Vietnam after this man had doubts. I do hold him responsible for that. I do understand that it was difficult to express those doubts. However, that is why we honor the courageous who did speak up. They risked, "their lives, their fortunes and their sacred honor" to tell the truth and stop the needless and pointless deaths in this war.

[beachmom]

13. Well said, Tay. I mean, one can give him a point for admitting he was wrong later.

But seeing he has received tens of thousands of demerits for what he did wrong, his late "regret" doesn't count for much.

Edit: it reminds me of Clinton's "regrets" for allowing the Commodities Market not to be regulated. Hey, people's lives are being destroyed NOW, Bill. Too late. But here's a cookie for your saying you were "sorry".

[sandnsea]

6. I am so so glad he stayed in the Senate

It's been so long since we've had a functioning government, where legislation moves out of Congress and to the Executive, like it's supposed to. I constantly see his hand in the most important domestic and foreign policies, from Pakistan to health care. I hate to think what the Senate would look like without his steady and wise leadership.

[karynnj]

7. Another interesting NYT op-ed on MacNamara from the man who did Fog of War

HOW should we remember Robert McNamara? As an engaged public servant who participated in some of the most important decisions of the 20th century? A hawk who served as the chief architect of the war in Vietnam? A technocrat who never fully understood the moral implications of his policies? A hero who steadfastly worked to prevent the escalation of conventional war into thermonuclear conflict? All of the above?

http://morris.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/07/mcnamara-in-context/

It raises some interesting questions. It speaks of how JFK stood up to the joint chief of staff and other military people on using nuclear weapons - MacNamara held the same position as JFK. He suggests that with LBJ as President, MacNamara was the strongest person making that argument. It also says that MacNamara did not advocate for the escalation - LBJ wanted it. This is the most exculpatory way of looking at MacNamara.

The question, I guess, would be whether his NOT being there would have made a difference in terms of nuclear war and where his skepticism would have done more to end the Vietnam war. He appears to have had no effect within the administration on Vietnam, and as Secretary of Defense he was leading the war in a very aggressive way. To my knowledge, he never spoke of his concerns to the Congress. At that point could he have been more effective speaking out rather than implementing a war plan, that would kill millions of Vietnamese and thousands of Americans, when he knew it couldn't "work"? Both of these issues show the power and the impotence that a cabinet can have on issues. They have the President's ear, but the decision is completely the President's.

If he felt that his influence in cabinet meeting could be essential to prevent the use of nuclear weapons, could he have been caught in a spider's web created by his need to be loyal to his President and keep private his dissenting opinions? That does seem a hard choice to make as his replacement would more likely have been on the side of the military on this issue. Until the end of LBJ's term this excuse does carry some weight. But he failed to speak out in 1969, when he was not in the government. Not speaking out then as the war continued really has putting the politicians losing faith ahead of the need to do the right thing.