http://www.lexingtonbattlegreen1971.com/files/Cram,%20Bestor.pdf BC: I think we were having successful experiences in all of the things
that we were lining up for this particular demonstration, particularly with
all the different community organizations that we were in touch with, and
the kind of support that was being given to us, plus the aftermath of
Operation Dewey Canyon Three was a very positive aftermath. It had
placed the VVAW on a national map in a manner in which it was separated
from really the May Day demonstrations, and we were seen as a responsible group of ragtag soldiers. John Kerry had become a spokesperson overnight
in a way that had an eloquence that was quite different than the rest of the
peace movement.
INT: Was this is April, about that time?
BC: Right, when he spoke in front of Fulbright's Senate Armed Forces
Committee. It , I think, substantial credibility. We weren't walking
around with swelled heads, but we felt, well, if there's a time in which we
can get some things done and people are going to listen to us, now is the
time so we better keep on keeping on. But I don't recall us getting any
indications until a very late date that we had some problems. We began to
anticipate there were problems. We, in fact, recognized that we needed to
put together a bail fund. This was not something that we had initially
planned on, but we recognized that now, with the fact that there was not
complete understanding in terms of what it was we were going to do, and
what authorities thought we were going to do, and that there was a
discrepancy in terms of how we were going to conduct ourselves the way
we wanted to do it, and the way in which the authorities wanted us to. We
anticipated the potential of some kind of confrontation that would place
people's––not lives in jeopardy––but place ourselves in jeopardy in terms of
the law. I should say also, though, I had no idea actually how many
veterans were going to show up for this demonstration. I didn't know if we
were going to be 5 or were going to be 500. I think it turned out to be
more around 150 or so, if I…
INT: When you say we––those of us who felt responsible––do you
mean, yourself, John Kerry?
BC: John Kerry, Arthur Johnson, Christopher Gregory. I actually don't
remember all of the different people that were there, but there was a smallband of us who knew all the players, and had been involved in making the
arrangements, and had also kind of thought through at least some of the
ramifications of any action that we might take, recognizing that there were
a number of people that showed up there that certainly had no bail money
to get out, didn't have any idea what the ramifications of the legal action
could be, and we certainly felt the need to explain that, to have that out
front. And as I said, there was also this underlying tension of just events
that could get out of control, events where there's always a tinge of gun
shyness amongst a bunch of veterans who are still trying to get used to guns
not going off, are there standing in the dress of their war, carrying toy guns
that look very much like the real thing, and in a sense have put them in a
mind set that is very similar to the mind that they had when they were in
Vietnam.
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