It's difficult, but not impossible, for a public figure to get into court with a defamation suit. If successful, such legal action by Sandy Berger could get the same kind of discovery against ABC Paula Jones got against Bill Clinton in her sexual harassment action.
Carol Burnett won a $50,000 damage judgment (reduced from a $1.6 million jury award) from the National Enquirer because she proved they knowingly published an article falsely alleging she was drunk, argued loudly with Henry Kissinger at his table, and spilled a glass of wine on another patron. The 1983 Appeals Court decision in her favor (at
http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/communications/burnett.html ) spells out what Berger's lawyers would have to do, quickly, to get the ball rolling and preserve options for future legal action:
"CAROL BURNETT v. NATIONAL ENQUIRER, INC. Court of Appeals of California, Second Appellate District, July 18, 1983
Maintaining the item was entirely false and libelous, an attorney for Ms. Burnett, by telegram the same day and by letter one week later, demanded its correction or retraction "within the time and in the manner provided for in Section 48(a) of the Civil Code of the State of California," failing which suit would be brought by his client ..."
Despite repeated warnings from other media, from politicians, and from activists that a scene involving an actor portraying Sandy Berger never happened, ABC/Disney showed it anyway Sunday evening. Berger is portrayed as having refused to authorize the taking of bin-Laden by the CIA, who literally had him in their sights. Apparently, neither "event" ever happened, and ABC/Disney cannot argue they did not know the material was false and defamatory.
I'm not a lawyer, but these facts would seem to have the same legal elements as Burnett v National Enquirer.
Since 1967, apparently it has been even more difficult for public figures than for private figures to succeed in defamation lawsuits. The standard seems to be whether the defendant "knew or acted in reckless disregard of whether (its) words would be interpreted by the average reader as (false) statements of fact."
A crucial USSC decision seems to be Harte-Hanks (491 US 666):
"(T)he actual malice standard is not satisfied merely through a showing of ill will or 'malice' in the ordinary sense of the term. . . . Nor can the fact that the defendant published the defamatory material in order to increase its profits suffice to prove actual malice. . . . Actual malice, instead, requires at a minimum that the statements were made with a reckless disregard for the truth. And although the concept of 'reckless disregard' 'cannot be fully encompassed in one infallible definition,' we have made clear that the defendant must have made the false publication with a 'high degree of awareness of . . . probable falsity,' or must have 'entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.'"
This snippet comes from a recent (1999) restatement of the principles of libel law and its controlling cases (megabyte PDF at
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/coa/newopinions.nsf/72BFB353104C6BE288256BD60075C6AA/$file/0155443.pdf?openelement#search=%22libel%20%22reckless%20disregard%20for%20truth%22%20%22carol%20burnett%22%22 ).