Diebold rebuts Princeton study

[sabra]

http://newsblogs.chicagotribune.com/news_theswamp/2006/09/diebold_stands_.html#more

<snip>

In its press release, the company explained why, in its view, such manipulation would be impossible.

"The unit has security software that was two generations old, and to our knowledge, is not used anywhere in the country," said Dave Byrd, president of Diebold Election Systems in a written statement.

"Normal security procedures were ignored," said Byrd. "Numbered security tape, 18 enclosure screws and numbered security tags were destroyed or missing so that the researchers could get inside the unit. A virus was introduced to a machine that is never attached to a network.”


“By any standard - academic or common sense - the study is unrealistic and inaccurate,” he said.

“...Every voter in every local jurisdiction that uses the AccuVote-TS should feel secure knowing that their vote will count on Election Day,” is how Byrd ends his statement.

[proud2BlibKansan]

1. Well what a shock!

:sarcasm:

[FogerRox]

49. Learn about the smart card used in the princeton video

HERE:

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=203x449172

[waiting for hope]

2. Yeah, and Soylent Green

isn't people either...tell us another one you pukes.

[acmavm]

3. Then let the latest model be tested.

[Nikki Stone 1]

4. Exactly!

:kick:

[Lusted4]

37. Dave Byrd can personally drop the new unit off at Princeton himself. n/t

[helderheid]

41. RIGHT FUCKING ON. THAT needs to be the response. If this is

unrealistic, let's put the latest model in a "real time" scenario and let them try it.

[Land Shark]

51. And Velvet Revolution called their bluff on it, asking for truly ind. exam

Here's a copy of the press release, permission to reprint all (note last couple paragraphs)

Ilene Proctor PR [phone]
Washington, DC
September 14, 2006

ELECTIONS CAN BE STOLEN ON DIEBOLD VOTING MACHINES WITH A VIRUS

In May, Princeton University computer scientists obtained a Diebold system with cooperation of www.VelvetRevolution.us, an umbrella organization of more than 100 election integrity groups. For four months, scientists conducted a top secret analysis of the system’s hardware, software and firmware and have now issued an explosive report blasting the vote machines as unsecure and dangerous. Such an independent study has never been allowed by either Diebold or elections officials.

The study reveals that a computer virus can loaded into an electronic voting machine to flip votes for opposing candidates. According to the study, a vote for George Washington can be easily converted to a vote for Benedict Arnold, and neither the voter nor the election officials administering the election would ever know what happened. The virus could also be written to spread undetected from one machine to another. The study was released along with a videotape demonstration at http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/voting. Here are the main findings:
1. Malicious software running on a single voting machine can steal votes with little if any risk of detection. The malicious software can modify all of the records, audit logs, and counters kept by the voting machine, so that even careful forensic examination of these records will find nothing amiss.
2. Anyone who has physical access to a voting machine, or to a memory card that will later be inserted into a machine, can install said malicious software using a simple method that takes as little as one minute. In practice, poll workers and others often have unsupervised access to the machines.
3. AccuVote-TS machines are susceptible to voting-machine viruses — computer viruses that can spread malicious software automatically and invisibly from machine to machine during normal pre- and post-election activity.
4. While some of these problems can be eliminated by improving Diebold's software, others cannot be remedied without replacing the machines' hardware. Changes to election procedures would also be required to ensure security.
Yesterday, Diebold spokesman, Mark Radke, challenged the study asserting that their new Diebold machines are much more secure than the one tested by Princeton.

VR believes that none of the Diebold vote machines are secure and now challenges Diebold to back up its claim by providing each version of its voting machines to the Princeton team for a complete, unfettered, and independent analysis.

www.velvetrevolution.us

[helderheid]

58. excellent!

[dogday]

70. They needed to test a model from the 2004

election.. they did the right thing... we needed to know what these machines were capable of in 2004, not what the new ones are doing now, although they need to be tested as well....

[gkhouston]

5. um, don't these machines have internal modems?

or am I remembering a different box? Also, what's the actual difference between "generations"? Substantial or not? The same flaws (or worse ones) likely exist. I'm guessing that given time, those folks at Princeton could hack the new machine, too.

on edit: And of course, we're supposed to believe that no one anywhere in the country is using dated election equipment. :spray:

[dweller]

9. they do have a printer port

discussed in a DU thread recently. not sure about internal modems, i'd suspect they do.

dp

[TexasLawyer]

32. good points!

[Warpy]

6. HAHAHAHA!

Pretty lame rebuttal in the face of proof that is now being picked up all over the net and published here and there in the MSM.

[annabanana]

7. Hey Diebold!. . . . . .PROVE IT!

That's all I have to say to them. That's all I've EVER had to say to them..

[Lusted4]

38. Diebold should offer a million dollar prize

to anyone that can breach their system. Yeah that will happen.

[Lusted4]

39. Better yet Princeton should offer a million dollar prize

for any company that can bring them a voting machine they can't hack. Yeah thats the ticket.

[Jack Rabbit]

8. Philip Morris rebutted studies showing a smoking/cancer lingage

ExxonMobil bought off a few "scientists" to rebut global warming.

I'll take a look at the study and see if I can find flaws in it, but I won't take Wally O'Dell or his PR agents at their word.

I was a computer programmer for over 25 years and I will say this: Anybody who has ever received a passing grade in a programming course has the necessary skills to rig an election using those machines, especially where the software is regarded as the private property of the manufacturer and beyond public inspection.

In short, those things should not be used to count votes. They make election fraud way too easy. I don't need an academic study to tell me that.

[Justice Is Comin]

10. Wail 'til Pap gets a hold of them in a deposition.

[lonestarnot]

11. Just more spewing crap.

[Touchdown]

12. Why would there be a headphone jack on these?

The video says when the machine is accessed a musical tone plays, but it can be defeated by inserting headphones. WTF does a voting machine need with headphone jacks?:wtf:

[ret5hd]

17. the headphone jack is for the blind...

note: i am in NO WAY defending these crapulent machines, merely answering a question.

[Marr]

13. But- you don't understand! We put a piece of tape over the hatch, too!

[hunter]

14. Sure my vote will "count," but will it be counted CORRECTLY?

And who's dumb-ass idea was it to make a ballot box that fits in a pocket, with votes that nobody can see?

[magellan]

25. That's right. Says nothing about the central tabulator.

It doesn't matter how the votes get there or what shape they're in; once there, anything can happen.

[napi21]

43. That's been my theory all along. If there's manipulation done, it's

being done at a collection point! Why would ANYONE mess with several hundredor several thousandmachines when all they really needto do is ONE? I would love to actually see how the entire operation fits together. They keep saying there is NO LINK to the internet. Well, just how does the data get transmitted to the central tabulator? Carrier pigeon???

Does the data go from each polling site directly to the State tabulator, ordoes it go from the polling place to the District Hdq. and then to the State?

[magellan]

50. In answer, do you remember Volusia County (FL) right after Election '04?

I know the name Bev Harris is anathema, but the skullduggery she managed to uncover in Volusia explains a bit about how/where things are tabulated:

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=104x2704906

This thread too (which also shows why I don't trust optical scan machines any more than DREs -- they all tabulate the same way):

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=203x55178#55190

I believe this was never investigated; attention was centered on Ohio. But clearly there's plenty of opportunity for partisan election supervisors to interfere with tallies wherever these machines are, right down to the precinct level.

[hootinholler]

59. Funny you should mention carrier pigeon...

A Standard for the Transmission of IP Datagrams on Avian Carriers

Enjoy,
-Hoot

[mnhtnbb]

15. And by the way, we have a bridge we'd like you to see...

[Vidar]

16. Their "security software" consists of Blackwater thugs who won't

let anyone examine their cod.

[DaveJ]

18. open voting?

I know very little about this. Does Diebold reveal its source code and machine design? One would think they'd have to in order to show the public we have nothing to be concerned about. If not, why?

[tkmorris]

19. No they do not

The reason they give is essentially that it is proprietary hardware/software, which they need to keep secret to protect themselves from their competitors.

[DaveJ]

21. Uhh, that makes no sense....

:wtf:

First of all it takes no skill to design a program that simply counts votes. It hardly deserves to be considered a proprietary application. That kind of program would be too simple even for a Programming 101 assignment. Secondly if we know exactly how paper ballots work we should know how the computer programs work as well. That is utterly ridiculous. Just as stupid a millionaire airline engineers not making planes with secure cockpit doors.... nobody notices anything until it's too late.

Thanks for the info. Now I'm infuriated.

[high density]

20. Why don't they enumerate the reasons why this new version is better

Princeton gave us some nice facts and research while Diebold basically just says "wrong" with little explanation. Give the researchers an updated machine for crying out loud.

I'm a huge computer geek and I simply don't understand why we're trying to complicate a simple process like voting so much with these insecure machines. It's even more outrageous that a firm in the banking and security business would make such shitty voting machines and that idiot municipalities would actually buy them.

[DaveJ]

22. They sound like Republicans....

Just like typical Repukes who can't admit the possibility that they could be wrong. This company is not worthy of our nations trust.

[rasputin1952]

23. With this:

“...Every voter in every local jurisdiction that uses the AccuVote-TS should feel secure knowing that their vote will count on Election Day,' is how Byrd ends his statement."

The big question is still there, the votes may be counted, but are they counted honestly?

I don't think so. W/O a verifiable paper trail, no one can trust these machines.

[DaveJ]

24. absolutely not!

After having learned they keep their source code and electrical design a secret I know something must be going on. There is no reason not to reveal how these machines are designed.

Even without a paper trail I would be happy if the machine architecture were known. Third parties could analyze it for integrity.

Barring that -- who the f@#% decided that DieBold could be trusted with was is essentially they master key to Democracy? This is WAY messed up.


Edit: Sorry for being so repetitive. I'm just behind the knowledge curve on this and am just now becoming quite upset.

[rasputin1952]

26. Hagel, my senator from NE has a hand in Diebold...

Seems like a LOT of R's do.

The machines need to be taken out of the proprietary sphere and independently tested. There needs to be a paper trail w/a printed ballot that can be used for verification as well as a recount. You get a receipt from the store if you buy a pack of gum, why should a vote not be worth as much as gum?

[DaveJ]

28. Yeah

It would be simple. People vote on the computer, and get a receipt, then put their receipt in the 'recount box' that would be used in the event the race were contested.

If we do not have a way of knowing our votes count we might as well revolt because there no longer is any proof we're in a Democracy.

[Mayberry Machiavelli]

42. Agreed. That's my idea too. And it's BEYOND simple and obvious!!!

[Ms. Toad]

29. Hagel's connection is with ES&S, not Diebold

http://www.thehill.com/news/012903/hagel.aspx

[rasputin1952]

31. OOPS! my bad...Hagel has defended the electronic machines in

the past, but I can bear to be corrected...:) :hi:


As an aside though, how can anyone justify a defence of a paperless trail?

No one would by something and not get a receipt, nor would anyione make a bank transaction w/o one. Why this particular thing is an anomoly is precisely why people should be taking congresscritters to task. There is no excuse for this to be denied public scrutiny...it is just an indefensible position.

[Ms. Toad]

34. Paper trail is one thing...

Receipts, on the other hand, create the opportunity for vote buying/coercion because they provide a way to prove to the purchaser (or employer if keeping your job depends on it) that you voted a particular way.

[rasputin1952]

35. There does not need to be any identifying notations on the ballot...

just a paper w/the date the machine # and the votes as verified by the voter; dropped into a box for recount/verification purposes.

# of people voting=# of ballots in the box, tally the #'s and it is a verifiable election.

[Ms. Toad]

36. It's not the identifying notations

that create a problem with receipts. It is that receipts provide proof that one voted for a particular candidate (the votes as verified by the voter . . . for recount).

Either the paper deposited in the box needs to be the ballot itself (in which case there's no point in taking it away, since removing the paper from the polling place means it wasn't counted), or - if it is a backup only - it needs to be automatically deposited by the voting machine into the recount/verification box. Anything that is not the ballot itself but which can be used to prove what votes that were on the ballot and which can be taken away (like the purchase receipts, the example to which I was responding) makes vote buying possible. The risk that the number of ballots wouldn't be accurate wouldn't stop someone who is selling their vote (or being coerced to vote in a particular way) from taking a receipt if they can get their hands on it - and realistically, the election isn't going to be tossed just because the number of "receipts" is off.

That's my only point - receipts create the likelihood of more fraud, not less. A voter verified record which can be used for recount but which it is impossible to take from the polling place is a different beastie than a receipt.

[Mayberry Machiavelli]

44. That's what many of us are talking about, a ballot that drops into a box.

Voter doesn't take it with them. Maybe you inspect it to make sure you agree with what it says before it goes into box, but it stays with box for possible recount or challenge.

And really, some selection of these should be audited against the electronic tally anyway.

[Ms. Toad]

52. All I am suggesting is that using the word

"receipt," and comparing it to receipts such as ATM or store receipts are not helpful in regards to minimizing corruption - the common meaning or the word receipt (which both ATM and store receipts match) includes putting it physically putting it in the hands of the voter (and the voter walking away with it).

It is important to ask for what is needed. If we ask for and get receipts, they will be used for vote selling.

[napi21]

45. I understandthe Sequoia machinesoperate like you asked.

There's a paper ballot (sinilar to adding machine tape) that prints after you've cast your vote, that showsthe info, but it is under a sealed glass container. The voter verifies their info is right, and that piece of paper then drops into a sealed vote container.

Those are the only ones I've heard of that function that way.

[The Count]

53. ES&S and Diebold - owned by 2 brothers. Republicans.

Not hard to have a connection to both. Thay count 80% of the national vote today.

[Ms. Toad]

55. If we play fast and loose with the facts

people will ignore us because what we say can't be counted on to be accurate. They ignore us enough, anyway, I'd rather not give them any valid excuses to do so.

Hagel's well documented connection is with ES&S, not Diebold, and the poster to whom I responded acknowledged that was the connection being referred to.

[The Count]

71. "fast and lose"? Two brothers? Okey dokey.

I am sure they never speak to each other.

[Ms. Toad]

77. The comment to which I was responding was,

"my senator from NE has a hand in Diebold..." Regardless of how many times the brothers speak to each other, the brothers' relationship with each other does not necessarily create a relationship between Hagel and ES&S, and I have seen no evidence that Hagel has his hand in Diebold.

If you have anything more than speculation that the brothers talk to each other to link Hagel to Diebold, please share.

[lonestarnot]

46. Yes he does. You may be interested to read this.

http://www.commondreams.org/views04/0225-05.htm

[malaise]

60. So where are the old machines from the

2002 Georgia elections? Where are the memory cards? There must be a whistleblower somewhere.

[lonestarnot]

73. Probably burned like the Mexico ballots. No idea.

[Imagevision]

27. Why don't they produce a paper receipt and end the BS.

[Justice Is Comin]

33. I think there is supposed to be an important hearing scheduled

about that very thing. There was one a month or so ago on the problems with the e-voting machines and it was astounding, but two republicans who were main figures in the subcommittee sounded like democrats. Boehlert was one and I can't think of the other one.

They said we WILL have a hearing shortly on the need for a paper trail. Said there is no excuse for this.

[lonestarnot]

47. Because they can't win without stealing it!

http://www.commondreams.org/views04/0225-05.htm

[zreosumgame]

30. so they are admitting that the 'elections' 2 years ago WERE hacked?

but now we should just 'trust them' this time... um, no thanks...

[Up2Late]

40. Oh, I feel much better now! NOW GIVE ME A PAPER BALLOT!

Diebold Sucks! :mad:

[FogerRox]

48. which one of you people failed to recommend this post?

Pretty lame # of votes for the length of thread......

[The Count]

54. Trust me, the car has been barely used!

I'm so glad they said we should trust them!

[hootinholler]

56. A virus was introduced to a machine never connected to a network...

SO?!

Hey Mr. Recto-Cranio-Inversion, There is no requirement that a network be used to transmit a virus. In fact in the early days viri were much more effective when removable media were targeted, because networking was hard to get right and most people were using 'sneaker-net' where you carried a disk from machine to machine. Another reason this is bullshit is that the network is only the transmission medium, in fact, you don't even need wires to use network protocols for data transmission and most even modern viri rely on a user executing an infected file.

This is promulgating talking points and, as we say in the industry, "hand-waving" instead of fact. The paper's strategy would be very effective in distributing modified software to enough machines to make a difference in election outcome. More so if the virus was introduced during a primary to lie quiescient until the targeted election. It would likely never be noticed, because techs wouldn't be expecting or looking for it. If by chance an update memory card was infected, by upgrading an infected machine, the propagation would be into every machine serviced after that event.

Oh, you can bet your ass (pun intended) the study is valid work, realistic and possible. I read it eagerly, now if anyone has the source tarball for these things, PM me.

-Hoot

[helderheid]

57. EXCELLENT RESPONSE:

Diebold says:

"The unit has security software that was two generations old, and to our knowledge, is not used anywhere in the country."

Yet:

In March, 2005 the same severe Diebold security problems were discovered in Emery County, Utah by BlackBoxVoting and Bruce Funk that had been originally discovered in the late 1990's and in early 2003 by RABA Technologies in MD and by others previously. (See http://www.blackboxvoting.org/BBVtsxstudy.pdf)

Diebold advertised dozens of non-existant office locations in the white pages in dozens of states, and delivered a mixture of used and new voting machines to Utah for the price of new ones. (See pictures on http://UtahCountVotes.org)

Why should we believe Diebold now? Diebold could prove its claims are true by allowing independent thorough examination of its voting system to (not by The Election Center - an Association of Election Officials and Voting Machine Vendors that Linda Lamone of MD favors because it includes the same election insiders who pushed for unauditable paperless fundamentally flawed, highly hackable voting systems).

The Princeton team noted that even if Diebold fixes its software, it would still be vulnerable unless it also fixes its hardware.


Diebold says:

"Normal security procedures were ignored. Numbered security tape, 18 enclosure screws and numbered security tags were destroyed or missing so that the researchers could get inside the unit."

Yet:

Diebold voting machines do not use available common-sense security measures and did not even remove the development tools from its operating system, making its system less secure than an electronic toy.

Insiders are always the biggest threat to any voting system. Insiders include all Diebold staff and election officials and workers.

The Princeton team demonstrated that election stealing software can be inserted without ignoring any security procedures, by simply accessing a memory card prior to an election. Princeton even showed that a savy voter could possibly buy cards and vote multiple times.

To anyone observing an election, election rigging would look exactly like a normal election. (See the Princeton film http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/voting/)

Diebold says:

"A virus was introduced to a machine that is never attached to a network."

Yet:

The Princeton team did not network the machines and the virus can be transferred from one machine to another on a memory card, such as whenever the software is updated or when an election supervisor installs the election definition files, or if someone like a poll worker has one minute's access to the machine.


Diebold says:

"The current generation AccuVote-TS software - software that is used today on AccuVote-TS units in the United States - has the most advanced security features, including Advanced Encryption Standard 128 bit data encryption, Digitally Signed memory card data, Secure Socket Layer (SSL) data encryption for transmitted results, dynamic passwords, and more."

Yet:

Edward Felten, director of the Center for Information Technology Policy and professor of computer science at Princeton, claimed that the new safeguards still don't ensure security. "Just because they use a digital signature, just because they use encryption, that's a check-box approach that doesn't pass muster in any security analysis," he said. Felten also noted that encryption doesn't prevent an attack of the kind used in the study because the encryption key is present in the machine.

"The malicious software has the full run of the computer. It has access to everything."


Diebold says:

"In addition to this extensive security, the report all but ignores physical security and election procedures. Every local jurisdiction secures its voting machines - every voting machine, not just electronic machines. Electronic machines are secured with security tape and numbered security seals that would reveal any sign of tampering."

Yet:

Malicious software can be most easily installed during the normal course of storing, maintaining, updating, or conducting elections without raising any suspicion. It is virtually impossible to secure these machines using the security procedures in use today in election jurisdictions.

BlackBoxVoting, Princeton, and Avi Rubin, among others, have shown that Diebold's "security tape" is easy to tamper with, without leaving any noticeable evidence. New security tape is also available for purchase. Third, The security tape can be avoided altogether by removing a few screws. (See Avi Rubin's "day as a poll worker" http://avi-rubin.blogspot.com/2006/09/my-day-at-polls-maryland-primary-06.html)

Diebold says:

"Secure voting equipment, proper procedures and adequate testing assure an accurate voting process that has been confirmed through numerous, stringent accuracy tests and third party security analysis."

Yet:

Only persons uneducated in computer science would buy that logic. Diebold deliberately avoided having its modified operating system software federally tested. No amount of testing would assure a tamper-free election, as Princeton explained in its movie clip and is further explained in this testimony before the US Congress by DAVID WAGNER, PH.D. COMPUTER SCIENCE DIVISION UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY, SEPTEMBER 11, 2006 in Question #1 of Responses to "Questions for the Record Submitted by Chairman Ehlers and Chairman Boehlert..."
http://www.votetrustusa.org/pdfs/qfr-house06.pdf

Diebold says:

"Every voter in every local jurisdiction that uses the AccuVote-TS should feel secure knowing that their vote will count on Election Day."

Yet:

To secure the accuracy of election results we must to audit - manually count - voter verifiable paper ballot records associated with sufficient vote counts to give a 99% probability of detecting any outcome-altering vote miscount.

Banks, businesses, and churches are subjected to independent audits. Election outcomes determine who controls budgets in the millions to trillions of dollars, yet are not sufficiently audited in any state.

-------------------------

Kathy Dopp
http://electionarchive.org
The National Election Data Archive
Dedicated to accurately counting elections.

The National Election Data Archive will be publicly releasing a new mathematical method of calculating vote count audit amounts that will ensure election outcomes are accurate.

[mod mom]

62. excellent-did you post this on Huff Po as well? If not you should to...

combat their freeper element.

[helderheid]

66. how do I post there?

[wiggs]

65. Ohio Diebold rep "rebooted" before recount

As you say:

Diebold says:

"In addition to this extensive security, the report all but ignores physical security and election procedures. Every local jurisdiction secures its voting machines - every voting machine, not just electronic machines. Electronic machines are secured with security tape and numbered security seals that would reveal any sign of tampering."

Yet:

Malicious software can be most easily installed during the normal course of storing, maintaining, updating, or conducting elections without raising any suspicion. It is virtually impossible to secure these machines using the security procedures in use today in election jurisdictions.


What was it in Ohio where one worker noted that Diebold rep was making the rounds to precints to "reset" machines for the recount...the same guy who posted the recount "targets" for workers so that recounts could match the original?

[Ganja Ninja]

61. Totally missing the point.

It doesn't matter how much security you have. Manipulation is possible and you don't have any way to verify that it hasn't been done. I don't care what steps are taken to safeguard the machines. If you can't manually count the votes you have no way of knowing if the machine is giving an accurate reflection of the votes cast.

[dogday]

63. Come on, It is Freaking Princeton University

it is not a freaking community college.... This is an accredited higher learning institution....

[tenshi816]

64. "Every voter in every local jurisdiction

that uses the AccuVote-TS should feel secure knowing that their vote will count on Election Day."

Yeah, but he didn't say who the votes would count for.

[Trekologer]

67. Two things I have noticed:

1. Audible warning "muted" by use of headphones. This comes from Diebold building these things on the cheap and using basiclly off-the-shelf PC computer parts. The headphone jack is for blind individuals. The system should output warning tones or alarms for the operators though a seperate audio output device that is always used, no matter what.

2. The flimsy locks can be defeated by opening the case of the system. Higher-end computers have alarms that will either sound immediately or log when the case of the system was opened. I have even seen one configured such that the system will not boot again without a password being entered to reset the security system on the computer after the case is detected to be opened. From what I have seen these voting machines lack even that. Let's take a step back here... a friggin desktop computer used for spreadsheets has better physical security than a machine that is used to tally votes!!!

[helderheid]

68. why do they even have headphone jacks??

[lonestarnot]

74. for blind voters.

[helderheid]

75. Oh DUHHH. Color me stupid.

[lonestarnot]

76. NOT

:hug:

[stepnw1f]

69. Phillip Morris Rebutted Too... Nice Try Assholes!

You are BUSTED! I hope your stocks plumett...

[Ganja Ninja]

72. The fact that they keep resisting providing a verifiable and ...

un-refutable way of checking the accuracy of these machines pretty much tells you they're rigged.