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Edited on Thu Jan-11-07 07:31 PM by necso
Certes! and we've paid a heavy price (in resources wasted, alternate courses denied, etc) waiting for the well-intentioned (and sundry) to come to a realization that was apparent to some from the very beginning.
Moreover, the time to put out a fire is when it's just starting -- not when it's raging wild. And at some point you must basically just let a wildfire burn itself out -- while protecting those things that can still be saved, by containment, point-protection, diversion, backfires, or whatever else can be made to work (but especially using proven methods, not risky unproven ones that promise "miracles").
Smokescreen aside, w's simply spinning out the same basic-course, re-emphasizing themes that had traction before and throwing out new ones that test-market well, in hopes that the opposition (whoever this is) to his will (whatever this is) will crack -- or that the problem will go away -- or be dumped in someone else's hands, who can be blamed for w's failures.
Open-minded*, perceptive* and adaptable* (etc), w is not. But these are fundaments of survival and prosperity (thriving): more precisely, ie, survival (prosperity) of the group in the long term, if not always of the individual in the short term (although this is often the case). So it is that w (arrogant, elitist) errs, and we the (humble) people pay, and will continue to pay, the price.
*: All three of these things entail being receptive (the last (directly) in the sense of receptive to change), although sometimes I make some implicit thing explicit (and do the like) in order to highlight this otherwise-hidden (implicit) something.
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Disarming Sectarian Militias
It's easy to talk of disarming sectarian (etc) militias in Iraq as though these armed bodies are some anomaly.
But they aren't.
Rather these militias are an expression of a warlord/tribal/(sub)sectarian (etc) culture. And even were these militias to be disarmed or destroyed, this would not change people's loyalties from these groups to the larger entity of the country, state and people. And without this, it's all just window dressing -- or the triumph of one group (or allied groups) over the others. (Indeed, the people who might have put country, state and people first (more so, anyway) have, in no small part, been driven out of the country -- or disempowered -- or driven into a counterproductive, violent course, for which there's no hope.)
(And it rather looks like we are backing people who will fracture Iraq -- and effectively hand a large portion over to Iran (and Syria?). But, of course, the neocons "plan" to "deal with" this by "taking out" both of these states.)
Moreover, the militias are never going to be completely disarmed (in extremis, they will lay low or "incorporate" into "security forces") -- and, in practice, only certain groups will be targeted (to varying degrees) to the exclusion (or near exclusion) of others. And so talking about "disarming militias" is just cover for what we're really up to (going after certain groups, not others). (And good cover it is.)
More generally, it seems at times that what is hoped-for is that the Iraqis will change their culture. But culture is a big part of de-facto character (as-in-act, as-exists, character), and culture can be nearly as difficult to change as more-basal character is (the latter being basically impossible to change, without altering the brain). And trying to change culture by force is not only (generally) a necessarily costly-and-brutal process, but this "change" often doesn't outlast the occupiers (except in trivial matters).
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Several interesting data-points (accuracy?) have popped up in recent days.
For example, apparently two brigades from northern Iraq (one from each of two main Kurdish parties/militias?) and one brigade from the south (SCIRI, Badr Brigades?) are being moved into Baghdad in order to attack the Mahdi Army. (While other brigades (largely-Shia?) are used against the Sunnis there.) This speaks to the unwillingness (incapacity) of other Army brigades to carry out this (Mahdi) attack. And it also speaks to the willingness of certain political factions (militias) to go after former allies (if only nominal allies; still it's an important threshold). (In effect, we are supporting Shia sectarian-"cleansing" of the Sunni (arabs) on the one hand -- while supporting faction fighting among the Kurds and Shia on the other. Can we get any stupider?)
The recent heavy force used against "insurgent" Sunnis in Baghdad inclines one to believe that heavy force will be used in operations against the Mahdi Army and others (eg, to minimize US casualties).
It will be interesting to see if provincial elections are held before or after(!) new Baghdad operations. (Provincial elections might give more power to al-Sadr, thereby further legitimizing him.) (I've been in favor of devolving power to the provinces (not to regions), as this has better potential to mitigate the concentration of power.)
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A few words on virtues and context.
Virtues have context (as does basically everything), and ripping some virtue from its context, trumpeting it as something of itself (to the exclusion, even negation, of its partner virtues), and then using this tactic to argue for some stupidity betrays the very concept of the virtue: polluting the ether with misused, debased words -- and murdering the very meaning of the virtue through substanceless posturing and contrary actions. Hypocrisy is bad enough, but debasing and destroying the concept of virtue is criminal.
For example, patience is effectively a valueless concept without it's partner (predecessor) values of timing, perspective, understanding and judgement (etc). These partner (predecessor) values give necessary form, flow, context and timing to the practice of patience. And without them, it's a shell, a plaything for fools and morons -- and a weapon for the use of self-servers, hypocrites and manipulators.
To illustrate, one is not patient with some hopeless, futile, costly, avoidable stupidity.
....And that would be where courage (etc) comes in (back in).
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