:hi:
for my journal
Thanks The Straight Story
Top Secret Document made public - 33 communications about 9/11attack
(Moderator please note - this is not a thread about 9/11 mihop/lihop, it is about our government, in general, not being able to function and work together and talks about more than 9/11 - but since it is mentioned-and is a focus of the document-I wanted to mention it. This is a clear case of how poorly our government has run under bush regime and more grounds for impeachment - if you feel this is better off in 9/11 group then please move, but I wanted to stress this more than 9/11 here)
2. Finding: During the spring and summer of 2001, the Intelligence Community
experienced a significant increase in information indicating that Bin Ladin and al-
Qa’ida intended to strike against U.S. interests in the very near future.
Discussion: The National Security Agency (NSA), for example, reported at least
33 communications indicating a possible, imminent terrorist attack in 2001. Senior U.S.
Government officials were advised by the Intelligence Community on June 28 and July
10, 2001, that the attacks were expected, among other things, to “have dramatic
consequences on governments or cause major casualties” and that “ttack preparations
have been made. Attack will occur with little or no warning.”
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4. Finding: From at least 1994, and continuing into the summer of 2001, the
Intelligence Community received information indicating that terrorists were
contemplating, among other means of attack, the use of aircraft as weapons. This
information did not stimulate any specific Intelligence Community assessment of, or
collective U.S. Government reaction to, this form of threat.
Discussion: the information often sketchy, the Inquiry confirmed that the Intelligence Community did
receive intelligence reporting concerning the potential use of aircraft as weapons. For
example, the Community received information in 1998 about a Bin Ladin operation that
would involve flying an explosive- laden aircraft into a U.S. airport and, in summer 2001,
about a plot to bomb a U.S. embassy from an airplane or crash an airplane into it. The
FBI and CIA were also aware that convicted terrorist Abdul Hakim Murad and several
others had discussed the possibility of crashing an airplane into CIA Headquarters as part
apparently not all, of these reports were disseminated within the Intelligence Community
and to other agencies].
The Transportation Security Administration, for example, advised the Committees
that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had not received three of these reports,
that two others were received by the FAA but through State Department cables, and that
one report was received by the FAA, but only after September 11, 2001. Many
policymakers and U.S. Government officials apparently remained unaware of this kind of
potential threat and the Intelligence Community did not produce any specific assessments
of the likelihood that terrorists would in fact use airplanes as weapons. For example,
former National Security Advisor Sandy Berger testified before these Committees that:
I don’t recall being presented with any specific threat information about an
attack of this nature or any alert
highlighting this threat or indicating it was any more likely than any other.
That testimony is consistent with the views publicly expressed by the current
National Security Advisor, Condoleeza Rice, shortly after the September 11 attacks.
Similarly, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz testified that he
had not been made aware of this type of potential threat:
I don’t recall any warning of the possibility of a mass casualty attack using
civilian airliners or any information that would have led us to contemplate
the possibility of our shooting down a civilian airliner.
Even within the Intelligence Community, the possibility of using aircraft as
weapons was apparently not widely known. At the FBI, for instance, the FBI Phoenix
field office agent who wrote the so-called “Phoenix memo” testified that he was aware of
the plot to crash a plane into CIA Headquarters, but not the other reports of terrorist
groups considering the use of aircraft as weapons. The Chief of the Radical
Fundamentalist Unit in the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division also confirmed, in an Joint
Inquiry interview, that he was not aware of such reports.
5. Finding: Although relevant information that is significant in retrospect regarding
the attacks was available to the Intelligence Community prior to September 11,
2001, the Community too often failed to focus on that information and consider and
appreciate its collective significance in terms of a probable terrorist attack. Neither
did the Intelligence Community demonstrate sufficient initiative in coming to grips
with the new transnational threats. Some significant pieces of information in the
vast stream of data being collected were overlooked, some were not recognized as
potentially significant at the time and therefore not disseminated, and some
required additional action on the part of foreign governments before a direct
connection to the hijackers could have been established. For all those reasons, the
Intelligence Community failed to capitalize fully on available, and potentially
important, information. The sub-findings below identify each category of this
information.
of “the Bojinka Plot” in the Philippines, discussed later in this report.
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/pdf/part1.pdfBasically speaking as I read over this I see how inept our government has (and is) being run.
Things like this:
Despite having all this information, and despite the republication of CTC
guidance regarding watchlisting procedures in December 1999 (see Appendix, “CTC
Watchlisting Guidance – December 1999”), CIA did not add the names of these two
individuals to the State Department, INS, and U.S. Customs Service watchlists that are
used to deny individuals entry into the United States.
WTF is wrong with our intelligence community?