http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/060410/10interior.htmFor three years, the U.S. has tried to build Iraq's police force. Why it's still a mess
By Kevin Whitelaw
4/10/06
Inside a low-slung bunker in a quiet residential neighborhood in Baghdad, Falah al-Naqib was holding court in his temporary office. It was July 2004, and Iraq's new interior minister was briefing a team of U.S. civilian advisers on his plan to jump-start Iraq's moribund police force. A former Sunni opposition leader, Naqib wanted to bring back intact Iraqi Army units, which mirrored Iraq's ethnic and sectarian makeup, to form a new police commando force that could tackle an alarming spike in violence.
Within a few weeks, the first recruits were training, even though they lacked uniforms--and in some cases, shoes. When Matt Sherman, a U.S. adviser, first saw the unit, he was impressed by its tight discipline and high morale. The commandos soon received support from the U.S. military and gained respect from other Iraqis after battling insurgents in several cities. "They literally were the most effective
fighting force," says Sherman. "What was great about it was that the Iraqis were doing it on their own."
Deadly raids. The glow has long since faded. Today, the bunker where this brief success story was conceived is better known as the site of an illegal detention center apparently run by a renegade force within the Interior Ministry. The reputation of the police force now lies in tatters, amid accusations of human-rights violations and other police abuses. And many Sunnis have come to distrust the commandos, now called the National Police, while the ministry is widely believed by Iraqis to be riddled with hard-line Shiite militias that have free rein to pursue their own, often violent, agendas. Suspicion has only grown in the past two weeks after a string of deadly raids on Baghdad businesses by gunmen dressed in Iraqi commando uniforms.