The GAO report indicates that it took 18 months after the requirement for kits was realized to get kits in the field. Even at that, fuel tankers still won't be protected until 2007. Blames DOD, Rumsfeld, lack of oversite, etc. If this was a business, the stock holders would have them all fired. Add this to the pile of other botched efforts like Katrina, 9/11, etc. and still reasonable and otherwise intelligent people on the right defend this administration.
Splat
http://www.sftt.org/main.cfm?actionId=globalShowStaticContent&screenKey=cmpIntel&htmlId=5316•The Army did not fully capitalize on approved operational requirements for truck armor that were established in 1996. The 1996 requirements were similar to those developed in 2003 in response to experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, addressing similar threats for most of the same types of trucks. Generally, official requirements such as these lead to the development and production of new systems to address the specified required capabilities. Production of armor kits based on the 1996 requirements may have increased the availability of truck armor for current operations in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East.
•The Army’s award of contracts to armor contractors for amounts less than the total requirement caused production schedules to be longer than they might have otherwise been. Instead of awarding contracts in a way that maximized production rates, the Army awarded contracts in amounts less than the total requirement because requirements increased due to operational conditions and the Army received its allocation of funding from DOD at less than the total requirement. Funding was not always available to award contracts at the time requirements were identified, but neither DOD nor Army officials could explain or document why increased funding was not provided earlier or how funding decisions were made. In April 2005, we reported that insufficient and delayed funding also contributed to critical wartime shortages of armored vehicle track shoes, lithium batteries, and tires, and that we could not determine why sufficient funding was not provided earlier because adequate documentation of funding requests was not available. Without formal documentation and communication of urgent wartime funding requirements and the disposition of funding decisions, the rationale for funding decisions and the officials and organizations accountable for making those decisions may not be subject to effective oversight by Congress or the Secretary of Defense.
•Material shortages impacted the availability of Army truck armor. For example, production levels for several Army kits were constrained, in part, by shortages of material and components such as steel and door handles. Further, competition between the Army and Marine Corps for limited contractors and materials exacerbated problems with limited availability of materials.
•Limited installation rates affected the Army’s ability to install armor kits onto tankers. The rotation of fuel trucks into the maintenance area as they returned from missions paced the installation of armor. In addition, unique requirements to coat the tankers with a protective chemical limited the numbers of armor installation sites available for armor installation due to the need for controlled environmental conditions. As a result, the total length of time to field tanker armor was stretched out over a longer period.
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