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Edited on Sat Nov-29-08 03:15 AM by liberalpragmatist
I figured DU'ers who aren't familiar with South Asia might appreciate a brief rundown of the political history of South Asia. My profile is this: Indian-American and Hindu. I consider myself proudly Indian and proudly Hindu, though a cultural sense (like secular Jews). I'm also very interested in Indian history. One of Hinduism's best tenets is the belief in universalism -- I believe very firmly in tolerance and the essential goodness of the vast majority of human beings. Hence I strongly recoil from simplistic attempts to label any group enemies, something that needs to be stressed in this kind of Islamophobic climate.
In any event, here goes:
The Creation of Pakistan
Prior to 1947, under British rule, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh were all under British administration. 3/5 of the subcontinent was ruled directly by the British and divided into various provinces (Punjab, Sindh, Northwest Frontier, United Provinces, Central Provinces, Bengal, Assam, Madras, Bombay, etc.). The other 2/5 of the subcontinent were ruled indirectly through various Indian princes whose ancestors had cut deals with the British.
Pakistan arose due to the agitation of the Muslim League, lead by Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Jinnah had been an Indian Nationalist at one point, but he came to embrace the "Two Nation Theory" -- the idea that Hindus and Muslims constituted two separate nations within India and required equal political representation. People still debate whether Jinnah's actions were merely opportunistic or heartfelt (you can often tell who's Pakistani and whose Indian based on their assessments). Nevertheless, I won't delve into Jinnah's motivations. What IS true is that for a significant body of Muslims, there was fear that their religious rights would be curtailed under Hindu-majority rule.
Hindu nationalists also came to embrace the Two Nation Theory, and activists from the Hindu Mahasabha Party promoted the idea that Islam and Hinduism were incompatible; though some opposed the partition of India, they weren't all that upset by the outcome -- an overwhelmingly "Hindu" India.
The Muslim League was actually dominated by landowners who largely came from what is now Northern India. The demand for Pakistan was not particularly widespread prior to 1946 (a year before independence). In fact, the areas that currently MAKE UP Pakistan were largely resistant to the idea -- in those provinces, Muslims constituted a majority, so the local Muslims didn't really feel any sense of oppression. The Northwest Frontier Province -- the Pashtun region that is now the source of most of the terrorism -- was actually dominated by the secular Indian National Congress and their provincial leader, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, was a close disciple of Gandhi who vehemently rejected the idea of partition. The Punjab was ruled by a regionalist party that also eschewed partition.
Part of the Muslim League's rise to power actually came in response to WWII. The Indian National Congress, which was secular but Hindu-dominated, had been running a devolved government under British rule. They opposed Britain's declaring war on behalf of India, however, and boycotted the government and were arrested. Since the Muslim League had supported Britain's war efforts, the Brits put the Muslim League in charge of the Indian Administration -- the move vastly increased their visibility and gave them crucial space. In the previous elections, after all, the Muslim League had actually vastly underpolled the Congress and numerous regional parties.
When the war ended and the Congress members were released, the Muslim League's new power allowed it to agitate more strenuously for Pakistan. Due to their increased visibility, the call for Pakistan this time began to resonate, especially once communal violence broke out in several Indian cities.
In the 1946 election, the Muslim League vote surged, and the League swept the races for the Muslim seats (the British had divided seats in the Indian proto-parliament along religious lines -- Muslims could only vote for Muslim candidates, Hindus for Hindu candidates). At this stage, the demand for Pakistan remained quite vague, and there's reason to believe that Jinnah was actually agitating for a pan-Indian Confederation with Pakistan as a component unit. (After all, much of the Muslim League's core support came OUTSIDE the areas that would become Pakistan -- a completely independent Pakistan would leave those people outside its jurisdiction unless they moved.)
This was actually proposed in 1946 as a power-sharing deal (the 1946 Cabinet Mission Plan). The Muslim League actually accepted it -- however, the Indian National Congress, after initially accepting it, changed their minds and turned it down. Basically, at this point, the Congress had little desire to compromise with the Muslim League, especially when they felt they could obtain unchallenged political power in a slightly smaller India.
Partition came extremely rapidly. The demand had seen very little public support just two years earlier, yet in June of 1947, amidst rising communal tensions and following severe riots in major cities, the Brits -- who were hell bent on getting out -- announced that in two months they would leave and that the country would be divided. The borders weren't even announced until the day AFTER independence. They were drawn by a civil servant from England who had never been to India and never would.
Few on either side expected partition to be particularly traumatic. The expectation from both the Muslim League and the INC was that most Hindus and Sikhs in Pakistan would stay in Pakistan and most Muslims in India would stay in India. Jinnah himself never sold his Indian property. The expectation was that BOTH states would be secular (as Jinnah himself desired).
Yet as soon as independence for both countries was declared, there was mass chaos. The British refused to enforce order, arguing their mandate had expired. As cities devolved into massive killing zones, millions of Hindus and Muslims abruptly fled -- many with almost no planning, having anticipated staying in their homes until just days earlier. 10-20 million people crossed the borders in those days, and millions were killed in an undeclared civil war.
The Partition permanently poisoned relationships between India and Pakistan thereafter. It radicalized an entire generation on both sides to think of "the other" as a would-be killer.
The Kashmir Dispute
The Kashmir Conflict is fairly complicated. At the time of partition, Kashmir as a princely state -- the princely states were not subject to the British and were technically independent when the British ended their administration. The princely states were theoretically free to join either India or Pakistan or remain independent. Except for Kashmir, however, all the others either joined India or Pakistan (based on the wishes of the local population) or were forced to join either India or Pakistan by force.
Kashmir was an interesting place. It had a multethnic and multireligious character, but had an overall Muslim majority of about 65%. Nevertheless, it was ruled by a Hindu king. The chief political party -- the democratic opposition to the Maharajah -- was the National Conference, a Muslim political party based in the Kashmiri valley (the region of the state where the bulk of the state's Muslims lived).
At the time of the partition, the general sentiment in Kashmir from both the king and most of the Kashmiris (at least among residents of the Valley) was for Kashmir to remain independent. Both India and Pakistan coveted the region, however. Pakistan coveted it because it was a Muslim-majority region and India coveted it for strategic reasons and more sentimental ones: the family of Nehru, India's first Prime Minister, was Kashmiri in origin.
When, months after independence, Kashmir had yet to accede to either state, Pakistan sent tribal elements to invade and jumpstart what they hoped would be a pro-Pakistan uprising. Things did not quite turn out that way. The tribal warriors would up getting diverted and preoccupied themselves with looting, which gave the Maharajah enough time to ask for Indian assistance to repel the invaders. India consented on the condition that the Maharajah accede to India.
At the time, the evidence actually indicates that most Kashmiris supported the decision to accede to India. Though the king was hated, Sheikh Abdullah, the popular leader of the National Conference had openly denounced the partition of India and was a close friend of Nehru. India troops were welcomed by the local population, who also feted Gandhi when he had visited earlier. India managed to turn back the Pakistani irregular forces, but only pushed them back until they were left with about one-third of the state -- these were mainly tribal regions in the north where India had little popular support. Nehru called for a cease-fire and went to the UN, who asked that both states withdraw and hold a plebescite.
Both sides ignored that call. India simply admitted Kashmir as a state, albeit one with a special autonomous status -- Kashmir was to be largely self-governing, with its own flag and constitution (something other Indian states don't have), and it would have the right to nullify federal laws. Furthermore, Kashmir could set its own immigration policies (to prevent large-scale Hindu transfers into Kashmir).
For the next ten years, there were no protests against Indian rule in Kashmir. However, the central government began to violate the terms of Kashmir's accession, stripping the state slowly of its autonomy. When Sheikh Abdullah protested and publicly flirted with the idea of independence, India responded by throwing him in jail on charges of sedition, which lead to the first large-scale protests against Indian rule.
Over the next several decades, successive Indian governments, attempting to stifle rising separatist sentiment, would jail Kashmiri politicians and blatantly rig elections in order to promote friendly politicians. The modern troubles date to 1988, when the brutal suppression of protests following another rigged election lead to sustained militancy.
Thereafter, Pakistan's intelligence services essentially grabbed onto Kashmir as a proxy conflict. They began funding anti-India groups that quickly took on a deeply fundamentalist bent. (The movement had started out largely Muslim but secular.) This was ironic, since Kashmir had historically been one of the most tolerant places in India -- the local Muslim customs were highly universalist and the Sufi saints were honored jointly by Hindus AND Muslims in Kashmir. The Islamicization of the Kashmir conflict lead to attacks on local Hindus and their large-scale emigration to other parts of India.
These days, most of the militants in Kashmir are foreign fighters. That isn't to say Kashmiris themselves are any happier with the situation -- most of them still desire independence. Independence is complicated by the fact that its opposed by the Hindu minority and by majorities in the regions of the state abutting the Kashmir valley. The Jammu region of the state is majority-Hindu and would like to remain part of India - Jammu lies to the south of the Kashmir Valley and the Valley is economically-dependent on Jammu. To the east of the Valley are the regions of Kargil and Ladakh, which have a mixed Muslim/Buddhist population -- that region too wants to stay part of India but can only be accessed through the Kashmir Valley.
Moreover, India fears that independence in Kashmir would lead to a small, unstable state on its northern border and that it would threaten India's unity, since India is a multiethnic, multireligious country with several dozens of languages and other non-Hindu majority states. (Indian Punjab has a Sikh majority and several tribal states in the Northeast have Christian majorities.)
Pakistan and Islamic Militancy
Pakistan entered independence in a very weak state. India had obtained most of the civic infrastructure and the bulk of the British-Indian military. Moreover, the Indian National Congress had more developed plans for government. The Muslim League had mainly been a pressure group for agitating for Pakistan -- once that demand was granted, the party had little in the way of a policy platform.
Moreover, the state was a geographic monstrosity, consisting of two wings -- East Pakistan and West Pakistan -- that were separated by nearly 2000 miles of Indian territory. Culturally, the Bengalis of East Pakistan and the Punjabis, Pashtuns, Sindhis, and Urdu-speakers of West Pakistan were completely different. There was nothing in common between them except for their Islamic faith. (Imagine creating a "Catholic" nation that consisted only of Spain and Poland -- that's what Pakistan was like at birth.)
Jinnah's hope was to create a secular homeland for Muslims on the subcontinent -- in theory, the closest analogue would actually be Israel. (It was for this reason that the Indian National Congress opposed the division of Palestine or the creation of Israel, viewing it as the exact same principle.)
Yet that distinction between a homeland for Muslims and a Muslim state was lost on many. Certainly, the more politicized members of the Muslim clerical establishment saw Pakistan as an endorsement of an Islamic state.
Jinnah may have been able to prevent that from happening, but he died very shortly after independence. His successor, the like-minded secularist Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated in 1950 under mysterious circumstances.
The result is that Pakistan drifted for nearly a decade without a formal constitution, being governed under an amended form of the Government of India Act of 1937. No elections were held and the civilian president, Ghulam Muhammad, basically ruled as a civilian-autocrat until the army stepped in and placed Gen. Ayub Khan in power in the late 1950s.
The country drifted in and out of military rule for the next several decades. In 1971, the country split apart, with Pakistan's eastern wing, the province of East Bengal, becoming the independent state of Bangladesh in an extremely bloody civil war that saw Indian intervention.
In 1977, the civilian Prime Minister Zulfiker Bhutto was overthrown by Gen. Zia ul-Haq, who was responsible for the large-scale Islamicization of Pakistan. Although Pakistan had trappings of Islamic rule up till that point, it had largely been secular and most Pakistani law was British in origin.
Zia used Islam as a tool to justify his rule and curry favor with the conservative clerics. He also became a key U.S. Cold War ally and both the Carter and Reagan Administrations showered his regime with arms and funding in order to arm the Afghan Mujihadeen who were fighting the Soviets. It was Zia who also began funding militant groups in both Indian Punjab (Sikh separatists) and Kashmir.
He also put in place sharia law in civil cases and cracked down harshly on the Ahmadiyyas, a heterodox Muslim sect. Zia died in a mysterious plane crash in 1988, but the legacy of his rule is the rise of radical political Islam in Pakistan, something which had barely existed prior to his patronage.
Throughout the 1990s, Pakistan was ruled by weak and corrupt civilian leaders -- Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. The country's economy was entirely stagnant during this period and Islamic political parties began to exercise a great deal of political power through brute force -- though they still didn't win many votes, they became expert agitators.
After Sharif was overthrown by Musharraf in 1999, Musharraf again, like Zia, used religious parties as cover for his policies. Though, post-9/11, he pledged to withdraw financing and funding of terror groups operating in Kashmir and Afghanistan, this didn't happen, whether by intent or design -- much of the Pakistan security and military establishment is essentially rogue.
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In the end, this has wound up FAR longer than I anticipated. I expect this will drop like a rock, but I'm posting it anyway. I hope at least a few of you find this informative.
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