Republican Stimulus Opposition Explained via Game Theory

[Christa]

So, regarding support for Obama (and his plan):

* If they support him and he succeeds, they fail.
* If they oppose him and he succeeds, they fail.
* If they support him and he fails, they fail.
* But if they oppose him and he fails, they succeed.

Opposing him violently and hoping he fails is simply the only scenario where they can win, and lo and behold–that’s precisely what they’re doing.



http://dmiessler.com/blog/republican-stimulus-opposition-explained-via-game-theory-image

[GoesTo11]

1. They're completely transparent.

[mwb970]

2. Despite republican leader Limbaugh's girth, you can see right through him. /nt

[BadgerKid]

3. GOP thinking and The Far Side

[glitch]

5. lol! K & R nt

[Jackpine Radical]

4. You remind me of my use of the Prisoners" Dilemma game

to analyze the actions of the new Democratic Congress in 2006 (at least as I HOPED they were playing it). From my journal:

http://journals.democraticunderground.com/?az=archives&j=2023&page=3

Game Theory and Hardline Congresscritters: The Dems are Right
Posted by Jackpine Radical in General Discussion (01/01/06 through 01/22/2007)
Tue Jan 02nd 2007, 10:50 AM
There seem to be a number of people who deplore the Dems’ tough new stance in Congress, not cutting the Puggies in on power and generally proposing to treat them the way they treated us in the last three Congresses. Well, those critics are wrong and the Dems are doing exactly the right thing. The best way to explain why this is so is to diverge for a moment into a gamelike situation called The Prisoner’s Dilemma that has been the object of much study by social psychologists and other game theorists.

Here is the “classic” form of the game as described in Wikipedia:

Two suspects, A and B, are arrested by the police. The police have insufficient evidence for a conviction, and, having separated both prisoners, visit each of them to offer the same deal: if one testifies for the prosecution against the other and the other remains silent, the betrayer goes free and the silent accomplice receives the full 10-year sentence. If both stay silent, both prisoners are sentenced to only six months in jail for a minor charge. If each betrays the other, each receives a two-year sentence. Each prisoner must make the choice of whether to betray the other or to remain silent. However, neither prisoner knows for sure what choice the other prisoner will make. So this dilemma poses the question: How should the prisoners act?

In this game, the winning strategy is to betray your opponent. That way you either go free (if your opponent makes the mistake of “playing nice” and not betraying you) or get 2 years if he is as unscrupulous as you. You always avoid the 10-year sentence.

However, the game changes entirely when the game is repeated over and over again. In this instance, the winning strategy is to “play nice” the first time and then, on the second iteration, you do whatever your opponent did to you on the first. If he “played nice” too, then you “play nice” again. If he betrayed you, then you betray him. On all subsequent iterations you keep repeating the same pattern, doing whatever your opponent did to you on the previous round.

The Puggies played it last time as if it were a single-shot game. That will turn out to be a bad mistake. The winning strategy for the Dems is to play it as the continuing game that it is. That means that they must go hard on the Puggies this time. That’s what they’re doing.

Bravo.