Here's part of the story about the Hunt brothers and the effort to corner the market in silver, although I have not done any research to make sure everything in the story is true. You'll note similarities in what the Hunt brothers did to today's grim economic situation, and you'll realize how thoroughly they understood our economy.
Lamar Hunt, one of the brothers, became owner of the Kansas City Chiefs. He and Dick Cheney were very close, and if you google you'll read of how the two friends watched a Chiefs game together in 2004, when Cheney came to Kansas City for a most profitable fundraiser prior to the Kerry/Bush Presidential election.
Now just because Lamar Hunt and his kin failed in their attempt to corner the silver market, don't think he stopped there and never tried anything nefarious again. No, I imagine he and his kin and cronies learned many new ways to manipulate the markets and ... pedal their influence. That's just my own opinion, ya understand, based on lots of facts, some knowledge of stock markets and how easily they can be manipulated, followed by connecting lots of dots.
Then there's a supposed Lamar Hunt connection to the Kennedy Assassination, and I've read he's mentioned in the Warren report. Lamar Hunt died in December 2006.
The plot sickens and thickens, doesn't it. And there's nothing that can or will be done about it. I also imagine, if certain people tried to bring everything out into the light, they would meet with an accident. Or their family would.
Here's the Lamar Hunt story, part 1.
http://articles.wallstraits.net/articles/1298HUNT BROS CORNER SILVER MARKET
The story of what would become known as Silver Thursday began in the early 1970s. The principal players would be Bunker, Herbert, and Lamar Hunt, sons of the legendary oil wildcatter H. L. Hunt.
The senior Hunt was a fervent apostle of extreme right-wing views, believing that Calvin Coolidge had been the last good President and that succeeding administrations had left the country "susceptible to Communism." For a time, H. L. Hunt was possibly the richest man in America. Like many wildcatters, H. L. was an inveterate gambler, a trait his sons seemed to inherit. They also inherited his political opinions, viewing modern democratic governments as "welfare states" that would ineluctably debase the currency (that is, create inflation).
Believing that only "hard" assets provided protection against government-induced inflation, the Hunt brothers took an interest in silver, which they were convinced was cheap relative to the other traditional metallic standard of value, gold. By the mid-1970s they were confirmed "silver bugs." Believing in an almost messianic vision of an inflationary Armageddon, they were not interested in playing the silver market merely to capture moderate profits from small swings in the price, like most silver traders. They had far bigger objectives in mind. Backed by an inherited fortune variously estimated to have been between US$6 billion and $14 billion, the Hunts entered the silver market like rampaging bulls in the proverbial china shop.
While the Hunts to this day deny it, most observers believe that the brothers' objective was to "corner" the market in silver. The effect of such a corner would be to squeeze the many commercial interests and other speculators who would in the normal course of business have sold silver short. Once the Hunts controlled the available supply of the metal, they could then force the "shorts" to come to them to buy back the metal they were short, at prices set by the Hunts.
The commodities futures markets provided an excellent vehicle for the Hunts' mechinations. A "futures contract" is simply a transaction entered into by a buyer and a seller that will be consummated ("settled") at a specified date in the future. On that date, the seller is obligated to deliver to the buyer a stipulated amount of the commodity in question, unless the seller has reversed his position in the futures market by buying back a like contract for delivery on the same date.
--snip --
The Hunts poured their billions into silver. By January 1980, the Commodity Futures Trading Corporation (the regulatory body supervising the commodities markets) became alarmed, estimating that the Hunts and their allies controlled contracts for 77% of all the privately held silver in the world. The regulators increased margin requirements, but this only made matters worse; the shorts were forced to come up with tens of millions of dollars to meet their obligations under the new rules. Silver prices spurted higher, incredibly breaking through $50 per ounce on January 21, 1980, up from about $9 per ounce only six months earlier.
Finally the regulators and the commodities exchanges took draconian action to forestall disaster. Rules were imposed arbitrarily to prevent further buying of silver by the Hunts or anyone other than legitimate industrial users and shorts who were buying back silver they had previously sold. The Hunts were trapped; they could not buy, and there was no one to sell to.
By March 1980, silver had declined to the point where the Hunts, despite having inherited a multibillion-dollar fortune, actually began to run short of money. In addition to their huge hoard of silver, they had accumulated large stockholdings in such companies as Columbia Pictures, Global Marine, First National Bank of Chicago, and the brokerage firm through which they directed much of their business, Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields. As the price of silver fell (along with the prices of many of their stockholdings), they were continually required to put up more margin. They had exhausted much of their available credit, and the very high interest rates prevailing in early 1980 made their existing credit lines extremely expensive.
On March 14 they were hit with a body blow from an unexpected source. The Federal Reserve took another step in its efforts to squeeze out the inflationary forces the Hunts feared. A policy of "special credit restraint" was announced, under which member banks were advised in no uncertain terms to cease providing loans to finance speculative activity.
Technially this program was voluntary, but few banks were prepared to openly resist it. It was generally assumed that the Fed was specifically targeting the Hunts; whatever the case, the effect of the new policy on the brothers was devastating. They could expect to borrow no more money from U.S. banks to meet future margin requirements.
The price of silver continued to slide, and the Hunts, for the first time, found themselves unable to meet their margin calls. Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields put up some of the money for them, but even this additional margin was quickly consumed by falling prices. Worse still, Bache itself was now placed in a precarious finanical position. Even though the Hunt brothers still possessed substantial assets that were not encumbered by loans, those assets were illiquid and could not be sold easily to raise cash. Because of Federal Reserve policy, banks would not lend to them. The day of reckoning had finally arrived. Herbert Hunt offered a sobering assessment of what would occur if silver continued to plummet. He said simply, "All the Hunt family will be washed out. We will go broke."
The panic spread to the stock market, where rumors flew that Bache and several other firms connected with the Hunts' commodity speculation, including Merrill Lynch, might fail. Unable to raise enough money by selling silver, Bache dumped blocks of stock the Hunts had also posted as collateral for their loans, exacerbating the stock market drop. On March 27, dubbed Silver Thursday (reminiscent of Black Tuesday in 1929), the stock market decline degenerated into a rout.
Then suddenly the market reversed itself. Much as had occurred in 1962 at the bottom of the May "crash," a stunning rally in stock prices erased most of the day's losses. There was no news or action by any government or private entity that could explain the abrupt reversal. In coming years, critics of the "efficient market" hypothesis would cite examples of unexplained volatility such as this as proof that the stock market was not truly efficient.
The silver market also stabilized, enabling Bache to unload some of the metal it had taken from the Hunts as collateral for loans. In the short term, disaster was averted, but it had been a very near thing. Bache and several smaller dealers had barely survived.
To be continued...
Posted on 24 Oct 2005.