|
It seems to me that at the operational level in Nigeria and Amsterdam, it wasn't necessarily that a program was incapable of providing detection, but rather that the implementation of that program was defeated by a loss of vigilance. "Sleeping," bought off, or decieved watchmen have been a security vulnerability since humans began guarding things.
The failure of US Intelligence agencies to heighten vigilance in those places with a warning based on available, but unnoticed patterns in intelligence, certainly is a contributing factor. But, it's not an excuse for the concommitant lack of vigilance that occurred.
Imperfect implementation of a security measures is built into security planning and it is why there are multiple layers to air transportation security (visa control, watchlists, no-fly lists, profiling/behavioral screening at transportation hubs, physical inspections, chemical screening, directives to not accept items for transport from strangers, on-board vigilance of flight crews/air marshalls/passengers). The effect of multiple layers of security is that the joint probabilities of the combined security measures generate very low probabilities of successful attacks.
That said, no system is ever going to be able to protect against all attacks all the time.
To me, less than 100% protection doesn't seem like a necessarily valid reason to abandon a reasonable protective system. Any adopted system must be expected to provide an acceptable level of protection relative to all costs (including impositions on liberty). What constitutes an acceptable cost/effectiveness ratio will vary among individuals depending upon how each person percieves different types of threat. I'll expect and pay for bomb/chemical sniffing dogs at transportation hubs, but I don't want to pay for that protection at the small town hardware store I shop, and where some of residents of the county apparently buy chemicals for their meth labs.
|