Krugman on Bernake:
Where am I? Right now, I’m agonizing — which isn’t a place I ever expected to be, and not just because Bernanke hired me at Princeton.
The pro case is obvious: Ben Bernanke is a great economist, whose work on monetary economics has been a crucial guide to action in this crisis, and he applied his academic insights forcefully in 2008 and early 2009, helping pull the world back from the brink.
Against that are two factors. One is that he completely failed to see the trouble building as the housing bubble inflated — and no, it wasn’t one of those things nobody could have predicted, since a lot of reputable economists were warning almost frantically about the bubble. True, Bernanke’s failure to see what was right in front of his nose was shared by almost everyone at the Fed — but as I’ll explain in a moment, that’s actually part of the problem.
The second is that since the acute phase of the crisis came to an end, and especially since his renomination, Bernanke has seemed out of touch with the severe problems that remain. He hasn’t engaged in any self-criticism, at a time when we really need to know that policymakers can learn from their mistakes. He hasn’t been a strong voice for financial reform. And most important from my point of view, he has seemed deeply worried about defending himself against the inflation hawks, not at all concerned with the question of whether the Fed is doing all it should to fight catastrophically high unemployment. (It isn’t).
As I see it, the two things that worry me about Bernanke stem from the same cause: to a greater degree than I had hoped, he has been assimilated by the banking Borg. In 2005, respectable central bankers dismissed worries about a housing bubble, ignoring the evidence; in the winter of 2009-2010, respectable central bankers are worried about nonexistent inflation rather than actually existing unemployment. And Bernanke, alas, has become too much of a respectable central banker.
That said, however, what is the alternative? Calculated Risk says we can do better. But can we, really?
It’s not that hard to think of people who have the intellectual chops for the job of Fed chair but aren’t fully part of the Borg. But it’s very hard to think of people with those qualities who have any chance of actually being confirmed, or of carrying the FOMC with them even if named as chairman (which is one reason why this suggestion is crazy). Does it make sense to deny Bernanke reappointment simply in order to appoint someone who would follow the same policies?
And yet, the Fed really needs to be shaken out of its complacency.
As I said, I’m agonizing.
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/23/the-bernanke-conundrum/#more-6825