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Edited on Fri Mar-26-10 11:45 PM by paulsby
The per curiam majority opinion overturned the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute, overruled Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), and articulated a new test — the "imminent lawless action" test — for judging so-called seditious speech under the First Amendment:
“ …Whitney has been thoroughly discredited by later decisions. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, at 507 (1951). These later decisions have fashioned the principle that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. ”
The three distinct elements of this test (intent, imminence, and likelihood) have distinct precedential lineages. Judge Learned Hand was possibly the first judge to advocate the intent standard, in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), reasoning that "f one stops short of urging upon others that it is their duty or their interest to resist the law, it seems to me one should not be held to have attempted to cause its violation." The Brandenburg intent standard is more speech-protective than Hand's formulation, which contained no temporal element.
The imminence element was a departure from earlier rulings. In Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), the Court had adopted a "clear and present danger" test that Whitney v. California had expanded to a bad tendency test: if speech has a "tendency" to cause sedition or lawlessness, it may constitutionally be prohibited. Dennis v. United States, a case dealing with prosecution of alleged Communists under the Smith Act for advocating the overthrow of the government, used the clear and present danger test while still upholding the defendants' convictions for acts that could not possibly have led to a speedy overthrow of the government. Brandenburg did not explicitly overrule the bad tendency test, but it appears that after "Brandenburg" the test is de facto overruled. "Brandenburg" also made the time element of the clear and present danger test more defined and more rigorous.
Interestingly, the per curiam opinion cited to Dennis v. United States as though it were good law and amenable to the result reached in Brandenburg. In point of fact, Brandenburg essentially eviscerated Dennis's central holding and held that "mere advocacy" of any doctrine, including one that assumed the necessity of violence or law violation, was per se protected speech. It may be that principles of stare decisis figured in the Court's decision to avoid overruling the relatively recent Dennis, but the distance between the two cases' approach is obvious and irreconcilable.
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